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i 
Abstract 
The thesis examines if the recent legal developments on assisted death in England and 
Wales have addressed the needs of society and the concerns of those seeking an assisted 
death. Despite assisted suicide being a crime in England and Wales, many British 
citizens successfully obtain an assisted suicide by travelling abroad. With the help of 
loved ones, they patronise right-to-die organisations in jurisdictions with more 
permissive laws on suicide. Meanwhile, the prosecution of those who assist a suicide is 
subject to an uncertain discretion of the DPP, whose prosecuting policy effectively 
decriminalises ‘compassionate assisted suicides’. Inconsistencies in the law on assisted 
death between the legal prohibition of assisted suicide, and legally permitted end-of-life 
medical decisions will also be examined. Whilst assisted death is a crime, physicians are 
legally permitted to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients. The 
extent to which a patient’s ‘quality of life’ has been a factor in these inconsistent 
decisions will be analysed. The thesis will show that the present prohibition against 
assisted suicide in England and Wales is legally and morally indefensible. Whilst 
investigating whether assisted suicide should be legalised in England and Wales, the 
thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of six jurisdictions from around the world. It 
also evaluates the ‘slippery slope’ argument, i.e. whether a law permitting assisted death 
for a restricted group of people would inevitably lead to assisted death being practised 
beyond that group. The thesis will conclude that there is a strong case for providing the 
legal option of physician-assisted suicide to patients experiencing a poor and 
unacceptable quality of life due to unbearable pain and suffering brought about by 
terminal illness. 
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Chapter 1: Overview, Purpose and Research Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
The thesis examines the law on assisted death in England and Wales. Assisted death has 
recently been the subject of much debate in England and Wales, in response to which 
this thesis proposes law reform. Within this thesis, ‘assisted death’ collectively refers to 
both assisted suicide and euthanasia. Assisted suicide refers to the act of assisting 
another to commit suicide at their request. The person requesting assistance performs 
the act causing death. Euthanasia, on the other hand, refers to the termination by one 
person of another person’s life to put an end to pain and suffering (sometimes referred 
to as ‘mercy killing’). Both assisted suicide and euthanasia are unlawful in England and 
Wales. Assisted suicide is prohibited by section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 
(‘SA 1961’).1 As euthanasia is not specifically addressed by the law, it is prohibited 
through application of the law of murder. Although the main focus of this thesis is on 
assisted suicide, it addresses related issues on euthanasia. 
Calls for assisted death in England and Wales to be legalised have recently been brought 
into sharp focus for three main reasons. First, whilst assisted suicide is a crime if 
committed in England and Wales, it remains open to those British citizens who are able 
to travel abroad and seek assistance at ‘right-to-die’ organisations, such as Dignitas in 
Switzerland.2 Secondly, section 2(4) of the SA 1961 provides that no prosecution shall 
be instituted for the offence of assisted suicide except with the consent of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’).3 This requirement of a ‘consent to prosecute’ from the 
DPP suggests that at least some instances of assisted suicide are not regarded as 
culpable. Thirdly, wide publicity given to the case of Tony Nicklinson has commanded 
extensive public attention.  
The case of Tony Nicklinson is briefly discussed below. It is the most recent 
‘right-to-die’ case to highlight the plight of British citizens who competently decide that 
                                                          
1 The Suicide Act 1961 sub-s 2(1) (as amended in 2009) provides that a person commits an offence if they do an act 
‘capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person’, and that act ‘was intended to 
encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide’. 
2 See section 1.2.1 for ‘suicide tourism’. 
3 See section 1.2.2 for ‘the DPP’s consent’. 
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they do not wish to continue living, and who thus seek an assisted death in England and 
Wales. 
1.1.1 The case of Tony Nicklinson 
Tony Nicklinson’s ‘right-to-die’ case went further than previous high profile 
‘right-to-die’ cases that centered around assisted suicide.4 Nicklinson had suffered a 
stroke which left him with a condition known as ‘locked-in’ syndrome. As he was 
almost completely paralysed from the neck down, he was incapable of taking his own 
life even with assistance. Nicklinson was dependent on others to end his life for him 
through an act of euthanasia. He was capable of travelling to Dignitas with his wife’s 
help. However, euthanasia is illegal in Switzerland, and thus not performed at Dignitas. 
Nicklinson’s desire to end his life accordingly led him to challenge the current law in 
England and Wales on assisted suicide and euthanasia. He argued that it was illogical, 
harsh and hypocritical for the law to prohibit such practices when it does not prohibit 
suicide and allows patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment.5 In 2012, Nicklinson 
requested that the law on homicide be changed so that a physician could lawfully 
administer him with a lethal injection and yet remain immune from prosecution on the 
grounds of ‘necessity’. He sought a declaration that the common law defence of 
necessity6 should be made available against both a charge of murder in the case of 
voluntary euthanasia,7 and against a charge of assisted suicide under section 2(1) of the 
SA 1961.8  
Nicklinson was unsuccessful in his application. Lord Justice Toulson held that:  
A decision by the court to alter the common law so as to create a defence to 
murder in the case of active voluntary euthanasia would be to introduce a 
major change in an area where there are strongly held conflicting views, 
                                                          
4 The cases of Diane Pretty, Debbie Purdy and Daniel James, discussed in ch 2. 
5 A Garwood-Gowers, ‘A Right to Die? The Tony Nicklinson case’ The Times (London, 28 June 2012). See ch 2 for 
the legality of the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. 
6 See Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961, discussed in ch 2. 
7 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ is where euthanasia is performed on an individual, upon the individual’s expressed wishes. 
8 Nicklinson also sought a declaration that the current law of murder and/or of assisted suicide is incompatible with 
his right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in so far as it 
criminalises voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. This issue was rejected by the court, as it had been dealt 
with in great detail by the House of Lords in Purdy. R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 
[18],[148]. 
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where Parliament has rejected attempts to introduce such a change, and 
where the result would be to create uncertainty rather than certainty…it is 
hard to imagine that Parliament would legalise any form of euthanasia 
without a surrounding framework regarding end of life care and without 
procedural safeguards…It is not for the court to decide whether the law 
about assisted dying should be changed and, if so, what safeguards should 
be put in place. Under our system of government these are matters for 
Parliament to decide, representing society as a whole, after Parliamentary 
scrutiny, and not for the court on the facts of an individual case or cases.9  
In a concurring judgment, Mr Justice Royce held:  
Some will say the Judges must step in to change the law.…But the short 
answer is that to do so here would be to usurp the function of 
Parliament…Any change would need the most carefully structured 
safeguards which only Parliament can deliver…These are matters which 
must be adjudicated upon by Parliament and not Judges or the DPP as 
unelected officers of state.10  
Nicklinson refused food and medical treatment after failing in his application to the 
High Court. He died of pneumonia a week after the High Court ruling.11 
The judges in Tony Nicklinson’s case echoed Lord Goff’s earlier judgment from 1994 
in Bland’s case:  
Euthanasia is not lawful at common law. It is of course well known that 
there are many responsible members of our society who believe that 
euthanasia should be made lawful; but that result could, I believe, only be 
achieved by legislation which expresses the democratic will that so 
fundamental a change should be made in our law, and can, if enacted, 
                                                          
9 ibid [84],[85],and[150]. 
10 ibid [151]. This is merely an outline of the judicial review of Nicklinson’s case in the High Court. As will be 
discussed in ch 2, Nicklinson’s wife’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. See Court of Appeal judgment in 
Nicklinson, Lamb and Martin’s joint appeal: R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA 961.  
11 S Boseley, ‘Tony Nicklinson dies after losing “right to die” legal battle’ The Guardian (London,22 August 2012). 
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ensure that such legalised killing can only be carried out subject to 
appropriate supervision and control.12  
As the main focus of this thesis is on assisted suicide, it will not resolve cases like Tony 
Nicklinson’s.13 It will, however, address issues similar to those which pertain to 
euthanasia. There have recently been several campaigns in England and Wales for a 
change in the law on assisted death, all of which have fuelled debate on whether 
competent individuals should be lawfully assisted to die. The following section will 
explain the problem that this thesis aims to address by highlighting three principal 
sources of controversy in this debate. 
1.2 The problem to be addressed 
1.2.1 The first source of controversy: suicide tourism 
The first source of controversy in the debate on the legalisation of assisted death is that 
while assisted suicide is a crime in England and Wales, there frequently occurs what has 
been euphemistically referred to as ‘suicide tourism’.14 Today, many British citizens 
wanting to end their lives are taking advantage of the relatively liberal suicide laws of 
Switzerland. Assisted suicide is not only lawful in Switzerland, but is also available to 
non-Swiss nationals.15 The Swiss ‘right-to-die’ organisation Dignitas, which assists 
people to commit suicide, is currently the most popular destination for these so-called 
‘suicide tourists’.16 As at February 2013, figures published by Dignitas17 showed that 
                                                          
12 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (Bland’s case), at 865, discussed in detail in chs 2 and 4.  
13 In cases such as Nicklinson’s, patients have been known to resort to refusing food and fluids, thus dying of 
starvation or dehydration or other complications in order to achieve death. See G Saunders, ‘Letters: My partner Meg 
Taylor’s unassisted dying’ The Guardian (London,17 July 2013). 
14 B Falconer, ‘Death Becomes Him’ Atlantic Monthly (Washington, March 2010) 68, 70. 
15 MA Branthwaite, ‘Should patients be able to choose physician-assisted suicide at the end of their lives?’ (2006)7 
Lancet Oncology 602. 
16 See statistics of assisted suicide deaths at Dignitas at ‘Accompanied suicide of members of Dignitas, by year and 
by country of residency 1998-2012’ (Dignitas,2013) <www.dignitas.ch/images/stories/pdf/statistik-ftb-jahr-wohnsitz-
1998-2012.pdf> accessed 31 July 2013. 
17 ‘Statistics’ page of Dignitas website <www.dignitas.ch/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32 
&Itemid=72&lang=en> accessed 4 February 2013. 
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approximately 215 British citizens had been helped to end their lives since 1998.18 The 
figures also showed that Dignitas had 821 members from Britain at the end of 2012.19 
British subjects who have ended their lives at Dignitas have had a wide range of 
medical conditions. Cases range from the terminally ill with cancer or motor neurone 
disease, to those with non-fatal conditions like progressive multiple sclerosis and spinal 
cord injuries. As observed by Seale in 2010, ‘one in five [requesting assisted suicide in 
Dignitas] has no fatal condition but rather, for example, arthritis, osteoporosis, ‘general 
weakness’, blindness, or mental disorders, usually depression’.20 In September 2008, 23-
year-old Daniel James, who had sustained a serious spinal injury in a rugby accident 
and become paralysed, became the youngest Briton to receive assistance to die at 
Dignitas.21 In March 2011, an 84-year-old arthritic British woman committed suicide at 
Dignitas simply because she did not want to die of old age.22 She left a note saying she 
wished to escape the ‘long period of decline, sometimes called “prolonged dwindling”, 
that so many people unfortunately experience before they die’.23 A more recent case in 
May 2013 involved an 83-year-old British man who did not want to face the agony of 
progressive dementia. Realising the strain that his incurable dementia would almost 
certainly place on his family, he did not want to become a burden to them. He is 
understood to be the first Briton to have used the services at Dignitas solely due to 
dementia.24 
Patients travelling to Dignitas are often either accompanied by their loved ones, or have 
travel arrangements made by loved ones on their behalf.25 Several such incidents of 
loved ones assisting patients to travel to Dignitas have been investigated by police as 
there remains a question of whether such acts constitute suicide ‘assistance’. However, 
                                                          
18 ‘Accompanied suicide of members of Dignitas, by year and by country of residency 1998-2012’ (n17). 
19 ‘Members of Dignitas by country of residency as of 31 December 2012’ (Dignitas,2013)  <www.dignitas.ch/ 
images/stories/pdf/statistik-mitglieder-wohnsitzstaat-31122012.pdf> accessed 4 February 2013. These are the 
annually published February statistics for 2013.  
20 C Seale, ‘Do it properly or not at all’ (2010)340 BMJ c1719.  
21 R Edwards, ‘Parents of rugby player in Dignitas assisted suicide will not face charges’ The Telegraph (London, 
9 December 2008).  
22 M Hanson, ‘Living in fear of the “prolonged dwindle”' The Guardian (London,4 April 2011). 
23 J Adetunji, ‘Assisted dying campaigners split over right to die for those not terminally ill’ The Guardian 
(London,3 April 2011). 
24 M Hall, ‘Pensioner has become first British dementia sufferer to die at suicide clinic’ The Telegraph 
(London,30 May 2013). 
25 K Starmer, Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Decision on Prosecution — The Death by Suicide of Daniel James’ 
(9 December 2008) paras 1, 4 <www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james> accessed 19 June 
2014. 
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to date, none of the relatives and friends involved have been prosecuted for assisted 
suicide.26 Three cases in particular — Diane Pretty, Daniel James, and Debbie Purdy — 
exemplify the complexity of prosecuting suicide tourism.27 These will be discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
1.2.2 The second source of controversy: the DPP’s consent 
The second source of controversy in the debate on the legalisation of assisted death is 
caused by uncertainty over how the DPP gives her consent to initiate a criminal 
prosecution for assisted suicide.28 Due to a lack of prosecutions relating to suicide 
tourism, Debbie Purdy,29 a multiple sclerosis sufferer, sought clarification from the 
British courts as to whether her husband would be prosecuted if he assisted her to travel 
to Dignitas. On appeal to the House of Lords, she requested advice on the circumstances 
in which a person would likely be prosecuted for helping another to travel abroad to 
commit suicide.30 In July 2009, the House of Lords ruled that the law was not 
sufficiently clear in this area. The House of Lords instructed the DPP to produce an 
offence-specific policy, explaining how decisions are taken in assisted suicide cases, for 
the benefit of Purdy and others like her who are contemplating ending their lives at 
‘right-to-die’ organisations abroad.31 Lord Hope distinguished assisted suicide cases that 
would ordinarily invite prosecution, from ‘uncertain’ cases involving the 
‘compassionate assistance’ of those who are terminally ill or incurably disabled, who 
competently decide to end their lives at ‘right-to-die’ organisations abroad and require 
assistance to do so. As His Lordship’s judgment in Purdy states: 
[A person] may be prosecuted if there is enough evidence to sustain a 
prosecution and it is in the public interest that this step should be taken. But 
the practice that will be followed in cases where [there is] compassionate 
assistance…is far less certain.32  
                                                          
26 See ‘Latest Assisted Suicide Figures’ (CPS, 1 March 2014) <www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_ 
suicide.html> accessed 2 May 2014. 
27 ‘Assisted suicide: Diane Pretty, Debbie Purdy and Daniel James’ The Telegraph (London,23 September 2009). 
28 Suicide Act 1961 sub-s.2(4). 
29 Debbie Purdy was also a right-to-die campaigner for Dignity in Dying, a British pro-assisted death lobby group. 
30 DM Cohen, ‘Comment: Looking For A Way Out: How to Escape The Assisted Suicide Law In England’ (2010)24 
Emory Int’l L.Rev. 697. 
31 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45[56]. 
32 ibid [27]. 
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His Lordship goes on to further state that:  
The [Code for Crown Prosecutors] will normally provide sufficient 
guidance…In most cases its application will ensure predictability and 
consistency…But that cannot be said of cases where the offence in 
contemplation is aiding or abetting the suicide of a person who is terminally 
ill or severely and incurably disabled, who wishes to be helped to travel to a 
country where assisted suicide is lawful and who, having the capacity to 
take such a decision, does so freely and with a full understanding of the 
consequences.33 
Following from the House of Lords’ decision in Purdy, the DPP published the 
prosecuting policy on assisted suicide (‘DPP’s Policy’) on 25 February 2010.34 The 
DPP’s Policy sets out the public interest factors that are for and against a prosecution 
for assisted suicide. The policy distinguishes compassionate assistance provided to 
someone who reaches a voluntary and settled decision to commit suicide, from 
malicious, irresponsible and professionally organised help.  
The thesis will show that the DPP’s Policy does not meet the needs of society in 
England and Wales. The DPP’s Policy has effectively decriminalised ‘compassionate’ 
assisted suicides in England and Wales, by making the motive of the person assisting a 
crucial factor. As observed by Dignity in Dying (a British lobby group campaigning for 
the legalisation of assisted death),35 whilst the DPP’s Policy effectively permits 
‘compassionate’ assisted suicides, such ‘compassionate assistance’ still remains illegal 
under the SA 1961. Further, by deterring healthcare professionals36 from providing 
suicide assistance,37 the DPP’s Policy encourages those requiring suicide assistance to 
rely on ‘amateur assistance’ from non-medically qualified people such as friends and 
                                                          
33 Purdy (HL)(n31)[54]. The Code for Crown Prosecutors gives guidance to prosecutors on the general principles to 
be applied when making decisions about prosecutions: Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors (2013)(‘CCP’). See paras1.13 and 4.12 of the CCP. 
34 CPS, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide: Issued by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’s Policy’)(February 2010). 
35 See Campaign for Dignity in Dying <www.dignityindying.org.uk> accessed 17 May 2013. 
36 The Court of Appeal in Nicklinson’s case addressed the issue of the participation of healthcare professionals in 
assisted suicides. The issue was raised by an individual called ‘Martin’ whose case was part of a joint appeal with 
Nicklinson’s wife and another, Lamb. The Court of Appeal requested the DPP to amend his policy to provide more 
clarity for healthcare professionals. See Court of Appeal judgment in Nicklinson, Lamb and Martin’s joint appeal: 
Nicklinson (CA)(n10). This is discussed in detail in ch2. 
37 DPP’s Policy (n34) para43(14).  
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family members. As well as the risk of ‘botched’ or failed suicides, this leaves family 
and friends with difficult choices ─ whether to unlawfully assist a loved one who is 
desperate to end their suffering, or whether to deny them the death that they want.38 The 
DPP’s Policy is discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
1.2.3 The third source of controversy: inconsistencies in the law 
The third source of controversy in the debate on the legalisation of assisted death is that 
there is tension due to inconsistencies in the current law of England and Wales between 
the legal prohibition of assisted death and other end-of-life medical decisions which are 
legally permitted. These inconsistencies will be addressed in detail in section 2.3. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in cases where physicians have withheld or withdrawn 
life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients, the English courts have justified 
such medical decisions by applying the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction. The 
inconsistency in English law between the prohibition on assisted death and the 
lawfulness of the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients was 
acknowledged by the House of Lords in Bland’s case. As Lord Mustill in Bland’s case 
held:  
The…distinction drawn by the criminal law between acts and 
omissions…carries with it…a distinction between…‘mercy killing’ where 
active steps are taken in a medical context to terminate the life of a suffering 
patient, and a situation…where the…conduct has the aim…of terminating 
the life…by withholding…the basic necessities of life. [Nevertheless], 
however much the terminologies may differ the ethical status of the two 
courses of action is for all relevant purposes indistinguishable.39  
Lord Goff similarly held, ‘It is true that the drawing of this [“acts and omissions”] 
distinction may lead to a charge of hypocrisy.’40  
Medical decisions with a ‘double effect’, in which physicians may lawfully administer 
palliative medication which has a possible life-shortening effect, also demonstrate an 
                                                          
38 See ‘Kay Gilderdale: A Devoted Mother’ The Guardian (London,25 January 2010).  
39 Bland’s case (n12) 887 and 891.  
40 ibid 865.  
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inconsistency in the current English law. The tension in the law here is that, whilst a 
physician is legally prohibited from administering or supplying a lethal medication to a 
patient at their request, a physician is legally permitted to administer a patient (with or 
without their consent) with lethal amounts of palliative medication, with the intention of 
alleviating pain and suffering, even if it is foreseen that the patient’s death will be 
hastened as a result.  
A third inconsistency in the law relates to a competent patient’s legal right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, even though the same patient is not legally permitted to make a 
voluntary and informed request for an assisted death. This inconsistency in the law was 
brought to light in 2002, by the cases of Pretty41 and Re B42. Both cases involved 
competent women with debilitating illnesses which had left them paralysed from the 
neck down. In Pretty, Mrs Pretty who was terminally ill was denied a court order 
permitting her husband to assist her to travel abroad to Dignitas for an assisted suicide. 
By contrast, in Re B, Ms B who was not terminally ill was allowed by the court to 
refuse a life-sustaining ventilator which kept her alive. 
The thesis adopts the view that these end-of-life medical decisions which are legally 
permitted, are morally indistinguishable from assisted death as they equally hasten 
death.43 The above-mentioned inconsistencies in the law, and the legal and ethical 
distinctions between the law prohibiting assisted death and legally permitted end-of-life 
medical decisions will be considered in Chapters Two and Three. The thesis considers 
that the current English law on assisted death is less than satisfactory and is in need of 
Parliamentary reform.  
The following section sets out the aims and objectives of the thesis. It describes the 
main areas of concern which are shaping the debate on assisted death in England and 
Wales, and which are driving the calls for possible law reform. It also outlines what the 
thesis aims to achieve in terms of analysis, arguments, and proposed reforms. 
 
 
                                                          
41 R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61. 
42 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449,see ch2. 
43 T Tannsjo, ‘Moral dimensions’ (2005)331 BMJ 689. 
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1.3 Aims and objectives 
Studies in the UK have found that the reasons the terminally ill want an assisted death 
include pain and anticipated pain, fear of indignity, loss of control and cognitive 
impairment, and not wanting to be a burden.44 Similarly, a study in 2010 by Price et al 
found that the reasons for a desire for assisted death among terminally ill patients are, 
i) social factors that included financial difficulties and lower levels of social support, 
ii) illness-related factors that included having a symptom burden that had a greater 
effect on the individual’s identity or emotions, and a lower sense of personal control and 
control over treatment, and iii) a loss of dignity.45 There are many terminally ill patients 
in England and Wales who suffer a protracted dying process.46 Some with debilitating 
conditions choose to end their lives at a relatively early stage in their illness, whilst they 
are still physically able to do so, resulting in them dying prematurely.47 This thesis aims 
to address these concerns. It will be argued that there is a strong case for allowing 
competent patients who are terminally ill to make an autonomous request for physician-
assisted suicide if they are experiencing a poor and unacceptable quality of life due to 
unbearable pain and suffering brought about by a terminal illness.  
The thesis will examine the developments in English law that have had an impact on the 
law of assisted death to demonstrate that they have not met the needs of society, 
especially the concerns of those seeking an assisted death in England and Wales. This 
thesis will also examine legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions in England and 
Wales. It will demonstrate that due to the inconsistencies noted above in section 1.2.3, 
the current prohibition on assisted death is legally and morally indefensible. It will be 
argued that a law which permits physician-assisted suicide in particular circumstances is 
desirable to regulate end-of-life decisions.  
The social and ethical influences affecting the development of the law on assisted death 
in England and Wales will be considered in this thesis. These influences include a rise 
in individualism, an ageing population, the sanctity of life, a right to self-determination, 
medical paternalism, and personal autonomy. The impact of these influences on both 
                                                          
44 A Chapple et al, ‘What people close to death say about euthanasia and assisted suicide: a qualitative study’ 
(2006)32 Journal of Medical Ethics 706,706. 
45 A Price et al, ‘Prevalence, course and associations of desire for hastened death in a UK palliative population: a 
cross-sectional study’ (2011)1(2) BMJ Supportive&Palliative Care 140. 
46 Pretty (HL)(n41). 
47 P Allbeck et al, ‘Increased suicide rate in cancer patients’ (1989)42 J Clin Epidemiol 611. 
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the law of assisted death, and the laws which govern end-of-life medical decisions will 
be examined. In regard to personal autonomy and self-determination, it will be argued 
that a law which permits physician-assisted suicide in particular circumstances will 
ensure that competent patients who are terminally ill are given a level of respect which 
is comparable to those who already influence the manner and timing of their death by 
refusing life sustaining treatment. 
There have been repeated calls for law reform in England and Wales. Over the past 10 
years, there have also been several draft Bills proposed to legalise assisted death for the 
terminally ill. These include Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 
2004 (‘ADTI Bill 2004’).48 The House of Lords set up a Select Committee (‘2004 Select 
Committee’) to examine the legal and ethical issues of this Bill on assisted dying, and to 
make recommendations for any future Bill.49 For reasons discussed in Chapter Two, the 
Bill was not tabled for a second time. In September 2010, Lord Falconer’s Commission 
on Assisted Dying (‘the Commission’) evaluated the present law and explored a 
possible framework for assisted dying that might be acceptable to the general public.50 
The Commission’s 2012 Report found that ‘the current legal status of assisted dying is 
inadequate and incoherent’ and that there is ‘a strong case for providing the choice of 
assisted dying for terminally ill people’.51 Based on the recommendations of the 
Commission’s 2012 Report, an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Choice at the End of 
Life52 together with Dignity in Dying53 drafted a Bill to amend the law.54 The draft Bill 
provided for competent terminally ill adults to have the option of an assisted death, 
subject to strict upfront safeguards.55 After a period of public consultation from July to 
                                                          
48 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill HL Bill (2003-04) 17 (‘ADTI Bill 2004’). 
49 Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL] 
Vol I (2004-05,HL86-1) para269. 
50 The Commission on Assisted Dying was not a governmental or parliamentary commission. See more details on the 
Commission at ‘About the Commission on Assisted Dying’ (Commission on Assisted Dying,2010) 
<www.commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/about-the-commission-for-assisted-dying> accessed 2 August 2013. 
51 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying (Demos,2012) 285. 
52 The APPG on Choice at the End of Life believes that provided sufficient legal safeguards are in place, mentally 
competent terminally ill adults should have the right to an assisted death. See APPG on Choice at the End of Life and 
Dignity in Dying, Safeguarding Choice – A draft Assisted Dying Bill for consultation <www.appg-
endoflifechoice.org.uk/pdf/appg-safeguarding-choice.pdf> accessed 23 July 2013. 
53  Dignity in Dying supports the aims of the APPG on Choice at the End of Life and provides the secretariat to the 
Group. Refer to n35. 
54 See All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Choice at the End of Life and Dignity in Dying, ‘Frequently Asked 
Questions’ <www.appg-endoflifechoice.org.uk/frequently_asked_questions> accessed 23 July 2013. 
55 APPG, Safeguarding Choice – A draft Assisted Dying Bill for consultation (n52). 
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November 2012,56 Lord Falconer redrafted this Bill, and introduced it as the Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013 (‘AD Bill 2013’) on 15 May 2013.57 To inform the current law reform 
agenda in England and Wales, the thesis will evaluate the ADTI Bill 2004, the 
recommendations of the 2004 Select Committee,58 the Commission’s 2012 Report, and 
the AD Bill 2013. 
The thesis adopts the view that the current English law is out of step with public 
opinion. Recent opinion polls conducted in the UK consistently demonstrate a high 
level of public support for assisted death for the terminally ill.59 The 200560 and 200761 
British Social Attitudes (‘BSA’) surveys show that 80% of respondents thought that 
assisted dying should be allowed for terminally ill patients. A July 2009 Populus poll 
for The Times newspaper similarly found that 74% of respondents supported physician-
assisted suicide in particular circumstances, of which 95% thought that it should be 
legal for people who are terminally ill.62 These opinion polls are relevant as they 
indicate a perception by the public that their needs are not being met by the current law 
on assisted death in England and Wales. 
The British public are also generally in favour of a law that allows physicians to assist 
the suicides of their patients i.e. physician-assisted suicide. This is demonstrated by 
Chappel et al’s 2006 study on assisted death which found that those contemplating 
suicide wanted to end their lives with medical help and in the company of family or 
friends.63 It will be argued that by allowing physicians to assist in suicides, this would 
address the issue of medical complications which may arise during a suicide and lower 
the risk of ‘botched’ or failed suicides. 
The thesis will argue that a law permitting physician-assisted suicide that restricts 
eligibility to people with terminal illness would be in line with the current public 
                                                          
56 APPG on Choice at the End of Life and Dignity in Dying, ‘Bill consultation: Latest news’ <www.appg-
endoflifechoice.org.uk/bill_consultation> accessed 23 July 2013. 
57 Assisted Dying HL Bill (2013-14) 24 (‘AD Bill 2013’). 
58 Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL] 
Volumes I, II and III (2004-05, HL 86-I, 86-II and 86-III). 
59 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying (n51) 195. 
60 A Park and E Clery, ‘Assisted dying and decision-making at the end of life’ in Park A et al (eds), BSA: the 21st 
Report (Sage 2005). 
61 E Clery et al, ‘Quickening Death: the euthanasia debate’ in A Park et al (eds), NatCen Social Research, BSA: the 
23rd report – Perspectives on a changing society (Sage 2007). 
62 ‘The Times Poll: CATI Fieldwork: July 17th-19th 2009’ (Populus).  
63 Chapple (n44) 706. 
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opinion. In doing so, however, the thesis acknowledges the limitations on terminal 
prognosis. Clinical evidence shows that physicians are often inaccurate in their 
estimation of a patient’s prognosis and life expectancy, and that assessing the terminal 
phase is inherently difficult.64 The limitations on prognosis have also been highlighted in 
foreign studies.65 In a 2000 American study on doctors’ prognoses for terminally ill 
patients, the researchers found that physicians are often inaccurate in their prognoses, 
and that the error is systematically optimistic.66 Similarly, in a 2001 research paper on 
clinical predictions of survival, a group of Australian researchers noted that the 
prognoses in terminally ill cancer patients are far more frequently over-optimistic about 
life expectancy than they are overly pessimistic.67 It will be argued that, although the 
terminal phase of an illness may not be known with absolute certainty, there is a need 
for an arbitrary definition of ‘terminal illness’ in the proposed law for physician-assisted 
suicide, in order to minimise the likelihood of abuse.68 
Opinion polls also show that there is less public support for making the option of 
assisted death available to people with non-terminal life-limiting conditions. The 200769 
and 201070 BSA surveys both found that more than 80% of the public support assisted 
dying being made available for people dying of incurable illnesses, but only 45% 
support assisted dying for people with non-terminal conditions. The July 2009 Populus 
poll similarly found that of the 85% of respondents who supported assisted suicide 
under certain circumstances, only 65% were in favour for people with a degenerative 
condition who were not terminally ill; 56% were in favour of this for people who were 
suffering extreme pain but who were not terminally ill; 48% were in favour for people 
with a ‘severe physical disability’ who were otherwise healthy and 34% for ‘people who 
simply wish to die at the same time as a long-term spouse or partner who has a terminal 
                                                          
64 P Glare, N Christakis, ‘Predicting survival in patients with advanced disease’ in D Doyle et al (eds), Oxford 
Textbook of Palliative Medicine (3rd edn,OUP 2004). 
65 E Chow et al, ‘How accurate are physicians’ clinical predictions of survival and the available prognostic tools in 
estimating survival times in terminally ill cancer patients? A systematic review’ (2001)13(3) Clinical Oncology 209. 
66 NA Christakis and EB Lamont, ‘Extent and determinants of error in doctors’ prognoses in terminally ill patients: 
prospective cohort study’ (2000)320 BMJ 469. 
67 Glare et al ‘A systematic review of physicians’ survival predictions in terminally ill cancer patients’ (2003)327 
BMJ 195.  
68 LO Gostin, ‘Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted 
Dying’ (1993)21 J Law Med Ethics 94,98. 
69 Clery (n61). 
70 S McAndrew, ‘Religious faith and contemporary attitudes’ in A Park et al(eds), NatCen Social Research, BSA:the 
26th Report (Sage 2010). 
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illness’.71 As noted by the Commission’s 2012 Report, the results of these opinion polls 
indicate public concern for those whose lives might be devalued in the eyes of society, 
by the very fact of such an option being made available to them.72  
Groups of people considered potentially vulnerable under a law permitting physician-
assisted suicide will be identified in this thesis, and safeguards to protect them will also 
be examined. They include the disabled and the elderly. Those opposed to the 
legalisation of assisted death often argue that were it to be legalised, the vulnerable may 
feel pressured to request an assisted death.73 The argument is that if the vulnerable think 
that their life is not of value to society,74 they may be pressured to spare society, or loved 
ones from the perceived hardship and distress of their care.75 Care Not Killing (‘CNK’), 
an organisation which campaigns against the legalisation of euthanasia in the UK, 
believes that any relaxation of the current prohibition against assisted suicide in 
England and Wales will leave vulnerable people without adequate legal protection, and 
will forge a mindset that certain lives are less worth living.76 The thesis will consider the 
possible impact of a law on physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients on the 
ageing population in England and Wales. The July 2009 Populus poll found that 90% of 
those aged 65 years and over (‘the elderly’) felt that assisted suicide should be legalised 
for people who are terminally ill.77 Nevertheless, it will be argued that the proposed law 
should have strict safeguards to protect the elderly who might in turn be vulnerable 
under such a law.  
Depression is another source of vulnerability that will be explored. Studies have found a 
close relationship between terminal illness, depression and the desire for hastened death. 
In Ganzini et al’s 2000 study of physicians’ experiences with Oregon’s law on 
physician-assisted suicide, approximately 20% of requests for physician-assisted suicide 
                                                          
71 ‘The Times Poll: July 17th-19th 2009’ (n62).  
72 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying (n51) 292. 
73 BD Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Dutch Experience of Monitoring Euthanasia’ (2005)331 BMJ 691. 
74 JC D’Oronzio, ‘Rappelling on the Slippery Slope: Negotiating Public Policy for Physician-Assisted Death’ 
(1997)6(1) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 113. 
75 EL Csikai, ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Issues for Social Work Practice’ (1999)31(3) J Gerontological Social 
Work 49. 
76 Care Not Killing (‘CNK’) is a UK-based alliance of individuals and organisations established in 2005. It brings 
together disability and human rights organisations, healthcare and palliative care groups, and faith-based 
organisations. See <www.carenotkilling.org.uk> accessed 10 June 2013. 
77 ‘The Times Poll: July 17th-19th 2009’ (n62).  
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came from depressed patients.78 Chochinov et al’s 1995 Canadian study on the desire for 
death in the terminally ill similarly showed that a ‘serious’ desire for death was 
associated with a diagnosis of depression. The study found that 8.5% of 200 terminally 
ill patients had a ‘serious or pervasive’ desire for death. Of these patients, 58.8% had a 
diagnosis for depression compared with only 7.7% for those patients with no such 
desire.79 A similar and more recent study in the UK found 14% of 300 terminally ill 
participants to have a desire for death, out of which 63.6% had some form of depressive 
disorder.80 It will be demonstrated that depression is often undetected by physicians, and 
that undiagnosed or untreated clinical depression in patients may impair their decision-
making capacity. To ensure that a patient’s request for assisted death is not affected by 
depression or any other mental disorder, the thesis includes a mandatory mental health 
evaluation within its proposed law for physician-assisted suicide.  
Those opposing the legalisation of assisted death often argue that palliative care is a 
viable alternative to assisted death.81 They argue that good palliative care can adequately 
relieve the pain and distress of terminally ill patients. Palliative treatment includes 
comfort care, hospice care and pain-control options.82 It aims to relieve the symptoms of 
terminal illness, and focuses on a patient’s quality of life.83 The anti-euthanasia 
organisation, CNK, promotes more and better palliative care for the terminally ill.84 The 
thesis will demonstrate that palliative care is unable to provide all patients with total 
relief from distressing symptoms.85 It will be argued that the legalisation of physician-
assisted suicide is needed to respond to the predicament of terminally ill patients, whose 
pain and suffering cannot be relieved by even the best palliative care. 
The fear of many terminally ill patients is the possibility of dying in an undignified 
manner.86 The thesis will show that a loss of autonomy and personal dignity, and a 
diminished quality of life are often the more important concerns of those requesting 
                                                          
78 L Ganzini et al, ‘Physician’s experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act’ (2000)342 N Engl J Med 557.  
79 HM Chochinov et al, ‘Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill’ (1995)152 Am J Psychiatry 1185,1189-90. 
80 Price (n45). 
81 D Harris et al, ‘Assisted Dying: The Ongoing Debate’ (2006)82 Postgraduate Medical Journal 479. 
82 R Korobkin, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation: Issues and Preliminary Responses’ (1998)12 Notre Dame 
J.L.Ethics & Pub.Pol’y 449.  
83 C Saunders, ‘Hospice’ (1996)1 Mortality 317. 
84 See CNK (n76). 
85 R Hoffenberg, ‘Assisted dying’ (2006)6 Clinical Medicine 72. 
86 R Russell, Freedom to Die: The Legal Aspects of Euthanasia (Human Sciences Press 1977) 35. 
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assisted death.87 Advances in medical technology over recent decades have increased the 
possibilities for managing and treating the pain and symptoms of the terminally ill. 
However, medical technology often does nothing to improve a patient’s quality of life.88 
Rather, it prolongs the dying process.89 Suffering and dying may be prolonged to the 
point where the terminally ill decide that it is no longer worth living.90 It will be argued 
that terminally ill patients should be able to make a request for physician-assisted 
suicide based on a personal assessment of their quality of life. This would be consistent 
with court decisions allowing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
from incompetent patients, which are similarly based on a judgement of the patient’s 
quality of life. 
The thesis will show that English law is also out of step with legal provisions in other 
jurisdictions around the world.91 A key factor influencing public opinion of the current 
law in England and Wales is the laws of those other jurisdictions which permit assisted 
death in some form. By informing popular debate in England and Wales, these 
jurisdictions are changing the views of society at large. For this reason, the thesis 
undertakes a comparative analysis of the laws and legal issues relating to assisted death 
in six other jurisdictions — the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon (US), the Northern 
Territory (Australia), Switzerland, and Germany — to consider alternative provisions 
which might be adopted in England and Wales. The thesis will assess the impact of their 
laws on assisted death, and evaluate the efficacy of each jurisdiction’s approach to 
assisted death in the context of their particular cultural and legal background.  
One of the main objections against law reform in England and Wales is the so called 
‘slippery slope’ argument — that if assisted death were legalised then it could not be 
efficiently monitored and controlled and will lead to error, abuse, and the violation of 
the rights of vulnerable patients.92 Disability rights organisations in the UK, such as Not 
                                                          
87 R Smith, ‘A Good Death’ (2000)320 BMJ 129. 
88 M Otlowski, ‘Active Voluntary Euthanasia: Options for Reform’ (1994)2 Med.L.Rev 161. 
89 ibid. 
90 GS Neeley, ‘The Constitutional Right to Suicide, the Quality of Life, and the “Slippery-Slope”: an Explicit Reply 
to Lingering Concerns’ (1995)28 Akron L.Rev. 53,54. 
91 HM Biggs, ‘The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004: Will English Law Soon Allow Patients the 
Choice to Die?’ (2005)12 Eur J Health L 43. 
92 RJD George et al, ‘Legalised Euthanasia will Violate the Rights of Vulnerable Patients’ (2005)331 BMJ 684. 
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Dead Yet UK93 and Scope,94 are opposed to the legalisation of assisted death on this 
basis. They have expressed concern that even very limited legalisation for a small set of 
cases would lead to assisted death being practised beyond the group of people for whom 
it was envisaged. Others argue that legalising assisted suicide may lead to the 
permissibility of voluntary euthanasia95 and even to the acceptance of involuntary and 
non-voluntary euthanasia.96 They fear that vulnerable groups might become ‘targets of 
non-voluntary euthanasia disguised as physician-assisted suicide’.97 Glover describes 
involuntary euthanasia as where a person is assisted to die against their expressed 
wishes, and non-voluntary euthanasia as where the person being assisted to die cannot 
express their wishes because of their physical or mental state.98 The thesis will 
investigate whether there is evidence to support such ‘slippery slope’ concerns, and 
whether safeguards can stringently minimise the risk of such abuse.99  
The thesis will establish that the present law prohibiting assisted death in England and 
Wales is unsatisfactory. It will propose a law that permits physician-assisted suicide as a 
medical option of last resort, to competent patients who are terminally ill. Such patients 
may make an autonomous request for assisted suicide, if they experience a poor and 
unacceptable quality of life due to the unbearable suffering caused by their terminal 
illness. The proposed law will include strict legal safeguards to protect potentially 
vulnerable people, and avoid other potential abuse of the law.100 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 Not Dead Yet UK (NDYUK) is a network of disabled people in the UK, who oppose the legalised killing of 
disabled people. All those involved are disabled people including people with physical and sensory impairments, 
learning difficulties, and mental distress. See ‘About Not Dead Yet UK’ <www.notdeadyetuk.org/notdeadyet-
about.html> accessed 28 July 2013. 
94 A UK disability charity. See <www.scope.org.uk> accessed 28 July 2013. 
95 Refer to explanation in n7. 
96 Csikai (n75) 
97 CH Pailet, ‘Comment: Abortion and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is There a Constitutional Right to Both?’ (2006)8 
Loyola J Public Interest Law 45,66. 
98 J Glover, Causing death and saving lives (Penguin 1977). 
99 Otlowski (n88). 
100 This framework is similar to the one proposed by Dignity in Dying, a British pro-assisted death lobby group. See 
‘The law is not working’ (Campaign for Dignity in Dying) <www.dignityindying.org.uk/assisted-dying/law-not-
working.html> assessed 14 May 2013.  
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1.4 Research questions 
The five research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
i) Is the current law on assisted death in England and Wales satisfactory? In 
addressing this research question, the thesis will examine whether the law meets 
the needs of society in general and of individuals who competently decide that 
they do not wish to continue living, whether the law is consistent and coherent, 
and whether the law is legally and morally defensible.  
ii) Have recent legal developments on assisted death addressed the needs of society 
and the concerns of those seeking an assisted death in England and Wales? In 
addressing this research question, consideration is given to the impact of the 
House of Lords decision in Purdy,101 the DPP’s Policy,102 the Court of Appeal 
decision in Nicklinson,103 the present debate on the legalisation of assisted death, 
the recent Bills on ‘assisted death’ introduced in Parliament,104 and the influence 
of the laws of other jurisdictions.105  
iii) Can a person’s ‘quality of life’ determine whether they should have an assisted 
death? In addressing this research question, the extent to which ‘quality of life’ 
has been an influence on legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions will be 
considered. Court decisions where life-sustaining treatment has been withdrawn 
or withheld from incompetent patients will be examined, to determine whether 
the ‘best interests’ assessment by the courts and doctors is in effect a quality of 
life judgement. 
iv) Would a law permitting assisted death for a restricted group of people lead to 
assisted death being practised beyond that group? This question is concerned 
with whether legalisation would, either likely or inevitably, lead to an 
unintended further extension of the law — euphemistically described as a 
descent on the ‘slippery slope’. In addressing this research question, the assisted 
death laws of the selected jurisdictions are examined to determine whether the 
                                                          
101 Purdy (HL)(n31). 
102 DPP’s Policy (n34). 
103 Nicklinson (CA)(n10). 
104 e.g. Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill HL Bill (2003-04) 17 (n48), Assisted Dying HL Bill (2013-14) 24 (n57). 
105 i.e. the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon (US),the Northern Territory (Australia), Switzerland,and Germany. 
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slippery slope argument is indeed a legitimate concern, and if so, whether 
effective safeguards could be successfully implemented to protect vulnerable 
members of society. 
v) If the law on assisted death is to be reformed in England and Wales, what should 
the scope of the change be and how should the proposal for law reform be 
drafted? In addressing this research question, recent proposals for change in 
England and Wales, and the laws on assisted death of the other jurisdictions will 
be examined to inform potential reforms, and provide a valuable reference point. 
An overview of the structure of the thesis, and the methodologies employed by this 
thesis will now follow. 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
The thesis is comprised of seven chapters. The chapters are described briefly as follows.  
Chapter One introduces the topic of the thesis. It sets out the problems with the current 
law which governs assisted death in England and Wales, and the principal sources of 
controversy in the debate on the potential legalisation of assisted death. The chapter 
explains the aims and objectives of the thesis. It outlines the research questions that are 
to be addressed, and sets out the structure of the thesis. It also explains the methodology 
that is adopted to answer the research questions.  
Chapter Two sets out the present law on assisted death in England and Wales. It 
establishes that the current English law on assisted death is legally and morally 
inconsistent, because whilst assisted death is illegal, physicians are legally permitted to 
carry out certain end-of-life medical decisions. These are medical decisions involving a 
‘double effect’ and the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction. The chapter considers the recent 
developments in English law concerning assisted death. These include the cases of 
Diane Pretty,106 Debbie Purdy107 and Tony Nicklinson,108 the DPP’s decision in the case 
of Daniel James, and the DPP’s Policy.109 The chapter also examines recent attempts 
made to legalise assisted death in England and Wales. These include the ADTI Bill 
                                                          
106 Pretty (HL)(n41). 
107 Purdy (HL)(n31).  
108 Nicklinson (CA)(n10). 
109 DPP’s Policy (n34).  
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2004,110 and the AD Bill 2013111. The recommendations of the 2004 Select Committee,112 
and the Commission’s 2012 Report113 will also be evaluated. 
Chapter Three examines the social and ethical influences which have affected the 
development of the law on assisted death in England and Wales to-date. It considers 
whether English law meets the needs of society, and whether the law is consistent and 
morally defensible. The social influences examined are religion, a rise in individualism, 
and an ageing of the population. The ethical influences considered are sanctity of life, a 
right to self-determination, professional ethics, the doctrine of double effect, the concept 
of ‘quality of life’, paternalism, and an increasing scarcity of healthcare resources. 
Theories which offer a framework for such ethical influences are also considered. These 
include the four principles of medical ethics (respect for autonomy, non-maleficence 
and beneficence, and justice in medical care) which determine the ethical duties that 
physicians owe to their patients, and the ethical measures of consequentialism and 
deontology which are used to assess the morality of actions. Other influences affecting 
the debate on the legalisation of assisted death are also discussed. These include public 
trust in physicians, advances in medical technology, palliative care, concerns over 
patient dignity, concerns over a slippery slope, concerns for vulnerable members of 
society, the laws on assisted death of other jurisdictions, and the role of the media. The 
chapter examines the impact of these influences on both the law on assisted death, and 
on legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions.  
Chapter Four examines whether a person’s ‘quality of life’ can be used to determine 
whether they should be permitted to receive an assisted death. It shows that 
considerations of quality of life have been relevant to end-of-life medical decisions 
made to-date. The chapter considers the extent to which English law has allowed quality 
of life to influence decisions involving the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment in the ‘best interests’ of incompetent patients. The chapter also considers the 
difficulties of assessing a patient’s quality of life.  
Chapter Five examines the laws which govern euthanasia and assisted suicide in six 
other jurisdictions — the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, the Northern 
                                                          
110 ADTI Bill 2004 (n48). 
111 AD Bill 2013 (n57). 
112 2004 HL Select Committee Report Volumes I, II and III (n58).  
113 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying (n51). 
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Territory (Australia) and Oregon (US). Although the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Germany have civil law systems, and the Northern Territory and Oregon have 
common law systems, the chapter identifies common themes in these legal regimes. 
Assisted suicide is currently expressly provided for by law in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Oregon, whilst euthanasia is legalised only in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. In the Northern Territory, euthanasia and assisted suicide were both 
temporarily legalised from July 1996 until March 1997. Except for Switzerland and 
Germany, in all these jurisdictions, assisted death has been carried out by physicians. 
There is no law that expressly permits assisted suicide in Germany, neither is there any 
law that explicitly forbids it. Except for physicians, who are disallowed from assisting 
in deaths, anyone may assist in suicides in Germany. Chapter Five identifies features 
from these foreign laws which could potentially resolve issues of debate in England and 
Wales. It considers the social and ethical influences affecting these laws, and examines 
the extent to which ‘quality of life’ has been an influence on end-of-life medical 
decisions in these foreign jurisdictions. The chapter also examines whether the laws in 
each of these jurisdictions have been effective in response to their initial call for reform, 
and whether they have been subject to abuse.  
Chapter Six examines the ‘slippery slope’ argument. It investigates whether there is 
evidence from the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon to support the slippery slope 
argument. Examples of slippery slope concerns which are looked for, include an 
expansion of circumstances for lawful euthanasia, and a disregard for the current 
regulations by physicians and enforcement authorities. The chapter considers whether 
there have been risk factors introduced into any of these jurisdictions which constitute 
potential slippery slope ‘mechanisms’. It examines whether there is evidence to support 
a slippery slope argument that a law which permits voluntary euthanasia will lead to a 
stronger likelihood of non-voluntary euthanasia taking place. The chapter also 
investigates whether the current English law concerning the withdrawal and 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment provides support for similar slippery slope 
concerns with regard to such end-of-life medical decisions.  
Chapter Seven recapitulates the issues discussed across the entire thesis. It examines 
whether the aims and objectives outlined in section 1.3 above have been met, and 
whether the research questions set out in section 1.4 have been answered. The chapter 
also makes specific proposals for law reform in England and Wales. It considers a law 
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on physician-assisted suicide for competent patients who are terminally ill and suffering 
unbearably, and experiencing a poor and unacceptable quality of life. The chapter also 
considers strict safeguards to prevent abuse of the law, and to protect vulnerable 
members of society. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
To answer the research questions stated in section 1.4, the research methodology 
adopted in this thesis involves three methods of research  a socio-legal approach, a 
doctrinal evaluation, and a comparative law analysis. As Chynoweth observes, legal 
enquiry has begun to move in the direction of inter-disciplinary research, such as the 
socio-legal approach of this thesis.114 The research methodology and its methods are 
addressed separately below. 
1.6.1 Socio-legal approach 
According to a socio-legal approach, the analysis of law is directly linked to the analysis 
of the social situation to which the law applies.115 As asserted by Cotterrell, true legal 
scholarship must entail a sociological understanding of law.116 To broaden the 
understanding of the law, it is to be seen as an entirely social phenomenon that must be 
understood empirically and systematically.117 Under a socio-legal approach, legal 
institutions, like any other social institutions, cannot be understood without seeing the 
entire set of interacting relations of which they are constituted, and the environment in 
which they function.118 Schiff argues that the methodology of ‘sociology of law’ does 
not start with the primacy of legal rules or laws, or of a legal system. Instead, the 
methodology is determined by an initial understanding of society, or of the social 
system, with the aim of analysing social structures and social institutions generally.119  
                                                          
114 P Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’ in A Knight and L Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built 
Environment (Blackwell Publishing 2008) 28,30. 
115 DN Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976)39 MLR 287,287. 
116 R Cotterrell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?’ (1998)25(2) J.L.& Soc'y 171. 
117 ibid 183. 
118 SS Sibley, ‘Ideology, Power and Justice’, in BG Garth and A Sarat (eds), Justice and Power in Sociolegal Studies 
(Northwestern University Press 1998) 273. 
119 Schiff (n115) 294. 
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A socio-legal approach as described above has been used to examine the social and 
ethical influences that currently affect the debate on the legalisation of assisted death in 
England and Wales. As will be noted in Chapter Three, these social and ethical 
influences include i) sanctity of life, ii) respect for autonomy, iii) quality of life, 
iv) concerns over patient dignity, and v) societal interests that may be grounded in 
moral, philosophical or religious traditions.120 The thesis will consider whether a 
person’s autonomy should override the doctrine of sanctity of life, and whether ‘quality 
of life’ should be used to inform assisted death.121 Within the social and legal debate 
surrounding assisted death, it will be demonstrated that ‘suicide tourism’ cases have 
also had an impact on the English legislature, particularly where family or friends 
‘assist’ by making travel arrangements and accompanying their loved ones abroad for 
an assisted suicide.122 Studies and surveys which have assessed the laws on assisted 
death in the selected jurisdictions (the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon (US), the 
Northern Territory (Australia), Switzerland, and Germany) are also examined in 
Chapters Five and Six, to inform the thesis. These studies also raise issues associated 
with comparative law, which are considered in section 1.6.3 below.123 
1.6.2 Doctrinal research 
The doctrinal research method is characterised by the study of legal texts, and for this 
reason is often described colloquially as ‘black-letter law’.124 ‘Doctrine’ has been 
defined as ‘[a] synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and 
values’.125 The doctrinal research method is a two-part process because it involves first 
locating the primary sources of the law, and then interpreting and analysing the text to 
establish the nature and parameters of that law.126  
Chapter Two will examine the law on assisted death and legally permitted end-of-life 
medical decisions in England and Wales. This includes the decision of the House of 
                                                          
120 TS Jost, ‘Comparative and International Health Law’ (2003)14 Health Matrix 141.  
121 This will be discussed in chs2,3,and 4.  
122 S Ost, ‘The De-Medicalisation Of Assisted Dying: Is A Less Medicalised Model The Way Forward?’ (2010)18 
Medical Law Review 497,498,515. 
123 E Orucu, ‘Methodology of comparative law’, in J Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2006) 442. 
124 Chynoweth (n114) 29. 
125 T Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (3rd edn, Reuters Thomson 2010) 38. 
126 T Hutchinson and N Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012)17(1) 
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Lords in Purdy,127 and the DPP’s Policy128. Recent Bills proposing to legalise assisted 
death will also be examined.129 Chapter Five will analyse assisted death legislation in 
other selected jurisdictions,130 to consider whether England and Wales can learn any 
lessons from their experiences. 
This thesis’ doctrinal analysis inevitably raises issues as to the purpose and context of 
the law. There is thus an inescapable ‘shading’ of doctrinal analysis into socio-legal 
issues. Legal rules are normative in character as they dictate how individuals ought to 
behave.131 However, they make no attempt to either explain or understand human 
behaviour.132 The socio-legal approach is acknowledged by Chynoweth as having a 
place in doctrinal research. He notes that in practice, doctrinal analysis usually makes at 
least some reference to other external factors. He explains, for example, that an 
uncertain or ambiguous legal ruling can often be more easily interpreted when viewed 
in its proper historical or social context, or when one has an adequate understanding of 
the setting or circumstances to which it relates.133 Thus, it is important to build on 
doctrinal research conclusions by using sociological or other ‘outsider’ perspectives.134 
Further, whilst legal doctrine is the description and the systematisation of the law in one 
specific legal system, comparative law (as explained in the following section) is the 
comparing of legal systems.135 Together with statute law, case law and customary law, 
legal doctrine is an object of the comparative study.136 
1.6.3 Comparative law 
Comparative law involves the investigation of legal rules, structures, approaches and 
techniques in more than one system or society.137 Comparative law is undertaken in this 
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thesis to identify common themes on assisted death across the legal systems of selected 
jurisdictions – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, the Northern Territory 
(Australia), and Oregon (US). It is used to test whether a particular notion about a law is 
true across different systems, and to determine whether a law reflects a consistent 
manner of dealing with behaviour across states, or a local idiosyncrasy.138 By examining 
the law on assisted death of other jurisdictions, we can see how foreign legal systems 
approach and resolve common problems.139  
The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany have civil law systems, whilst 
England and Wales, Australia and the United States have common law systems.140 Civil 
law systems are based on a code which contains the laws that regulate society.141 In 
common law systems, the common law as a body of law consists of all the rules that can 
be generalized out of judicial decisions.142 There is also legislation in common law 
systems.143 This consists of particular rules intended to control certain factual situations, 
and are thus specified with considerable detail compared to judicial decisions.144  
A crucial difference between civil law systems and common law systems is that a civil 
law system’s code generally states new law and abolishes the previous law on the same 
area, whereas statutes in common law systems often supplement or codify pre-existing 
case law rather than replacing such law.145 The legislature in a common law system may 
selectively enact individual amendments to a law due to a changing environment or 
incidents unforeseeable at the time of a statute’s enactment.146 This is because ‘courts 
are not capable of writing speedily enough most of the rules that a modern society 
apparently needs’.147 Over time, the legislature in common law systems develops an 
extensive body of statutes.148 This development of statutes as a source of law in common 
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law systems supports the use of statutory analogies for comparative research purposes.149 
As Schadbach observes, the ‘age of statutes’150 demands that the common law 
methodology be augmented by civil law methodologies elaborated in statutorily-based 
systems.151 
A civil law system, in which the law-making role of a judge is limited, assumes judges 
interpret a statute rather than create substantive law.152 However, in a common law 
system, whenever a statute does not specifically address a set of facts, the application of 
the common law is the default rule.153 The common law systems direct courts, when 
faced with statutory language that is silent on an issue, to any prior (common) law on 
the issue, or to assume that the issue is left for common law judicial decision making.154  
Comparative law as a research method is often used to propose reforms to a law,155 as 
comparisons provide legislators with new regulatory and conceptual ideas.156 As noted 
by Maine in 1871, ‘The chief function of comparative jurisprudence is to facilitate 
legislation and the practical improvement of the law.’157 Similarly, Zweigert and Kötz 
assert more recently, ‘[C]omparative law is an école de vérité which extends and 
enriches [sic] the “supply of solutions” and offers the scholar of critical capacity the 
opportunity of finding the “better solution” for his time and place.’158 Thus, comparative 
law is employed in this thesis as an aid to reform the law on assisted death in England 
and Wales.159 Knowledge of the different laws in the selected jurisdictions extends to the 
statutory requirements, qualifications or safeguards which could potentially resolve 
issues of debate in England and Wales.160 Domestic law cannot always adequately deal 
with problems in its own legal system.161 Comparative law enlarges the ‘supply of 
solutions’. The thesis considers whether England and Wales can learn any lessons from 
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the experiences of these selected jurisdictions, noting that they do not always share 
common philosophical and religious traditions.162 For this reason, the adoption of any 
principles or rules from these selected jurisdictions in England and Wales requires 
careful consideration to maximise the prospect of success.  
As it is necessary to examine and evaluate a foreign legal concept before adopting it 
domestically,163 comparative law provides an increased and deepened understanding of 
both foreign and domestic laws.164 In addition to gaining knowledge of other countries’ 
laws, comparing legal institutions and concepts is an avenue to new insights about one’s 
own legal system.165 Comparative law may challenge one’s understanding of the 
domestic system through the use of the different rules and approaches of the foreign 
system.166  
Comparative law is about ‘legal transplants’  the desirability and practicality of 
borrowing from another legal system.167 The methodology reveals the viability of a 
transplant of one system’s laws into another legal system.168 As such, it is important to 
understand the foreign rules, institutions and cultures of the selected jurisdictions, and 
assess the prospects for a good ‘fit’ within England and Wales.169 According to 
Schadbach, the knowledge of alternative answers to common legal problems inevitably 
provides novel ways to understand and solve problems in one’s own legal system.170 The 
acceptance of a foreign law or legal concept is more likely to occur where the compared 
legal systems share common socio-cultural, economic, or political factors.171 The more 
comparable two legal cultures are, the greater the benefit one receives in relation to 
one’s own system.172 It would be a futile effort to transplant laws to a country with a 
completely different cultural and social background.173 
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It is, however, difficult to set up a common methodology of comparative law.174 The 
difficulty is that of comparing ‘like with like’,175 due to the legal and cultural differences 
between the legal systems of the selected jurisdictions.176 Such differences may limit the 
ability to draw inferences from these jurisdictions, as to what would happen in England 
and Wales.177 A further challenge is that we see other systems, as we see other cultures, 
through preconceptions of our own.178 
In this thesis, comparative research is carried out within the common law system by 
examining the assisted death legislation in the Northern Territory and Oregon. This is 
referred to by commentators as intra-systematic comparison.179 The disadvantage of an 
intra-systematic comparison, according to Zweigert and Kötz, is that often such a 
comparison does not offer the distance necessary to gain new insights into one’s own 
system.180 However, Schadbach observes that the main advantage of an intra-systematic 
comparison is that solutions are easier to transfer, since the ‘host body’ would be more 
receptive to the ‘legal transplant’.181 It is accepted that such intra-systematic 
comparisons are still valuable, as they enable one to learn from another system’s 
mistakes, flaws or weaknesses and thus improve on refining the law. 
Comparisons are also made in this thesis with the assisted death laws in four civil law 
systems  the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany. This is known as an 
extra-systematic comparison.182 The difficulty with an extra-systematic comparison is 
that the distinctions between a common law system and a civil law system have to be 
considered when carrying out such comparative research. For example, civil law 
systems often distinguish euthanasia as a criminal offence which is distinct from other 
forms of wilful homicide.183 Euthanasia is recognised as ‘homicide upon request’ with a 
less severe sentence, as the consent or request by the deceased is regarded as a 
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mitigating factor.184 In contrast, euthanasia is classified as murder in all common law 
systems. A further distinction is that in civil law systems, motive is an integral element 
in determining ‘culpability’ for a crime. However, under common law, motive is only 
an evidentiary factor. 
In conclusion and despite the challenges noted above, it is argued that there are three 
main reasons why the use of a comparative law research method is beneficial to this 
thesis. First, the experience of the other systems of law is valuable not only in 
suggesting a foreign legal institution or law as a model or guide, but also in showing 
what laws to avoid.185 As Tallon states: 
[The] aim [of comparative analysis] is not to find a foreign institution which 
could be easily copied, but to acquire ideas from a careful survey of similar 
foreign institutions and to make a reasonable transportation of those which 
may be retained, according to local conditions.186  
The second reason which calls for the employment of the comparative law research 
method, addresses the technique of drafting legislation.187 ‘[A]ny intelligent group of 
draftsmen…will consider similar legislation in other states…and will not confine their 
efforts necessarily to a restatement of what they conceive to be “the law” of their 
jurisdiction.’188 The third reason is concerned with the question of practicability and 
enforceability of the proposed law.189 In this regard, experience gained by one legal 
system as to the effectiveness of some legal solutions may be most valuable to 
another.190 
1.6.4 Conclusions on research methodology 
Although the doctrinal research method would involve mainly a qualitative evaluation, 
the socio-legal approach in this thesis allows for a broader evaluation of the legal and 
ethical arguments and influences on the law of assisted death. The comparative law 
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research method allows further for a quantitative evaluation based on the results of 
surveys and studies conducted by other researchers (i.e. secondary sources). By 
applying a combination of a socio-legal approach, the doctrinal and comparative law 
research methods, this thesis adopts an inter-disciplinary approach to its research. These 
methods not only complement each other, but the combination reduces the chance of 
error or bias. This allows for a better understanding of the debate, and bolsters 
confidence in the findings and answers to the research questions. 
The thesis reflects the law as at 1 January 2014. 
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Chapter 2: The Development of English Law 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will set out the scope of the present law on assisted death1 in England and 
Wales. It will also consider the recent developments on assisted death that have had an 
impact on society. Such developments include the cases of Diane Pretty and Debbie 
Purdy, the DPP’s decision not to prosecute the parents of Daniel James, the DPP’s 
Policy, and the Court of Appeal decision in Tony Nicklinson’s appeal. It will be 
demonstrated that these legal developments have been strongly influenced by the ethical 
principle of ‘personal autonomy’. 
The chapter will examine the limits and problems with the current law on assisted 
suicide. It will assess the implications of the DPP’s Policy, both in respect of key public 
interest factors specified by the policy and the wider implications of such a policy on 
the law. The chapter will show that the clarifications provided by the DPP’s Policy are 
unsatisfactory, and that in spite of assisted suicide being a crime in England and Wales, 
the DPP’s Policy effectively de-criminalises ‘compassionate’ assisted suicides. Overall, 
it will be demonstrated that the recent developments in the law on assisted suicide are 
inadequate with regard to the needs of those who competently decide to end their lives. 
In relation to end-of-life issues, the chapter will show further aspects in which English 
law is unsatisfactory. Although assisted death is illegal, physicians are legally permitted 
to make end-of-life medical decisions involving a ‘double effect’, or which fall within 
the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction in England and Wales. The chapter will analyse the 
legal framework surrounding the doctrine of ‘double effect’, and the withdrawal and 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. It will be 
demonstrated that whilst English law recognises a person’s right of autonomy to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment and to die from such a refusal, it denies a person a right of 
autonomy to obtain lethal medication to end their life. To inform the potential law 
reform agenda for England and Wales, the chapter will also consider Bills which have 
been recently introduced into Parliament to legalise assisted death for the terminally ill. 
The chapter will review the recommendations of the House of Lords’ Select 
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Committee’s Report on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004, and the 
recommendations of the 2012 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying. 
In setting out the current scope of the laws in England and Wales, the chapter will firstly 
examine the laws governing euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
2.2 Current laws governing assisted death 
2.2.1  Euthanasia 
Euthanasia, as defined in Chapter One,2 is not expressly provided for by English law. 
However, pursuant to the Homicide Act 1957, euthanasia is prohibited under the law of 
murder and manslaughter. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, non-voluntary 
euthanasia3 through the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients is lawfully permitted. This is demonstrated below in section 2.3.3. 
2.2.2  Assisted suicide 
Assisted suicide has been a crime in England and Wales since 1861.4 Despite suicide 
and attempted suicide ceasing to be crimes with the passing of the SA 1961, assisted 
suicide remains a crime under section 2(1) of the Act.  
Section 2(1) originally provided that any person who ‘aids, abets, counsels or procures 
the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide’ is liable for up to 14 
years imprisonment. Subsequently, to address the emergence of internet websites giving 
encouragement or assistance with acts of suicide, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
amended section 2(1) in February 2010 to extend its coverage.5 It now provides that a 
person commits an offence if they do an act ‘capable of encouraging or assisting the 
suicide or attempted suicide of another person’, and that act ‘was intended to encourage 
or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide’.  
                                                          
2 ‘Euthanasia’, defined in section 1.1.  
3 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
4 R v Croft [1944] 1 KB 295,296. 
5 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 sub-s59(2). See also, Ministry of Justice, Encouraging or Assisting Suicide: 
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It is argued that by decriminalising suicide, English law has taken account of society’s 
right to ‘personal autonomy’6 and ‘self-determination’7. This right of individuals to 
personal autonomy was described by Hedley J in the case of Re Z, ‘a competent person 
is entitled to take their own decisions on these matters and that ... person alone bears 
responsibility for any decision so taken. That is the essence of ... self-autonomy’.8 By 
maintaining assisted suicide as a crime, it is contended that the ethical doctrine of 
sanctity of life9 has been given predominance over autonomy in assisted suicide cases in 
England and Wales. Considering that an act of assisted suicide requires the involvement 
by others, lawmakers may have given precedence to the need to protecting society as a 
whole and its most vulnerable members. There is, therefore, a conflict of ethical 
influences in English law, between ‘personal autonomy’ and ‘self-determination’ on the 
one hand, and ‘sanctity of life’ and ‘protecting society’ on the other.   
It is contended that one’s prospect of being prosecuted for assisted suicide in England 
and Wales lacks sufficient certainty. Whilst the offence of assisted suicide under the SA 
1961 is clear, whether or not a person is likely to be prosecuted for this offence is far 
from clear. Section 2(4) of the SA 1961 provides that ‘no proceedings shall be instituted 
for an offence under [section 2(1)] except by or with the consent of the [DPP]’. Thus, 
there are instances of assisted suicide that are not culpable. As observed by Hedley J in 
Re Z: 
 Although not unique, [the requirement for the DPP’s consent] is rare and is 
usually found where [P]arliament recognises that although an act may be 
criminal, it is not always in the public interest to prosecute in respect of it.10  
According to Hedley J’s judgment, ‘[Parliament] has committed to the DPP the 
discretion as to whether to permit a prosecution.’11 Despite the potential incoherence in 
the law by including such a discretion, the following reasons provided by Tur, and by 
Lord Lane CJ in R v Hough, for its inclusion in section 2(4) are compelling. Tur argues 
that section 2(4) avoids prosecution for assisted suicides that are morally justified, ‘in 
                                                          
6 See section 3.3.4.  
7 See section 3.3.2.  
8 Re Z [2004] EWHC 2817 [21]. 
9 See section 3.3.1.  
10 Re Z (n8)[14]. 
11 ibid [19]. 
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which conviction would be seriously absurd or grossly unjust’.12 Lord Lane CJ says, ‘in 
terms of gravity [the offence of assisted suicide] could range from the borders of cold-
blooded murder down to the shadowy area of mercy killing or common humanity’.13  
Today, prosecutors are faced with assisted suicide cases that relate to the phenomenon 
of ‘suicide tourism’. Lord Neuberger, in the 2009 case of Purdy (discussed below), 
described ‘suicide tourism’ as:  
difficult and tragic cases where a loving relative assists a person, who is of 
sound mind and determined to end her life, to travel abroad to achieve her 
wish in a country where assisting suicide is not unlawful…[in such cases the 
relative] will often be a relatively reluctant participator, and will often be 
motivated solely by love and/or sympathy.14 
Lord Hope in Purdy, however, made clear that it is still an offence under section 2(1) of 
the SA 1961 for someone to assist another to travel to Switzerland or anywhere else 
where assisted suicide is lawful in order for the latter to obtain an assisted death.15 Police 
investigations have been carried out on the role and involvement of several people in the 
assisted suicides of loved ones abroad, yet no charges or court proceedings have ever 
been brought under section 2(1).16 It is argued that the phenomenon of ‘suicide tourism’ 
has created doubt in the law on assisted suicide and undermined society’s respect for 
this law.  
An examination of four high profile English cases  Diane Pretty, Daniel James, Debbie 
Purdy, and Tony Nicklinson  will illustrate that the current law on assisted suicide is 
inadequate and fails to meet the needs of English society. 
 Diane Pretty 
Diane Pretty had terminal motor neurone disease, ‘a progressive degenerative illness 
from which she [had] no hope of recovery’.17 She did not want to live in an undignified 
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and unbearable condition towards the end of her life, as was her prognosis.18 Pretty’s 
husband was unsuccessful in obtaining advance immunity from prosecution, if he 
assisted her to travel to Dignitas. Pretty, too, failed in her legal action to have the 
Suicide Act declared incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’). In dismissing Pretty’s case, the House of Lords found that, inter alia, 
i) Article 2 of the ECHR19 could not be interpreted as conferring a right to self-
determination20 in relation to death, and ii) since the Executive has no power to dispense 
with laws without the consent of Parliament, the DPP had no power to grant such an 
advance immunity from prosecution.21 
Pretty then took her case to the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’).22 The 
ECtHR held that Pretty’s personal autonomy,23 and her ‘right to private life’ under 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR, encompass a right to make a decision to end her own life.24 
However, the ECtHR also found that the infringement of Pretty’s right to private life 
was justified under Article 8(2).25 The ECtHR held that the ‘right to private life’ does 
not include ‘an absolute right to die’, and therefore the State is not required to allow or 
facilitate a person’s death.26 The ECtHR stated that it would be a threat to the rule of law 
if individuals were granted exemptions from the law, and the gravity of assisting in 
someone else’s suicide was serious enough that the DPP’s refusal to grant advance 
immunity was not unreasonable.27 The ECtHR held that any arguments premised on 
respect for a patient’s autonomy were outweighed by the State’s interest in ‘preserving 
life and protecting the vulnerable’.28  
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It is concluded that the DPP’s refusal to grant advance immunity to Pretty’s husband 
was necessary to upholding the ‘sanctity of life’,29 and thus safeguarding the general 
value of human life and protecting the rights of the vulnerable in society.30 It is further 
concluded that these are the very reasons why Parliament is reluctant to legalise assisted 
death in England and Wales. 
 Daniel James 
Daniel James, a 23 year old rugby player, suffered from tetraplegia31 after sustaining a 
spinal injury in a rugby accident.32 After his third failed suicide attempt, James decided 
to end his life at Dignitas.33 James’ parents assisted with his correspondence with 
Dignitas, organised his flights with a friend’s help, accompanied him to Dignitas, 
arranged for Swiss carers, attended two suicide consultations between James and his 
Swiss doctor, and attended the Dignitas clinic on the day of the suicide.34  
Despite the amount of support and assistance given by James’ parents, the DPP decided 
not to prosecute them for assisted suicide. The DPP said, ‘While there is sufficient 
evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction of [Daniel James’ parents]…such a 
prosecution is not in the public interest’.35 In December 2008, the DPP took the 
unprecedented step of publishing the reasons for his decision not to prosecute James’ 
parents.36 The DPP found that the guidance on whether or not to prosecute provided by 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors (‘CCP’)37 was unsuitable for the offence of assisted 
suicide:  
I consider that the offence of aiding and abetting the suicide of another…is 
                                                          
29 See section 3.3.1.  
30 P Lewis, Assisted dying and legal change (OUP 2007) 24. 
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unique in that the critical act—suicide—is not itself unlawful, unlike any 
other aiding and abetting offence. For that reason, I have decided that many 
of the factors identified in the [CCP] in favour or against a prosecution do 
not really apply in this case.38 
It is submitted that the DPP’s decision not to prosecute James’ parents and his published 
reasons did little to make the position regarding prosecution clear for others who might 
wish to assist in a loved one’s suicide.  
The House of Lords in the subsequent case of Purdy (discussed below) noted that whilst 
the DPP’s reasoning was ‘generally helpful’, it did not provide sufficient clarity as to 
how the CCP should be applied to cases of assisted suicide.39 Lord Neuberger observed 
that there was no guarantee that the DPP’s position would not change in the future, or 
that his reasoning in the Daniel James case would extend beyond the particular facts of 
that case.40 The House of Lords accepted that the factors in the CCP were not applicable 
to the Daniel James case. As Baroness Hale held, ‘… the way in which the DPP had to 
explain his decision…shows that some of the listed factors have to be turned on their 
head and other unlisted factors introduced in order to cater for these difficult 
decisions’.41 In the same way, Lord Hope held:  
The [DPP’s] own analysis shows that, in a highly unusual and extremely 
sensitive case of this kind, the [CCP] offers almost no guidance at all. The 
question whether a prosecution is in the public interest can only be 
answered by bringing into account factors that are not mentioned there. 
Furthermore, the further factors that were taken into account in the case of 
Daniel James were designed to fit the facts of that case.42 
The Daniel James case was influential in prompting the House of Lords in Purdy to 
request the DPP to create an offence-specific prosecution policy clarifying the public 
interest factors that would be taken into account for the offence of assisted suicide. 
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 Debbie Purdy 
Owing to progressive debilitating multiple sclerosis, Debbie Purdy was concerned that 
by the time she was ready to end her life by committing suicide, she would no longer be 
physically able to do so.43 She anticipated that she would need to travel abroad to 
Dignitas for an assisted suicide but that she would, by that stage, only be capable of 
doing this with the help of her husband.44 In December 2007, Purdy requested the DPP 
in writing to disclose his offence-specific prosecution policy on how he exercised his 
discretion to prosecute for assisted suicide, and if no such policy existed, to formulate 
one. The DPP replied in January 2008 stating, ‘There is no such policy; and 
indeed…any such policy…would be unlawful’.45 Purdy then applied to the High Court 
for a judicial review of the DPP’s refusal to provide prosecuting guidelines for the 
offence of assisted suicide.  
The issue before the High Court was ‘whether the [DPP] ha[d] acted unlawfully in 
failing to publish detailed guidance [on] the circumstances in which individuals will ... 
be prosecuted for assisting another person to commit suicide’.46 As had been argued in 
Pretty, Purdy argued that section 2(1) of the SA 1961 interfered with her right to private 
and family life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR.47 According to her, in the absence of the 
clarity that an offence-specific prosecution policy would provide, such interference did 
not fall within the justifications permitted in Article 8(2)48. Purdy argued that 
Article 8(2) requires the law to be accessible, foreseeable and precise in order for 
individuals to know in advance whether their conduct will be unlawful.49 As the High 
Court was bound by the House of Lords’ decision in Pretty (discussed above), it held 
that Article 8(1) was not engaged.  
On appeal, the House of Lords distinguished Purdy’s case from Pretty.50 Pretty had 
requested the DPP to grant her husband immunity from prosecution if he were to assist 
her to commit suicide at a later date. However, Purdy was requesting that the DPP 
publish an offence-specific prosecution policy detailing the factors that would be taken 
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into account by the DPP when deciding whether to prosecute. The House of Lords 
decided that it was free to depart from its earlier decision in Pretty, and to follow the 
ECtHR decision in Pretty that Article 8(1) was engaged, and that it extended to one’s 
right to end their own life.51  
The House of Lords held that when the law prevents an individual from exercising 
autonomous decisions that affect their quality of life,52 this constitutes an interference 
with their right to private life.53 This right to make autonomous choices regarding one’s 
quality of life includes an autonomous decision to end life.54 Baroness Hale held that, 
‘[I]f the court is serious about protecting autonomy [then it must] accept that 
autonomous individuals have different views about what makes their lives worth 
living’.55 Lord Brown accepted that there would be occasions where those assisting in 
suicide would have to be excused, to protect the victim’s right to private life:  
[T]here will on occasion be situations where…it would be possible to regard 
the conduct of the aider and abettor as altruistic rather than criminal, 
conduct rather to be understood out of respect for an intending suicide’s 
rights under [A]rticle 8 than discouraged so as to safeguard the right to life 
of others under [A]rticle 2.56  
The House of Lords considered whether Article 8(2) provided scope for the DPP to 
interfere with one’s right to end their own life with the assistance of another, by 
exercising his discretion to prosecute under section 2(4) of the SA 1961. Their 
Lordships found that the consequences of assisting a suicide were not sufficiently 
foreseeable under section 2(4), and that more guidance was required. Their Lordships 
were of the opinion that the generic CCP, which identifies factors which may bear upon 
the DPP’s discretion to prosecute in a wide range of cases, did not satisfy the 
Article 8(2) requirements of ‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’ for a person seeking to 
identify the factors likely to be taken into account by the DPP pursuant to section 2(4) 
of the SA 1961.57 
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Their Lordships believed that this lack of clarity in the DPP’s prosecution policy for 
assisted suicide meant that section 2(4) of the SA 1961 could not be justified under 
Article 8(2).58 In July 2009, the House of Lords held that in order to satisfy Article 8(2), 
the DPP would need to promulgate an offence-specific policy; identifying the facts and 
circumstances which he will take into account in deciding whether or not to consent to a 
prosecution of an assisted suicide case such as Debbie Purdy’s.59 
Referring to the offence-specific prosecution policy which would be required, Lord 
Brown described it as:  
a custom-built policy statement indicating the various factors for and against 
prosecution,…factors designed to distinguish between those situations in 
which, however tempted to assist, the prospective aider and abettor should 
refrain from doing so, and those situations in which he or she may fairly 
hope to be, if not commended, at the very least forgiven, rather than 
condemned, for giving assistance.60  
In that order, Lord Neuberger clarified that:  
the [DPP] ought to formulate…and publish a policy, which sets out what he 
would generally regard as the aggravating factors and mitigating factors, 
when deciding whether to sanction a prosecution under section 2 of the [SA] 
1961…Inevitably, as a matter of common sense as well as a matter of law, 
each case will have to be decided by reference to its own particular facts, 
and the contents of such a policy could not conceivably be exhaustive.61  
Baroness Hale stated that the DPP’s offence-specific prosecution policy, should not 
only be based on one’s right to autonomy, but also on making sure that one’s decision to 
end life is not the result of pressure, coercion or duress:  
Clearly, the prime object must be to protect people who are vulnerable to all 
sorts of pressures …[and]… at the same time, the object must be to protect 
the right to exercise a genuinely autonomous choice. The factors which tell 
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for and against such a genuine exercise of autonomy free from pressure will 
be the most important.62 
Baroness Hale’s judgment also focused on the need for society, in certain situations, to 
value the lives of others who have given up on life. ‘It is not for society to tell people 
what to value about their own lives, [however at times, it] may be justifiable for society 
to insist that we value their lives even if they do not’.63 Baroness Hale noted in her 
judgment that:  
[I]n attitudinal surveys the British public have consistently supported 
assisted dying for people with a painful or unbearable incurable disease 
from which they will die, if they request it, while rejecting it for people with 
other reasons for wanting to die (National Centre for Social Research, 
British Social Attitudes, The 23rd Report, 2007, chapter 2).64 
Thus, Baroness Hale was more in favour of a policy permitting assisted death to those 
who are suffering unbearably from a terminal illness.  
Seven months after the House of Lords’ judgment in Purdy, the DPP published an 
offence-specific prosecuting policy for the offence of assisted suicide. This prosecuting 
policy will be examined in section 2.2.3 below. 
 Tony Nicklinson 
Tony Nicklinson’s case went further than the earlier assisted suicide cases discussed 
above. Nicklinson had suffered a stroke in June 2005, leaving him almost completely 
paralysed with ‘locked-in’ syndrome.65 As a consequence, he could only communicate 
by blinking. Although Nicklinson’s condition was not life-threatening, in 2007 he 
decided to end his life. He was not physically able to take his own life, and was 
prohibited by law from obtaining the assistance of a doctor.66 Thus, Nicklinson sought a 
court declaration that the common law defence of necessity would be available to 
anyone who assisted him to die. As discussed in Chapter One,67 the High Court ruled 
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against his application. Nicklinson died in August 2012, a week after the High Court 
ruling. He had refused nutrition, fluids, and medical treatment prior to his death.68  
Nicklinson’s wife then appealed to the Court of Appeal on Nicklinson’s behalf. She 
sought to establish a right to die with dignity69 at a time of one’s own choosing. Mrs 
Nicklinson’s appeal relied on fundamental common law rights.70 She argued that the 
common law should provide a defence to murder where the crime takes the form of 
‘euthanasia’.71 The Court, however, rejected the argument that the common law should 
recognise a defence of necessity in cases of euthanasia, for the following four reasons.72  
First, the Court of Appeal held that the rights of autonomy73 and dignity have to yield to 
the sanctity of life74 which is a fundamental principle of the common law, reflected in 
the unqualified right to life found in Article 2 of the ECHR.75 Second, the Court held 
that section 1 of the SA 1961 should be regarded as conferring immunity from the 
criminal process for those who actually commit suicide rather than as conferring one 
with a right to commit suicide. As such:  
if there is no right to kill yourself, there can be no right, fundamental or 
otherwise, to require the State to allow others to assist you to die or to kill 
you. That analysis cannot be altered by the simple expedient of recasting 
what is at best a liberty or freedom to commit suicide as the exercise of a 
positive right to autonomy and dignity.76  
Third, the Court held that it was inappropriate for the Court to fashion a defence of 
necessity in a complex and controversial issue like euthanasia, but that this was a matter 
for Parliament.77 The court stated that:  
Parliament as the conscience of the nation is the appropriate constitutional 
forum, not judges who might be influenced by their own particular moral 
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perspectives; the judicial process which has to focus on the particular facts 
and circumstances before the court is not one which is suited to enabling the 
judges to deal competently with the range of conflicting considerations and 
procedural requirements which a proper regulation of the field may require; 
and there is a danger that any particular judicial decision, influenced perhaps 
by particular sympathy for an individual claimant, may have unforeseen 
consequences, creating an unfortunate precedent binding in other contexts.78  
Fourthly, the Court held that: 
any defence provided to those who assist someone to die would have to 
apply not merely to euthanasia but also to assisted suicide. That 
immediately raises the question: how can the courts develop a defence to 
assisted suicide when Parliament has stated in unequivocal terms that it is a 
serious criminal offence carrying a maximum sentence of 14 years’ 
imprisonment.79  
In her appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mrs Nicklinson also relied on the right to private 
life under Article 8 of the ECHR.80 She argued that the legal prohibition on assisted 
death constituted a disproportionate interference with one’s right under Article 8.81 This 
issue on whether the interference with the Article 8(1) right meets the criteria for 
permissible interference laid down in Article 8(2)82 was dealt with extensively in the 
cases of Pretty and Purdy (discussed above).83 Thus, the Court of Appeal referred to 
these earlier judgments and held that the blanket prohibitions on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide do not constitute a disproportionate interference with one’s rights under 
Article 8.84 Mrs Nicklinson’s appeal was accordingly dismissed in July 2013. Her appeal 
was joined by two other individuals (Paul Lamb and ‘Martin’) suffering from permanent 
physical disabilities. The Court of Appeal’s ruling on the submission made by the 
individual known as ‘Martin’, concerning the likelihood of healthcare professionals 
being prosecuted, will be dealt with under Healthcare professionals in section 2.2.3, 
which follows. 
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2.2.3 Interim Policy and DPP’s Policy 
In September 2009, less than two months after the House of Lords’ judgment in Purdy,85 
the DPP published a draft offence-specific prosecuting policy for the offence of assisted 
suicide. This policy, the Interim Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Assisted 
Suicide (‘Interim Policy’), set out public interest factors that were to be taken into 
account by the DPP for assisted suicide cases.86 At the same time, a public consultation 
exercise, which received nearly 5,000 responses, was initiated by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS).87 Following the public consultation, the Policy for 
Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (‘DPP’s Policy’) 
was published in February 2010.88 The DPP’s Policy sets out 22 public interest factors 
— 16 in favour of prosecution and six against prosecution. The 22 public interest factors 
listed within the DPP’s Policy are laid out in Table 1, overleaf. 
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Factors tending 
 in favour of prosecution 
(numbered as per DPP’s Policy, para 43) 
Factors tending 
against prosecution 
(numbered as per DPP’s Policy, para 45) 
The victim: 
(1) was under 18 years of age; 
(2) did not have the capacity (as defined by the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005) to reach an informed 
decision to commit suicide; 
(3) had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and 
informed decision to commit suicide; 
(4) had not clearly and unequivocally communicated 
his or her decision to commit suicide to the 
suspect; 
(5) did not seek the encouragement or assistance of 
the suspect personally or on his or her own 
initiative; 
(10) was physically able to undertake the act that 
constituted the assistance him or herself; 
The victim: 
(1) had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and 
informed decision to commit suicide; 
The suspect: 
(6) was not wholly motivated by compassion; for 
example, the suspect was motivated by the 
prospect that he or she or a person closely 
connected to him or her stood to gain in some way 
from the death of the victim; 
(7) pressured the victim to commit suicide; 
(8) did not take reasonable steps to ensure that any 
other person had not pressured the victim to 
commit suicide; 
(9) had a history of violence or abuse against the 
victim; 
(11) was unknown to the victim and encouraged or 
assisted the victim to commit or attempt to 
commit suicide by providing specific information 
via, for example, a website or publication; 
(12) gave encouragement or assistance to more than 
one victim who were not known to each other; 
(13) was paid by the victim or those close to the victim 
for his or her encouragement or assistance; 
(14) was acting in his or her capacity as a medical 
doctor, nurse, other healthcare professional, a 
professional carer [whether for payment or not], or 
as a person in authority, such as a prison officer, 
and the victim was in his or her care; 
(15) was aware that the victim intended to commit 
suicide in a public place where it was reasonable 
to think that members of the public may be 
present; 
(16) was acting in his or her capacity as a person 
involved in the management or as an employee 
(whether for payment or not) of an organisation or 
group, a purpose of which is to provide a physical 
environment (whether for payment or not) in 
which to allow another to commit suicide. 
The suspect: 
(2) was wholly motivated by compassion; 
(4) had sought to dissuade the victim from 
taking the course of action which resulted 
in his or her suicide; 
(6) reported the victim’s suicide to the police 
and fully assisted them in their enquiries 
into the circumstances of the suicide or the 
attempt and his or her part in providing 
encouragement or assistance. 
The actions of the suspect: 
(3) although sufficient to come within the 
definition of the offence, were of only 
minor encouragement or assistance; 
(5) may be characterised as reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of 
a determined wish on the part of the victim 
to commit suicide; 
 
Table 1 Public interest factors listed within the DPP’s Policy  
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Concerns raised during the public consultation, along with issues relating to the DPP’s 
Policy will be considered below. 
 Suspect’s motivation 
Factor 7 in favour of prosecution in the Interim Policy focused on suspects who were 
not wholly motivated by compassion, but who were motivated by the prospect that they 
or a person closely connected to them stood to gain in some way from the victim’s 
death.89 Respondents to the public consultation stated that there may be practical 
difficulties with the phrase ‘stood to gain’, as there will be many instances where some 
gain is secured by the suspect as a result of the victim’s death.90 It is contended here that 
there are difficulties in establishing the true motives behind an assisted suicide in 
circumstances where the person assisting may have acted out of mixed motives, 
i.e. partly by compassion but also in part by a desire to put an end to a difficult family 
situation or to gain some material benefit from the patient’s death.91 
A new public interest factor against prosecution – that the suspect did not stand to gain 
any advantage, financial or otherwise, from the death of the victim – was identified in 
the consultation exercise.92 Its underlying principle is now covered by Factor 6 in the 
DPP’s Policy in favour of a prosecution, which states that: ‘[t]he suspect was not wholly 
motivated by compassion; for example, the suspect was motivated by the prospect that 
he or she or a person closely connected to him or her stood to gain in some way from 
the death of the victim.’93  
To put ‘stood to gain’ in context, the DPP’s Policy states:  
On the question of whether a person stood to gain, ... the police and ... 
prosecutor should adopt a common sense approach. It is possible that the 
suspect may gain some benefit – financial or otherwise – from the resultant 
suicide of the victim after his or her act of encouragement or assistance. The 
critical element is the motive behind the suspect’s act. If it is shown that 
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compassion was the only driving force behind his or her actions, the fact 
that the suspect may have gained some benefit will not usually be treated as 
a factor tending in favour of prosecution…each case must be considered on 
its own merits and…facts.94 
This is demonstrated in the case of Sir Edward Downes and his wife, Lady Edwina 
Downes, who were both accompanied by their son to Dignitas, where they ended their 
lives. The DPP decided that there was no evidence that the son was motivated by the 
financial gain he received upon their deaths.95 The DPP said, ‘[t]he evidence and 
information available indicate[d] that [he] was wholly motivated by compassion’.96  
It has been contended that the DPP’s Policy represents ‘an excusatory as opposed to a 
justificatory approach’,97 where ‘the granting of [an] excuse is in part linked to the 
experience of conscience-driven emotional pressures arising from [the suspect’s] special 
relationship with [the victim]’.98 It is submitted that the introduction of a 
‘compassionate’ motive in the DPP’s Policy is a departure from the usual standards of 
criminal law.99 The classic elements of a crime are the actus reus and mens rea, with 
motive being irrelevant.100 Nevertheless, a ‘compassionate’ motive has been a 
consideration against prosecution for assisted suicide, even prior to the DPP’s Policy 
being published.101 For example, it had influenced the DPP’s decision to not prosecute 
the parents of Daniel James (discussed above).102 It is contended that there are practical 
difficulties in investigating a suspect’s motives following a victim’s death.103 The DPP’s 
Policy involves a retrospective assessment of a suspect’s motives, after the death of the 
victim, whereas the victim in such cases may have been the only person able to bear 
witness to the suspect’s motives in any meaningful sense.104 
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 Victim’s mental capacity 
The Interim Policy considered the victim’s ‘mental capacity’ and included factors that 
required the victim to have reached a clear, settled and informed wish to commit 
suicide. This was reflected in Factor 3 in favour of prosecution, and Factor 1 against 
prosecution, in the Interim Policy.105 This was a recognition of a victim’s competent 
autonomous decision to end their life. However, only 38% of respondents to the public 
consultation supported the inclusion of these factors.106 The CPS was, nevertheless, of 
the view that the absence of a victim’s informed and settled decision to commit suicide 
should be a factor in favour of prosecution.107 Thus, the second factor in favour of 
prosecution in the DPP’s Policy provides for situations where the victim did not have 
the capacity, as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA 2005’),108 to reach an 
informed decision to commit suicide.109  
It is, however, argued that the definition of a person who lacks capacity in the MCA 
2005 is unclear. The group of persons falling within this definition may be wide, as the 
MCA 2005 does not provide any examples or illustrations.110 Section 2 of the MCA 
2005 provides that a person lacks capacity if they are unable to make a decision because 
of an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain, whilst section 3 
provides that a person would be unable to make a decision when they are unable to 
i) understand the information relevant to the decision, ii) retain the information, iii) use 
or weigh the information as part of the process of making that decision, or 
iv) communicate that decision. Additionally, as the MCA 2005 does not require a 
psychological or psychiatric assessment for determining capacity, clinical depression or 
any other mental disorders impairing a person’s decision-making capacity may be 
undetected under the Act.  
Furthermore, criminal investigations for assisted suicide take place after a victim has 
died, when investigators must rely on retrospective, second-hand accounts to establish a 
victim’s competence, and motivation for choosing to end their life.111 As such, reliance 
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on the DPP’s Policy after the fact, fails to adequately protect the interests of those who 
may be vulnerable112 to abuse, coercion, pressure or exploitation.113  
 Suspect’s assistance 
The DPP’s Policy fails to provide any guidance as to what actions amount to ‘minor 
encouragement or assistance’ as described in the third public interest factor tending 
against prosecution.114 Lewis argues that direct acts of assistance such as providing 
medication, writing a prescription, setting up an intravenous drip which is then triggered 
by the patient, crushing or dissolving medication or other technical or practical 
assistance with the act of suicide itself will make prosecution more likely than less 
proximate assistance, such as making travel arrangements to a right-to-die organisation 
abroad.115 In the case of Sir Edward Downes and Lady Edwina Downes, the DPP 
decided that the son’s actions in booking a hotel room in Switzerland for his parents, 
and in accompanying them there, where they subsequently committed suicide at 
Dignitas, ‘although sufficient to come within the definition of the offence, were very 
much only of minor assistance’.116 It is argued that the DPP’s Policy lacks clarity in 
relation to this factor. The DPP’s Policy does not provide any specific examples, 
circumstances, or illustrations of what would make a suspect’s acts of assistance more 
or less likely to be prosecuted.117  
The DPP stated in both the Interim Policy118 and the DPP’s Policy,119 that each case is to 
be judged on its own facts and merits. He said: 
Prosecutors must decide the importance of each public interest factor in the 
circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall assessment. It is 
quite possible that one factor alone may outweigh a number of other factors 
which tend in the opposite direction.120  
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This is illustrated in the 2010 case of Michael Bateman. Bateman assisted his wife’s 
suicide by assembling a helium gas apparatus and placing a plastic bag over her head, 
before his wife herself turned on the helium supply and tightened the bag.121 Although 
Bateman’s actions could hardly be described as constituting ‘only minor assistance or 
encouragement’, the DPP concluded that Bateman had been wholly motivated by 
compassion and that it was not in the public interest to prosecute him.122 In this case, 
Bateman’s compassionate motive amounted to an overriding public-interest factor 
against prosecution. It is thus submitted that, allowing the DPP’s Policy to place a 
criminal act beyond the reach of the criminal courts on the basis of a ‘compassionate’ 
motive whilst assisted suicide remains a crime is incoherent. 
 Victim’s physical or medical condition 
Factor 6 in favour of prosecution in the Interim Policy123 – that the victim did not have a 
terminal illness, a severe and incurable physical disability, or a severe degenerative 
physical condition, from which there was no possibility of recovery – and Factor 4 
against prosecution in the Interim Policy124 – that the victim had a terminal illness, or a 
severe and incurable physical disability, or a severe degenerative physical condition, 
from which there was no possibility of recovery – received the most feedback during the 
public consultation. An estimated 1,200 respondents specifically asked the CPS to 
reconsider the inclusion of these factors, on the basis that they could be seen as 
discriminatory against those with a serious illness or disability.125 Accepting that it was 
inappropriate for any factor to suggest that a relevant act was somehow less serious 
simply by virtue of the victim’s physical condition, the CPS removed these factors from 
the DPP’s Policy.126  
Gorsuch also cogently argues that a prosecution policy which purports to respect 
autonomy127 should exclude any qualifying factors regarding an individual’s physical 
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condition. He asserts that to fully comply with the principles of autonomy, a State must 
‘abstain from coercively interfering with any rational adult’s private decision to die, 
whatever the motive or reason for the individual’s considered decision’.128 It is, 
however, argued that by disregarding a victim’s physical condition, it may not be 
practical for prosecutors to decide if the suspect was compassionately motivated to 
assist in the victim’s suicide.129 An objective assessment of whether a suspect’s 
assistance was motivated by compassion will naturally involve an assessment of 
whether the victim was suffering.130 Thus, an assessment of a victim’s physical 
condition is unavoidable. The benefit of referring to a patient’s physical condition is 
supported by Factor 10 in favour of prosecution in the DPP’s Policy, which states that a 
prosecution is more likely if ‘the victim was physically able to undertake the act that 
constituted the assistance him or herself.’131  
As noted in Baroness Hale’s judgment in Purdy (discussed above), a large majority of 
the UK public support the legalisation of assisted death for the terminally ill.132 This 
support was also evidenced in the DPP’s public consultation. Respondents had proposed 
that if there is written documentation outlining a victim’s request and intentions to 
commit suicide (e.g. a Living Will), and if a doctor had confirmed that the victim was 
terminally ill, then these should be factors against prosecution.133 Baroness Hale’s 
judgment in Purdy also highlighted that there is less support amongst the British public 
for assisted death to be allowed for people with reasons other than a painful or 
unbearable incurable disease from which they will die.134 Support for this is 
demonstrated in a 2010 poll by ComRes for the BBC’s current affairs programme, 
‘Panorama’.135 The poll found that 74% of respondents supported physician-assisted 
suicide for the terminally ill, while 73% were in favour of a family member or close 
friend assisting the suicide of a terminally ill person. However, only 45% were in favour 
of physician-assisted suicide for non-terminally ill patients with a painful and incurable 
condition, and 48% were in favour of a family member or close friend assisting the 
suicide of a non-terminally ill person. Nevertheless, the DPP maintained, in his public 
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consultation exercise, that only Parliament can set out the criteria or requirements that 
might be appropriate for an exemption from prosecution for the offence of assisted 
suicide.136 
In this thesis, it is argued that the reform of the law on assisted suicide should be limited 
to terminally ill patients only. The results of different opinion polls show support for 
such a restriction on eligibility. In the 2005,137 2007138 and 2010139 BSA surveys, 80% of 
respondents thought that assisted death should be allowed for terminally ill patients, 
while only 45% thought it should be available to people with incurable but non-terminal 
illness. Other public opinion surveys delivered similar results. A Populus poll for 
The Times newspaper in July 2009 found that among the 85% of respondents who 
supported assisted suicide in ‘specific circumstances’, 95% thought that assisted suicide 
should be legal for people who are terminally ill.140  
 Healthcare professionals 
Factor 14 of the public interest factors in favour of prosecution in the Interim Policy 
provides that, ‘The suspect was paid to care for the victim in a care/nursing home 
environment’.141 Respondents to the public consultation commented that it was 
inappropriate to single out professional carers working in particular environments.142 An 
estimated 34% of comments suggested that it should be a factor in favour of prosecution 
if the suspect was a nurse, doctor or other healthcare professional and the victim was in 
their care.143 In response, the CPS amended Factor 14, which now reads: 
the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse, 
other healthcare professional, a professional carer [whether for payment or 
not], or as a person in authority, such as a prison officer, and the victim was 
in his or her care.144  
                                                          
136 ‘Public Consultation Exercise on the Interim Policy for Prosecutors’ (n87)[7.6]. 
137 Park and Clery (ch1 n60). 
138 Clery (ch1 n61). 
139 McAndrew (ch1 n70). 
140 ‘The Times Poll: July 17th-19th 2009’ (ch1 n62).  
141 DPP’s Interim Policy (n86). 
142 ‘Public Consultation Exercise on the Interim Policy for Prosecutors’ (n87)[3.6]-[3.7]. 
143 ibid [3.3]. 
144 DPP’s Policy (ch1 n34) para43(14).  
 53 
It is submitted that a key driver for this amended Factor 14 is the potential conflict 
between assisting a suicide and a physician’s traditional role and responsibilities 
towards a patient.145 By specifically deterring healthcare professionals from providing 
suicide assistance, Factor 14 (as amended) now places a heavier burden on the friends 
and family of a victim. An unintended consequence of this may be an increase in failed 
suicides, assisted by well-meaning, but ill-trained loved ones.146  
The DPP’s Policy deters physicians from justifying any current conduct of assisting 
suicides.147 By contrast, in the Netherlands (discussed in Chapter Five), physicians are 
permitted to rely on a defence of necessity, when assisting the deaths of patients who 
are experiencing intolerable pain and suffering that cannot be alleviated. The DPP’s 
Policy could have similarly reduced the incidence of unregulated medical killing. A 
study by Seale on end-of-life medical decisions in the UK between 2007 and 2008148 
found that patients were already being assisted to die by physicians. The survey found 
that approximately 0.5% of all deaths in the UK are as a result of euthanasia. 0.2% of all 
deaths constituted voluntary euthanasia, where ‘following a request from a patient, a 
drug is administered with the explicit intention of ending life’, whilst 0.3% of all deaths 
were identified as ‘ending life without an explicit request from patient’ (or 
non-voluntary euthanasia149). This constitutes approximately 2,500 unlawful deaths (of 
the 500,000 total deaths per year) facilitated by healthcare professionals without any 
appropriate safeguards or transparency on their ‘unlawful’ end-of-life medical 
practice.150  
The thesis argues that society’s needs would be better served if healthcare professionals 
were not explicitly discouraged from assisting suicides under the DPP’s Policy. 
Healthcare professionals have the expertise necessary to achieve a safe and humane 
assisted death, and are the main gatekeepers of the medications needed to reliably and 
humanely achieve this.151 They are also better able than members of the general public to 
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detect whether a patient’s decision to die is impaired by depression or some other 
psychiatric or psychological disorder. The involvement of healthcare professionals 
would consequently give greater certainty of outcome, lower the risk of botched 
suicides152 and of suffering during the suicide.153 
The results of public opinion surveys in the UK show that there is more support for 
physician-assisted suicide, than for relatives or friends to be permitted to assist in 
suicides. The 2005 BSA survey found 60% of its respondents in favour of a law 
permitting physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients, whereas only 44% 
thought that relatives should be allowed to undertake this role.154 More recent surveys 
have found strong support for both physician-assisted suicide and assisted suicide by 
friends and relatives. The July 2009 Populus poll, as referred to above, found that 74% 
of respondents were in favour of legalising physician-assisted suicide, and that 60% 
supported the legalisation of non-physician assisted suicide (i.e. by friends and 
relatives).155 Similarly, a 2010 poll by ComRes found that 74% of its respondents 
supported physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill, whilst 73% supported the 
idea of allowing family members or close friends to assist with suicides for the 
terminally ill.156 It is submitted that the growing support by the public for family 
members and friends to assist with suicides may be due to the fact that physicians are 
not only legally prohibited but also disallowed by the medical professional bodies in 
England and Wales from taking active measures to end the lives of their patients.157  
It is argued that the DPP’s Policy is not clear on what might be legally permissible in 
terms of ‘assistance’ provided by healthcare professionals in assisted suicides. It is 
doubtful whether the DPP will apply his policy to a healthcare professional who merely 
provides a patient with their medical records in order for them to seek an assisted 
suicide abroad.158 It would be a breach of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for a 
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physician to refuse a patient their medical records.159 Further, section 7 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 provides a patient with a right of access to their medical records, 
provided the disclosure of such data does not cause ‘serious harm’ to the physical or 
mental health of the patient.160 The ‘serious harm’ exception in section 7 is difficult to 
reconcile with patients who regard assisted suicide to be in their best interests.161  
The lack of clarity in the DPP’s Policy on ‘permissible assistance’ by healthcare 
professionals was considered by the Court of Appeal in Nicklinson (discussed above). 
Martin, who was joined as a party in Mrs Nicklinson’s appeal, argued that the DPP’s 
Policy fails to provide sufficient clarity on the assistance which is permissible by 
healthcare professionals or professional carers (whether for payment or not) to those 
requesting assisted suicide. Martin asserted that the DPP’s Policy is an unjustified 
interference with his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR, as the interference is too 
uncertain to be ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by Article 8(2).162 The Court of 
Appeal held that the phrase ‘in accordance with law’ requires the law to be clear, 
accessible and foreseeable.163 The Court held that a person should be able to reasonably 
foresee the effect of their involvement or participation in someone’s suicide, and that it 
is impossible to predict with certainty under the DPP’s Policy whether a healthcare 
professional who assists a victim to commit suicide will be prosecuted or not.164 The 
Court of Appeal judgment states:  
Despite the wording of the order made in Purdy, we consider that it is not 
sufficient for the [DPP’s] Policy merely to list the factors that the DPP will 
take into account in deciding whether to consent to a prosecution under 
section 2(1) [of the SA 1961]. A list of factors which contains no clue as to 
how the discretion to grant or withhold consent will be exercised is not 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 8(2)… If a list of relevant 
factors does not enable the person concerned to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable and adequate in the circumstances, the consequences of his 
action, then the Article 8(2) requirement is not satisfied. It is clear, 
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therefore, that the order made by the House of Lords in Purdy required the 
DPP to identify the facts and circumstances which he would take into 
account in such a way that a person who is considering providing assistance 
to a victim to commit suicide is able to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable and adequate in the circumstances, the consequences of 
providing such assistance.165  
By a majority decision, the Court of Appeal in Nicklinson requested the DPP to amend 
the DPP’s Policy to provide more clarity for healthcare professionals.166 The Court of 
Appeal judgment states:  
In our judgment, the…[DPP’s] Policy is in certain respects not sufficiently 
clear to satisfy the requirements of Article 8(2) in relation to healthcare 
professionals. It is not surprising that…[healthcare professionals] are 
reluctant to assist victims to commit suicide ... How does…[the DPP’s 
Policy] apply in the case of a medical doctor or nurse who is caring for a 
patient and out of compassion is willing to assist the patient to commit 
suicide, but is not, as it were, in the business of assisting individuals to 
commit suicide and perhaps has never done so before? How much weight is 
given by the DPP to…[Factor 14 in favour of prosecution] alone? And if the 
professional accepts some payment for undertaking the task, will that be 
likely to involve a finding that he or she is not wholly motivated by 
compassion, thereby triggering both…[Factor 6 in favour of prosecution] … 
and…[Factor 13 in favour of prosecution] ? These questions are of crucial 
importance to healthcare professionals who may be contemplating providing 
assistance. It is of no less importance to victims who wish to commit 
suicide, but have no relative or close friend who is willing and able to help 
them to do so ... the…[DPP’s] Policy should give some indication of the 
weight that the DPP accords to the fact that the helper was acting in his or 
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her capacity as a healthcare professional and the victim was in his or her 
care…the Policy does not provide medical doctors and other professionals 
with the kind of steer…that it provides to relatives and close friends acting 
out of compassion.167  
The fact that to date, no physicians have been prosecuted, in any capacity, for assisting a 
suicide abroad adds to the uncertainty in respect of ‘permissible assistance’ by 
healthcare professionals.168 An example is the case of Dr Michael Irwin, though it must 
be appreciated that this case is of limited significance in the present context. The case 
occurred at a time when there was no offence-specific prosecuting policy for the offence 
of assisted suicide, and thus the DPP applied the public interest factors in the CCP.169 In 
February 2007, Irwin assisted in the arrangements for Raymond Cutkelvin’s suicide at 
Dignitas. This included visiting Cutkelvin to discuss the Dignitas procedures, 
contributing towards the Dignitas costs by paying £1,500 of his own money, and 
accompanying Cutkelvin on the flight to Switzerland.170 These arrangements could be 
regarded as more than ‘minor assistance’,171 yet the DPP stated that a prosecution would 
not be in the public interest, and Dr Irwin was not prosecuted.172  
Although public opinion supports a change in the law to allow healthcare professionals 
to assist suicides, recent studies by Seale173 and Lee et al174 suggest that a majority of 
doctors are opposed to such a change. Both studies found that only between one-third 
and two-fifths of doctors are in favour of a more permissive approach to assisted suicide 
for those patients suffering from a terminal illness. Seale’s 2007–2008 study of 3,733 
doctors found that 35.2% of the doctors surveyed were in favour of physician-assisted 
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suicide for the terminally ill, whilst only 21.7% were in favour for the chronically ill.175 
Lee et al’s 2007 study was based on a sample of 372 questionnaires returned by 
doctors.176 The study found that 39% of respondents supported a change in the law to 
permit assisted suicide for terminally ill patients and 49% were opposed to such a 
change. Of the 39% in support, only 31% were willing to personally facilitate 
physician-assisted suicide. Lee et al’s survey further found that doctors who regularly 
worked with the dying were less likely to support a change in the law to permit 
physician assisted suicide. 66% of those never caring for the dying supported a change 
in the law, whilst 72% of those caring for the dying on a daily basis opposed it. 
 Previous suicide attempts 
Before the Interim Policy was introduced, a victim’s previous suicide attempts were 
taken into account by the DPP when deciding whether to prosecute a suspect for 
assisted suicide. This is demonstrated in the case of Daniel James, where previous 
suicide attempts of the 23-year-old James were a factor against prosecuting his 
parents.177 Despite this, Factor 11 against prosecution in the Interim Policy – that the 
victim had previously attempted to commit suicide and was likely to try to do so again – 
attracted substantial critical comment during the public consultation. Rather than 
regarding this as evidence of a voluntary, clear, settled and informed intent by a victim 
to end their life, an estimated 1,000 respondents fittingly considered a victim’s previous 
suicide attempts as being equally indicative of their suffering from serious mental or 
physical issues.178 They soundly argued that previous suicide attempts could be seen as a 
victim’s ‘cry for help’, and that such vulnerable individuals could more properly benefit 
from increased care, or support, rather than being assisted to end their life.179 As a result, 
Factor 11 was appropriately removed from the DPP’s Policy. 
 Suspect’s relationship with the victim 
Factor 10 in favour of prosecution in the Interim Policy provided for a higher likelihood 
of prosecution if the suspect was neither the spouse, partner, close relative or close 
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personal friend of the victim,180 whilst Factor 6 against prosecution provided for a lower 
likelihood of prosecution if the suspect was either the spouse, partner, close relative, or 
close personal friend of the victim.181 Over 1,600 respondents raised concerns with these 
two factors. They aptly asserted that familial or other close personal relationships are 
not always supportive and could in some circumstances be antagonistic, manipulative or 
violent.182 They also said that such factors could discriminate against a victim who does 
not have such close support available to them.183 This was the very predicament 
experienced by Tony Nicklinson,184 and more recently by Martin.185 Both factors were 
duly removed from the DPP’s Policy. Nevertheless, as discussed above, public opinion 
surveys in the UK show increasing support for family members to be able to lawfully 
assist in the suicides of their loved ones.    
Based on the response from the public consultation, the DPP believed that the public 
interest factors in the DPP’s Policy represents society’s general moral yardstick to what 
it believed to be permissible suicide assistance.186 It is argued however that the feedback 
from the public consultation, as it was conducted, does not reflect the prevailing 
morality or values in English society. There had been no thorough study or survey 
conducted to establish an objective, independent gathering and evaluation of data. It is 
unclear how members of the public were invited to participate in the consultation 
exercise, and whether there were any selection procedures involved. The DPP’s method 
of gauging public opinion, by merely inviting members of the public to respond with 
views on the policy is not a sound method of collecting empirical data. The results from 
the public consultation were also not statistically sound in terms of size, as only an 
estimated 5,000 people responded to the consultation.187  
2.2.4 Effect of DPP’s Policy 
The DPP’s Policy attempts to clarify how prosecutorial discretion is exercised, by 
providing a list of factors that the DPP will take into account in deciding whether or not 
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a prosecution for assisted suicide is in the public interest.188 The fact that suicides which 
take place within England and Wales are included in the DPP’s Policy makes the policy 
more significant than was originally anticipated by the House of Lords in Purdy which 
had only directed the DPP to provide clarity for those travelling overseas.189 As observed 
by Lewis, ‘[the] DPP [has created] an expansive policy covering all assisted suicides 
rather than just those which take place in another more permissive jurisdiction.’190 
Pursuant to the DPP’s Policy, a prosecution would be unlikely to be in the public 
interest where a person compassionately assists a loved-one, who has made a voluntary, 
clear, settled and informed decision to die.191 The British public is generally in favour of 
the principle that a person should not be prosecuted for compassionately assisting 
another to commit suicide.192 This is demonstrated in the findings of a 2010 YouGov 
poll for the Daily Telegraph newspaper, which showed that 82% of respondents 
supported the DPP’s Policy on assisted suicide.193 It is, however, argued that in respect 
of meeting the needs of society, the DPP’s Policy itself is far from adequate for the 
following reasons. 
The effect of relying upon the DPP’s Policy is that investigations are only ever carried 
out to consider the victim’s settled decision to die, and the suspect’s motivation after the 
victim’s death.194 Thus, there are no prospective safeguards in place under the current 
model to protect those who seek an assisted suicide, but who might be vulnerable and 
feel under pressure from others to seek such assistance. The public-interest factors in the 
DPP’s Policy have been designed to ensure that suicide assistance remains an activity 
carried out by amateurs or inexperienced individuals in England and Wales, as 
healthcare professionals are deterred from assisting patients.195 They also deter any 
individuals or organisations from providing any expert information,196 even to the extent 
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of making such information available on a website,197 and discourage the emergence of 
any assisted suicide facility198 within England and Wales.199 Thus, the DPP’s Policy 
makes sure that it is extremely difficult to obtain meaningful or practical assistance with 
suicide within England and Wales.200 This may actively encourage people to seek help in 
right-to-die organisations abroad, and to seek an assisted suicide sooner than they might 
otherwise, because of the need to travel abroad whilst they are able to do so.201 In this 
manner, the DPP’s Policy may succeed in keeping the number of assisted suicides 
which take place entirely within England and Wales relatively low.202 However, if this is 
achieved at the cost of exporting suicidal Britons to a jurisdiction where an assisted 
suicide is easily available, then the law is less than satisfactory.203 
The inadequacy of the DPP’s Policy is also reflected in the recent 2013 decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Nicklinson:  
A list of factors which contains no clue as to how the discretion to grant or 
withhold consent will be exercised is not sufficient to meet the requirements 
of Article 8(2)204…If a list of relevant factors does not enable the person 
concerned to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable and adequate in the 
circumstances, the consequences of his action, then the Article 8(2) 
requirement is not satisfied.205 
A concern with the DPP’s Policy is that the discretion to prosecute assisted suicide 
cases under section 2(4) of the SA 1961 is applied according to an offence-specific 
policy, rather than legislation. If there is a change of DPP, then the application of the 
DPP’s Policy may change. Thus, there remains considerable uncertainty with the type of 
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conduct that will attract criminal prosecution for assisted suicide in England and 
Wales.206  
The CPS has asserted that the offence of assisted suicide is no different from any other 
criminal offence in which the DPP has a similar discretion whether or not to 
prosecute.207 This, however, is not convincing. In addition to the CCP,208 the CPS applies 
the DPP’s Policy when exercising its prosecutorial discretion on whether to prosecute 
for assisted suicide offences.209 As the DPP’s Policy states:  
[W]here there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution [for assisted 
suicide], prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is 
required in the public interest…[P]rosecutors must apply the public interest 
factors set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the factors set out in 
[the DPP’s Policy] in making their decisions. A prosecution will usually 
take place unless the prosecutor is sure that there are public interest factors 
tending against prosecution which outweigh those tending in favour.210 
There is a difference in application between the DPP’s Policy and the CCP. The DPP’s 
Policy prescribes public interest factors for and against a prosecution that apply to all 
cases of assisted suicide, whereas the DPP’s public interest discretion not to prosecute 
under the CCP is normally reserved for exceptional individual cases. 
The DPP’s Policy states that it neither ‘decriminalises’ the offence of encouraging or 
assisting suicide, nor provides an assurance that any person will be immune from 
prosecution.211 Nevertheless, there have been no prosecutions for assisting a suicide 
since the DPP’s Policy was published. This is notwithstanding the fact that there have 
been 68 cases referred to the CPS between 1 April 2009 and 1 March 2013.212 It is 
accepted that the DPP’s decision not to prosecute any of these referrals has undermined 
society’s respect for the law.213 There is now a public perception that any assisted 
suicides which meet the criteria stipulated by the DPP’s Policy have been 
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decriminalised.214 This perception has been further bolstered by the House of Commons 
passing a motion to endorse the DPP’s Policy on 27 March 2012.215  
The chapter will now demonstrate that the current law on assisted death is inconsistent 
with the current law on end-of-life medical decisions in England and Wales. Despite 
assisted death being illegal in England and Wales, physicians are legally permitted to 
carry out certain end-of-life medical decisions. Three such situations are examined in 
the following section.  
2.3 Current laws concerning end-of-life medical decisions 
There are three situations in which end-of-life medical decisions are legally permitted  
the administration of palliative medication with the foreseen although unintended 
consequence of the patient’s death (‘doctrine of double effect’), the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from competent patients who refuse treatment, 
and the similar withdrawal of such treatment from incompetent patients in their ‘best 
interests’. These will be discussed in turn below. This section will also examine the case 
of Re A, where the English courts, relying on ‘necessity’, permitted an operation to 
separate a pair of conjoined twins that resulted in the death of one twin.216 However, 
‘necessity’ as a legal justification for ending one’s life, remains restricted to the unusual 
facts of Re A.217  
2.3.1 Doctrine of double effect 
English case law permits a physician to administer a patient with palliative medication, 
with the intention of relieving pain and discomfort, even if it is foreseen that the 
patient’s death will be hastened as a result of the high dosages of medication that are 
typically administered.218 The English case that first highlighted this ‘doctrine of double 
effect’219 in medical practice was the 1957 murder trial of Dr Bodkin Adams, who had 
injected his 81-year-old patient with high doses of heroin and morphine.220 Although 
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Adams was acquitted of murder, the General Medical Council (‘GMC’) barred him 
from practising medicine for three years.221 Mr Justice Devlin stated that: 
If the first purpose of medicine – the restoration of health – could no longer 
be achieved, there was still much for a doctor to do, and he was entitled to 
do all that was proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if 
the measures he took might incidentally shorten life by hours or perhaps 
even longer.222  
It is the physician’s intention which determines whether the doctrine of double effect 
constitutes a legal defence to murder.223 Provided a physician demonstrated the intention 
to only relieve suffering, the fact that they might have foreseen that death was virtually 
certain to result from a high dosage of palliative medication does not matter.224 It is 
argued that there is a contradiction between this doctrine and the elements of the law of 
murder. English courts have recognised that where a person foresees that death is a 
virtually certain consequence of their action, this would either amount to intention, or at 
least evidence of intention.225 However, to maintain the legality of the doctrine of double 
effect, a legal distinction between ‘foresight’ and ‘intention’ has been created by the 
courts. As a result, the English courts have legally permitted what could be regarded as 
‘indirect euthanasia’. In this regard, it is concluded that the law is inconsistent in its 
approach to medical decisions with a ‘double effect’ and assisted death in England and 
Wales. 
The doctrine of double effect was endorsed by the House of Lords in 1994 in Bland’s 
case, where Lord Goff held that a physician may ‘lawfully administer painkilling drugs, 
[in an incompetent patient’s best interests], despite the fact that he knows that an 
incidental effect of that application will be to abbreviate the patient’s life’.226 Seale’s 
2004 national survey on end-of-life decisions, using the responses of 857 doctors in the 
UK, found the administration of palliative medication with possible life-shortening 
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effect to be a widespread practice. An estimated 192,000 patients (out of 584,791 
deaths) per annum were found to have their lives ended in this way.227 
Rothschild’s argument that the doctrine of double effect could be manipulated to 
covertly end a patient’s life is a powerful one. Although a patient is not legally 
permitted to request lethal medication, if a lethal amount of palliative treatment is 
administered, it would be difficult to determine the legality of such actions.228 In such 
cases the courts would have to determine whether the physician’s intention was to end 
the patient’s life, or to alleviate their pain. The findings of Seale’s 2009 survey, on 
end-of-life decisions in the UK between 2007 and 2008, indicate the existence of such 
covert practices in England and Wales. Seale’s survey showed that slightly less than one 
fifth of annual patient deaths in the UK are the result of the doctrine of double effect.229 
Of the 2,869 physicians who had presided over patient deaths in 2008, 17.1% of deaths 
had involved a medical decision with a ‘double effect’. In 15.1% of these deaths the 
physicians reported ‘knowledge of probable or certain hastening of end of life’, and in 
2.0% the physicians reported that they were even ‘partly intending to end life’. This 
2.0% of deaths where physicians had ‘partly intended to end life’ is evidence 
demonstrating the difficulty of determining the legality of medical decisions with a 
‘double effect’. It is accepted that in such cases doctors may have a ‘double intention’, 
an intention to not only relieve suffering but an intention to hasten death as well.230 
This ‘double intention’ of doctors in relation to medical decisions with a ‘double effect’ 
was illustrated in the 1981 case of Dr Arthur.231 Dr Arthur was charged with the 
attempted murder of a Down Syndrome child who also had other defects affecting his 
brain, heart and lungs. The doctor had ordered ‘nursing care’ only for the child, and 
administered a sedative which alleviated stress.232 The child died of starvation three days 
later. Dr Arthur confessed to the police that the sedative was intended to both relieve the 
symptoms of the child’s physical condition and to stop him wanting sustenance.233 
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However, the judge made no mention of Dr Arthur’s potential homicidal intent during 
the summing up,234 and the doctor was acquitted.235 The law in respect of medical 
decisions with a ‘double effect’, involving critically ill infants, has been clarified by 
Lord Donaldson in the 1990 case of Re J:  
[D]octors and the court have to decide…whether, in the best interests of the 
child …a… decision as to medical treatment should be taken which as a 
side-effect will render death more or less likely… [T]he use of drugs to 
reduce pain will often be fully justified, notwithstanding that this will hasten 
the moment of death. What can never be justified is the use of drugs or 
surgical procedures with the primary purpose of doing so.236 
The doctrine of double effect was rejected in the 1992 case of Dr. Nigel Cox. Dr. Cox’s 
patient died after he gave her an intravenous injection of potassium chloride, a drug 
which has no pain-reducing qualities, but could cause cardiac arrest.237 The patient was 
suffering from a severe case of rheumatoid arthritis. She was expected to die within a 
few days, but the pain had become so extreme that she pleaded for an injection to end 
her life.238 The court found the physician to have intended to hasten his patient’s death 
rather than to relieve the patient of pain and suffering.239 Due to the uncertainty of the 
cause of death, Cox was charged with attempted murder rather than murder.240 Although 
Cox was found guilty and the judge held that he had ‘betrayed his unequivocal duty as a 
physician’, he was merely penalised with a 12 month suspended prison sentence.241 Cox 
was also not reprimanded by the GMC after being found guilty of serious misconduct.242 
Instead, when addressing Cox, the President of the GMC said, ‘you acted in good faith 
in what you thought to be the best interests of your dying patient, and ... your purpose 
was to relieve her intolerable suffering by expediting her death’.243  
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In conclusion, the doctrine of double effect calls into question the legal and moral 
defensibility of the current English law on assisted death. Whilst physicians cannot 
lawfully respond to a direct request for assistance to die, English law upholds the 
doctrine of double effect and permits doctors to knowingly hasten a patient’s death by 
relying on the fact that it is a mere side effect of palliative medication and not their 
intention to end life. Also, the cases of Dr Arthur and Dr Cox demonstrate that where 
physicians fail to rely on the doctrine of double effect to justify medical decisions 
hastening death, the English courts and the medical profession are lenient with such 
physicians if the reasons for such medical decisions are based on compassion.  
2.3.2 Competent patients refusing life-sustaining treatment 
In the 2002 case of Re B, the court held that physicians are not lawfully allowed to treat 
a competent patient who has refused life-sustaining treatment.244 In this case, Ms B was 
a 44-year-old woman who had suffered a haemorrhage in her spinal column, leaving her 
paralysed from the neck down and dependent on a ventilator to breathe. Ms B instructed 
her physicians to switch off her life-sustaining ventilator, but they refused on the 
grounds that she was not competent. She then sought a court order to declare that the 
refusal was an unlawful trespass. The court found Ms B to be competent. Dame 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P considered that:  
I am…asked…to decide whether [Ms B]…is legally competent to make [the 
decision whether to require the removal of the artificial ventilation keeping 
her alive]…Unless the gravity of the illness has affected the patient’s 
[mental] capacity, a seriously disabled patient has the same rights as the fit 
person to respect for personal autonomy.245 
Dame Butler-Sloss further stated that those caring for Ms B ‘should not confuse the 
question of mental capacity with the nature of the decision made by the patient, 
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however grave the consequences’, since Ms B’s decision may ‘reflect a difference in 
values rather than an absence of competence’.246  
Keown argues that Ms B’s request to her physicians to switch off the life-sustaining 
ventilator may effectively be regarded as a request for physician-assisted suicide. The 
decision in Re B, according to him, could amount to a judicial extension of the right to 
refuse treatment to the right to assisted suicide.247 Keown’s argument is not persuasive 
as competent patients have the absolute right to refuse treatment, ‘notwithstanding that 
the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or non-existent’.248 
The English courts have also expressly stated that refusals of life-sustaining treatment 
do not amount to suicide.249 As Lord Goff in Bland’s case held:  
there is no question of the patient having committed suicide, nor therefore of 
the doctor having aided or abetted him in so doing. It is simply that the 
patient has, as he is entitled to do, declined to consent to treatment which 
might or could have the effect of prolonging his life, and the doctor has, in 
accordance with his duty, complied with his patient’s wishes.250 
It is submitted that the case of Re B demonstrates that English law does not recognise a 
competent person’s right to die with assistance except to the extent that a person can 
achieve this goal by exercising their right to refuse treatment.251 
It is argued that a comparison made between the cases of Pretty252 (discussed above) and 
Re B demonstrates the inconsistency of the current English law on assisted death. Ms B, 
who was not terminally ill, was granted a court order which enabled her to die, whilst 
the terminally ill Mrs Pretty was denied a court order permitting her husband to assist 
her to travel to Switzerland, for an assisted suicide at Dignitas. Commentators have 
provided various ethical justifications for reconciling cases such as these. For example, 
Beauchamp and Childress consider that in cases such as Re B it is the underlying 
disease or injury that causes the patient’s death rather than the discontinuance of 
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treatment.253 Pellegrino describes this as ‘letting Nature take its course’,254 while McGee 
regards this as ‘not taking control of death’.255 Miller, however, convincingly argues that 
where life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn from patients like Ms B who are not 
terminally ill, the cause of death is both the underlying disease or injury and the 
withdrawal of treatment.256 He also forcefully argues that if life-sustaining treatment is 
withdrawn from a terminally ill patient, it is reasonable to assume that death is caused 
by the disease, as life is merely prolonged by such treatment. Thus, relying on Miller’s 
ethical reasoning, by switching off Ms B’s life-sustaining ventilator, the physicians 
would have contributed to her death. The case of Re B demonstrates that a competent 
patient, dependent on life-sustaining treatment, may still have some control over the 
manner and timing of their death under the present law in England and Wales. 
Thus, it is rightly contended by Brodowski that: 
there may be little distinction between the intent of a terminally ill patient 
who decides to remove her life support and one who seeks the assistance of 
a doctor in ending her life ... [as in] both situations, the patient is seeking to 
hasten a certain, impending death.257 
Thus, if patients are able to end their lives by refusing life-sustaining treatment, it is 
morally indefensible that they are prevented from ending their lives more directly 
through lethal medication.258 Many commentators argue that there is the risk of abuse 
should physician-assisted suicide be legalised. However, it is submitted that the same 
risks of abuse exist in cases where life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn. 
As correctly observed by Rothschild, there is no reason why patients and particularly 
the old and vulnerable,259 cannot be coerced or pressured into having treatment withheld 
or withdrawn which may otherwise save or extend their lives.260  
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2.3.3 Incompetent patients unable to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
English law permits physicians to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients, if they determine this to be in the patients’ best interests. In 1994, 
the House of Lords in Bland’s case held that a physician’s duty towards a patient in a 
permanent vegetative state (‘PVS’) does not extend to prolonging their life at all costs.261 
In this case, Bland was a 17-year-old patient who had sustained injuries from being 
crushed and deprived of oxygen in the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium disaster. 
These injuries had led to irreversible brain damage, and had caused Bland to be in a 
state of PVS for four years. The House of Lords held that the provision of artificial 
nutrition and hydration (‘ANH’) was futile, burdensome and of no benefit to Bland,262 
and permitted the withdrawal of ANH from him, causing him to starve to death.263 As 
Lord Goff held, ‘if the treatment is futile ... it is no longer in the best interests of [Bland] 
to continue it.’264 His Lordship was of the view that there was no real difference between 
turning off a life support machine and never providing it in the first place.265 As the 
House of Lords had to draw a distinction between such withdrawal of treatment and 
murder, the lawful withdrawal of treatment was regarded as an ‘omission’ to provide 
treatment which there was no duty to provide,266 and Bland’s death was ‘regarded in law 
as exclusively caused by the injury or disease to which his condition [was] 
attributable’.267 
Brazier argues that ‘The legerdemain by which their Lordships classified removal of a 
feeding tube as an omission not an act provokes charges of covert legalisation of 
euthanasia.’268 Even Lord Lowry in Bland’s case expressly recognised that the case 
might be seen as an example of ‘euthanasia in action’.269 He further stated that the ‘act’ 
and ‘omission’ distinction was ‘a distinction without a difference: the intention is to 
terminate life’.270 Similarly, Lord Mustill observed in Bland’s case that, to absolve the 
physicians from causing the death of a patient on the basis that it was an omission and 
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not an act was ‘morally and intellectually dubious’, ‘illogical’, and served only to 
emphasise ‘the distortions of a legal structure which is already both morally and 
intellectually misshapen’.271 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bland’s case admitted that the 
Bland decision was irrational: 
How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, 
over a period of weeks from lack of food but unlawful to produce his 
immediate death by a lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet 
another ordeal to add to the tragedy that has already struck them?272  
It is contended that the House of Lords’ approach to the distinction between ‘act’ and 
‘omission’ is artificial as their Lordships themselves conceded. Whilst a discontinuation 
of treatment is regarded an ‘omission’, it is hard to rationalise how the ‘removal’ of 
treatment such as life support machines and feeding tubes can be considered an 
‘omission’. As soundly asserted by Beauchamp, when a feeding tube is removed from a 
patient, it is the withdrawal of treatment that directly leads to death by starvation and 
dehydration, rather than death being the result of an underlying illness or disease.273 
McLean forcefully argues that the House of Lords’ authorisation of the removal of 
ANH from Bland amounted to the endorsement of non-voluntary euthanasia.274 
Similarly, Andrews cogently asserts that: 
[w]e seem to be progressing down the road of accepting [non-]voluntary 
euthanasia before voluntary euthanasia has been accepted legally. It is 
unlikely that starvation would be regarded as an acceptable way of assisting 
dying in voluntary euthanasia, so should we even consider this method for 
[non-]voluntary euthanasia?275  
Seale’s research on end-of-life decisions in the UK between 2007 and 2008 shows how 
prevalent such omissions are. Seale found that over one fifth of annual deaths involved 
an omission to treat the patient, both competent and incompetent. 21.8% of deaths 
involved the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, with the 
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physician’s knowledge or intention that this would result in the patient’s death.276 In 
16.8% of the deaths, the physician made the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment 
with ‘knowledge of probable or certain hastening of end of life’. In 4.9% of the deaths, 
the decision was made ‘with explicit intention of hastening end of life’.  
It is argued that the current prohibition on assisted death in England and Wales is 
inconsistent with such end-of-life medical decisions involving incompetent patients. It 
is permissible to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent 
patient, without their prior consent, with the intention to end their life. Yet, it is illegal 
to assist a person to end their life based on their competent and autonomous decision to 
die.  
Over 10 years after Bland’s case, it was reiterated in the 2005 case of Burke that 
treatment which placed an intolerable burden on an incompetent patient may be 
withdrawn if it is clinically determined to be futile and unlikely to be in the patient’s 
best interests. The Court of Appeal in Burke also held that legally competent patients 
cannot demand that life-sustaining treatment be administered in the event that they 
cease to be legally competent.277 In Burke, the patient was dying from cerebellar ataxia, 
a progressive degenerative brain condition. His condition was expected to deteriorate to 
a point at which he would lose his physical abilities, including the ability to swallow 
and communicate. The patient was concerned that the GMC’s guidance on the 
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment278 would result in him being 
deprived of ANH once he was no longer able to express his wishes. He challenged the 
legality of this guidance, by invoking Articles 2,279 3280 and 8281 of the ECHR. The Court 
of Appeal held that the withdrawal or withholding of ANH may be appropriate when 
physicians determine that the burdens outweigh the benefits of treatment. The Court 
further stated that the ‘best interests’ test is an objective one, and that what physicians 
consider to be in a patient’s best interests may conflict with the patient’s own wishes. 
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Based on Burke, physicians must provide ANH to a patient who is competent. However, 
when a patient is no longer competent, the provision of ANH is purely a medical matter 
to be determined by physicians by acting in the patient’s best interests.  
The cases of Bland and Burke demonstrate that English law is morally indefensible. 
When a patient becomes incompetent, physicians are allowed to make paternalistic282 
medical decisions on the provision of life-sustaining treatment to them. After weighing 
the burdens and benefits of treatment, and determining the best interests of the patient, 
physicians may withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from incompetent 
patients. Yet, a competent patient is not allowed to determine their own best interests 
and end a life of unbearable pain and suffering with the assistance of a willing 
physician.  
 Advance decisions  
Under common law, English courts have recognised that an advance refusal of 
treatment by a patient who has subsequently become incompetent is as valid as a 
contemporaneous refusal of treatment by a competent patient.283 However, prior to the 
MCA 2005, the courts had approached such advance refusals ‘with a bias against their 
validity and applicability, unless they are clear and unambiguous’.284 Since 2007, life-
sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld from an incompetent patient 
pursuant to an advance decision made under the MCA 2005 when the patient was 
competent.285 Thus, advance decisions may effectively enable competent patients to 
extend their autonomy286 and right to self-determination,287 to make decisions concerning 
the manner and time of their death for when they are no longer competent.  
It is, however, argued that advance decisions may lack the moral force of 
contemporaneous decisions.288 A person’s wishes and feelings may not remain the same 
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following their incapacity.289 As Donnelly cogently argues, a competent person may 
have clear preferences regarding their life but these might change following a loss of 
capacity. A person who, while competent, expresses a strong preference that they would 
not wish to live with profound disabilities, may be contented in a state which would 
have previously seemed unbearable to them.290 Nevertheless, an advance decision made 
pursuant to the MCA 2005 will not be followed if there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for 
believing that circumstances exist which the person did not anticipate at the time of 
making the advance decision, and which would have affected the decision had the 
person anticipated them.291 
 Best interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) 
Since 2007, decisions made on behalf of incompetent patients have to be made based on 
an assessment of the patients’ best interests under the MCA 2005.292 The MCA 2005 
provides a checklist of factors that must be considered in determining what would be in 
the patient’s best interests.293 However, as the checklist is not exhaustive, other factors 
will also be considered.294 In respect of the provision of life-sustaining treatment, the 
MCA 2005 provides that:  
All reasonable steps which are in the person’s best interests should be taken 
to prolong their life. There will be a limited number of cases where 
treatment is futile, overly burdensome to the patient or where there is no 
prospect of recovery. In circumstances such as these, it may be that an 
assessment of best interests leads to the conclusion that it would be in the 
best interests of the patient to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment, even if this may result in the patient’s death.295 
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The MCA 2005 specifically states that the decision-maker must not, in considering 
whether the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment is in a person’s best 
interests, be motivated by a desire to bring about their death.296 
The MCA 2005 also provides:  
As with all decisions, before deciding to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining treatment, the decision-maker must consider the range of 
treatment options available to work out what would be in the person’s best 
interests. All the factors in the best interests checklist should be considered, 
and in particular, the decision-maker should consider any statements that the 
person has previously made about their wishes and feelings about 
life-sustaining treatment.297  
It is submitted that by recognising a person’s past wishes and feelings,298 views,299 beliefs 
and values300, the MCA 2005 promotes the autonomy of incompetent patients. As 
Dworkin observes, by providing a space for past preferences, it seeks to give effect to 
the individual’s ‘right to a life structured by his own values’.301  
It is argued that a ‘best interests’ assessment which recognises past preferences contains 
a strong element of the ‘substituted judgement’ standard.302 Thus, the MCA 2005 
recognises the dicta of Hoffman LJ in Bland’s case which suggested applying a 
‘substituted judgement’ standard for Bland: 
[t]he patient’s best interests would normally also include having respect 
paid to what seems most likely to have been his own views on the subject. 
To this extent I think that what the American courts have called ‘substituted 
judgement’ may be subsumed within the English concept of best interests.303 
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It is accepted that the ‘substituted judgement’ standard under the MCA 2005 is closer to 
an autonomy based standard304 than the ‘objective’ best interests standard under 
common law.305  
In October 2013, the Supreme Court decision of Aintree University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v James (the Aintree NHS Trust case)306 affirmed that the best interests 
assessment under the MCA 2005 is one that requires a patient’s subjective interests to 
be considered, an assessment which is line with a ‘substituted judgement’ standard. The 
Court also noted that although: 
The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the 
patient’s point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any 
more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail. We cannot always 
have what we want.307  
The Aintree NHS Trust case will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four. 
As observed by Joyce, the substituted judgement standard is included in the best 
interests assessment under the MCA 2005, to whatever extent the views or wishes of the 
patient when they had capacity are known. However, where patient’s wishes or 
preferences are not known, the best interests assessment involves the weighing up of a 
range of factors to decide what is, on balance, best for the person.308 In such 
circumstances, the ‘objective’ best interests assessment may be applied by physicians 
and the courts. Besides the wishes or preferences of the person, the views of others like 
family members and carers may also be taken into account if it can help determine what 
is in a patient’s best interests.309 However, it is argued that close friends or family 
members may not always know the past preferences or relevant beliefs and values of an 
incompetent person.310 Thus, in these cases, the MCA 2005 cannot guarantee respect for 
what an incompetent patient’s earlier autonomous decision would have been. 
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For cases such as Bland involving a patient in a PVS, the courts have indicated that 
when considering the ‘best interests’ of a patient in a PVS under the MCA 2005, no 
balancing exercise need be undertaken because continued treatment will never be in 
such a patient’s ‘best interests’.311 
A review of cases under the MCA 2005 indicates there remain at least three areas where 
the details the MCA’s application are still to be resolved. The first area concerns the 
determination of a patient’s ‘best interests’ under the MCA 2005, and how to reconcile 
this with the common law principle that a physician should not be compelled to treat a 
patient. This was considered in An NHS Trust v L (L’s case).312 
L’s case involved an application by an NHS Trust for a declaration that it would not be 
in the best interests of L, an incompetent patient, to receive active resuscitation in the 
event that he should require it due to a cardiac arrest or similar deterioration. L was in a 
‘minimally conscious state’ after suffering a heart attack, with no prospect of further 
improvement. In the event of a further cardiac arrest, L’s condition was likely to 
deteriorate further if revived, and would at best be returned to its current state of 
minimal consciousness. 
The judge in L’s case, Moylan J, noted that the voice given to a patient’s autonomy 
under the MCA 2005 continues to be constrained by the principle that ‘doctors cannot 
be required to provide treatment which is contrary to their professional judgment’313. In 
reconciling this principle with the MCA 2005, Moylan J further noted (i) that under the 
MCA 2005 ‘there needs to be a choice of treatment options. If there are no treatment 
options, then the court has no effective choice to make’,314 and (ii) that ‘[t]hey must be 
treatments which would not require medical professionals to act in a way which was 
contrary to their professional clinical judgment’.315 Moylan J stated that in his own view, 
there were no such treatment options in L’s case, as there was only one treatment option 
which was not contrary to professional clinical judgment. This was the option of not 
reviving L, should L require it.316 Somewhat surprisingly, Moylan J then stated that 
‘[h]owever, as none of the parties support this conclusion, I now turn to the balancing 
                                                          
311 In re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) at 
[102] and [64]. Baker J (obiter) referring to Lord Goff’s judgment in Bland’s case (ch1 n12) 868-869. 
312 An NHS Trust v L [2013] EWHC 4313 (Fam) (‘L’s case’). 
313 ibid [78]. 
314 ibid [113]. 
315 ibid [116]. 
316 ibid [117]. 
 78 
exercise [under the MCA 2005]’.317 It is unclear whether Moylan J felt obliged to do this 
because he was constrained by the parties’ submissions, or whether he merely chose to 
do this in order to remove any doubt about either the outcome, or about how the MCA 
2005 is to be applied. 
As required under the MCA 2005, Moylan J balanced all of the factors pointing both in 
favour and against the provision of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (‘CPR’) to L. In 
doing so, he considered both the evidence of L’s wishes, as well as the physicians’ 
objective assessment of L’s likely quality of life. As a factor in favour of CPR, 
Moylan J accepted evidence from the family that L would ‘find the current state and 
possibly a future worse state as giving an acceptable quality of life’.318 As a factor 
against CPR, Moylan J considered that ‘Even though it might be acceptable to Mr L, he 
has a very poor quality of life which is likely significantly to deteriorate in the event of 
a further cardio-respiratory arrest or other serious deterioration in his health’.319  
Given Moylan J’s view that a balancing of factors under the MCA 2005 was not 
required, it is not surprising that Moylan J’s assessment when applying the MCA 2005 
was that the clinical judgment of the doctors still prevailed. He concluded in favour of 
the NHS Trust’s application. The fact that all parties to this case disagreed with Moylan 
J, and asserted that multiple treatment options did exist in this case,320 may indicate that 
the full mechanics are yet to be ironed out for reconciling the MCA 2005 with the 
common law principle that a physician’s clinical views about futile treatment are 
sacrosanct. 
A second apparent unresolved area of the MCA’s application concerns the weight that is 
to be given under the MCA 2005 to the expressed wishes of a patient who lacks full 
capacity. This arose in the 2012 case of A Local Authority v E (E’s case),321 and in the 
2013 case of A NHS Trust v Dr. A (Dr. A’s case). 322 
E’s case involved a 32-year-old patient (E) who suffered from ‘a triad of anorexia, 
alcoholism and personality disorder’. Tragically, all three conditions stemmed from E 
suffering sexual abuse as a child. During the preceding six years, E had been placed 
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four times in an eating disorder unit, and once in an alcohol treatment unit.323 E was now 
in a palliative care unit after refusing to eat, or receive any treatment or nourishment. 
She had also signed a document stating that she did not want to be resuscitated or to be 
given any medical intervention to prolong her life. 
A question considered in E’s case by Jackson J was ‘Does E at this point have the 
mental capacity to make decisions about her treatment?’324 He held that:  
There is no doubt that E has an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain in the form of her anorexia. Equally it is 
clear that in terms of MCA s. 3(1) she can understand and retain the 
information relevant to the treatment decision and can communicate her 
decision.325  
However, in holding that E lacked capacity, Jackson J then stated that:  
there is strong evidence that E’s obsessive fear of weight gain makes her 
incapable of weighing the advantages and disadvantages of eating in any 
meaningful way. For E, the compulsion to prevent calories entering her 
system has become the card that trumps all others. The need not to gain 
weight empowers all other thoughts.326  
He further held that: 
A secondary reason for the conclusion that E lacks capacity is that she is 
now subject to strong sedative medication and is in a severely weakened 
condition. She is, as her parents described it, in a ‘drug haze’.327 
Although Jackson J determined that E lacked capacity, when considering ‘The 
advantages and disadvantages of each course of action [that] must be balanced out’,328 
he considered that the following two factors were in favour of continued palliative care 
as a treatment option — ‘It reflects E’s wishes’, and ‘it reflects E’s personal 
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autonomy’.329 The consideration of these factors despite E being held to lack capacity 
appears to be somewhat contradictory. 
Dr. A’s case includes a similar apparent contradiction. The case involved an Iranian 
doctor (Dr. A), who was resisting deportation from the UK with a hunger strike, whilst 
also showing symptoms of delusions which called into question his capacity to make 
rational decisions. In determining whether it would be in Dr. A’s best interests to grant a 
declaration which would allow for the forcible provision of nutrition and hydration, 
Baker J applied the balance sheet approach.330 As an argument against force feeding, 
Baker J considered that ‘[Dr. A’s] hunger strike... should be respected as an aspect of 
his personal autonomy’331 but then later noted that that ‘in deciding what weight to 
ascribe to those wishes, it is of course relevant that this court has concluded that [Dr. A] 
lacks capacity to use and weigh up information relevant to a decision’. 332 As noted by 
Richardson: 
The MCA does not ... indicate the weight to be given to the wishes of a 
person without capacity, nor how they are to be assessed against the court’s 
more general assessment of best interests.333 
This further indicates that in some aspects of end-of-life medical decisions, the 
application of the MCA 2005 is still yet to be refined. 
A third apparent unresolved area of the MCA’s application concerns a so-called  
‘Catch 22 situation’ that arose in E’s case. Jackson J acknowledged that ‘a person with 
severe anorexia may be in a Catch 22 situation regarding capacity, namely, that by 
deciding not to eat, she proves that she has no capacity at all’.334 In this ‘Catch 22’, a 
patient seeks to rely on their absolute autonomous right as a competent person to refuse 
treatment. As noted above, this right exists ‘however grave the consequences’.335 Yet, as 
noted by Jackson J, the patient’s attempt to exercise this right then also forms the basis 
for impugning their competency, and hence their right to autonomy. 
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Coggon likens E’s case to an earlier case, X NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment) (T’s case),336 in which a patient (T) was held to lack the capacity to 
refuse a blood transfusion, because she had refused the transfusion in the belief that her 
own blood was ‘evil’.337 Comparing T’s case to E’s case, Coggon notes that, ‘in both 
cases, the patients are conscious decision-makers, but are ruled to lack capacity on the 
basis of the reasons that underpin their choices’.338 Coggon then contrasts this with other 
cases in which the refusal of treatment or food due to religious or other conscientious 
beliefs was upheld, with no impugnation of the patient’s capacity. He concludes that 
there is currently no satisfactory means of ascertaining ‘which values are worthy of 
respect, and which ones of themselves indicate that the patient should be judged to lack 
capacity’.339 
In summary, the cases of L, E and Dr. A demonstrate that the application of the MCA 
2005 still requires further clarification, particularly in relation to, i) the determination of 
an incompetent patient’s ‘best interests’, ii) the weight to be given to the expressed 
wishes of a patient who lacks full capacity, and iii) the determination of whether or not 
a patient lacks capacity based upon the rationale for their conscious decisions.   
2.3.4 Necessity 
The moral and legal defensibility of the law on assisted death in England and Wales was 
tested even further by the case of Re A in 2000.340 In this case, the Court of Appeal 
allowed a surgical separation of twins, which resulted in the intended death of one twin, 
to enable the survival of the other. The conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, were born 
joined at the lower abdomen. Mary depended on Jodie’s heart and lungs to receive and 
use the latter’s oxygenated blood.341 This dependence by Mary on Jodie was expected to 
ultimately cause Jodie’s heart to fail. If the twins were surgically separated, Jodie had a 
good prospect of a healthy and normal life, but Mary was certain to die within minutes. 
The Court of Appeal granted an application by the hospital for a declaration that it could 
lawfully carry out the surgical separation. The Court had to address whether the surgery, 
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carried out in the knowledge that it was certain to result in Mary’s immediate death, 
would amount to murder. The Court noted that since the physicians foresaw that the 
severance of the common aorta was certain to cause Mary’s death, the physicians 
intended to kill Mary,342 ‘even though they may not have any desire to achieve that 
result’.343 The Court emphasised that the separation procedure was only valid because of 
the unique facts involved in the case.   
Brooke LJ noted that it was impossible to act simultaneously in the ‘best interests’ of 
both twins, agreeing that the ‘sacrificial separation operation’ was permissible on the 
basis that Jodie’s interests should be preferred, given that Mary was ‘sadly, self-
designated for a very early death’.344 Ward LJ stated that, ‘Given the conflict of duty 
[between the twins] I can see no other way of dealing with it than by choosing the lesser 
of the two evils and so finding the least detrimental alternative.’345 Ward LJ balanced the 
benefits of the operation to separate the twins, and held that this fell in favour of Jodie, 
as Mary would die either with or without operation.346 He observed that the physicians 
owed a duty to defend Jodie from the threat of fatal harm which arose from the physical 
burden imposed by Mary.347 He stated:  
I can see no difference in essence between…legitimate self-defence and the 
doctors coming to Jodie’s defence and removing the threat of fatal harm to 
her presented by [Mary]. The availability of such a plea of quasi-
self-defence, modified to meet the quite exceptional circumstances nature 
has inflicted on the twins, makes intervention by the doctors lawful.348  
Brooke LJ applied the doctrine of necessity to facts of the case. He said:  
there are three necessary requirements for the application of the doctrine of 
necessity: (i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; 
(ii) no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to 
be achieved; (iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil 
avoided. Given that the principles of modern family law point irresistibly to 
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the conclusion that interests of Jodie must be preferred to the conflicting 
interests of Mary, I consider that all three of these requirements are satisfied 
in this case.349  
The case of Re A further demonstrates, albeit on very narrow and special facts, the legal 
inconsistency in the law on the prohibition of assisted death in England and Wales. In 
Re A, physicians were allowed to carry out a medical procedure that resulted in Mary’s 
death. The decision was not a medical decision involving the ‘acts and omissions’ 
distinction or a ‘double effect’. The Court of Appeal relied on the doctrine of necessity 
to differentiate the case from euthanasia, and allowed the surgical separation. The Court 
also stated that the application of the doctrine of necessity was restricted to the unique 
facts of Re A. As stated in its judgment:  
Lest it be thought that this decision could become authority for wider 
propositions, such that a doctor, once he has determined that a patient 
cannot survive, can kill the patient, it is important to restate the unique 
circumstances for which this case is authority. They are that it must be 
impossible to preserve the life of X without bringing about the death of Y, 
that Y by his or her very continued existence will inevitably bring about the 
death of X within a very short period of time, and that X is capable of living 
an independent life but Y is incapable under any circumstances (including 
all forms of medical intervention) of viable independent existence.350  
As noted previously, the case of Nicklinson has more recently sought to argue a defence 
of necessity in cases of euthanasia with such arguments so far having been rejected by 
the courts.351   
In informing the current reform agenda for England and Wales, the chapter will now 
examine Bills which have been recently tabled in Parliament to legalise assisted death in 
England and Wales. The section will also consider recommendations for a future law on 
assisted death made by the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for 
the Terminally Ill Bill 2004, and the Commission on Assisted Dying in 2012. 
 
                                                          
349 ibid 1051. 
350 ibid 1018 (Ward LJ). 
351 See section 1.1.1, and section 2.2.2 under Tony Nicklinson. 
 84 
2.4 A review of recent reform attempts 
There have been repeated calls for reform of the law on assisted death in England and 
Wales. Between 2003 and 2006, three attempts were made to legalise assisted deaths for 
the terminally ill. These attempts were made through the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill in 
2003,352 the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004,353 and the Assisted Dying 
for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005.354 All were introduced in the House of Lords by Lord 
Joffe. In respect of the second Bill, a Select Committee, formed by the House of Lords 
to review the Bill (‘Select Committee’), published a report (‘2004 HL Select Committee 
Report’) on the legal and ethical issues on assisted dying, and made recommendations 
for any future Bills.355 Lord Falconer also made two separate attempts at amending the 
law on assisted death. During the passage of the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009, Lord 
Falconer proposed an amendment to the law on assisted suicide, which would have 
expressly allowed competent adults to travel abroad for an assisted suicide. In 2010, 
Lord Falconer became the Chairman of the Commission on Assisted Dying (‘the 
Commission’), an unofficial body which was established and funded by private 
campaigners to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the present law following the 
publication of the DPP’s Policy, and to explore a possible framework for legalising 
assisted death.356 Based on the recommendations of the Commission’s 2012 Report, the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Choice at the End of Life357 drafted a Bill together 
with Dignity in Dying358. After the Bill went through a public consultation exercise, 
Lord Falconer made amendments to it, and introduced it as the Assisted Dying Bill 
2013 in May 2013 in the House of Lords.359 The Bills mentioned here, along with the 
recommendations of the 2004 HL Select Committee Report, and of the Commission’s 
2012 Report, will be examined below. 
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2.4.1 Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003 
In 2003, Lord Joffe introduced a Private Member’s Bill, the Patient (Assisted Dying) 
Bill 2003 (‘PAD Bill 2003’) in the House of Lords. The PAD Bill 2003 would have 
enabled a competent adult who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal or 
serious, incurable and progressive illness to receive medical assistance to die at their 
own considered and persistent request.360 The PAD Bill 2003 would have allowed a 
physician to undertake either assisted suicide or euthanasia. The Bill did not proceed 
beyond its Second Reading. 
2.4.2 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004 
In January 2004, Lord Joffe introduced a second Private Member’s Bill, the Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004 (‘ADTI Bill 2004’)361 in the House of Lords. The 
Bill would have enabled a competent adult who is suffering unbearably from a terminal 
illness to receive medical assistance to die at their own request. ‘Medical assistance to 
die’ referred to providing the patient with the means to end life, or ending that life if the 
patient is physically unable to do so.362 The ADTI Bill 2004 included a requirement for 
the option of palliative care363 to be discussed with patients before assisting their 
deaths.364 
The ADTI Bill 2004 was given a Second Reading in March 2004. The Select 
Committee conducted an exhaustive examination of the Bill, including studies on public 
opinion and a comparison of the Bill to the laws of four jurisdictions (Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Oregon(US))365 where assisted death has already been 
legalised in some form.366 The Select Committee published the 2004 HL Select 
Committee Report in April 2005 which presented the ethical and practical issues 
surrounding the Bill, and the arguments for and against a change in the English law.367 
Although the Select Committee failed to reach a consensus on the acceptability or 
                                                          
360 PAD Bill 2003 (n352). 
361 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48). 
362 ibid cl 1(2). 
363 See section 3.4.3. 
364 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48) cl 3(1). 
365 See ch 5. 
366 2004 HL Select Committee Report Vol I (ch1 n49) paras2-7.  
367 2004 HL Select Committee Report Vols I, II and III (ch1 n58).  
 86 
otherwise of the ADTI Bill 2004, it did make recommendations for future legislation.368 
Some of the issues highlighted by the report were: 
i) The ADTI Bill 2004 sought to legalise not only medical assistance with suicide but 
also, in cases where self-administration of lethal medication is not possible, 
voluntary euthanasia.369 The Select Committee recommended that any future Bill 
should be clear in distinguishing between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia 
and to address these two courses of action separately, as the considerations involved 
in each are very different.370 
The Select Committee visited two jurisdictions with very different assisted death 
laws  Oregon, where only physician-assisted suicide is legal, and the Netherlands, 
where both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia by physicians are legal. These 
showed very different annual rates of assisted deaths. The Select Committee found 
that whilst less than one in 700 deaths in Oregon was attributable to assisted death, 
that figure was more than one in 40 in the Netherlands. Of those deaths in the 
Netherlands, less than 10% were from assisted suicide, while over 90% were the 
result of euthanasia.371 The Select Committee concluded that the inclusion of 
euthanasia in the law on assisted death had led to a significantly higher rate of 
assisted deaths. The Select Committee was also of the view that assisted suicide, 
with its emphasis on the individual taking responsibility for the final stage of ending 
their life, has the effect of making those who are minded to end their lives think 
more carefully before taking action to give effect to their wishes.372 
The Select Committee considered that any new Bill should be narrower in scope 
than the ADTI Bill 2004. It found that while some physicians supported a change in 
the law, the medical profession as a whole was at best ambivalent about legalising 
assisted death and in many cases opposed.373 It considered that there would be less 
opposition to a law which was restricted to physician-assisted suicide. The Select 
Committee heard evidence from Oregon that any proposal to extend Oregon’s Death 
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with Dignity Act (‘DDA’)374 to also legalise euthanasia was expected to encounter 
much greater opposition from the medical profession.375 The Select Committee also 
noted that a blurring of the line between voluntary and involuntary assisted dying is 
more likely to occur by legalising voluntary euthanasia376 than by legalising assisted 
suicide.377 It emphasised a belief that the key issue with assisted death is that 
responsibility for the ultimate act should rest with the patient.378 
It is submitted that the Select Committee’s view that there would be less opposition 
from the medical profession for a law on assisted death that did not include 
euthanasia by physicians is no longer supported in England and Wales today. This is 
demonstrated by recent studies that found almost equal support for physician-
assisted suicide and euthanasia by physicians in the UK. The first is Seale’s 2007–
2008 survey of doctors’ attitudes (as referred to previously), that showed 35.2% of 
doctors surveyed supported physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill, whilst 
34% thought that doctors should be able to perform euthanasia for such patients.379 
The second study on doctors’ attitudes was by McCormack et al in 2011. This study 
too found almost equal support for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia but the 
level of support for both was lower than in Seale’s earlier study. Whilst 24.9% of 
doctors were willing to perform physician-assisted suicide, 22.7% were willing to 
perform voluntary euthanasia.380 
ii) ‘Terminal illness’ was defined by the ADTI Bill 2004 as an inevitably progressive 
illness which cannot be reversed by treatment, and which will likely result in death 
within a few months at most.381 The Select Committee heard evidence that an 
accurate prognosis is not possible beyond 8–12 weeks.382 The Royal College of 
Physicians (‘RCP’) gave evidence that prognosis of terminal illness was ‘a 
probabilistic art’ and that ‘prognosticating may be better when somebody is within 
the last two or three weeks of their life’ but that, ‘when they are six or eight months 
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away from it, it is pretty desperately hopeless as an accurate factor’.383 Similarly, the 
Royal College of General Practitioners stated that ‘it is possible to make reasonably 
accurate prognoses of death within minutes, hours or a few days. When this 
stretches to months, then the scope for error can extend into years’.384 These 
statements are supported by data from the Oregon Public Health Division’s 
(‘OPHD’) annual reports, where some terminally ill people who had been given 
lethal drugs by physicians pursuant to the DDA, on the basis of a prognosis of six 
months or less had gone on to live longer, sometimes much longer, before either 
using the drugs to commit suicide or dying of natural causes.385 The Select 
Committee recommended that, ‘if a future [B]ill should include terminal illness as a 
qualifying condition, this should be defined in such a way as to reflect the realities 
of clinical practice as regards accurate prognosis’.386 
iii) ‘Unbearable suffering’ was defined by the ADTI Bill 2004 as suffering, resulting 
from the patient’s terminal illness, which the patient finds so severe as to be 
unacceptable.387 The Select Committee heard evidence that suffering is a subjective 
experience, which cannot be assessed objectively by clinical methods, or reliably 
attributed to the underlying condition.388 The Select Committee recommended 
changing the phrase ‘unbearable suffering’ to ‘unrelievable suffering’, to require 
that efforts be made to relieve any suffering, and restrict assisted dying to only those 
whose pain cannot be alleviated by palliative care.389 Thus, a more objective medical 
assessment is made of the patient’s suffering which ensures that all available steps 
have been taken to relieve distress.390 
iv) The ADTI Bill 2004 provided that only if a physician believed that their patient is 
not competent, were they to refer the patient to a psychiatrist to confirm that the 
patient was not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder causing 
impaired judgement.391 However, the experience of Oregon’s law on physician-
assisted suicide was that referrals under similar provisions in the DDA were rare.392 
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The Select Committee recommended that a patient requesting assisted dying should 
be given a psychiatric assessment by default, to confirm that the request is based on 
a reasoned decision free from external pressure, and that the applicant is not 
suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder causing impaired judgement. 
v) The ADTI Bill 2004 required a specialist in palliative care to have discussed the 
option of palliative care with the patient.393 However, the Select Committee stated 
that: 
if a future [B]ill is to claim with credibility that it is offering assistance 
with suicide…as complementary rather than alternative to palliative 
care, it should consider how patients seeking to end their lives might 
experience such care before taking a final decision.394 
It recommended that patients should actually experience palliative care rather than 
merely be informed of such care as an option.395 The Select Committee drew 
attention to evidence from a UK charity for hospice care, Help the Hospices, that 
‘experience of pain control is radically different from the promise of pain control, 
and cessation is almost unimaginable if symptom control has been poor’.396 It 
concluded that patients seeking assistance to die without having experienced good 
symptom control could not be deemed fully informed.397 
vi) The GMC gave evidence to the Select Committee that:  
A…law [on] physician-assisted dying would have profound implications 
for the role and responsibilities of doctors and their relationships with 
patients.398 Acting with the primary intention to hasten a patient’s death 
would be difficult to reconcile with the medical ethical principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence.399 
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A similar observation was made by Finlay et al in their 2011 article on a reappraisal 
needed of safeguards for an assisted dying law. They argued that the underlying 
ethics of medicine is at variance with the ethics of assisted death, as the role of 
doctors is to treat illness or, where that is not possible, to relieve its symptoms and 
thereby improve quality of life.400 The Select Committee considered that the issue 
was whether a reformed law on assisted dying should encompass ‘therapeutic 
killing’, or whether the therapeutic option of a physician giving a patient a lethal 
overdose crosses a ‘Rubicon’ that would radically alter the way every physician 
practices medicine.401 With particular reference to implications for palliative care, 
Finlay argued in 2005, that once the option of a lethal overdose enters the arena, a 
paradigm shift occurs in medical decision-making. Assisted suicide and euthanasia 
become treatment options that would have to be presented to all terminally ill people 
who are believed to be in the last months of life.402 This potential conflict between a 
physician’s traditional role and responsibilities towards a patient, and physician-
assisted death, was later emphasised in 2010 in the DPP’s Policy which states that a 
factor in favour of prosecuting an assisted suicide is whether or not it is perpetrated 
by ‘a medical doctor, nurse or other healthcare professional’ and whether the 
deceased had been ‘in his or her care’.403 
2.4.3 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 
The House of Lords debated the 2004 HL Select Committee Report (discussed above) 
in October 2005.404 Lord Joffe then introduced a revised Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill 2005 (‘ADTI Bill 2005’) in November 2005.405 The purpose of the 
ADTI Bill 2005, which was modelled on Oregon’s DDA,406 was to ‘enable an adult who 
has capacity and who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal illness to receive 
medical assistance to die at his own considered and persistent request’.  
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The ADTI Bill 2005 did not permit euthanasia. However, whilst the Select Committee 
had recommended that a new Bill be limited to physician-assisted suicide, the ADTI 
Bill 2005 allowed not only for physicians to prescribe lethal medication to patients who 
request it, but to prescribe and provide a means of self-administration to patients for 
whom it would have been impossible to orally ingest medication.407 As argued by 
Laurie, the ADTI Bill 2005 straddled the boundary between physician-assisted suicide 
and euthanasia as it would have permitted physicians to provide some assistance to 
patients who were physically unable to administer the lethal medication themselves.408 
The ADTI Bill 2005 did not adopt the Select Committee’s recommendations for a 
patient to have actually experienced palliative care before being allowed the option of 
assisted dying, or for the term ‘unbearable suffering’ to be amended to ‘unrelievable 
suffering’.409 The ADTI Bill 2005 progressed to its Second Reading. However, the 
House of Lords voted against it in May 2006.410 
2.4.4 Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 
In May 2009, Lord Falconer campaigned for the legal protection from prosecution of 
individuals who assist their loved ones to travel abroad for an assisted suicide.411 To this 
end, Lord Falconer proposed an amendment to the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009, 
which would have created an exception to the SA 1961. The proposed amendment 
would have effectively legalised aiding terminally ill people to travel abroad for an 
assisted suicide. It would have required the victim to make a declaration of their 
intention to die in writing, witnessed by an independent person.412 Two physicians 
would have been required to be ‘of the opinion in good faith’ that the person was 
terminally ill and that they had the ‘capacity to make the declaration of their intention to 
die’. The proposed amendment to the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 was defeated in 
the House of Lords.413  
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2.4.5 Commission on Assisted Dying 2010 
The Commission on Assisted Dying was a non-governmental and non-parliamentary 
group which was established in September 2010. It was an independent body 
commissioned by two private individuals who had previously spoken in support of 
assisted suicide  author Terry Pratchett and businessman Bernard Lewis.414 The 
purpose of the Commission was to investigate what system, if any, should exist to allow 
people to be assisted to die and whether it might be possible to introduce sufficient 
safeguards within such a system to prevent abuse and ensure that vulnerable people415 
could not be pressured to choose an assisted death. The Commission considered the 
impact that a regulatory regime for assisted dying might have on individual people and 
society more broadly.  
The Commission consulted with a wide range of stakeholders to examine their views on 
these issues. Its inquiry into ‘assisted dying’ included a public call for evidence, public 
evidence hearings, international research visits to four jurisdictions, original research 
and commissioned research. Its original research concerned the relationship between 
suicide and serious physical illness, and also attitudes on assisted dying among people 
from ‘vulnerable groups’. Its commissioned research concerned the effectiveness of 
legal safeguards, and the quality of palliative care,416 in jurisdictions that permit some 
form of assisted dying.417  
In its January 2012 Report, the Commission concluded that it is possible to formulate a 
legal framework with strictly defined circumstances in which terminally ill people could 
be assisted to die, while providing upfront safeguards to protect potentially vulnerable 
people.418 The Commission’s Report drew attention to some of the more significant 
considerations for a permissible assisted death. These include i) a good level of care and 
support services for the terminally ill with properly trained health and social care staff, 
ii) clearly defined eligibility criteria, iii) the patient has the capacity to make a request 
for assisted death, iv) the physician knows the person well, v) the patient is fully 
informed of all the options available for treatment, care and support, vi) an assessment 
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by at least two physicians who are wholly independent of one another, vii) guidance on 
how lethal medication is to be used, stored, transported and administered to avoid risk 
of abuse viii) the patient must carry out the final act that will end their own life, ix) the 
death is certified and recorded as an assisted death, and x) the assisted death is reported 
to a national monitoring commission that reviews all cases and has retrospective powers 
to investigate compliance with the law.419  
The Commission recommended that a person requesting an assisted death should satisfy 
the following four criteria: i) be aged 18 or over, ii) have a diagnosis of terminal illness, 
iii) be making a voluntary choice that is an expression of their own wishes and is not 
unduly influenced by others, and iv) have the mental capacity to make a voluntary and 
informed choice, with their decision-making ability unimpaired as a result of mental 
health problems such as depression.420 To protect the vulnerable in society and avoid any 
potential abuse, the Commission proposed firstly, a decision-making model involving 
the assessment, advice, support and independent judgements of two independent 
doctors, with support from other health and social care professionals where necessary, 
secondly, safeguards to ensure (i) that the patient has been fully informed of all other 
treatment and end of life care options that are available and still wishes to proceed 
(ii) that the eligibility criteria are met (iii) that the patient has a settled intention to die 
(iv) the safe storage and transportation of any lethal medication (v) that the patient has a 
reliable and supported assisted death (vi) that assisted deaths are reported correctly, and 
thirdly, monitoring and regulatory oversight by a national monitoring commission with 
powers to investigate suspected non-compliance.421 
It is contended that the independence of the Commission is to be questioned. The 
Commission was set up with funding provided by two assisted suicide supporters 
(discussed above).422 The ‘think-tank’ organisation, Demos, that provided the research 
secretariat and administrative support to the Commission, responded to a tender from 
these two individuals.423 The British pro-assisted suicide lobby group, Dignity in Dying 
brokered the relationship between Demos and these individuals.424 As such, the validity 
or strength of the results of the Commission’s inquiry is debatable. Further, it is not 
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known how the selection procedures for the public call for evidence and public hearings 
were conducted. Thus, it is doubtful if the findings of the Commission are reflective of 
an objective, and independent gathering of evidence, and evaluation of results. 
2.4.6 Assisted Dying Bill 2013 
In 2013, Lord Falconer introduced a Private Member’s Bill, the Assisted Dying Bill 
2013 (‘AD Bill 2013’), into the House of Lords. It received its First Reading on 15 May 
2013.425 A date has not yet been set for the Bill’s Second Reading. The AD Bill 2013, 
which is based on the findings of the Commission’s 2012 Report, seeks to license 
doctors to provide mentally competent patients who are terminally ill with less than six 
months to live with the means to end their lives – i.e. physician-assisted suicide.426 
Under the AD Bill 2013, a patient would have to prove that they have (i) the mental 
capacity to make a voluntary and informed choice, (ii) are not being unduly influenced 
by others and (iii) have a ‘settled intention’ about their wish to die.427 Two doctors 
would have to independently assess the patient to confirm that the patient has a terminal 
illness with a prognosis of six months or less to live.428 The patient would also have to 
be informed of the palliative, hospice, and other care which is available.429 The patient 
would have to wait for at least 14 days before the prescribed lethal medication is 
delivered (by the attending doctor, a registered medical practitioner or a registered 
nurse) to him or her.430 In cases where a patient is expected to die within one month, the 
waiting period may be reduced to six days.431  
Other important features in the AD Bill 2013 include, an assisting health professional to 
(i) prepare the medicine for self-administration, or to prepare a medical device which 
will enable the person to self-administer the medicine, and to assist the person to ingest 
or otherwise self-administer the medicine, and (ii) remain with the person until the 
person has self-administered the medicine and died, or decided not to self-administer 
the medicine.432  
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Some noteworthy concerns with the AD Bill 2013 are discussed below and will be 
considered again in Chapter Seven in the context of the reform agenda for England and 
Wales.  
i) The AD Bill 2013 does not specify how a physician should confirm that a patient 
has the required mental capacity to make a voluntary, informed and settled decision 
to die.433 There is no requirement in the Bill for a mental health evaluation, even in 
cases where the assessing doctor has doubts about the patient’s mental capacity or 
suspects that the patient’s judgement is impaired by depression.434 Thus, there is 
potential for abuse under this Bill. As clinical depression may be undetected or 
overlooked, vulnerable patients may be at risk under this Bill.  
ii) The AD Bill 2013 seeks to offer assisted suicide to terminally ill people with a 
prognosis of six months or less to live.435 In this regard, the findings and 
recommendations of the 2004 HL Select Committee Report have been 
disregarded.436 As discussed above, the Select Committee heard evidence that 
accurate prognosis is not possible beyond a few weeks.437 It was informed that a 
prognosis of terminal illness that stretches to months would be unreliable.438 
Nevertheless, reliance on the prognoses available under current medical technology 
may be an unavoidable limitation. 
iii) A majority of physicians in England and Wales oppose the legalisation of physician-
assisted suicide. This is demonstrated by Seale’s 2007-2008 survey (discussed 
above) which found that only 35.2% of doctors surveyed supported physician-
assisted suicide for the terminally ill.439 The lack of support by English physicians 
for a law on physician-assisted suicide may encourage ‘physician shopping’ under 
the AD Bill 2013.440 As explained by Butler-Sloss et al, physicians who support the 
legalisation of assisted death may be more ‘willing’ to make favourable assessments 
and write prescriptions for lethal medication for patients whose regular physicians 
are unwilling to do so under the Bill.441 However, a physician who has only recently 
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been introduced to a patient may not be able to make an assessment of the latter’s 
mental state or whether factors in their personal or family life are unduly influencing 
their request for assisted suicide.442 As will be discussed in Chapter Five, physician-
shopping is a common practice under the DDA in Oregon. 
iv) The AD Bill 2013 allows for a 14-day ‘cooling off’ period before the prescribed 
lethal medication is delivered to the patient, with a shorter period of just six days 
where death is expected within one month.443 Camden-Smith argues that such short 
‘cooling off’ periods may not offer adequate time for a patient to reconsider and 
reflect on their decision.444 Nevertheless, as recommended by the Select Committee, 
the Bill balances the need to avoid increased suffering for determined applicants 
against the desirability of providing time for reflection for the less resolute.445 
v) Under the AD Bill 2013, a request for assisted suicide would not necessarily be 
acted on as soon as the ‘cooling off’ period has expired. The lethal medication 
would only be supplied to the patient if and when requested by the patient after that 
period. However, as observed by Camden-Smith, given the progressive nature of 
terminal illness, mental capacity may be lost in the period between the request being 
approved and the drugs being supplied and swallowed.446 As she clearly points out, 
the relationship between time and capacity is explicitly laid out in the MCA 2005. It 
states that ‘an assessment of a person’s capacity must be based on their ability to 
make a specific decision at the time it needs to be made’.447 Thus, Camden-Smith’s 
argument that, an assessment of capacity made at one point in time cannot be 
regarded as valid for a decision taken at a subsequent point, which may be weeks or 
even months later, is compelling.448 
The proposals for law reform discussed above will be referred to and examined further 
in the proceeding chapters, particularly in Chapter Seven on the recommended law 
reform for England and Wales. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the current law on assisted death in England and Wales. Under 
this law, euthanasia is prohibited by the law of murder and manslaughter. Whilst 
assisted suicide is also a crime, any prosecution for this offence requires the consent of 
the DPP. From the analysis undertaken, the chapter concludes that the law is 
unsatisfactory, and that it fails to meet the needs of society in general, or of those 
seeking an assisted death. The reasons for these conclusions are as follows.  
The chapter established that the current English law on assisted suicide in England and 
Wales is incoherent. Firstly, by decriminalising suicide, English law has recognised an 
individual’s autonomous right to end their own life. However, by maintaining assisted 
suicide as a crime, sanctity of life and protection of the vulnerable have taken 
precedence over autonomy, for those suicides which involve the assistance of others. 
The incoherence of this inconsistency is demonstrated by the preponderance of assisted 
suicide cases that have not been regarded as culpable by the DPP (i.e. where the DPP 
has deemed prosecution not to be in the public interest). 
Secondly, English law is increasingly inconsistent between its approach to end-of-life 
medical decisions and its approach to assisted death. The chapter demonstrated this 
inconsistency in the case of Re B, where English law did not recognise a competent 
patient’s right to die with assistance, but did allow Ms B to achieve death by exercising 
her right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. It is morally indefensible that patients such 
as Ms B must end their lives by refusing life-sustaining treatment and die a potentially 
prolonged and painful death, and that they are prevented from ending their lives more 
directly and humanely through the ingestion of lethal medication.  
Thirdly, by upholding the doctrine of ‘double effect’ whilst maintaining euthanasia as a 
crime, English law incoherently relies upon the physician’s intention as the 
distinguishing feature between these two. Under English law, a physician is permitted to 
administer a patient with palliative medication, with the intention of relieving pain and 
discomfort, even if it foreseen that the patient’s death will be hastened as a result of 
such a high dosage of medication. However, the administration of excessive palliative 
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medication crosses the line to become an illegal act which precipitates death.449 
Although it is a physician’s intention which determines whether they may rely upon the 
doctrine of double effect as a defence, the law fails to cohesively address situations 
where a physician has not only an intention to relieve suffering, but also an intention to 
hasten death.  
Fourthly, by allowing life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn from incompetent 
patients in their ‘best interests’ whilst maintaining euthanasia as a crime, English law is 
further incoherent in its reliance upon a distinction between an ‘omission’ and an ‘act’. 
This was demonstrated in Bland’s case, where life-sustaining treatment was permitted to 
be withdrawn from an incompetent patient in Bland’s ‘best interests’, as the treatment 
was determined to be futile and burdensome. The House of Lords held that the 
withdrawal of treatment was an ‘omission’ to treat, rather than an ‘act’ causing death.   
As cogently argued by Sayers, the danger of re-describing indirect euthanasia and 
non-voluntary euthanasia450 in medical terms such as the ‘doctrine of double effect’ or 
‘acts’ versus ‘omissions’ is that physicians may thereby either wittingly or unwittingly 
practice euthanasia with no oversight.451 
The chapter also considered the DPP’s Policy, including the public interest factors taken 
into account when deciding whether to prosecute an assisted suicide. Several difficulties 
were demonstrated in respect of the policy’s application. Firstly, there is difficulty in 
retrospectively establishing a suspect’s motives after a victim’s death. Yet, under the 
policy, compassion is the key determining factor which will place a criminal act beyond 
the reach of the criminal courts.452 In this regard, society’s need to protect the vulnerable 
is not well met.  
Secondly, the DPP’s Policy is unclear as to what actions would amount to ‘minor 
encouragement or assistance’, and which would thus be less likely to be prosecuted. 
Thirdly, the Policy is unsatisfactory for discouraging those wanting an assisted suicide 
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from accessing medical expertise.453 This was noted by the Court of Appeal in 
Nicklinson when they requested that the DPP’s Policy be amended to provide more 
clarity for healthcare professionals as to permissible assistance. As was asserted in the 
chapter, although the majority of healthcare professionals in England and Wales are 
opposed to the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide, only they have the required 
expertise to provide a safe and humane assisted death.  
As the DPP’s Policy does not meet the needs of those seeking an assisted suicide, it 
encourages those who can travel to right-to-die organisations abroad to do so while they 
still can, even if they would prefer to wait. If such ‘suicide tourism’ is infeasible for a 
patient due to financial or health reasons, then the burden of assisting their suicide will 
most probably fall on someone with no experience and no access to expert 
information.454 As noted by Seale, ‘[B]otched suicides assisted by amateurs and ill-
considered decisions to die by some of the most vulnerable people in society are the 
likely outcomes of the [DPP’s Policy]’.455  
What adds to the uncertainty of the DPP’s Policy, is that it neither decriminalises 
assisted suicide nor provides assurances of immunity. Yet there have been no 
prosecutions for assisted suicide since the Policy was published. Further, the DPP also 
has the ability to change the DPP’s Policy with no consultation. In these two aspects — 
the uncertainty of the policy and the discrimination against those who are unable to 
travel — the DPP’s Policy further fails to meet the needs of those seeking an assisted 
death. 
Two significant statistics were discussed in this chapter, both indicating that the needs 
of those seeking an assisted death are not being met. Firstly, public opinion polls. These 
included the 2010 YouGov poll for the Daily Telegraph newspaper, which found that 
82% of respondents wanted a change in the law.456 Secondly, the surveys by Seale on the 
incidence of unlawful deaths facilitated by healthcare professionals as part of end-of-life 
medical practice. 
Recent attempts at legislative reform in England and Wales have also been highlighted 
in this chapter. They are an acknowledgement by many, that the current law is 
                                                          
453 Lewis (n151). 
454 Lewis (n97) 130. 
455 Seale (ch1 n20). 
456 ‘YouGov / Daily Telegraph Survey Results, 26th - 28th January 2010’ (n193). 
 100 
unsatisfactory. As a means of protecting the vulnerable, these attempted reforms have 
focused on providing the option of physician-assisted suicide to terminally ill patients. 
Other potential safeguards were also highlighted in this chapter — such as requirements 
for mental capacity, unbearable suffering, and palliative care. These will be considered 
in more detail in Chapters Three, Five and Seven. The following chapter, Chapter 
Three, will consider the social and ethical context of the current law on assisted death in 
England and Wales. 
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Chapter 3: The Social and Ethical Context of the 
Law on Assisted Death 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the discussion of the scope of the current law on assisted death1 in England 
and Wales in the previous chapter, this chapter will examine the social and ethical 
influences affecting the development of this law. It will compare traditional influences 
with those that are shaping debate on assisted death today, and discuss the 
interrelationships between these influences. The chapter will demonstrate that English 
law does not wholly meet society’s needs and is inconsistent and morally indefensible.  
The social influences that will be examined are religion, a rise in individualism, and an 
ageing population. The ethical influences that will be explored are the sanctity of life, a 
right to self-determination, professional ethics, the doctrine of double effect, the concept 
of ‘quality of life’, paternalism, and an increasing scarcity of healthcare resources. 
Frameworks for such ethical influences will also be considered in the chapter. These 
include the traditional Hippocratic Oath previously sworn by physicians and the 
‘four-principle’ model of medical ethics (i.e. respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence and justice in medical care) developed by Beauchamp and Childress.2 The 
two main ethical measures for assessing the morality of actions — consequentialism 
and deontology — will also be discussed. Other factors having an effect on the present 
debate on assisted death will also be examined. These include public trust in physicians, 
advances in medical technology, effective and adequate palliative care, concerns over 
loss of dignity, the ‘slippery slope’ argument, protecting vulnerable members of society, 
the laws on assisted death of other jurisdictions, and the role of the media. The chapter 
will examine the impact of these influences on both the law of assisted death, and on the 
legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions which were discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
Most of the influences examined in this chapter in relation to England and Wales have 
also impacted the other jurisdictions considered in Chapter Five that have legalised 
                                                          
1 ‘Assisted death’, defined in section 1.1.  
2 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th edn, OUP 2008). 
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assisted death in some form  the Netherlands, Belgium, Northern Territory (Australia), 
and the State of Oregon (US). 
3.2 Social influences 
3.2.1 Religion 
Christian culture has traditionally been a key influence in England and Wales on the law 
and public policy governing both assisted death and end-of-life medical decisions. A 
report on the 2009-10 Citizenship Survey showed that 79% of UK citizens affiliated 
themselves to a religion.3 Although the Christian faith (70%) was the most prevalent 
religion, the proportion of Christian citizens had fallen from 77% in 2005. Other 
religions were much less prevalent (4% Muslim, 2% Hindu, 1% Sikh and 2% other). 
Further evidence that the predominance of the Christian faith is declining in the UK, is 
provided in the 26
th
 Report of the BSA 2010 survey (‘26th BSA Report’).4 According to 
the 26
th
 BSA Report, 66% of UK citizens in 1983 identified themselves as being 
Christian, declining to 50% in 2008, and then 43% in 2009. The 28
th
 BSA Report 
showed that this figure has remained at 44% in 2011.5 The 26
th
 BSA Report also noted 
that the proportion identifying themselves as belonging to a non-Christian religion has 
conversely risen from 2% in 1983, to 5% in 2009. The 28
th
 BSA Report then showed a 
further rise to 6% in 2011. Whilst this thesis is focused on England and Wales, the BSA 
figures referred to here are for the entire UK. 
As observed by Engelhardt, Christianity upholds the sanctity of life, and regards suicide 
as self-murder, and thus assisted suicide and euthanasia as forms of assisted self-murder. 
Although Christianity imposes no religious obligation to postpone death or prolong life 
with life-sustaining treatment, a patient may have a religious duty to use medical 
technology to gain a last opportunity for repentance.6  
It is argued that, in recent times, two trends have characterised the influence of religion 
in England and Wales. The first is a trend towards pluralism. England, today, is a 
culturally pluralistic society which maintains that no person should be bound by the 
                                                          
3 Department of Communities and Local Government, Race, Religion and Equalities: A report on the 2009-10 
Citizenship Survey (21 December 2011). 
4 McAndrew (ch1 n70). 
5 A Park et al (eds), NatCen Social Research, BSA: the 28th Report (Sage,2012). As noted by the report, the largest 
decline has been in affiliation with the Church of England, which has halved since 1983 (from 40% to 20%). 
6 HT Engelhardt and AS Iltis, ‘End-of-life: the traditional Christian view’ (2005)366 Lancet 1045. 
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dictates of another’s religion. This pluralism compels a consideration of the views of 
non-Christian religions towards assisted death and end-of-life medical decisions. For 
Islam, as a non-Christian example, the sanctity of life is ordained in the Quran: ‘Do not 
take life which God has made sacred except in the course of Justice’ (6:151). Islam 
maintains that life-sustaining treatment should not be withheld or withdrawn unless 
death is inevitable.7 In Hinduism, there has been a tradition of ‘religious suicide’. Such 
‘self-willed’ deaths, according to Firth, have been ‘linked to a specific purpose: to 
obtain freedom through an act of omnipotence involving the sacrifice of the self’. As 
Hinduism views suffering as ‘purifying’ and ‘cleansing’, it regards the suicide of a 
person wishing to end intolerable pain and suffering as morally wrong.8 Hindu religious 
tenets are generally opposed to the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from incompetent patients, because such decision-making does not reflect the 
patient’s autonomous decision and therefore can be abused.9  
Sikhism, which derives its ethics from the teachings of Guru Granth Sahib and its code 
of conduct, the Rehat Maryada, considers life as a gift from God.10 Sikhism is not in 
favour of assisted death as it holds that the timing of birth and death is in God’s hands, 
and that suffering is part of karma.11 Judaism’s position on end-of-life is that one’s body 
belongs to God.12 Therefore, as noted by Dorff, one does not have the right to commit 
suicide, and anyone who assists with a suicide commits murder. Judaism restricts the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to situations where there is 
certainty that the patient will die within 72 hours.13 Buddhism generally rejects assisted 
death, as it is contrary to its First Precept, which prohibits intentional killing.14 In 
Buddhism, the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in a PVS would be 
a denial of ‘universal compassion’, which is a core facet of Buddhism.15  
Although pluralism means that non-Christian religions now represent a significant 
proportion of English society, as noted above most of the religions which are significant 
                                                          
7 A Sachedina, ‘End-of-life: The Islamic View’ (2005)366 Lancet 774. 
8 SH Firth, ‘End-of-life: A Hindu View’ (2005)366 Lancet 682. 
9 ibid. 
10 ‘Sikhism: Ethics: Euthanasia, assisted dying, and suicide’ (BBC,27 October 2009) <www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ 
religions/sikhism/sikhethics/euthanasia.shtml> accessed 9 March 2013. 
11 ibid. 
12 EN Dorff, ‘End-of-life: Jewish perspectives’ (2005)366 Lancet 862. 
13 ibid. 
14 D Keown, ‘End-of-life: The Buddhist View’ (2005)366 Lancet 952. 
15 ibid. 
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in the UK share with Christianity a belief in the sanctity of life. Therefore, the trend 
towards pluralism will have little impact on the proportion of society who regards the 
current law on assisted death as acceptable.  
The second trend which characterises the influence of religion in England and Wales is 
a shift towards being a more secular society. A useful definition of secularisation is 
provided by Berger, who describes it as, ‘the process by which sectors of society and 
culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols’.16 
Berger’s description includes ‘the secularisation of consciousness’, of which he says 
‘that the modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look upon 
the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations’.17 This 
suggests that the trend towards secularisation means that the ideology of any religious 
faith may be less influential on English law today than it was previously.  
Support for this trend towards secularisation in England and Wales is demonstrated in 
the findings of the recent BSA surveys. According to the 26
th
 and 27
th
 BSA Reports,18 the 
percentage of Britons who profess no religion rose from 31% in 1983 to 43% in 2008, 
with a further rise to 51%, in 2009-2010. The 28
th
 BSA Report showed that the figure 
remained at 50% in 2011. In summary  one in three (31%) in 1983 did not belong to a 
religion, compared with one in two (50%) in 2011.19 However, the 29
th
 BSA Report in 
2012 showed that the percentage of Britons with no religion then dropped to 45.7%.20 
The 26
th
 and 27
th
 BSA Reports further found that only 37% of all people with a religious 
‘affiliation’ saw themselves as actively practising their religion. Thus, those with a 
religious affiliation are tending to be ‘less religious’. However, this percentage varied 
by religion.21  
It is submitted that the decline in religious affiliation in England and Wales is primarily 
brought about by generational replacement, with older, more religious, generations 
dying out and being replaced by less religious generations.22 This is demonstrated by the 
                                                          
16 P Berger, The sacred canopy (Doubleday 1967). 
17 ibid. 
18 McAndrew (ch1 n70); A Park et al (eds), NatCen Social Research, BSA: the 27th Report (Sage,2011).   
19 L Lee, ‘[Chapter] 12. Religion: Losing Faith?’ in BSA: the 28th Report (n5) 181.  
20 A Park et al (eds), NatCen Social Research, BSA: the 29th Report (2012).  
21 Whilst the majority of people identified themselves as Christian, those that did so were notably less likely than all 
other main religions to be actively practising their religion. Only 33% of Christians actively practised their religion, 
compared with 79% of Muslims, 74% of Sikhs and 70% of Hindus.  
22 Lee (n19) 181.   
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findings in the 28
th
 BSA Report.23 In 1983, 55% of those born between 1956 and 1965 
(then aged 18–27) did not belong to a religion, compared with 12% of those born before 
1915 (then aged 68+). By 2010, 65% of the youngest generation (born between 1986 
and 1992 and then aged 18–24) did not belong to a religion, compared with 24% of the 
oldest generation (born between 1926 and 1935 and then aged 75+). In 2011, nearly two 
thirds (64%) of those aged 18–24 did not belong to a religion, compared with 28% of 
those aged 65 and above.  
This suggests that the trend towards secularisation in England and Wales will continue. 
Each generation is less likely than its predecessor to be born into religious families, and 
this lack of religiosity will tend to remain with an individual as they get older.24 It is 
argued that there will be a continued increase in liberal attitudes towards assisted death, 
as the influence of considerations grounded in religion declines.25 As such, the overall 
religious attitudes of society can no longer be relied upon to justify the current 
prohibition on assisted death. Further, according to the 26
th
 BSA Report, in 2009, 71% 
of those with faith, and 92% of those without, believed that a physician should be 
allowed to end the life of a patient with an incurable disease.26 It is thus argued that for 
both those with faith, and those without, the sanctity of life ethic is no longer regarded 
as absolute. As such, religion itself is not as much of an influence on the debate on the 
legalisation of assisted death as it might have once been.  
3.2.2 Rise in individualism 
A trend towards individualism in modern Western culture, including England and 
Wales, is a social influence which has encouraged support for personal autonomy and 
self-determination, and thus the right to choose the manner, time, and place of one’s 
own death.27 As a result, there have been numerous attempts at law reform in England 
and Wales, and debate on the legalisation of assisted death is as rife as ever. Smith 
argues that individualism is based on an idea that: 
we each own our own body and hence should be able to do what we choose 
with our physical self — including destroy it.  Not only that, but if we want 
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24 ibid 182. 
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27 MA Somerville, ‘Against Euthanasia’ (2006)5(4) Arts and Opinion. 
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to die, liberty dictates that we should have ready access to a ‘good death’, a 
demise that is peaceful and pain-free.28 
As observed by Somerville, Western countries today are placing more emphasis on the 
‘individual’ than on society as a whole:  
We are now societies based on intense individualism possibly individualism 
to the exclusion of any real sense of community, including in situations 
facing death … Matters such as euthanasia, that would have been largely the 
subject of moral or religious discourse are now explored in our courts and 
legislatures, particularly through the concepts of individual human rights.29  
Somerville argues that by permitting an autonomous choice for an assisted death, this 
would ‘damage important, foundational societal values and symbols that uphold respect 
for human life’.30  
It is submitted that while as a society we should be concerned about the rights of the 
individual, we must also be concerned about the rights of society as a whole and the 
protection of its rights. The interests of family and the various sectors of society must be 
balanced against patient autonomy and individual choice.  
3.2.3 Ageing population 
A factor which has shaped the social debate on assisted death in England and Wales has 
been the rapid growth in the proportion of elderly people (defined as over-65s) in 
society. Support for a law on assisted suicide in the UK from the older generations is 
demonstrated in the results of the July 2009 Populus poll for The Times newspaper. The 
results of the survey showed that among the older respondents who favoured the 
legalisation of assisted suicide in certain circumstances, 89% of those between 55 and 
64 years, and 90% of those aged 65 and over (‘65+’), felt that assisted suicide should be 
legalised for people with terminal illness.31 In their 1995 study on euthanasia and the 
role of good care, Seale and Addington-Hall found that the loss of independence is an 
important aspect of quality of life that influences the desire for assisted death in the 
                                                          
28 WJ Smith, ‘Euthanasia advocates work to make suicide easy’ National Review (New York,15 November 2004). 
29 MA Somerville, ‘Legalising Euthanasia: Why Now?’ (1996) 68(3) Australian Quarterly 1,5. 
30 MA Somerville, ‘The Case against Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide’ (2003)(Spring) Free Enquiry 33. 
31 ‘The Times Poll: July 17th-19th 2009’ (ch1 n62).  
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elderly.32 In an earlier 1994 study on why people want to die earlier, they found that an 
increasing population of elderly people with associated disabilities and distress, and the 
role played by modern medical technology in preserving life, have both fuelled public 
moral concerns about the merits of assisted death.33  
The growth and age composition of the ageing population in the UK, along with 
associated health concerns will be considered here. In 2010, there were 10.3 million 
people aged 65+ in the UK.34 According to the Office for National Statistics,35 this 
number is projected to increase by 23%, to 12.7 million in 2018.36 Growth in this age 
group is projected to continue for the foreseeable future, with the 65+ population 
expected to reach 16.9 million by 2035.37 Irving’s 2011 study similarly estimated that by 
2040, there will be 15 million people in the UK aged 65+.38 There has also been a 
substantial change in the age composition of older people. In 1951, those aged 85 and 
over (‘85+’) made up just 4% of the 65+ population. In 2010, this figure had increased 
to 14%.39 According to the Office for National Statistics, the very old are the fastest 
growing group in the UK. In 2012, there were 1.4 million people aged 85+.40 This is 
projected to increase to 2.0 million by 2022 and to 3.6 million by 2037, more than 
doubling over 25 years.41 The ageing population in England and Wales has increased the 
proportion of society living in poor health or with disabilities. In 2010, the expected 
years lived in poor health from age 65 onwards was 7.7 years for men and 8.7 years for 
women,42 whilst the expected years lived with disabilities was 8 years for men and 9 
years for women.43 Further, life expectancy at birth in the UK is projected to rise from 
                                                          
32 C Seale and J Addington-Hall, ‘Euthanasia: the role of good care’ (1995)40(5) Soc Sci Med 581. 
33 C Seale and J Addington-Hall, ‘Euthanasia: Why People Want to Die Earlier’ (1994)39(5) Soc Sci Med 647,652.  
34 T Rutherford, Population ageing: statistics SN/SG/3228 (House of Commons Library,10 February 2012). 
35 Rutherford (ibid) was based on the Office for National Statistics, National Population Projections, 2010-Based 
Statistical Bulletin (26 October 2011).  
36 Rutherford (n34).  
37 ibid.  
38 E Irving, ‘The United Kingdom’s Ageing Population: UK Population Growth Slows Down as Population Ages’ 
(About,6 February 2011) <http://geography.about.com/od/populationgeography/a/The-United-Kingdoms-Ageing-
Population.htm> accessed 6 February 2013.  
39 Rutherford (n34). 
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2012).  
41 ibid.  
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78.5 years in 2010 to 83.3 years in 2035 for men; and from 82.6 years in 2010 to 87.0 
years in 2033 for women.44  
Cracknell notes that the ageing population of the UK is partly a consequence of the 
large number of people born immediately after the Second World War and during the 
1960s ‘Baby Boom’.45 He notes that it also stems from increased life expectancy, due to 
advances in medical technology. These trends put increasing demands on healthcare 
resources, as noted in section 3.3.9. The over-65s already represent the largest cohort of 
patients in the NHS. They account for over 75% of NHS patients, 60% of hospital 
admissions, and 70% of bed days in NHS hospitals. 39% of over-65s are estimated to 
have a limiting longstanding illness.46  
3.3 Ethical influences 
3.3.1 Sanctity of life 
The current prohibition on assisted death upholds the doctrine of ‘sanctity of life’, 
i.e. that life should be respected. The doctrine has its roots in Judeo-Christian traditions, 
which emphasise the intrinsic worth and equal value of human life.47 Pursuant to such 
religious traditions, human life is created in the image of God and therefore possesses 
an intrinsic dignity.48 Nevertheless, Fitzpatrick forcefully argues that a religious basis 
for sanctity of life works only for those who share the same religious view.49 As such, a 
prohibition on assisted death derived from a religious belief should not apply to those 
who do not share that religious belief.50 However, Keown argues that even without a 
religious basis, one’s ‘right to life’ is essentially a right not to be intentionally killed.51 
Glover too defines sanctity of life as ‘an absolute barrier, an absolute ban, not derived 
from a religious source on the intentional taking of innocent human life’.52 As discussed 
in section 3.2.1, given the trend towards a more secular society in England and Wales, 
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48 ibid. 
49 F Fitzpatrick, Ethics in Nursing Practice (Linacre Centre 1988) 185–202. 
50 RF Weir, Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (Columbia University Press 1977) 300. 
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and the fact that sanctity of life is no longer regarded as absolute by those with and 
without faith, there is less reliance on ‘sanctity of life’ arguments by those opposing the 
legalisation of assisted death. 
Sanctity of life arguments alone cannot coherently be the rationale for the current 
prohibition on assisted death in England and Wales, as neither legally permitted 
end-of-life medical decisions,53 nor the law decriminalising suicide,54 conform to the 
doctrine of sanctity of life. McGee, however, maintains that the doctrine of sanctity of 
life remains intact in legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions concerning the 
withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment. The doctrine of sanctity of life 
according to McGee, is not about preserving life at all costs, but about ‘not taking 
control of death’.55 He argues that human intervention into the natural sequence of 
events occurs at the stage of administering treatment. When life-sustaining treatment is 
withdrawn or withheld, physicians are allowing nature to finally take its course and the 
patient to die naturally from the condition that has afflicted them.56 Conversely, McGee 
argues that assisted death involves taking control of one’s death, as nature is overridden 
by bringing about the patient’s death before its time. It is argued here, however, that the 
death that a patient is likely to experience when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn is 
not a natural one (e.g. starvation). Whilst life-sustaining treatment may change a 
patient’s death from its natural course, an assisted death (e.g. a lethal injection) may 
bring a patient’s death closer to what it would have naturally been, had there never been 
the invasive intervention of medical treatment.57  
Harris justifies the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from an 
incompetent patient in a PVS (as in Bland’s case),58 by qualifying the ‘sanctity of life’ 
with a distinction between ‘life’ and mere ‘existence’. He argues that if there is no 
probability of a person ever regaining consciousness, then they have no ability to value 
their own existence, and have thus ceased to be a person.59 Accordingly, the provision of 
ANH to such patients in a PVS merely prolongs an ‘existence’ rather than a ‘life’.60 It is 
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possible to justify the withdrawal of treatment in Bland’s case by applying Harris’ 
argument that the intrinsic value of ‘human life’ does not include ‘mere existence’ with 
no possibility of future consciousness. However, if the doctrine of sanctity of life is 
absolute then we should not allow the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment. All lives will have to be preserved without exception, even Bland’s.  
3.3.2 Right to self-determination 
The right to self-determination is an ethical principle which underpins the concept of 
personal autonomy. It is argued here that ending one’s own life is the ultimate act of 
self-determination. As Brock argues:  
self-determination is valuable because it permits people to form and to live 
in accordance with their own conception of a good life, at least within the 
bounds of justice and consistent with not preventing others from doing so as 
well. In exercising self-determination people exercise significant control 
over their lives and thereby take responsibility for their lives and for the 
kinds of persons they become … if self-determination is a fundamental 
value, then the great variability among people on this question makes it 
especially important that individuals control to the extent possible the 
manner, circumstances, and timing of their dying and death.61 
As discussed in Chapter Two, self-determination in terms of controlling the manner, 
circumstances, and timing of one’s own death is already evident in English law. Not 
only is suicide no longer a crime, a patient is also permitted to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment,62 even to the extent of making an advance refusal of such treatment. With 
particular reference to a competent patient’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment, Lord 
Donaldson in Re T said:  
This situation gives rise to a conflict between two interests, that of the 
patient and that of the society in which he lives. The patient’s interest 
consists of his right to self-determination — his right to live his own life 
how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death. Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is 
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sacred and should be preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in 
the ultimate the right of the individual is paramount.63  
Dworkin argues that the right to assisted death should be a part of an individual’s moral 
right to self-determination.64 It is however argued that assisted death is not a private 
matter of self-determination, but rather an act that requires the assistance of others, and 
the approval of society.65  
3.3.3 Professional ethics 
The GMC, the independent regulator for British physicians,66 opposes assisted death. 
The role of physicians, according to the GMC, is to treat illness or, where that is not 
possible, to relieve its symptoms67 and thereby improve quality of life.68 In its evidence 
to the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the ADTI Bill 2004, the GMC stated:  
A change in the law to allow physician-assisted [death] would have 
profound implications for the role and responsibilities of [physicians] and 
their relationships with patients. Acting with the primary intention to hasten 
a patient’s death would be difficult to reconcile with the medical ethical 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.69  
The view of the British Medical Association (‘BMA’), which represents physicians 
throughout the UK, is similar to the GMC. Since 2006, the general consensus of the 
BMA has remained that UK law should not be changed to permit physician-assisted 
death.70 The BMA is concerned that giving a terminally ill patient a legal right to end 
their life with physician assistance, even where that assistance is limited to assessment, 
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verification or prescribing medication, could alter the ethics of medical practice, which 
is to improve a patient’s quality of life, rather than to bring it to an end.  
Like the GMC, the Royal College of Surgeons (‘RCS’) also stresses the role of surgeons 
to alleviate and control symptoms. The RCS is of the belief that adequate palliative care 
is able to address the needs of the terminally ill. In its written evidence to the 2010 
Commission on Assisted Dying (discussed in Chapter Two), the RCS stated that while 
some patients have distressing symptoms, ‘a compassionate response to these situations 
should involve empathy and working hard to control symptoms and not simply to hasten 
death’.71  
The underlying ethics of medicine in England and Wales is strongly influenced by the 
ancient Hippocratic Oath, which emphasises three objectives for the physician — to 
cure or heal a patient of their illness or disease, to ease the intensity of a patient’s pain 
and suffering, and to cease futile burdensome treatment.72 Thus, the Hippocratic Oath 
takes into account palliative care, the doctrine of double effect, and the withdrawal and 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment. 
It is argued that there is a contradiction in the underlying ethics of medicine. This is 
evidenced by the fact that physicians can indirectly hasten death through the withdrawal 
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, yet the direct and deliberate assistance to die, 
at a patient’s request, is opposed. The views of the BMA are clearly expressed in its 
August 2009 note, where it states that life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or 
withdrawn when it is unable to benefit an incompetent patient and is not in their best 
interests.73 Similarly, the more recent 2010 guidelines of the GMC on treatment and care 
towards the end of life state that, where death is imminent and ANH is already in use, it 
may be appropriate to withdraw such treatment if it is considered that the burdens 
outweigh the possible benefits to the patient.74 In this regard, the GMC and BMA’s 
opposition to a law on physician-assisted death based on the grounds that it is against 
the underlying ethics of medicine is morally indefensible.  
Contrary to the tenor of present ethical and legal thinking, there should be engagement 
by the medical profession with patients seeking an assisted suicide. Physicians would be 
                                                          
71 Report of the Commission on Assisted Dying (ch1 n51) 79. 
72 H ten Have and J Welie, Death and Medical Power, An Ethical Analysis of Dutch Euthanasia Practice (Open 
University Press 2005) 23. 
73 BMA, End-of-Life Decisions: Views of the BMA (August 2009). 
74 GMC, Treatment and care towards the end of life (ch2 n278) para 123. 
   
113 
able to investigate the reasons why patients want to die and explore whether there are 
any treatment alternatives.75 Physicians should be involved in some of the procedural 
safeguards necessary for a law on assisted death, such as ensuring that a patient is well 
informed about their condition, prognosis, and possible treatments and ensuring that all 
reasonable means have been taken to improve the quality of the patient’s life.76 
The January 2013 GMC guidance on ‘when a patient seeks advice or information about 
assistance to die’ addresses the concerns of physicians over criminal liability arising 
from end-of-life conversations, and whether physicians might be implicated merely by 
answering questions or providing information. The guidance advises physicians to 
merely ‘listen and discuss’ a patient’s reasons and ‘provide [them] with the information 
they want or need so they can make decisions about their health or health care.’77 It also 
considers that the mere provision of advice or information on the assisted suicide law, 
and access to medical records for purposes of an assisted death abroad are unlikely to 
result in an investigation.78  
It is argued that as the professional conduct of physicians in England and Wales is 
already controlled by the GMC’s professional codes of practice, and subject to its 
disciplinary processes, a mechanism already exists to oversee and regulate the medical 
practices of physicians.79 As noted in Chapter Two, there is evidence that physician-
assisted death is to some extent already being performed in an unregulated fashion.80 
However, it is submitted here that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide, with 
appropriate regulatory procedures, and taking into account adequate palliative care, may 
in fact reduce the likelihood of covert and unlawful practices in England and Wales.81  
Overall, as the conduct of physicians is already controlled by the GMC, it would be no 
more likely for a physician to abuse a law on assisted death if legally permitted to assist 
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in a patient’s death.82 Similarly, no evidence of such an increased likelihood of abuse is 
found in Chapter Six, from a review of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Oregon. 
Presently, the medical profession in England and Wales is not unanimously opposed to 
the legalisation of physician-assisted death. The Healthcare Professionals for Assisted 
Dying (‘HPAD’) is a group of healthcare professionals who do not believe that the 
terminally ill should have to suffer or travel abroad to a right-to-die organisation for an 
assisted suicide.83 Besides access to good quality end-of-life care, it supports a change in 
the law to allow mentally competent terminally ill adults the choice of an assisted death, 
within upfront safeguards. It argues that for those with terminal conditions, the dying 
process becomes a failure if the patient suffers an undignified death.84 
As noted in Chapter Two, the results of recent surveys in the UK show that the majority 
of physicians oppose the legalisation of assisted death by physicians. Seale’s 2007-2008 
survey on doctors’ attitudes to physician-assisted death in the UK found that 35.2% of 
doctors surveyed supported physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill, whilst 34% 
of doctors thought that doctors should be able to perform voluntary euthanasia85 on the 
terminally ill.86 The survey also found that those in favour of physician-assisted death 
frequently qualify their support, by stressing a need for safeguards and adequate 
palliative care. Seale’s survey also noted that those opposing assisted death are more 
likely to be palliative care specialists. Physicians who were in favour of a law on 
assisted death expressed concern about involvement by the medical profession, and 
supported a law that might not involve physicians.87 The concern was the impact of 
physician-assisted death on the physician-patient relationship and the relationship 
between the medical profession and society in general.88 A more recent UK study by 
McCormack et al in 2011, on the attitudes of UK doctors, found even higher opposition 
amongst doctors to assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Only 24.9% of doctors 
were willing to perform physician-assisted suicide, and 22.7% of doctors were willing 
to perform voluntary euthanasia.89 Lee at al’s 2007 survey on doctors’ opinions on the 
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legalisation of physician-assisted suicide also showed that physicians working closest 
with the terminally ill are those with the strongest objections to legalising physician-
assisted death.90 These are legitimate concerns and are considered further in section 
3.4.1, as well as Chapter Seven on the proposed law reform for England and Wales. 
3.3.4 The ‘four-principle’ model of medical ethics 
There are four widely accepted general principles of medical ethics that provide a 
framework for analysing ethical issues — respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence and justice in medical care. This ‘four-principle model’ was developed by 
Beauchamp and Childress in 1979 as an approach to ethical dilemmas in medicine.91 
Each principle is discussed in further detail below.   
 Respect for autonomy 
The first principle of medical ethics under the four-principle model, respect for patient 
autonomy, is correctly heralded by Pellegrino as the dominant principle shaping 
medical ethics, the law and the physician-patient relationship.92 As discussed in section 
3.3.2, patient autonomy is based on the underlying ethical influence of the right to self-
determination. Patient autonomy encompasses a belief that each patient has the right to 
make unconstrained treatment decisions about matters that primarily affect themselves.93 
As discussed in Chapter Two, competent patients have the absolute right to make 
autonomous treatment decisions, notwithstanding that the reasons for making such 
decisions may be irrational.94  
To enable patients to make autonomous treatment decisions that are fully informed and 
considered, they require adequate medical information from their physicians.95 For this 
purpose, the GMC’s Consent guidance: patients and doctors making decisions together 
provides that physicians should discuss with their patients their condition and treatment 
options. Bearing in mind the wishes of their patients, physicians should share 
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information in proportion to the nature of their patients’ condition, treatment, and 
seriousness of any side effects, complications or other risks.96 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, English law presently defers to patient autonomy in cases of suicide, and 
competent97 or advance98 refusals of life-sustaining treatment. It is submitted here that 
there is an inconsistency in English law which acknowledges the right to autonomy 
when allowing a person to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but denies a similar right to a 
patient who requests death from their physician.99 
Salem cogently argues that autonomy is the right to act and govern oneself in 
accordance with one’s own private beliefs, values, and choices without interference as 
long as one’s behaviour does not harm others.100 Salem’s definition of autonomy can be 
best explained by Mill’s principle of liberty:  
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better 
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. ... Over himself, over his 
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.101  
It is accepted that a terminally ill patient’s decision to end their own life should not be 
interfered with on the grounds that others are acting for the patient’s own good in 
preventing the death.102 
Beauchamp argues that the right to request an assisted death is an extension of a 
patient’s autonomous right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.103 It is however contended 
that a patient can only be administered treatment with their consent. A physician’s 
obligation to subsequently comply with the patient’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment 
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cannot be the basis for imputing an obligation on the physician to assist with the 
patient’s request for assisted death.104 McLean makes a compelling argument that in 
cases of assisted death there is a combination of individual autonomy, in which private 
morality is taken into account, and relational autonomy, in which public morality and 
the interests of others are given weight. It is this combination which allows for the 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, but denies a right to assisted death.105 
It is argued that the wish for assisted death may be less an act of surrender due to 
unbearable suffering, and more the expression of autonomy and control over the timing 
and manner of one’s death.106 As Seale and Addington-Hall assert, ‘Requests for help to 
die may indicate not that patients are giving up in the face of suffering, but that they are 
positively asserting their desire to control events.’107 This is supported by studies of 
physician-assisted suicides under the DDA in Oregon (discussed in Chapter Five). 
These found that the majority of terminally ill patients never use the lethal medication 
prescribed pursuant to that Act. It is accepted that those patients who don’t immediately 
self-administer their prescribed lethal medication may be comforted just by the 
knowledge that they are in control of the timing and manner of their death, and that they 
have not been abandoned by their physicians. As the final physical act of administering 
the means of suicide in any physician-assisted suicide is the patient’s, a patient 
maintains control over their death when given the right to self-administer the lethal 
drugs.108  
It is also argued that in the case of physician-assisted suicide, a physician must also be 
willing to assist the patient and must not be compelled to do so. In such cases, the 
physician must be allowed an equal opportunity to exercise their own autonomy,109 as 
physician-assisted suicide involves the interpersonal dynamics of the physician-patient 
relationship, where there is a mutual decision between the physician and patient.110 
Rachels argues that Mill’s principle of liberty111 applies equally to cases of physician-
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assisted suicide, as the patient and physician act together in a private matter, where no 
one else’s interests are involved. According to Rachels, if we are to respect the right to 
liberty of dying patients, we must respect the right to physician-assisted suicides 
performed by willing physicians.112 However, it is submitted that respect for a patient’s 
autonomy should not disregard the importance of society’s interests. As was observed 
by the 1994 House of Lords’ Select Committee on Medical Ethics, ‘the issue of 
[assisted death] is one in which the interest of the individual cannot be separated from 
the interest of society as a whole.’113 Blondeau, too, correctly observes that just as life is 
a social practice, dying is also a social practice. It does not happen outside of a social 
network.114  
 Non-maleficence and beneficence 
The second and third principles of medical ethics under the four-principle model are 
non-maleficence and beneficence. As noted by Beauchamp and Childress, ‘non-
maleficence’ means that one has an obligation not to intentionally harm others, whilst 
‘beneficence’ means that one has a duty to act for the benefit of others. Physicians must 
consider these two principles together and aim at producing a net benefit for their 
patients.115 These two principles are strongly influenced by the ancient Hippocratic Oath 
which aimed to provide net medical benefit to patients with minimal harm.116 These 
principles are demonstrated in cases where futile life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn 
or withheld from incompetent patients, as with Bland’s case.117 As Rachels forcefully 
argues, if the only effect of maintaining life-sustaining treatment is to prolong a 
patient’s suffering, this would offend the principle of non-maleficence. As such, the 
withdrawal of treatment would be the better treatment decision with the least harmful 
effects.118 
As correctly observed by Huxtable, there is no straightforward application of these 
medical ethical principles. Some may oppose the legalisation of physician-assisted death 
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by regarding life as a benefit based on an absolute view of the doctrine of sanctity of life, 
whilst others may favour the legalisation of physician-assisted death by prioritising 
one’s quality of life over sanctity of life.119 Nevertheless, it is argued that it is important 
to be aware of a patient’s own assessment of what is harmful or of benefit to them.120 It 
is essential for physicians to take account of a patient’s preferences about their own 
medical treatment.121 Although ‘beneficence’ requires a positive benefit to be conferred 
on the patient, it is accepted that even by assisting a suicide, a physician is conferring a 
positive benefit by providing the ultimate relief for a patient’s pain and suffering.122  
 Justice in medical care 
The fourth principle of medical ethics under the four-principle model is justice in 
medical care. Under this principle, all patients have an equal right to be treated, and 
medical care is to be distributed fairly to all patients. Patients should receive treatment 
according to their needs, physicians should provide treatment according to what is 
possible, and there should be a just distribution of care across all patients.123 Besides 
taking account of what is in the best interests of the patient, a physician must also 
consider the needs of other patients and prioritise and distribute health resources across 
all patients accordingly.124 As observed by Vincent, the cessation of futile life-sustaining 
treatment promotes the principle of justice in medical care, as the continuation of such 
treatment demands costs, time and energy that could be better used on other patients.125 
On the basis of this principle, physician-assisted suicide should be permitted to 
terminally ill patients who make a competent request for it, as this would free up 
medical care and resources that could provide a greater benefit to others. 
3.3.5 Consequentialism and deontology 
Consequentialism and deontology are two ethical measures for assessing the morality of 
actions. According to consequentialists, the consequences of one’s actions govern the 
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morality of those actions.126 The course that results in the best overall outcome with the 
most benefit is the morally right course of action.127 However, in applying this ethical 
measure, one challenge is that one does not always know the consequences of one’s 
actions. On the other hand, deontology holds that certain actions are intrinsically right 
or wrong regardless of their consequences.128 The deontological measure starts from a 
premise that human beings have absolute duties and obligations.129  
It is contended that medical ethical reasoning in England and Wales is primarily 
deontological in nature, as it relies on moral absolutes. The application of a 
deontological ethical measure is demonstrated by Bland’s case.130 The House of Lords in 
Bland made a distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘omitting to treat and letting someone 
die’ to morally justify the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent 
patient who was in a PVS.131 In Bland’s case, the patient was considered to have died 
from his underlying injury. However, as ‘killing’ and ‘letting someone die’ both have 
the same consequences, such a distinction does not work under a consequentialist 
ethical measure.132 As Lord Mustill observed in Bland’s case, ‘however much the 
terminologies [‘act’ and ‘omission’] may differ the ethical status of the two courses of 
action [pursuant to consequentialism] is for all relevant purposes indistinguishable’.133 
Thus, as argued by Gillon, if  ‘letting someone die’ is morally acceptable, then an ‘act 
of killing’ with the same consequences would also be acceptable under 
consequentialism.134  
It follows from this that the present prohibition on assisted death may be morally 
justified under consequentialism. The legalisation of assisted death may have a negative 
impact on the value of life in society at large. It may also have a negative effect on the 
relationship between patients and physicians.135 The vulnerable may feel pressured to 
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request an assisted death,136 and there may no longer be any motivation for physicians to 
look for ways to address a patient’s pain and suffering137 or to research a cure for 
terminal illness.  
However, the legalisation of assisted death could be justified by applying a 
deontological and a consequentialist ethical measure. The deontological approach is that 
respect for the personal autonomy of a terminally ill person who is suffering unbearably 
should be fundamental, and should override sanctity of life.138 Meanwhile a 
consequentialist approach is that a law on assisted death with adequate safeguards 
would provide the best overall outcome for society.  
3.3.6 Doctrine of double effect 
Under the doctrine of double effect, a physician is permitted to administer large doses of 
palliative drugs to a terminally ill patient, even though the toxicity of those drugs will 
inevitably shorten the patient’s life. As discussed in Chapter Two, the English courts 
have held that such treatment is lawful, even if the incidental effect of the lethal drugs is 
to hasten a patient’s death.139 Such treatment is justified because the primary intention is 
to relieve pain, with the hastening of death regarded as a foreseen but unintended 
consequence.140 It is, however, argued that if it is probable that a known side effect will 
occur, then a physician should accept the moral responsibility for such effects that they 
foresee as inevitable, even though they do not intend them.141 As argued by Harris, a 
person must be morally responsible for all of the consequences of their actions, whether 
direct or indirect.142 Cotton persuasively asserts, ‘[d]ying patients are given larger and 
larger doses of morphine. We talk about the “double effect”, and know jolly well we are 
sedating them into oblivion, providing pain relief but also providing permanent relief, 
and we don’t tell them’.143  
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As was argued in Chapter Two, the doctrine of double effect calls into question the 
moral defensibility of the current prohibition on assisted death. Physicians are not 
permitted to intentionally assist a patient to die, but may (under the doctrine) knowingly 
hasten a patient’s death provided that it is an unintended side effect of treatment. As 
observed by Kass and Lund, the distinction between physician-assisted death and the 
potential double effect of palliative medication is a ‘blur’.144 It is difficult to maintain a 
moral and legal difference between, on the one hand, a high dosage of palliative 
medication which is known to cause death over a few days, and on the other hand, 
purposefully assisting patients to die quickly from a lethal medication.145  
3.3.7 Quality of life 
An important driving force behind terminally ill patients seeking an assisted death is 
their poor quality of life. The terminally ill often fear the disintegration of their bodies 
and minds.146 Studies have found that one of the worst aspects of the quality of life of 
terminally ill patients is the loss of functioning, control and independence,147 which may 
lead to feelings of being a burden to others. This is demonstrated in Price et al’s 2010 
study, which investigated the desire for a hastened death in patients receiving palliative 
care. The study found that participants who had a higher quality of life and physical, 
cognitive and social functioning were less likely to have a desire for a hastened death.148 
It is argued that a terminally ill patient who is competent should be able to decide at 
what point their quality of life is so poor and unacceptable for them to continue living.149 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in the case of Re B, the patient found her quality of life to 
be so poor that continued life for her would have been worse than no further life at all.150 
Finding her quality of life to be of an unacceptable standard, the patient refused 
life-sustaining treatment. It is submitted that English courts already accept quality of life 
judgements in end-of-life decisions involving incompetent patients (discussed in 
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Chapter Four). A quality of life judgement was evident in Bland’s case, where the 
House of Lords allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an 
incompetent patient who was in a PVS.151 The House of Lords found Bland’s quality of 
life to be so poor that the provision of ANH would have been futile, burdensome and of 
no benefit to him. Due to the importance of the issue, quality of life is addressed in 
greater detail in Chapter Four. 
3.3.8 Paternalism 
The current law in England and Wales supports a paternalistic approach by the medical 
profession towards end-of-life medical decisions. This is demonstrated by the English 
courts in allowing physicians to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients.152 Medical ethicists argue that because beneficence is a guiding 
principle of medical ethics,153 it allows physicians to make medical decisions in the best 
interests of their incompetent patients.154 It is accepted that medical paternalism should 
be the approach to medical decision-making in cases involving incompetent patients.155 
As commentators have observed, decisions involving the termination of futile life-
sustaining treatment require an expert medical judgement by physicians who have the 
required knowledge, expertise and experience.156  
Nevertheless, beneficence may also be a guise for medical paternalism towards 
competent patients.157 For example, end-of-life medical decisions involving a ‘double 
effect’ may leave a patient at the mercy of their physician’s motivations and 
intentions.158 The law under the doctrine of double effect is in effect stipulating that the 
intention of a physician is more important than a patient’s right to self-determination.159  
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The case of Re B (discussed in Chapter Two) also demonstrates that, ‘If beneficence is 
left entirely to the subjective judgment of [physicians] it … easily becomes an excuse 
for paternalism’.160 In Re B,161 a competent patient exercised patient autonomy and 
requested that her life-sustaining ventilator be switched off. The patient’s physicians 
claimed that she lacked competence, and refused her request saying that the refusal was 
in her best interests. Dame Butler-Sloss held:  
the principles of autonomy and beneficence would appear to be in conflict in 
this case. In accordance with the principle [of autonomy], the right of the 
competent patient to request cessation of treatment must prevail over the 
natural desire of the medical and nursing profession to try to keep her 
alive.162  
Her judgment further stated, ‘There is a serious danger, exemplified in this case, of a 
benevolent paternalism which does not embrace recognition of the personal autonomy 
of the severely disabled patient.’163 
It is however submitted that where patients experience diminished autonomy, medical 
paternalism is justified.164 As Marzuk argues, there are some human conditions in which 
people are not capable of enjoying a full measure of autonomy. Patients may differ in 
intellectual ability, may have different medical experiences, may have an illness that 
affects higher cognitive functions, or may have a strong emotional reaction to illness 
that precludes their objective processing of medical information.165 Komrad soundly 
asserts that the physician-patient relationship is a dynamic process, where one’s degree 
of autonomy is not fixed but may fluctuate during the course of an illness.166 As a 
patient’s capacity for autonomy increases, a physician’s paternalism which nurtures that 
autonomy decreases.167 
The current prohibition on assisted suicide in England and Wales itself displays state 
paternalism. State paternalism was demonstrated in Pretty, when the ECtHR held that 
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the infringement of Pretty’s right to private life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR was 
justified under Article 8(2),168 and that any arguments premised on respect for a patient’s 
autonomy were outweighed by the state’s interest in ‘preserving life and protecting the 
vulnerable’.169 State paternalism was also evident in Purdy, in which Baroness Hale held 
that the DPP’s prosecuting policy should not only be based on one’s right to autonomy, 
but also on protecting people who are vulnerable to various sorts of pressures.170 
It is submitted that any legalisation of assisted death should not be absolutely based on 
personal autonomy, but should also be mindful of appropriate levels of medical and 
state paternalism, to avoid abuse of the law, and to protect the vulnerable in society.  
3.3.9 Increasing scarcity of healthcare resources 
An important factor in the debate concerning assisted death is the effort being made to 
save limited healthcare resources for other, purportedly more beneficial, uses especially 
in a publicly funded health care system.171 As efforts are made to contain health care 
expenditure and ensure the just allocation of limited resources, there has been a growing 
recognition by healthcare authorities of the benefit of respecting a patient’s choice not 
to be subjected to prolonged and unwanted medical treatment.172 A consequentialist 
ethical measure is of particular significance in a situation where there are limited 
healthcare resources.173 A consequentialist would question the morality of artificially 
maintaining a patient in a PVS, given its drain on limited medical resources.174 For a 
consequentialist, such resources should preferably be apportioned in ways that create 
greater benefit.175  
It is contended here that the legalisation of assisted death would be effective in freeing 
up limited healthcare resources for other patients and thus promoting the interests of 
society as a whole.176 Nevertheless, Somerville persuasively asserts that:  
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the greatest danger of … [legalising assisted death] would come from an 
overemphasis of [societal interests], [for example, freeing up limited 
healthcare resources] at the expense of individual rights. Such an outcome 
would be ironic if the introduction of [assisted death] were seen as 
necessary, as often claimed by advocates, to respect and promote individual 
rights.177  
Somerville’s argument involves concerns of a slippery slope, in which a scarcity of 
healthcare resources may cause undue pressure on patients to opt for an assisted death. 
3.4 Other factors 
Having considered the social and ethical influences which affect the law on end-of-life 
medical decisions and the debate on assisted death in sections 3.2 and 3.3, this section 
will now consider other significant factors having an impact on them. 
3.4.1 Public trust in physicians 
The issue of public trust in physicians is highly relevant to the acceptability of a 
proposal for law reform on assisted death in England and Wales. The physician-patient 
relationship has often been described as a ‘healing relationship’ in which the physician 
restores the patient to health, or assists the patient in coping with illness, disease, or 
disability, and even death where a cure is not possible.178 An objection against the 
legalisation of physician-assisted death is that this would undermine the public’s trust in 
the medical profession, and a patient’s faith in their physician. A patient may feel that 
their physician has given up on them and no longer feels the need to explore other 
treatment options.179 Whilst Harris et al acknowledge these concerns, they still assert 
that physician-assisted death is ethically appropriate.180 They argue that when respecting 
a patient’s personal autonomy and assisting in their suicide, a physician would be 
exercising compassion by providing the ultimate relief for pain and suffering.  
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In this thesis the view is taken that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide would 
not undermine the integrity of the medical profession. Physicians already regularly 
make end-of-life medical decisions in cases involving a ‘double effect’, and in cases 
where life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn or withheld from a patient, yet this has not 
undermined the public’s trust in physicians.181 As argued by Wintersheimer, the medical 
profession was not impacted by the case of Bland, in which the withdrawal of ANH was 
allowed by the House of Lords.182 This is despite the fact that the patient, Anthony 
Bland, effectively died slowly by starvation rather than by his underlying medical 
condition.183 As convincingly observed by Chamberlain, rather than undermine the 
physician-patient relationship, by providing an assisted death the physician fulfils their 
patient’s wishes and maintains their trust. 184  
It is further argued that a physician’s involvement in a patient’s death should be judged 
in the context of all the medical interventions they made during the patient’s terminal 
illness.185 For many patients, advances in medical technology may provide temporary 
remission from progression of their illness or disease.186 However, such technology will 
eventually fail to assist and the patient’s condition will deteriorate, with the potential for 
prolonged suffering.187 As appropriately argued by Benrubi, if physicians are responsible 
for the prolonged unbearable pain and suffering, due to advances in medical technology, 
they should then also be responsible for ending that pain and suffering. It would be 
unethical for the medical profession to bring patients to a state of extended suffering, 
and then abandon them there.188 There may be a greater loss of trust in physicians if they 
hold terminally ill patients hostage to technology, rather than assisting them to die.189  
Urofsky forcefully argues that physician-assisted death ‘demonstrate[s] a commitment 
to the patient’s well-being right up until the moment of death’.190 Nevertheless, it is 
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argued that any request for an assisted death should be treated as the trigger for a 
medical investigation into what other therapeutic options, such as hospice or palliative 
care, might effectively address the patient’s condition.191 For example, Ganzini et al’s 
2000 study on physicians’ experiences with Oregon’s DDA found that the control of 
pain or other symptoms, the referral to a hospice programme, or a trial of antidepressant 
medication had altered the requests of 46% of patients who had sought a lethal 
prescription.192 The option for physician-assisted suicide should be one of last resort and 
not an alternative to other means of medicine. As noted by Baron, this would not only 
help ensure, but would reinforce, public trust in the integrity of the medical 
profession.193 
As argued in Chapter Two, if physician-assisted suicide is legalised, patients would 
have the benefit of appropriate medical assistance from physicians who would have 
access to the necessary means for carrying out assisted death effectively.194 This would 
reduce many of the risks associated with compassionate amateur assisted suicides.195 
Such risks include the means chosen for suicide being unreliable or inappropriately 
used.196 Some physicians may even be able to screen for mental disorders, including 
depression, which may impair a patient’s decision-making capacity.197 Further, a 
physician present at a patient’s suicide provides reassurance to the patient that the 
process will be carried out effectively,198 and any complications that arise will be 
managed properly.199 
As cogently argued by Clark, physician-assisted suicide should only be provided in the 
context of a meaningful physician-patient relationship.200 This is to address the concern 
that a physician who has not developed a relationship with the patient may act too 
quickly and without adequate consideration of a patient’s personal needs and medical 
history.201 A meaningful relationship may also influence a patient’s willingness to trust 
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their physician. The need for an established relationship was also noted by the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on the ADTI Bill 2004 when it heard evidence of the 
long-standing physician-patient relationships which exist in Dutch practice.202 These 
help physicians to assess whether their patient’s request for assisted death is voluntary 
and well-considered, and whether their suffering is unbearable and without prospect of 
improvement.203  
As Chamberlain soundly argues, a physician’s duties to a terminally ill patient 
transcends simply keeping them alive in the face of excessive pain and suffering.204 
Similarly, it is submitted here that physician-assisted suicide should be a part of a 
continuum of medical treatment, palliative care, and compassion that will allow the 
terminally ill patient to feel that they are not abandoned by the medical profession at a 
time when they need it most.205 As Quill and Battin persuasively claim:  
[If] assisted death … is to involve physicians, [it] cannot be solely a matter 
of patient choice; it must also be a response to medical distress, to actual or 
imminent suffering. The nature of the patient’s suffering and why it is 
intolerable to the patient must be understood by the physician, who must 
then try to respond as a matter of mercy and in fulfilment of his 
commitment not to abandon the patient. Thus autonomy, mercy, and 
non-abandonment go hand in hand: for the physician to participate in 
assistance in dying, it must both be the patient’s choice and help the patient 
avoid suffering that is intolerable or about to become so.206 
As will be seen in the next section, advances in medical technology may lead physicians 
to focus on what is medically possible for prolonging life, rather than to focus on issues 
pertaining to a poor and unacceptable quality of life. 
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3.4.2 Advances in medical technology 
While most patients previously died of illnesses that medicine could not overcome, 
advances in medical technology and longevity have added new dimensions to the dying 
process. As Callahan aptly explains, ‘While technology has greatly improved our ability 
to prolong life in the face of severe illness, it has also increased our uncertainty over 
when such life extension is meaningful.’207 He goes on to further state that, ‘often it is 
only one’s dying that is prolonged by technological brinkmanship’.208 As noted in the 
judgment of Pretty’s case: 
in an era of growing medical sophistication combined with longer life 
expectancies, many people are concerned that they should not be forced to 
linger on in old age or in states of physical or mental decrepitude which 
conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal identity.209 
The view is accepted that advances in medical technology have further aggravated the 
issue of the ‘medicalisation of death’. Stringer defines the ‘medicalisation of death’ as a 
physician’s determined efforts to continue aggressive treatments for hopelessly ill 
patients. According to him, those who consider it impossible for medical technology to 
deliver a dignified death may view such aggressive treatments on the terminally ill to be 
inhumane, as they are responsible for ‘keeping us alive when we might be better off 
dead’.210 As similarly observed by Seymour, advances in medical technology blur the 
boundaries between living and dying.211 Otlowski too argues that medical technology 
often does nothing to improve a patient’s quality of life, but rather prolongs the dying 
process.212  
It is submitted that a request for assisted death is often the result of a patient’s fear of an 
undignified prolongation of death. Advances in medical technology frequently lead to 
the isolation of the dying person and the dehumanisation of death.213 As Somerville 
convincingly asserts, death has been institutionalised, de-personalised and de-
humanised. It is often a medical event that takes place in a medical institution, where 
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the person dying is alone and isolated.214 Similarly, Illich observes that modern medicine 
has ‘brought the epoch of natural death to an end.’215 Kastenbaum’s description of 
‘phenomenological death’,216 where dying people exist under sedation and trapped in an 
isolated state of suspended animation, may best depict the image of death most feared as 
a result of the advances in medical technology.217 As Timmermans clearly argues, ‘the 
observation that … it is impossible for advanced medical technology and humane, 
dignified dying to co-exist becomes thus both an assumption and a normative 
conclusion’.218 
As will be seen in the following section, palliative care and hospices assist to address 
this sense of isolation, depersonalisation, and loss of control that dying patients 
frequently suffer in hospitals, surrounded by medical technology.219 
3.4.3 Palliative care   
Those opposing a law on assisted death often argue that adequate palliative care can 
alleviate a patient’s desire for assisted death.220 Studies in the UK show that suicidal 
patients who have expressed a strong desire for death have been known to subsequently 
change their views once given high-quality palliative care.221 This is demonstrated by 
Price et al’s 2010 study which investigated the desire for a hastened death in patients 
receiving palliative care. The researchers noted that such a desire tends to fluctuate over 
time. The study found that a number of remedies available through palliative care 
services, such as symptom control, treating depression and improving social support, 
may contribute to reducing the desire for a hastened death in people with progressive 
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incurable illnesses.222 In Seale’s 2007-2008 survey on end-of-life care, 27% of doctors 
found their patients’ desire for a hastened death to have reduced over time, with 21% 
thinking that this was in response to the care provided.223 Further commentary on the 
ability to change one’s desire for death can be seen in Hotopf et al’s 2010 editorial 
comments on the role of psychiatrists in assisted suicides. They note that psychiatrists 
who see patients over long periods of time often find that their patients’ distress and 
suicidality fluctuate.224 Additionally, there is also the potential for patients to adapt to 
their terminal illness. As demonstrated in a 2005 study on depression and anxiety in 
women breast cancer sufferers, the researchers found that distress at the early stages of 
cancer often remitted as patients adapted to their illness.225 This is often referred to as 
the ‘response shift’ phenomenon, and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.226 
Foreign studies such as Chochinov et al’s 1995 American study also found that the 
desire for death among the terminally ill is inconsistent and changes over time. These 
researchers also observed that whilst a desire for death is strongly influenced by pain 
and depression, these are potentially reversible.227  
As observed by Seale and Addington-Hall, a concern often raised by those campaigning 
for or against the legalisation of assisted death is that not all terminally ill patients have 
access to effective palliative care or hospices.228 The validity of this concern was 
established by the 2011 Palliative Care Funding Review. The Review found that of 
approximately 470,000 people who die in England annually, an estimated 355,000 
require some form of end-of-life care, with 92,000 having unmet specialist palliative 
needs.229 This is supported by the 2005 report of the charity, Help the Aged, which 
stated that older persons (defined as over-75s) in England and Wales did not all have 
equal access to palliative care. Help the Aged found that older people in care homes 
were far less likely than others to access specialist palliative care, or be admitted to a 
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hospice.230 Higginson et al observe that overall, there is a general trend for the number of 
hospice deaths among older people to decrease as their age increases, while the numbers 
dying in care homes show a parallel increase.231 It is argued that this lack of access to 
palliative care could make older people vulnerable under any law which permits assisted 
death. This concern is further exacerbated by the government’s announcement in July 
2013 to phase out the Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dying Patient (‘LCP’), a UK care 
pathway, due to the abuse and misuse of its procedures by staff.232 The LCP was 
designed to offer a peaceful death for elderly patients who are nearing the end of their 
lives.233 It was developed to help doctors and nurses provide quality end-of-life care, and 
covers palliative care options for patients in the final days or hours of life.234 Its 
end-of-life care includes the withdrawal or withholding of medication and food from 
incompetent patients.235 
It is argued that although physicians may do everything medically possible to minimise 
the distress and discomfort of a terminally ill patient through palliative care,236 terminal 
illness may involve intolerable pain and suffering that is beyond the scope of optimal 
palliative care. This possibility was challenged by the RCS in its written evidence to the 
2010 Commission on Assisted Dying, when it stated that ‘It is unusual to encounter a 
patient whose symptoms are truly unmanageable and greater availability of palliative 
care expertise would help this further’.237 As Miller forcefully argued in 1992, although 
effective palliative care can reduce the demand for assisted death, it will not eliminate it 
completely.238 This was also reflected in the message by the National Council for 
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Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services in 1997: ‘universal availability of 
excellent palliative care services will not and can never eliminate all such rational and 
persistent requests for [assisted death].’239 Studies in the UK have also demonstrated that 
palliative care is not able to provide total relief for some patients. For example, a 
working group of the RCP in 2000 found that opioids could produce good pain control 
in only 80% of patients.240 This was supported by further studies between 2000 and 2002 
that found that pain control for some patients will remain inadequate even with pain 
control measures.241 Inadequate pain control was also a concern under Oregon’s DDA. 
In its 2012 Annual Report, the OPHD found that 90.4% of terminally patients who died 
under the DDA between 1998 and 2012 received hospice care, but 23.5% of these 
patients had concerns about inadequate pain control.242  
Singer and Siegler express concern that the legalisation of physician-assisted death 
would remove incentives for the medical profession to improve pain control, and 
provide adequate palliative care.243 A lack of expertise in palliative care, and thus its 
inadequacy, was raised by Pollard in 2001 when he argued that, ‘Because virtually 
every survey of palliative care [in the UK] has revealed serious shortfalls in training and 
practice, it could never be assumed that care had always been adequate.’244 Those 
against the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales also argue that such a 
law would detract from the growing need for palliative care services.245 To the contrary, 
as will be observed in Chapter Five, the physician-assisted suicide law in Oregon has 
had quite the opposite effect. The law has led to improved and better palliative care for 
patients requesting physician-assisted suicide. Ganzini et al’s survey on physicians’ 
attitudes in Oregon found that 30% of physicians increased their number of referrals to 
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hospice care, and 76% worked to increase their knowledge of pain medication.246 
Hospice nurses and social workers in Oregon have also noticed an increase in 
physicians’ knowledge of palliative care, and in their willingness to refer patients to 
hospice care.247  
In this thesis the view is taken that a law on physician-assisted suicide will not meet the 
needs of society if it operates against a backdrop of inadequate palliative care.248 Under 
such circumstances, such a law may be viewed as a backlash against a medical 
profession which fails to address the needs of the terminally ill.249 As Pollard rationally 
asserts, ‘Even though good palliative care cannot always relieve all distressing 
symptoms, it would surely be wrong to propose [assisted death] for a terminally ill 
patient who had not received adequate medical and nursing care.’250 It is submitted that 
with the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide, a contemporaneous development of 
palliative care should also be promoted in England and Wales. Rather than being 
considered as an alternative to assisted death, palliative care should be explored and 
exhausted before resorting to physician-assisted suicide as an option of last resort.251 As 
with the assisted death laws of jurisdictions such as Belgium, Oregon (US) and the 
Northern Territory (Australia) (discussed in Chapter Five), the legalisation of physician-
assisted suicide in England and Wales should require that palliative care options be 
explored (and possibly be exhausted) as a prerequisite to assisted suicide.  
It is submitted that a physician’s powers should not be limited to curing and treating, 
but should also include alleviating the suffering of those terminally ill patients who are 
beyond the reach of effective palliative care through physician-assisted suicide.252 It is 
inhumane to force a terminally ill patient to continue a life of unbearable pain and 
suffering.253 Since doctors are already legally permitted to withhold or withdraw life-
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sustaining treatment from patients and allow them to die slowly,254 it would be more 
compassionate and humane to assist a patient to end their life quickly by taking a lethal 
dose of medication.255 
Those opposing the legalisation of assisted death believe that most terminally ill 
patients can experience a dignified death with palliative care.256 Some commentators 
argue that the basic tenets of palliative care  ‘relieving symptoms, enhancing control, 
and preserving dignity’257  constitute an overall goal of enabling patients to die with 
dignity.258 Significantly, the BMA is also of the view that the continuing improvement in 
palliative care allows patients to die with dignity.259 The issue of dying with dignity will 
be discussed in the following section. 
3.4.4 Concerns over patient dignity 
Although palliative care, as discussed above, may substantially reduce the pain and 
discomfort of grave illness, no amount of palliative care can address concerns regarding 
the loss of autonomy and control over bodily functions.260 The inability to maintain 
control or independence while dying is regarded as a fundamental loss of dignity by the 
terminally ill.261 This is demonstrated by a 2004 UK study on dignity in old age, which 
found that the elderly often associate dignity with autonomy, independence, and 
preserving one’s intellectual powers.262 Similarly, in Oregon, the 2012 Annual Report of 
the OPHD found that the end-of-life concerns of those requesting a physician-assisted 
suicide under the DDA between 1998 and 2012 were more commonly a loss of 
autonomy (91.2%), a decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life 
enjoyable (88.8%), the loss of dignity (82%), and the loss of control of bodily functions 
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(51.6%).263 Inadequate pain control was the main concern of a mere 23.5% of patients 
who died under the law. 
A loss of dignity is also associated with fears of debility, loss of cognition, and 
dehumanisation from both the underlying illness, as well as the powerful effects of 
palliative medication.264Additionally, terminal degenerative conditions such as motor 
neurone disease265 involve an inevitable tragic decline in physical integrity and 
functional ability, with patients enduring a life beyond what they perceive to be 
dignified bounds.266 Thus, even with skilled end-of-life care,267 terminally ill patients 
may experience a degree of suffering towards the end of life that they consider can only 
be relieved by ending their life at a time of their own choosing.268 It is concluded that a 
quick and painless death would mean more to terminally ill patients, than being 
subjected to a prolonged and undignified dying process overcome by intolerable pain 
and suffering.269 Again, consistent with previous argument, physician-assisted suicide, 
as an option of last resort, provides assurance to the terminally ill that they can reliably 
depend on physicians to achieve a peaceful and dignified death.270  
3.4.5 Concerns over a slippery slope 
According to Smith, slippery slope arguments posit that because accepting a certain 
desirable legal standard might lead to the subsequent acceptance of a standard that is 
‘undesirable’, the desirable standard ‘should not be accepted because it leads to the 
second, even if that is the only thing wrong with the first’.271 Those opposed to the 
legalisation of physician-assisted suicide fear that it will start England and Wales down 
a slippery slope, firstly, towards the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia272 and, 
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secondly, towards vulnerable groups becoming ‘targets of non-voluntary euthanasia273 
disguised as physician-assisted suicide’.274 These slippery slope concerns are considered 
in detail in Chapter Six. 
3.4.6 Protecting the vulnerable 
Those opposed to the legalisation of assisted death often argue that certain groups of 
people in society would be vulnerable under such a law. Such vulnerable groups might 
be those who are depressed, feeling alone or isolated, feeling family or financial 
pressure, or feeling helpless due to a loss of control and independence.275 Four 
categories of vulnerable people are discussed below. These are the depressed, those who 
find themselves to be a burden to others, the elderly276 and the disabled. 
 The depressed 
Studies among the terminally ill have shown that depression is strongly associated with 
a request for assisted death. A 2000 study by Breitbart et al found that terminally ill 
patients with depression were four times more likely to request assisted death than those 
without.277 A recent study by Price et al in 2010, on the desire for hastened death in a 
UK palliative population, found that an estimated 14% of the 300 terminally ill 
participants had a desire for a hastened death, out of which 63.6% were identified as 
having some form of depressive disorder.278 In Ganzini et al’s 2000 survey on the 
competence required to consent to an assisted suicide, the researchers found that of 290 
psychiatrists in Oregon who responded to the survey, 58% (not a clear consensus) 
asserted that the presence of a major depressive disorder should result in an automatic 
finding of incompetence for the purposes of obtaining assisted suicide.279 It is often 
argued that patients with treatable clinical depression have impaired competence to 
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request assisted death.280 However, Levene and Parker’s 2010 UK study on depression 
in euthanasia and assisted suicide, found that ‘depression does not necessarily make 
patients incompetent and there is little evidence on whether treatment will be acceptable 
to patients at the end of life, or will change end-of-life decisions’.281  
There have been conflicting studies on whether one’s competence is necessarily 
affected by clinical depression. In a 1998 study of Oregonians with amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (a type of motor neurone disease), no association was found between 
depression and an intent to request a lethal prescription.282 Some commentators argue 
that depression can impair patient autonomy, and yet coexist with a competent and 
autonomous wish for an assisted death.283 For example, in a 1994 American study on the 
effect of depression treatment on elderly patients on life-sustaining treatment, Ganzini et 
al found that a patient suffering from clinical depression may still make an informed, 
competent and reasoned decision for an end-of-life decision, provided the depression is 
not distorting their judgement.284 Similarly, Levene and Parker’s study (discussed above) 
found that most people with major depression retain competence to make medical 
decisions, and that they did not rank depression as a motivating factor in their request 
for physician-assisted suicide.285 
Nevertheless, it is accepted that clinical depression would most likely distort a patient’s 
rational capacity to make choices.286 Emanuel et al’s 2000 American study of attitudes 
and desires related to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide among terminally ill 
patients found that terminally ill patients who suffer from treatable depression are more 
likely to change their minds about ending their life than patients without depression.287 
Similarly, Ganzini et al’s 2000 study found that a trial of antidepressant medication had 
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altered the requests of 46% of patients who had sought a lethal prescription under 
Oregon’s DDA.288 This was also demonstrated in an earlier 1998 UK study on suicide 
and attempted suicide, where researchers found that once depression was treated 
effectively, around 99% of patients changed their mind about wanting to die.289 
Although the presence of depression does not necessarily mean that a patient’s choice is 
irrational,290 it is concluded that the reasoning processes of a depressed patient will 
generally be biased, and their capacity to make well-considered end-of-life decisions is 
likely to be affected.291  
Studies show that physicians often fail to detect depression amongst terminally ill 
patients, with detection rates varying between 40% and 80%. As argued by Finlay, a 
terminally ill person can appear to have capacity when their decision making is in fact 
distorted by depression.292 In 2006, Hicks noted in his literature review that, even when 
a ‘low mood’ is recognised in severely ill patients, physicians tend to consider it a 
normal and understandable reaction by the patient to their condition.293 Chochinov made 
a similar observation that same year in a Canadian journal. He observed that as 
terminally ill patients frequently experience moments of sadness, depression is often 
overlooked.294 Thompson et al’s 2000 study on the detection of depression in primary 
care found that even British GPs who were trained in depression, recognised it in only 
39% of all depressed patients attending their practices.295 A subsequent Canadian study 
by Gruneir et al in 2005, however, had a higher rate of detecting depression in patients 
with advanced illness. Their study found that depression was undiagnosed in 20-30% of 
terminally ill patients.296 Additionally, studies in the UK, between 2005 and 2006, 
                                                          
288 Ganzini (ch1 n78) 563. 
289 Hawton & Fagg, ‘Suicide and other causes of death, following attempted suicide’ (1998)152 Br J Psychiatry 359. 
290 Conwell and Caine (n280) 1101-1102. 
291 Burt (n286) 174. 
292 IG Finlay, ‘Crossing the “bright line” – difficult decisions at the end of life’ (2006) 6 Clinical Medicine 398. 
293 MHR Hicks, ‘Physician-assisted suicide: a review of the literature concerning practical and clinical implications 
for UK doctors’ (2006) 7(39) BMC Family Practice 10. 
294 HM Chochinov, ‘Dying, Dignity, and New Horizons in Palliative End-of-Life Care’ (2006)56 CA-Cancer J Clin 
84. 
295 C Thompson et al, ‘Effects of a clinical-practice guideline and practice based education on detection and outcome 
of depression in primary care: Hampshire Depression Project randomized controlled trial’ (2000)355 Lancet 185. 
296 A Gruneir et al, ‘Depression in patients with advanced illness: an examination of Ontario complex continuing care 
using the Minimum Data Set 2.0’ (2005)3 Palliative and Support Care 99. 
   
141 
showed that the treatment of depression by GPs was limited by their skills and lack of 
resources.297  
It is submitted that depression amongst patients is significantly overlooked and under-
treated in England and Wales.298 Terminally ill patients who are clinically depressed 
may be vulnerable if physician-assisted suicide were to be legalised.299 As convincingly 
argued by Chochinov, physicians are often unable to recognise, assess and address the 
psychological distress that many terminally ill patients feel. Untreated depression, 
according to him, may increase a patient’s burden of suffering and lead to a significant 
decline in quality of life. This may cause them to turn to physician-assisted suicide.300 
Thus, in order to meet the needs of these potentially vulnerable members of society, 
measures to ensure an effective mental health evaluation will need to be considered. 
Price et al observe in their 2010 study that a number of remedies available through 
palliative care which treat depression might reduce the desire for assisted death by those 
with terminal illness.301 For this reason, palliative care is also recommended as part of 
any legalisation of assisted death. 
 Patients as a burden on others 
As noted by Hardwig, being a burden to loved ones is enough reason for some patients 
to want to end their lives. It is the fear of losing one’s physical ability or intellectual 
capacity and being handed over to the will of others that makes them vulnerable to a law 
on assisted death.302 Similarly, other commentators observe that patients may be 
indirectly encouraged or pressured by physicians, family members, and society to 
request death in order to spare their families financial or emotional strain.303 Evidence 
from Oregon found that in 2000, 63% of patients who received physician-assisted 
suicide under Oregon’s DDA had expressed a strong sense of being a significant burden 
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to their family, friends, or caregivers.304 It is submitted that palliative care could assist 
such vulnerable patients as its scope includes the social aspects of the patient in 
achieving a sense of control, relieving burden and strengthening relationships with their 
loved ones.305  
As will be discussed in the following sections, if physician-assisted suicide were to be 
legalised then the elderly and the disabled might feel that they have a duty to die to 
relieve their loved ones, carers and society in general of their care. 
 The elderly306 
There is evidence that many elderly members of society (whose demographic growth is 
discussed in section 3.2.3) currently face some form of abuse or discrimination in 
England and Wales. This has been found by numerous UK studies conducted in the last 
six years. A 2007 study on the abuse and neglect of older people307 found that 4% were 
experiencing some form of abuse.308 A later study in 2009 found that 8.6% of older 
people living in the community were experiencing some form of abuse, most commonly 
psychological abuse (4.1%) and neglect (2.8%).309  
Inadequate care and support for older people at the end of their lives was also 
documented in the 2011 ‘Report of the Health Service Ombudsman on ten 
investigations into NHS care of older people’ (‘2011 Ombudsman’s Report’). The 
report criticised NHS staff for treating elderly people without compassion, and for 
condemning many to die in unnecessary pain, indignity and distress.310 In 2011, the Care 
Quality Commission (‘CQC’) also published a report on the dignity and nutrition of 
older people being treated in NHS hospital trusts311. Approximately one in five of the 
hospitals visited were providing a level of care that ‘posed risks to people’s health and 
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wellbeing’.312 The findings of the 2011 Ombudsman’s Report and the CQC’s Report, 
published in February and October 2011 respectively, were further supported by the 
findings of the February 2013 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry (‘2013 Mid Staffordshire Report’).313 As observed by Dame Christine 
Beasley (former Chief Nursing Officer for England) in the 2013 Mid Staffordshire 
Report:  
I think we still have a real challenge in hospital care around the complex 
needs of our most vulnerable patients, which tend to be older people with a 
lot of complex conditions and who are normally, not exclusively, but who 
are normally in medical wards … that area … is still very challenging for us 
all, and I don’t think we’ve got it right.314  
It is argued that such existing circumstances may already constitute indirect pressure on 
elderly people in society to desire an assisted death. As noted in section 3.4.3, the 
concern that older members of society in England and Wales will be vulnerable to the 
legalisation of assisted death is further reinforced by the 2005 report by the charity, 
Help the Aged.315 The Report stated that the opportunity to go into a hospice declined 
with age.316 It showed that only 8.5% of older people who die of cancer do so in a 
hospice, compared with 20% of all those with cancer.317 This has given rise to the 
description of older people as ‘the disadvantaged dying’.318  
Despite the adverse findings of the above mentioned reports, Seale’s 2007-2008 survey 
of physicians on hastening death in end-of-life care found no statistical evidence that 
older patients are at a greater risk of end-of-life medical decisions which hasten death.319 
It is accepted that Seale’s results provide no support for concerns that the elderly may 
be vulnerable if physician-assisted suicide were to be legalised in England and Wales. 
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Nevertheless, a law on physician-assisted suicide would have to address the present 
prejudices towards older members of society.320 
 The disabled 
There is also concern about the impact of legalising physician-assisted suicide on 
disabled members of society. Harris et al argue that such a law may encourage a societal 
view that suffering is senseless, that interdependency is a burden, and thus the lives of 
disabled people are not worth living.321 Disability rights campaigners in England and 
Wales argue that in a society where disabled people are already not treated as equal 
citizens, a ‘right to die’ would endanger disabled people’s right to live and their right to 
have their lives seen as being of equal value. 
Not Dead Yet UK, a network of disabled people in the UK who oppose ‘the legalised 
killing of disabled people’, believes that legalising assisted death will inevitably lead to 
increasingly adverse beliefs about the quality of life of disabled people.322 It reiterates 
Harris et al’s concerns by stating on its website, ‘If we give in to the demand to assist in 
a suicide we are reinforcing attitudes that say that the lives of disabled people are not 
worth living – that they are a particular burden to themselves, their relatives and friends, 
and the state.’323 In March 2011, Scope, a UK disability charity, conducted a poll to 
explore disabled people’s perspectives on assisted suicide.324 53% of respondents said 
they would be concerned about a change in the law to legalise assisted suicide. If 
assisted suicide was to be legalised, 35% of respondents expressed concern of pressure 
being placed on them to end their life prematurely, 70% expressed concern of pressure 
being placed on other disabled people to end their lives prematurely, and 56% believed 
it would be detrimental to the way that disabled people are viewed by society as a whole. 
Similarly, the results of general opinion polls in the UK reflect a societal concern about 
the potential impact of extending the option for assisted death to those who might feel 
that their lives are devalued in the eyes of society, by the very fact that such an option is 
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available.325 As noted in Chapter One, the 23rd BSA Report in 2007,326 and the 26
th
 BSA 
Report in 2010,327 found that only 45% support assisted dying for those with non-
terminal conditions. The July 2009 Populus poll for The Times newspaper found that 
only 48% of respondents who supported assisted suicide under certain circumstances 
were in favour of extending this to people with a ‘severe physical disability’ who were 
otherwise healthy.328 It is argued that any law which legalises physician-assisted suicide 
would have to contain strict safeguards to protect these members of society against any 
abuse of the law. Such safeguards are addressed in Chapter Seven.  
3.4.7 The laws on assisted death of other jurisdictions 
The laws of other jurisdictions which have permitted assisted death in some form 
(discussed in Chapter Five) have influenced English law in two respects. Firstly, they 
provide a source of knowledge which has informed and shaped the current debate on 
possible law reform.329 Secondly, British citizens are able to obtain suicide assistance in 
more liberal jurisdictions  especially Switzerland. As the Swiss laws which permit 
assisted suicide are not restricted to Swiss residents, the Swiss right-to-die organisation, 
Dignitas, has become the most popular destination for British citizens seeking an 
assisted death abroad. By assisting death for so-called ‘suicide tourists’, these other 
jurisdictions are both encouraging calls for reform to current English laws, as well as 
generating complaints that current English laws are not being coherently prosecuted to 
prevent such suicide tourism from occurring.330  
The laws of other jurisdictions have also heightened general public awareness of issues 
concerning assisted death, especially through the media coverage given to suicide 
tourism cases.   
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3.4.8 Media coverage 
The increasing media coverage given to the assisted suicides of Britons at Dignitas, and 
of high-profile court cases like those involving Debbie Purdy331 and Tony Nicklinson,332 
has not only fuelled the debate on assisted death in England and Wales, but evoked huge 
public sympathy for those wanting assisted death to be legalised.333 Some recent 
documentaries are highlighted below.  
In December 2008, the television programme Sky Real Lives aired the documentary 
‘Right to Die’, about the assisted suicide of Craig Ewert at Dignitas in 2006.334 The 
documentary covered the last four days of Ewert’s life, and showed him dying with his 
wife at his side.335 In 2009, a film called ‘A Short Stay in Switzerland’, inspired by the 
life and death of Dr Anne Turner was produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(‘BBC’).336 Turner died at Dignitas in 2006, accompanied by her three children. In 2011, 
the British author, Sir Terry Pratchett, took part in a BBC documentary which followed 
the final days of a 71-year-old British man who travelled to Dignitas to die.337 The 
documentary, called ‘Choosing to Die’, was centred on Pratchett’s belief in a right to 
take his own life.338 There was also tremendous publicity surrounding Reginald Crews’ 
death in 2003.339 Crew was the first Briton to be publicly named as using the services of 
Dignitas.340 In the hope of promoting the legalisation of assisted suicide, Crew was 
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accompanied to Switzerland by not only his wife, but by a television documentary crew 
from ITV1.341 
By giving the debate on the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales such a 
high level of exposure, the media has not only helped shape the debate, but its coverage 
of suicide tourism cases has created a ‘vicious cycle’ in which greater public awareness 
of suicide tourism has encouraged greater numbers of people to pursue this option with 
news of this trend then receiving further media coverage. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter examined the social, ethical and other influences affecting the development 
of the current law on assisted death in England and Wales. The influences examined 
were (i) religion, (ii) individualism, (ii) an aging population, (iv) sanctity of life, 
(v) self-determination, (vi) professional ethics, (vii) the four principles of medical ethics 
(respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice in medical care), 
(viii) consequentialism and deontology, (ix) the doctrine of double effect, (x) quality of 
life, (xi) paternalism, (xii) scarcity of healthcare resources, (xiii) public trust in 
physicians, (xiv) advances in medical technology, (xv) palliative care, (xvi) concerns 
over patient dignity, (xvii) concerns over a slippery slope, (xviii) protecting the 
vulnerable, (xix) the laws on assisted death in other jurisdictions, and (xx) media 
coverage. From an analysis of these influences, this chapter concludes that the current 
law is unsatisfactory, and that it fails to meet the needs of those seeking an assisted 
death. The reasons for this, are as follows. 
Firstly, whilst the ethical influence of ‘sanctity of life’ may provide moral coherence to 
the current illegality of assisted death, this doctrine is upheld by neither the end-of-life 
medical decisions which are currently permitted, nor by the law which decriminalises 
suicide. The current level of public trust in the medical profession is one which exists 
despite physicians regularly making end-of-life medical decisions which hasten death. 
The chapter accordingly concludes that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide 
would not undermine the integrity of the medical profession. Opposition by the GMC 
and BMA to the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide on these grounds is similarly 
unfounded, and is inconsistent with their own support for such end-of-life medical 
decisions which indirectly hasten death. 
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Secondly, the chapter demonstrated that other ethical influences are growing in England 
and Wales, and are now challenging the moral coherence of the current prohibition on 
assisted death. These include self-determination, quality of life, patient dignity, and the 
medical ethical principle of autonomy. As these influences continue to make the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment more morally acceptable, the 
current prohibition on assisted death for those who competently request it tends to 
become more questionable.  
Thirdly, whilst seldom articulated in public debate, the chapter also found that the 
medical ethical principle of ‘justice in medical care’ (which provides that medical care 
is to be distributed fairly to all patients), combined with the increasing scarcity of 
healthcare resources (encouraging efforts to save limited healthcare resources for their 
most beneficial uses), tend to make end-of-life medical decisions such as the withdrawal 
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from patients more morally acceptable. This, 
combined with advances in medical technology that merely prolong the dying process 
of a patient, further strengthens the moral argument in favour of allowing assisted death 
with appropriate safeguards. 
This chapter considered the vulnerable groups within society, including those who are 
depressed, those who regard themselves to be a burden on others, and the elderly. In its 
analysis of the need to protect these vulnerable groups, the chapter concluded that this 
need has strongly influenced current laws, and is currently well satisfied.  However, if 
physician-assisted suicide were to be legalised, the potential for alternative safeguards 
to protect such vulnerable groups was also noted. These include mental health 
evaluations and adequate access to palliative care for those requesting an assisted death. 
The chapter found that social influences such as religion, where there is now a strong 
trend towards secularisation, should no longer be relied upon to justify the current 
prohibition on assisted death. Further, the trend towards individualism in England and 
Wales is a social influence which supports autonomy and self-determination. 
Increased public awareness of the legality of assisted death in other jurisdictions, due to 
the media coverage of the ‘suicide tourists’ who travel abroad to end their life, has in 
turn raised interest in changing the current law on assisted death in England and Wales 
due to a perception that it does not meet the needs of either society, nor of those seeking 
an assisted death. 
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A key ethical influence considered by this chapter was ‘quality of life’. It is argued in 
this thesis that a competent terminally ill patient should be able to obtain an assisted 
death, based upon their own decision of the point at which their quality of life is so poor 
as to be unbearable and unacceptable. This issue will be examined fully in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Quality of Life 
4.1 Introduction 
Having considered the social and ethical context of the law on assisted death1 in 
England and Wales in Chapter Three, this chapter will examine the extent to which 
‘quality of life’2 has been considered in legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions.  
The chapter will demonstrate that the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment from incompetent patients is often influenced by a judgement of the patient’s 
quality of life. As will be illustrated, such quality of life judgements are made under the 
guise of a ‘best interests’ assessment. The chapter seeks to establish that when allowing 
such withdrawal of treatment from incompetent patients, the English courts have 
decided cases based purely on the quality of life of patients. An examination of such 
end-of-life decisions involving infants is included in this chapter to further exemplify 
that the English courts have focused on a patient’s ‘quality of life’ in their judgments.  
The definition of ‘quality of life’ will be examined from a subjective patient perspective 
and from an objective professional perspective. The scope of quality of life in terms of 
health-related issues and in a much wider global sense will also be analysed in this 
chapter. The chapter seeks to establish that a competent patient who is terminally ill 
should be allowed to make a request for physician-assisted suicide based on a subjective 
evaluation of their quality of life3  a quality of life which they determine to be poor and 
unacceptable due to the unbearable suffering caused by their terminal illness. The 
chapter also seeks to establish that quality of life for purposes of law reform should be 
based on a subjective patient evaluation of health-related issues. The difficulties of 
using subjective measurement instruments to assess a terminally ill patient’s quality of 
life will also be examined.  
The following section will show that individuals seeking to end their lives do so based 
on a personal assessment of their quality of life. This is demonstrated not only by 
                                                          
1 ‘Assisted death’, defined in section 1.1.  
2 Quality of life is an ethical influence on the debate for the legalisation of assisted death, discussed in section 3.3.7. 
3 This would be in line with the House of Lords decision in Purdy where it was held that the right to private life under 
art 8(1) of the ECHR protects an individual’s right to make autonomous choices regarding their quality of life, 
including the choice to end their life: Purdy (HL)(ch1 n31)[39]. 
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assisted suicide cases at right-to-die organisations abroad, but also by cases where 
patients have requested the removal of life-sustaining treatment. 
4.2 Competent patients – a question of quality of life 
Britons who have ended their lives at the Swiss right-to-die organisation, Dignitas, 
include those suffering from a wide range of medical conditions, from the terminally ill 
with cancer,4 motor neurone disease,5 or progressive supranuclear palsy (a degenerative 
brain disease),6 to those with progressive non-fatal conditions like multiple sclerosis,7 
and even to those with severe non-fatal conditions like spinal cord injuries.8 In 2011, 
84-year-old Nan Maitland, suffering from arthritis, ended her life at Dignitas simply 
because she wished to escape the ‘long period of decline, sometimes called “prolonged 
dwindling”, that so many people unfortunately experience before they die’.9 In May 
2013, an 83-year-old man chose to die at Dignitas because he did not want to face the 
agony of progressive dementia.10  
As observed in Chapter Two, Baroness Hale in the case of Purdy noted that 
‘autonomous11 individuals have different views about what makes their lives worth 
living’.12 This situation is illustrated in the case of Re B,13 where Ms B who was 
paralysed from the neck down, requested that her life-sustaining ventilator be switched 
off. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss held that continued treatment was unlawful in the face 
of Ms B’s competent refusal for treatment: 
If mental capacity is not in issue and the patient, having been given the 
relevant information and offered the available options, chooses to refuse the 
                                                          
4 H de Quetteville, ‘Why I took my wife to die at Dignitas’ The Telegraph (London,19 July 2009). 
5 Laurance (ch3 n341). 
6 A Thompson, ‘“Anne, if you drink this you will die”: Why we stood by and allowed our mother to commit suicide’ 
Daily Mail (London,18 January 2009). 
7 ‘Assisted suicide: British multiple sclerosis sufferer ends life at Swiss “suicide clinic” Dignitas’ The Telegraph 
(London,30 December 2010).  
8 Edwards (ch1 n21).  
9 Adetunji (ch1 n23). 
10 J Stevens, ‘Man, 83, becomes first Briton to choose Dignitas assisted suicide because he had dementia’ The Daily 
Mail (London,30 May 2013). 
11 See section 3.3.4. 
12 Purdy (HL)(ch1 n31) [66]. 
13 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) (ch1 n42). 
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treatment, that decision has to be respected by the doctors.14  
Nevertheless, Keown persuasively argues that Ms B’s assessment of her quality of life 
was significant to her decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment.15 Ms B had been 
aware of the poor quality of life offered by the continuation of treatment. She said: 
Given the range of choices, I would want to recover and have my life back, 
or significant enough recovery to have a better quality of life. I am not 
convinced from the evidence that that is going to happen, and I find the idea 
of living like this intolerable.16  
The influence of ‘quality of life’ was also apparent in Butler-Sloss’ judgment:  
One must allow for those as severely disabled as Ms B, for some of whom 
life in that condition may be worse than death. It is a question of values and, 
as [expert healthcare professionals] have pointed out, we have to try 
inadequately to put ourselves into the position of the gravely disabled 
person and respect the subjective character of experience.17  
Although the various medical conditions described above affect the quality of life of a 
person, the proposal for law reform in this thesis will be restricted to patients with a 
terminal illness. A legal medical option of physician-assisted suicide for those 
experiencing a poor and unacceptable quality of life due to a terminal illness will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. The cases examined in the following section will 
show that when allowing life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld from 
incompetent patients, English courts have effectively been making judgements on a 
patient’s quality of life. It will be demonstrated that the courts do this under the guise of 
acting in a patient’s ‘best interests’. This will be evidence that the English courts are 
used to making judgements on a patient’s quality of life when determining end-of-life 
medical decisions. 
 
 
                                                          
14 ibid 474. 
15 Keown (ch2 n247). 
16 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) (ch1 n42) 461. 
17 ibid 472. 
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4.3 Incompetent patients – a question of quality of life  
Before proceeding with an analysis of English cases involving incompetent patients, the 
scope of ‘best interests’ at common law will be briefly considered. This will establish 
what factors the courts have taken into account when assessing an incompetent patient’s 
best interests, and accordingly in judging their quality of life. 
At first, ‘best interests’ were assessed by courts solely in terms of medical interests. 
This was established in the 1990 case of Re F, which held that an assessment of ‘best 
interests’ was to be carried out by physicians using their professional medical 
judgement in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion (i.e. the Bolam 
test).18 However, in 2000, Thorpe LJ in Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) held that: 
the Bolam test is applied only at the outset…In deciding what is best for the 
disabled patient the judge must have regard to the patient’s welfare as 
paramount consideration. That embraces issues far wider than the medical.19  
Similarly, in 2000, Butler-Sloss P in Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) not 
only separated the assessment of best interests from the Bolam test, but held that ‘best 
interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare issues’.20 On appeal to 
the Court of Appeal, Thorpe LJ then developed an approach where a balancing exercise 
is applied to provide an objective welfare appraisal within which all factors deemed 
relevant to the decision are outlined and weighed, including factors based on subjective 
evidence, to ascertain a patient’s best interests.21 He proposed that a balance sheet 
should be drawn up, setting out on each side the actual advantages and disadvantages 
associated with continuing or discontinuing the treatment in question.22 Thorpe LJ’s 
‘objective welfare appraisal’ was subsequently endorsed by Butler-Sloss LJ in the 2003 
case of Simms v Simms, where she held: 
In my judgement, I have to assess the best interests in the widest possible 
way to include the medical and non-medical benefits and disadvantages, the 
                                                          
18 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. The Bolam test was set out in Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
19 Re S (Sterilisation: patient’s best interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389,403.  
20 Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193,200–201. 
21 MC Dunn et al, ‘Constructing and Reconstructing “Best Interests”: An Interpretative Examination of Substitute 
Decision-making under the Mental Capacity Act’ (2007)29(2) J.Soc.Wel.& Fam.L. 117,125.  
22 Re A (Male Sterilisation) (n20) 206. 
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broader welfare issues of the…[patient]…All of these matters have to be 
weighed up and balanced in order for the court to come to a decision in the 
exercise of its discretion.23 
An examination of other common law cases will now follow. The following two 
sections will show that in judging the quality of life of newborn babies and mentally 
disabled adult patients, the English courts have emphasised that subjective measures of 
quality of life are essential to a ‘best interests’ assessment. 
4.3.1 Critically ill and severely disabled newborn babies 
In this thesis, it is argued that English courts have made quality of life judgements when 
allowing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from children. This 
is evident from the judgment of Lord Donaldson in the 1990 case of Re J:  
There is without doubt a very strong presumption in favour of a course of 
action which will prolong life, but…it is not irrebuttable…Account has to 
be taken of the pain and suffering and quality of life which the child will 
experience if life is prolonged. Account has also to be taken of the pain and 
suffering involved in the proposed treatment itself.24  
Thus, where a child is experiencing poor quality of life with life-sustaining treatment, 
and if such treatment is burdensome to them, in such cases Lord Donaldson has taken 
the view that the doctrine of sanctity of life25 is no longer absolute. 
In the 1990 case of Re B (A Minor), the court was confronted with parents who refused 
to consent to an urgent surgery for their newborn child.26 The child was born with Down 
Syndrome and had an intestinal blockage which required immediate surgery. Due to the 
Down Syndrome, the parents were of the view that it would be better for the child to be 
allowed to die. Contrary to the parents’ view, the court held that it was in the best 
interests of the child to receive the operation. The focus of Templeman LJ and 
 
                                                          
23 Simms v Simms (2003) 1 All ER 669 [60]. 
24 In Re J (A Minor) (ch2 n236) 938. 
25 See section 3.3.1. 
26 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 927 CA. 
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Dunn LJ’s judgments were on the child’s quality of life. Templeman LJ’s assessment of 
the child’s quality of life centred on: 
Whether the life of the child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in 
effect the child must be condemned to die, or whether the life of this child is 
still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to 
die.27  
He noted that should the operation be carried out, the child would be able to lead a 
normal, relatively happy life, to such extent as could be expected of any child with 
Down Syndrome. Dunn LJ’s quality of life assessment focused on the intolerability of 
the child’s life. He said, ‘there is no evidence that this child’s short life is likely to be an 
intolerable one. There is no evidence at all as to the quality of life which the child may 
expect.’28 It is argued that the Court of Appeal in Re B (A Minor) made a paternalistic29 
judgement of the child’s quality of life. The Court would have most likely relied on the 
medical assessments of doctors in making its quality of life judgement and allowing the 
operation to take place.30  
As with Dunn LJ’s judgment in Re B (A Minor) noted above, the focus of Taylor LJ’s 
‘quality of life’ judgment in Re J31 (noted above) was ‘intolerability’. In Re J, a child 
had been born prematurely, and was suffering from severe brain damage and epilepsy. It 
was likely that the child would be deaf and blind, possess not even limited intellectual 
abilities, and would develop serious quadriplegia. The Court of Appeal had to decide 
whether the child should be ventilated, if its breathing were ever to cease. The Court 
held that where the deformities of a newly born infant  when viewed from the 
perspective of a person able to make a sound judgement  were such that life would be 
intolerable, then life-preserving ventilation could lawfully be withheld.32 However, 
bearing in mind the child’s ‘best interests’, the Court emphasised the need to judge 
                                                          
27 ibid 929. 
28 ibid 930. 
29 See section 3.3.8. 
30 B Wright et al, ‘Clinical dilemmas in children with life-limiting illnesses: decision making and the law’ (2009)23 
Palliative Medicine 238,246.  
31 Re J (A Minor) ( ch2 n236). 
32 ibid. 
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quality of life from the child’s perspective. Taylor LJ attempted to determine the child’s 
‘assumed’ view by applying the ‘substituted judgement’ standard:33  
the court [should] judge the quality of life the child would have to endure if 
given the treatment and decide whether in all the circumstances such a life 
would be so afflicted as to be intolerable to that child…the test should not 
be whether the life would be intolerable to the decider. The test must be 
whether the child in question, if capable of exercising sound judgment, 
would consider the life tolerable.34  
The Court of Appeal in Re J accepted that disabled children may gain pleasure and 
satisfaction from a quality of life that seems intolerable to others.35 It is submitted that 
by emphasising the need to judge quality of life from the child’s perspective, Taylor LJ 
had stressed a need to respect patient autonomy36 in such cases. 
It is argued that there are real difficulties in applying the ‘substituted judgement’ 
standard to newborn babies. Forming a substituted judgement for a newborn baby is 
speculative, as it is impossible to know what a newborn baby would think of their likely 
quality of life and what they would prefer. Where medical decisions for incompetent 
adult patients are guided by the ‘substituted judgement’ standard, the courts are often 
able to assess a patient’s ‘best interests’ based on the patient’s known beliefs, 
preferences, views, and wishes from when they were competent. As appropriately 
observed by Rhoden, the ‘substituted judgement’ standard is ideal for patients who have 
previously expressed their views and is also feasible for patients who never expressed 
their views but whose established personalities provide clues as to their probable desires. 
However, this is an exercise in futility for infants or for patients with profound 
retardation who have never developed desires and preferences.37 As Brazier argues, 
‘substituted judgement’ in the case of incompetent patients can only ever become an 
integral part of ‘best interests’ where such judgement can be discerned.38 Further, the 
‘substituted judgement’ standard also does not take into account the ‘response shift’ 
                                                          
33 See section 2.3.3 under Best interests. 
34 In Re J (A Minor) (ch2 n236) 945.  
35 ibid 936, 938 (Lord Donaldson). 
36 See section 3.3.4. 
37 NK Rhoden, ‘Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts’ (1985)58 Southern 
Calif.L.Rev 1283,1304. 
38 Brazier (ch2 n268)132. 
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phenomenon,39 i.e. the possibility of a newborn infant adapting to their condition. It is 
submitted that an assessment of ‘best interests’ based on a child’s assumed view of their 
quality of life would be a wholly speculative exercise by the courts. In such situations, 
the courts would most likely rely on medical assessments, and make a paternalistic 
judgement of a child’s quality of life. 
In the cases of Re B (A Minor)40 and Re J41 discussed above, the English courts 
determined the ‘best interests’ of the newborn infants by relying on medical 
assessments provided by doctors. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that the ‘best 
interests’ standard involves a consideration of non-medical matters as well, for which 
physicians are not qualified to be the arbiters.42 Such a wider ‘best interests’ standard 
was accepted by the Court of Appeal in the 2005 case of Charlotte Wyatt, below. 43  
In Wyatt, Charlotte Wyatt was a severely disabled two-year-old child, who was born 
prematurely with chronic respiratory and kidney problems coupled with severe brain 
damage that left her blind, deaf and incapable of movement.44 Charlotte’s physicians felt 
that further aggressive treatment in the event of respiratory collapse would not be in her 
‘best interests’. Due to Charlotte’s short life expectancy of only a few months, and her 
quality of life that could not be improved, the High Court ruled in favour of her 
physicians.45 This was contrary to the wishes of Charlotte’s parents. The High Court 
decision, which was clearly dependent on the ‘best interests’ assessment by Charlotte’s 
doctors, was reviewed by the Court of Appeal after Charlotte survived longer than 
expected. Although still profoundly ill, Charlotte’s condition and quality of life had 
improved. The ‘do not resuscitate’ order which was initially imposed by the High Court, 
was ordered to be removed. The Court of Appeal took the view that where parents and 
physicians cannot agree on the termination or prolongation of life-sustaining treatment 
concerning a child, the courts have a duty to make an objective and independent 
decision in the child’s ‘best interests’ but from the child’s viewpoint.46 The Court of 
Appeal referred to Thorpe LJ’s approach in Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
                                                          
39 See section 3.4.3. 
40 Re B (A Minor) (n26). 
41 Re J (A Minor) (ch2 n236). 
42 M Charlesworth, Bioethics in a Liberal Society (CUP 1993) 51. 
43 Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA 1181. 
44 Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust (No 3) [2005] EWHC 693 (Fam). 
45 ibid [16]. 
46 Wyatt (CA)(n43)[91]. 
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Sterilisation)47 (discussed above) and endorsed the ‘objective welfare appraisal’. The 
Court emphasised that there is a presumption in favour of ‘sanctity of life’ but that it is 
not absolute and may be rebutted:  
The welfare of the child is paramount, and the judge must look at the 
question of the child’s welfare from the assumed point of view of the 
patient…There is a strong presumption in favour of a course of action which 
will prolong life, but the presumption is not irrebuttable…The term ‘best 
interests’ encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare 
issues…The court must conduct a balancing exercise in which all the 
relevant factors are weighed…and a helpful way of undertaking this 
exercise is to draw up a balance sheet…the court must…balance all the 
conflicting considerations in a particular case and see where the final 
balance of the best interests lies…to strike the balance between benefit and 
harm.48  
Thus, based on the 2005 Court of Appeal decision in Wyatt, the assessment of a child’s 
‘best interests’ is an ‘objective welfare appraisal’, that focuses on a child’s subjective 
assessment of their own welfare, and is entirely focused on fostering an outcome that 
maximises the child’s welfare.49 
It is submitted that by applying the ‘objective welfare appraisal’ approach, and thus by 
conducting a balancing exercise, the court would effectively be making a paternalistic 
judgement as to what would be considered a benefit or harm to a child. The court acts as 
the child’s proxy in determining the child’s welfare. The objective welfare appraisal 
approach incorporates an element of subjectivity based on available evidence. However, 
as mentioned earlier, this is impractical for children like Charlotte who, due to infancy 
or profound retardation, have never developed desires and preferences. Thus, rather than 
promoting the autonomy of a child, the ‘objective welfare appraisal’ approach would 
amount to the court making a paternalistic judgement of a child’s quality of life. 
In conclusion, the cases of Re J50 and Wyatt51 demonstrate that the English courts have 
incorporated subjective interests into an objective framework within which a person’s 
                                                          
47 Re A (Male Sterilisation) (n20) 206.  
48 Wyatt (CA)(n43)[87]-[90]. 
49 Dunn (n21) 131.  
50 Re J (A Minor) (ch2 n236). 
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overall ‘best interests’ is determined.52 In doing so, the courts are placing some 
emphasis on patient autonomy, even though decisions are being made by others on their 
behalf. As a result, 
 subjective measures of quality of life have become central to a ‘best 
interests’ assessment.53 This aligns with a proposal for a law on physician-assisted 
suicide (discussed in Chapter Seven) that is based on a patient’s subjective assessment 
of their quality of life. This is fundamental to an individual being able to express what 
they find to be a poor and an unacceptable quality of life.  
4.3.2 Mentally disabled adults 
In the 1996 case of Re R,54 the President of the Family Division, Sir Stephen Brown, 
held that the overriding principle for ‘best interests’ is the same for mentally disabled 
adults as for children. The patient was a physically and mentally disabled 23-year-old 
adult with severe epilepsy and profound learning difficulties. The patient was described 
as being in a ‘low awareness state’, with the perception and cognitive faculties of a 
newborn infant. The Court held that it was not in the patient’s best interests to subject 
him to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (‘CPR’) in the event of a cardiac arrest. The Court 
was influenced by Taylor LJ’s judgment in Re J discussed above.55 It is submitted that, 
as with Re J, the Court in Re R would not have been able to accurately assess whether 
the patient would have considered his life to be intolerable. With the perception and 
cognitive faculties of an infant, the patient would not have developed any desires or 
preferences from which the courts would have been able to assess the patient’s ‘best 
interests’. Thus, the Court would have made a paternalistic judgement of the patient’s 
quality of life, when allowing the withholding of treatment. In making this judgement, 
the Court would have relied on the medical assessments by physicians of the patient’s 
best interests.  
The case of Re R further demonstrates that the English courts have been trying to 
include the subjective views of incompetent patients in the ‘best interests’ assessment. 
The courts have stressed the need to respect and protect ‘patient autonomy’ in cases 
involving the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment. The common law 
                                                                                                                                                                          
51 Wyatt (CA)(n43)[91]. 
52 Dunn (n21) 126.  
53 ibid 126.  
54 Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99. 
55 Re J (A Minor) (ch2 n236). 
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cases discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 provide support for the inclusion of a 
patient’s subjective assessment of quality of life in the proposed law on physician-
assisted suicide for England and Wales. 
The following section will show that where patients are in a PVS or experiencing 
similar severe conditions, the English courts have considered the burdens, benefits and 
futility of life-sustaining treatment when assessing a patient’s ‘best interests’, and thus 
in determining their quality of life.   
4.3.3 Permanent vegetative state (PVS) or similar severe conditions 
In Airedale v Bland, as discussed in Chapter Two, Bland had been in a PVS for four 
years after his lungs were crushed in the 1989 Hillsborough football stadium disaster. 56 
In 1993, the House of Lords declared that since ANH was of no benefit to Bland, the 
doctors did not have a duty to continue providing such life-sustaining treatment. As 
reflected in Lord Goff’s judgment:  
If the justification for treating a patient who lacks capacity to consent lies in 
the fact that the treatment provided is in his best interests, it must follow that 
the treatment may…be discontinued where it is no longer in his best 
interests…for my part I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate or 
requisite simply to prolong a patient’s life, when such treatment has no 
therapeutic purpose of any kind, as where it is futile because the patient is 
unconscious and there is no prospect of any improvement in his 
condition…in the end…it is the futility of the treatment which justifies its 
termination.57  
It is argued that the House of Lords had effectively made a judgement of Bland’s 
quality of life, to determine whether ANH should be withdrawn in his best interests. It is 
submitted that the ‘futility of treatment’ as referred to by Lord Goff is in effect a quality 
of life judgement as to whether it is worthwhile to keep the patient alive. The ANH 
could only truly be considered ‘futile’ if there was no purpose in maintaining such 
treatment, whereas the ANH was indeed fulfilling its objective of keeping Bland alive. 
                                                          
56 Bland’s case (ch1 n12). 
57 ibid 869. 
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Thus, as Keown forcefully argues, Lord Goff’s ‘futility of treatment’ judgment in fact 
rested upon the futility of Bland’s life.58  
Lord Keith in Bland’s case held that:  
A medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat such a patient 
where a large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the 
effect that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance. Existence in 
a vegetative state with no prospect of recovery is by that opinion regarded as 
not being a benefit.59  
This reliance on ‘a large body of informed and responsible medical opinion’, to 
determine the ‘best interests’ of Bland, suggests that the English courts are leaving such 
end-of-life medical decisions to the medical profession. In effect, the House of Lords 
had relied on the doctors’ paternalistic judgement of the patient’s quality of life.60 The 
subjective views of Bland were nevertheless noted in the obiter dicta of Hoffman LJ: 
[t]he patient’s best interests would normally also include having respect 
paid to what seems most likely to have been his own views on the subject. 
To this extent…‘substituted judgement’ may be subsumed within the 
English concept of best interests.61 
Although the House of Lords in Bland’s case concluded that Bland’s best interests no 
longer required continued treatment, Lord Mustill held that, ‘This is not at all to say that 
I would reach the same conclusion in less extreme cases, where the glimmerings of 
awareness may give the patient an interest which cannot be regarded as null.’62 
Similarly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Bland’s case emphasised that the patient was an 
extreme case where it could be overwhelmingly proved that the patient was and would 
remain insensate, and expressed no view on cases where the chances of improvement 
were slight or the patient had ‘very slight sensate awareness’.63 Despite these 
pronouncements that a less extreme case might be considered differently, English courts 
have gone beyond Bland’s case by withholding ANH where there have been such 
                                                          
58 Keown (ch3 n47). 
59 Bland’s case (ch1 n12) 858-59. See Bolam test (n18) for responsible medical opinion. 
60 I Kennedy & A Grubb, ‘Withdrawal of Artificial Hydration and Nutrition: Incompetent Adult’ (1993)1 Med.L.Rev 
359,363. 
61 Bland’s case (ch1 n12) 833. See also section 2.3.3 under Best interests (ch2 nn302-305). 
62 ibid 899. 
63 ibid 885. 
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‘glimmerings of awareness’ and very slight sensate awareness. As Meyers and Mason 
observe, the post-Bland case law on the withdrawal and withholding of ANH from 
incompetent patients reflects a relaxation of the criteria for a PVS.64 The cases have 
been extended to include less well defined medical conditions than the PVS which 
existed in Bland’s case. This extension constitutes a ‘slippery slope’ in relation to 
legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions in England and Wales. Such ‘slippery 
slopes’ and the argument that they need to be avoided will be dealt with in Chapter Six. 
In the 1994 case of Frenchay NHS Healthcare Trust v S (Frenchay case),65 less than a 
year after Bland’s case, the court allowed ANH to be withheld from a patient in a state 
of deep unconsciousness, who demonstrated restlessness and distress that was 
inconsistent with a PVS. In April 1996, the RCP issued a set of guidelines for the 
diagnosis of a PVS.66 English courts have, however, authorised the withdrawal of ANH 
from patients who did not satisfy these guidelines. In these cases, the patients’ 
conditions were judged to be functionally indistinguishable from a PVS.67 The President 
of the Family Division, Sir Stephen Brown, in the 1997 case of Re H held that not all 
patients in a PVS present the same diagnostic indicators, and that some response to 
stimulation and visual tracking may be compatible with a diagnosis of PVS.68 In Re D, 
also heard by Sir Stephen Brown in 1997, the patient did not wholly fulfil the RCP’s 
criteria for a PVS as she appeared able to track movement with her eyes and to 
demonstrate a ‘menace’ response.69 Nevertheless, Sir Stephen held that ‘for all practical 
purposes’ she was in a PVS, and that ‘there is no evidence of any meaningful life 
whatsoever’.70 These cases demonstrate that once a patient has lost the capacity for 
conscious thought, English courts may uphold the withholding or withdrawal of ANH 
as being in their ‘best interests’. As with Bland’s case, it is submitted that in the cases of 
Frenchay, Re H, and Re D the courts made a paternalistic judgement of the patients’ 
quality of life, in determining their ‘best interests’. These cases also reaffirm that the 
doctrine of sanctity of life71 does not dictate that a patient’s best interests require the 
                                                          
64 D Meyers and J Mason, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Second View from Mid-Atlantic’ (1999)28 Anglo-
Am.L.R. 265,274. 
65 Frenchay NHS Healthcare Trust v S [1994] 2 All ER 403 (‘Frenchay case’). 
66 Royal College of Physicians Working Group, ‘The Permanent Vegetative State’ (1996)30(2) Journal of the Royal 
College of Physicians London 119,119. 
67 Re H (Adult: Incompetent Patient) [1998] 2 FLR 36. 
68 ibid 39. 
69 Re D (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 411,418. 
70 ibid 420. 
71 See section 3.3.1. 
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prolongation of life. This was emphasised by Sir Stephen Brown in his judgment in 
Re H: ‘[T]he sanctity of life is of vital importance. It is not, however, paramount’.72  
As with Bland’s case, the court’s decision in the 2001 case of Re G73 to withdraw ANH 
from a patient who was in a PVS was based on a ‘best interests’ assessment, which was 
effectively a quality of life judgement. In Re G, the patient suffered profound brain 
damage following surgery and lost all signs of any awareness. After being kept alive for 
nine months by ANH, the court was asked to authorise its withdrawal. Dame Elizabeth 
Butler Sloss P held:  
I am…entirely satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of Mrs G ever 
recovering at all. Consequently, one has to go on and consider what is in her 
interests, the best way to deal with this irreversible condition and the 
prospect that she might live like this for another four to five years. The 
family have…been consulted…each has carefully considered the 
implications of allowing [her] to die in peace and with dignity and not to be 
kept artificially alive…one element of their decision is that she herself if she 
knew about it would be shocked and appalled at the idea that she was being 
kept alive like this, that she expressed a strong view during her life…that if 
she was to be found in this situation she should not be kept alive regardless. 
I am satisfied that it is appropriate that I…permit Mrs G to die with dignity 
and in peace by the withdrawal of the artificial nutrition and hydration.74  
Thus, the court in Re G considered the subjective views of the patient in assessing the 
patient’s best interests, consistent with the obiter dictum in Bland’s case.75 Based on 
Re G, it is submitted that terminally ill patients who are competent should similarly be 
allowed to have a physician-assisted suicide based on their subjective personal 
judgement of their own quality of life. This proposal will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
In its 1999 guidance, the BMA endorsed the withholding and withdrawal of ANH not 
only from patients who are in a PVS, but also from patients with other serious 
conditions, such as those with severe dementia or those who have suffered a serious 
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stroke.76 This guidance impacts a broader range of patients who have lost awareness, or 
whose lives are of poor quality. Additionally, in 2002, the GMC
 
issued guidelines which 
provided that ‘Where death is imminent and ANH is already in use, it may be 
appropriate to withdraw such treatment if it is considered that the burdens outweigh the 
possible benefits to the patient’.77 The guidelines also stated that:  
Where adult patients lack capacity to decide for themselves, an assessment 
of the benefits, burdens and risks, and the acceptability of proposed 
treatment must be made on their behalf by the doctor, taking account 
of their wishes, where they are known. Where a patient’s wishes are 
not known it is the doctor’s responsibility to decide what is in the patient’s 
best interests.78  
It is submitted that by taking account of the known wishes of the patient, the GMC has 
incorporated a ‘substituted judgement’ in its guidelines. In this regard, the autonomy of 
the patient is promoted. Nevertheless, the GMC also places emphasis on medical 
paternalism in cases where a patient’s wishes are not known, by placing the 
responsibility on the doctor to decide what is in a patient’s ‘best interests’.  
It is contended that the ‘best interests’ assessment pursuant to the GMC guidelines is in 
effect a quality of life judgement by doctors. The guidelines require a physician to 
presuppose the quality of life that a patient may live with, by assessing the ‘benefits, 
burdens, and risks’ which may be associated with treatment.79 As Brock convincingly 
asserts, what the doctors are actually asking is:  
Is the patient’s quality of life so poor that the use of life-sustaining treatment 
is unduly burdensome, such that the burdens to the patient of the treatment 
and/or the life that it sustains are sufficiently great and the benefits to the 
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patient of the life that is sustained sufficiently limited, to make continued 
life on balance no longer a benefit or good to the patient?80  
A quality of life judgement by doctors is also reflected in the BMA’s August 2009 note 
on end-of-decisions, where it states that life-sustaining treatment can be withheld or 
withdrawn by doctors when such treatment is unable to benefit an incompetent patient 
and is accordingly not in their best interests.81  
The 2005 case of W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH and Others (KH’s case)82 demonstrates 
that where a patient’s wishes are unclear, the courts will have to decide whether to 
withdraw ANH based on what the courts regard to be in the ‘best interests’ of the 
patient. In KH’s case, the patient suffered from multiple sclerosis and required ANH. 
She was barely conscious or sentient. When her feeding tube became displaced, the 
question arose whether it should be replaced. The patient had previously expressly 
refused medical treatment that did not enable her to continue with a reasonable quality 
of life, including life support machines. However, the patient had not specifically 
addressed the issue of ANH. The patient’s family had objected to the feeding tube being 
reinserted, believing that the patient would have refused it. The English courts had to 
decide whether it was in the patient’s best interests that ANH be continued. The Court 
accepted that the patient had refused to be kept alive on ‘life support machines’. 
However, as there had been no specific refusal of ANH, the Court held that withholding 
the feeding tube would not be in the patient’s best interests. Brooke LJ held that:  
there was not an advance directive which was sufficiently clear to amount to 
a direction that she preferred to be deprived of food and drink for a period of 
time which would lead to her death in all circumstances. There is no 
evidence that she was aware of the nature of this choice, or the 
unpleasantness or otherwise of death by starvation…The Court cannot in 
effect sanction the death by starvation of a patient who is not in a PVS state 
other than with their clear and informed consent or where their condition is 
so intolerable as to be beyond doubt. This patient is sufficiently conscious 
and sentient to appreciate and experience the effects of death by starvation 
over weeks…I cannot say that life-prolonging treatment…would provide no 
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benefit…death by this route would in my judgment be even less dignified 
than the death which she will more probably face at some time in the more 
distant future. 83  
The 2005 case of Burke,84 discussed in Chapter Two, demonstrates further that the ‘best 
interests’ assessment for an incompetent patient is in effect a paternalistic quality of life 
judgement by doctors. In Burke, the patient suffered from spino-cerebella ataxia, a 
terminal wasting illness. He was afraid that ANH would be withheld from him at some 
time in the future, and that he would be aware of the pain and extreme distress that will 
result from dehydration and malnutrition. The patient requested the right to be given 
ANH until such time when he died of natural causes. The Court of Appeal held that 
life-sustaining treatment which places an intolerable burden on an incompetent patient 
may be withdrawn, if it is clinically determined to be futile and unlikely to be in the 
patient’s best interests. The Court stated that the concept of ‘best interests’ should be 
confined to an ‘objective test’, even though this may conflict with a patient’s subjective 
wishes.  
In conclusion, the cases in this section demonstrate that the English courts have been 
allowing the withdrawal or withholding of ANH from incompetent patients based on a 
‘best interests’ assessment that involves a quality of life judgement by physicians and 
the courts. To ensure legal and moral consistency, it follows from this, that any 
proposed law on physician-assisted suicide should also be based on a subjective 
assessment of quality of life by a terminally ill patient. Today, end-of-life decisions 
concerning the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent 
adult patients are governed by the MCA 2005. 
4.3.4 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) 
As discussed in Chapter Two,85 since 2007, decisions made on behalf of adult patients 
lacking capacity have to be made based on an assessment of their ‘best interests’ under 
the MCA 2005.86 The MCA 2005 provides that in cases where life-sustaining treatment 
is futile or overly burdensome to a patient, or where there is no prospect of recovery, an 
assessment of the patient’s ‘best interests’ may result in the withdrawal or withholding 
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of such treatment.87 In this regard, the MCA 2005 has endorsed the decisions in the 
common law cases of Bland88 and Burke,89 and the BMA90 and GMC91 guidelines on the 
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. In 
assessing best interests, a decision-maker (e.g. doctors, courts or ‘donees’92) needs to 
consider any statements that an incompetent patient has previously made about their 
wishes and feelings93 about life-sustaining treatment.94 The patient’s views,95 beliefs and 
values96 will also have to be taken into account. The views of anyone named by the 
patient as someone to be consulted, or anyone engaged in caring for the patient, or 
interested in the patient’s welfare97 will also have to be considered. 
It is submitted that the ‘best interests’ assessment under the MCA 2005 is not limited to 
an objective assessment about what is clinically most appropriate for the patient, but 
rather it encompasses much more subjective considerations about what treatment would 
best complement the patient’s values and preferences.98 As established in Chapter Two, 
an assessment of ‘best interests’ which recognises a patient’s previous wishes and 
feelings, contains a strong element of the ‘substituted judgment’ standard. This allows 
for a ‘best interests’ assessment that upholds patient autonomy99 where appropriate, and 
is thus based on a patient’s subjective evaluation of quality of life.100 
As noted in Chapter Two, others (even loved ones) may not always know the past 
preferences, beliefs and values of a patient.101 A patient’s wishes and feelings may also 
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not remain the same following their incapacity.102 As such, family members and even 
close friends may not have an accurate idea of a patient’s values or preferences.103 This 
is supported by Sulmasy et al’s American study, which showed that many family 
members who act as ‘surrogates’ cannot accurately predict what patients would have 
chosen in particular situations.104 In the 2011 case of Re M, the court considered an 
application to withdraw ANH from a patient diagnosed as being in a ‘minimally 
conscious state’, as distinct form a PVS. Baker J held that when considering the past 
wishes of M as required by section 4(6) of the MCA 2005, he could not attach ‘any 
significant weight’ to the past statements of M because (i) M’s past statements didn’t 
specifically address M’s current condition of being in a ‘minimally conscious state’, and 
(ii) ‘there is no way of knowing [M’s] current views, having lived in that state for over 
eight years.’105  
English researchers Addington-Hall and Kalra, found that surrogates may also be 
influenced by their personal feelings and by their experiences of caring for the patient.106 
With particular reference to older people, Wicclair observed that, many elderly people 
do not discuss their preferences and when elderly people do talk to their families about 
future care, comments may be vague, off-hand and ambiguous. He noted further that 
family members may also disagree regarding preferences, and conflicts of interest 
between family members may influence interpretations of a patient’s views.107 
The 2013 decision of Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James (the 
Aintree NHS Trust case)108 is the first case to be decided by the Supreme Court on the 
‘best interests’ assessment under the MCA 2005. The appeal was concerned with how 
doctors and courts should decide whether it is in the ‘best interests’ of an incompetent 
patient to be given life-sustaining treatment. In clarifying the best interests assessment 
under the MCA 2005, Lady Hale held:  
in considering the best interests of a…patient…decision-makers must look 
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at [the patient’s] welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and 
psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in 
question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider 
what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must 
try and put themselves in the place of the…patient and ask what [the 
patient’s] attitude is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others 
who are looking after [the patient] or interested in [the patient’s] welfare.109  
Lady Hale’s judgment further states that:  
The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the 
patient’s point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any 
more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail. We cannot always 
have what we want. Nor will it always be possible to ascertain what an 
incapable patient’s wishes are. Even if it is possible to determine what his 
views were in the past, they might well have changed in the light of the 
stresses and strains of his current predicament…insofar as it is possible to 
ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the 
things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken into 
account because they are a component in making the choice which is right 
for him as an individual human being.110  
It is submitted that the Aintree NHS Trust case has confirmed that the ‘best interests’ 
assessment under the MCA 2005 is not an ‘objective test’, but one that requires a 
patient’s subjective interests to be considered. By emphasising ‘welfare in the widest 
sense’, Lady Hale’s judgment is essentially also supporting a subjective patient 
evaluation of quality of life. 
As noted in Chapter Two,111 two recent cases under the MCA 2005 where a patient’s 
expressed views have not prevailed when assessing their ‘best interests’ are L’s case112 
and E’s case113. In L’s case, the patient’s assessment was overridden by the common law 
principle that ‘doctors cannot be required to provide treatment which is contrary to their 
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professional judgement’,114 and was also strongly outweighed by the quality of life 
assessments of his physicians. In E’s case, the patient’s assessment was considered as 
one of several factors under the MCA 2005. These factors were determined by 
Jackson J to be ‘almost exactly in equilibrium’.115 However, after careful consideration, 
Jackson J overruled the patient’s wish to not receive any further treatment, and 
determined that ‘the presumption in favour of the preservation of life is not displaced’.116  
In conclusion, the Supreme Court decision in the Aintree NHS Trust case clarifies that 
the assessment of best interests under the MCA 2005 promotes ‘patient autonomy’ 
where possible (noting exceptions such as E’s case and L’s case above), and thus 
encourages a subjective evaluation of quality of life. This subjective approach is 
consistent with the law reforms proposed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. Under that 
proposal, a competent terminally ill patient would be permitted to make a request for 
physician-assisted suicide based on their subjective assessment of their quality of life.  
The following section will examine the concept of quality of life in respect of treatment 
decisions concerning terminally ill patients. It will consider subjective and objective 
evaluations of quality of life, and the scope of issues covered by the concept of quality 
of life.  
4.4 What is ‘quality of life’? 
This section will firstly consider definitions of ‘quality of life’, by addressing the 
dynamics of the two types of quality of life evaluation  patient evaluation and 
professional evaluation.  
4.4.1 Definition 
‘Quality of life’ is a broad concept that covers both the actual and perceived level of 
fulfilment across physical, psychological and social aspects of an individual’s life.117 
Thus, quality of life is a combination of a subjective and objective evaluation of one’s 
quality of life.  
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 A subjective patient evaluation 
Although most definitions of ‘quality of life’ are multidimensional, and refer to a 
patient’s satisfaction levels with multiple areas of their life, there is no consensus as to 
which areas of life should be included.118 Barofsky argues that this lack of consensus is 
attributable to the subjective nature of quality of life.119 This is also noted by Rummans 
et al’s 2007 research on quality of life at the end of life. Rummans et al found that a 
terminally ill patient’s quality of life is based on their subjective experience of living 
with the interpersonal, psychological, and existential or spiritual challenges that 
accompany the process of physical and functional decline, and with the knowledge of 
their impending demise. Their research showed that a patient’s experiences contribute to 
their attitude toward their health condition and their belief about having the capacity to 
cope. These will be unique to each individual.120 Similarly, O’Boyle argues that only 
individuals can judge their own quality of life, and that they do so in the context of their 
own expectations, experiences, hopes and ambitions, fears, philosophies, perceptions 
and beliefs.121 This is clearly demonstrated in the four cases of Re B,122 Daniel James,123 
Pretty,124 and Nicklinson.125   
 An objective professional evaluation 
Healthcare professionals often make quality of life judgements when making treatment 
decisions concerning the terminally ill.126 These decisions address treatment regimens 
and therapeutic interventions,127 including decisions on the withdrawal or withholding of 
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life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients (discussed above).128 Some of these 
quality of life judgements by healthcare professionals form part of the procedures 
covered by the Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dying Patient (‘LCP’).129 The LCP’s 
procedures have enabled doctors to select palliative care,130 and other treatment options 
for terminally ill patients, when it is judged to be no longer beneficial to keep the patient 
alive. These options include the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
from incompetent patients and medical decisions with a ‘double effect’.131 Quality of life 
assessments made by healthcare professionals may be contrary to those of their 
patients.132 This was illustrated in the case of Re B, in which the patient had found her 
quality of life unacceptable and refused a life-sustaining ventilator, despite a contrary 
view being held by her physicians.133 This was also illustrated in L’s case,134 a case under 
the MCA 2005. As noted in Chapter Two,135 the court in L’s case accepted that an 
incompetent patient, L, would find his quality of life acceptable after a course of CPR 
(if ever required), despite a unanimous view by physicians that the application of CPR 
would do L more harm than good. 
Particularly in the case of a subjective patient evaluation, ‘quality of life’ is a dynamic 
construct that alters in response to illness over time.136 As Sprangers and Schwartz 
assert, changes in one’s assessment of quality of life that occur during a terminal illness 
result partly from patients adapting to the new situation in which they find themselves.137 
Addington-Hall and Kalra observe that patients assess their quality of life differently 
than they would have if they had not adapted to their illnesses. They refer to this 
phenomenon of internal adaptation as a ‘response shift’.138 Patients may also adapt to 
their illnesses as the result of effective palliative care treatment that successfully 
controls symptoms and manages pain. For these reasons, it is submitted that it is 
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essential to define quality of life in terms of subjective evaluations by patients, rather 
than in terms of objective evaluations by healthcare professionals.139  
The scope of quality of life will be considered below. Quality of life has tended to be 
described from two viewpoints, one in terms of health, and the second in a wider global 
sense.140 
4.4.2 Scope 
 Health-related quality of life 
As discussed above, quality of life for a patient relates to a subjective sense of 
well-being.141 Thus, a ‘health-related quality of life’ measure needs to capture a patient’s 
own perspective of their illness and treatment.142 Revicki et al define ‘health-related 
quality of life’ as the subjective assessment of the impact of either a medical condition 
or of specific medical interventions on a person’s physical, psychological, social and 
somatic domains of functioning and well-being.143 The Canadian commentators, 
Michael and Tannock, divide ‘health-related quality of life’ factors into three categories: 
those related to general health (including physical factors like mobility and fatigue; 
social factors like relationships, and emotional support; and psychological factors like 
anxiety, fear, depression), those directly related to the disease (including pain, and 
nausea), and those related to treatment (including nausea, hair loss, drowsiness, and 
confusion).144 Their definition of health-related quality of life goes beyond the narrow 
scope of a purely medical and physical diagnosis. 
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 Global quality of life 
Those defining quality of life according to a wider global sense, tend to add additional 
dimensions, such as an existential dimension.145 In their study of how best to measure 
the quality of life of the terminally ill, Byock and Merriman found that existential 
well-being embodies an individual’s ability to find meaning and purpose in life and to 
rise above physical discomfort, accept death, and feel at peace.146 Similarly Stewart et al 
observed that the terminally ill become increasingly concerned about their peace of 
mind, comfort, spirituality, and ‘transcendence’, which Stewart et al defined as making 
peace with life or God before death.147 Cohen and Mount further found that as a person’s 
physical condition declines at the end of life, existential, spiritual, and social issues gain 
in importance for them.148  
Having considered a ‘health-related quality of life’ and a ‘global quality of life’, it is the 
former that will be adopted for the purposes of law reform in this thesis. It will be 
proposed in Chapter Seven that a law that permits physician-assisted suicide, based on 
quality of life, should restrict the concept of quality of life to those aspects of life which 
are affected by a person’s medical condition and its treatment.149 Physician-assisted 
suicide should only be available to terminally ill patients experiencing a poor and 
unacceptable quality of life due to the unbearable pain and suffering that is caused by 
their terminal illness. As Sheldon asserts, a patient’s unacceptable quality of life must 
be due to a medically classified cause, either physical (somatic) or psychiatric.150  
In terms of measuring a wider global sense of quality of life, a physician would not be 
able to assess dimensions involving hopeless despair, loneliness, or existential suffering 
caused by an inability to adapt to one’s new situation.151 Griffiths et al explain that: 
a doctor who assists in suicide in a case in which the patient’s suffering is 
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not predominantly due to a ‘medically classified disease or disorder’…acts 
outside the scope of his professional competence.152  
Griffiths et al were commenting on the 2003 Dutch case of Sutorius (discussed in 
Chapter Five), in which a physician had assisted the suicide of an elderly patient who 
merely experienced physical decline, struggled with his ‘pointless and empty existence’, 
and felt socially isolated.153  
The following section will consider the challenges faced by physicians when measuring 
the quality of life of terminally ill patients for the purposes of treatment decisions. 
4.5 Measuring quality of life 
Testa et al observe that within medical practice, the lack of an agreed definition of 
‘quality of life’ has resulted in a wide variety of techniques to measure quality of life.154 
Measurement techniques may involve the patient completing a questionnaire (a patient 
self-report), or being asked questions by an observer who records the patient’s response 
(an indirect patient report).155 Bergner states that health-related quality of life, as 
discussed above, is generally measured in two dimensions  objective assessments of 
functioning or health status, and more subjective perceptions of health.156 As quality of 
life should be based on a subjective patient evaluation (discussed above), it is argued 
that measurement instruments should assess quality of life from the patient’s own 
perspective.157 Patients know which quality of life issues are of most concern to them.158 
Treatment decisions can then be based on their priorities and preferences.159  
There have been several instruments designed by the medical profession to specifically 
measure health-related quality of life at the end of life. These include the Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis Assessment Questionnaire (ALSAQ-40),160 the McGill Quality of Life 
                                                          
152 J Griffiths et al, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing 2008) 37. 
153 T Sheldon, ‘Dutch GP Cleared after Helping to End Man’s “Hopeless Existence”’ (2000)321 BMJ 1174. 
154 MA Testa et al, ‘Assessment of Quality-of-Life Outcomes’ (1996)334 The N Engl J Med 835. 
155 DF Cella, ‘Quality of life: Concepts and definition’ (1994)9 J Pain Symptom Manage 186. 
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158 CA O’Boyle, D Waldron, ‘Quality of life issues in palliative medicine’ (1997)244(4) J Neurology S18. 
159 Higginson, Carr (n142). 
160 This is a disease-specific quality of life instrument for motor neurone disease. Diane Pretty suffered from motor 
neurone disease, see ch2. 
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(MQOL) questionnaire,161 the Hospice Quality of Life Index (HQLI),162 the Missoula-
VITAS Quality of Life Index (MVQOLI),163 the McMaster Quality of Life Scale 
(MQLS),164 the adapted European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer 
(EORTC) questionnaires,165
 
the Functional Assessment of Chronic Illness Therapy – 
Palliative Care (FACIT-Pal),166 and the Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual 
Quality of Life (SEIQoL)167. Each instrument is designed to accommodate the unique 
experiences of dying patients, and to assess patients who either have a specific 
diagnosis or who are at a specific stage of illness.168 
It is well known that there are often methodological challenges with using such quality 
of life instruments on terminally ill patients, due to their fragile state of health.169 
Patients may be too ill to complete an assessment.170 There is also a tendency by patients 
to under-report their psychological and physical complaints.171 Cognitive impairment 
(which is prevalent in palliative care172) may also affect data quality.173 In such cases, a 
healthcare professional or family member of the patient may make an assessment of the 
patient’s quality of life instead.174 Studies show that such third party assessments can 
provide useful information on more observable aspects of quality of life,175 like 
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advanced disease. A preliminary study of validity and acceptability’ (1995)9 Palliative Medicine 207. 
162 SC McMillan, M Weitzner, ‘Quality of life in cancer patients: use of a revised Hospice Index’ (1998)6 Cancer 
Practice 282. 
163 Byock, Merriman (n146). 
164 Cohen, Mount (n148). 
165 NK Aaronson et al, ‘The European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer QLQ-C30: a quality-of-
life instrument for use in international clinical trials in oncology’ (1993)85 J Natl Cancer Ins 365. 
166 J Teno & KE Landrum, Toolkit of Instruments to Measure End of Life Care: Briefing Book for the Conference on 
Measuring Care at the End of Life (Center to Improve Care of the Dying 1996). 
167 HM McGee et al, ‘Assessing the quality-of-life of the individual: The SEIQoL with a healthy and a 
gastroenterology unit population’ (1991)21 Psychological Medicine 749. 
168 KE Steinhauser, ‘Measuring quality of life at the end of life: Validation of the QUAL-E’ (2004)2 Palliative and 
Supportive Care 3.  
169 SR Cohen et al, ‘Changes in quality of life following admission to palliative care units’ (2001)15 Palliative 
Medicine 363. 
170 GN Thompson, ‘Methodological Challenges in Measuring Quality Care at the End of Life in the Long-Term Care 
Environment’ (2006)32(4) J Pain Symptom Manage 378. 
171 M Bullinger, ‘Quality of life assessment in palliative care’ (1992)8 J Palliat Care 34. 
172 See section 3.4.3. 
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functional health, overall health and social activity.176 However, studies also 
demonstrate that such third party assessments are less accurate for the more subjective 
aspects of a patient’s life.177 It is concluded that, assessments which rely on a third party 
assessment of a patient’s quality of life should be interpreted cautiously, and should 
generally be accorded less weight than those that use a patient’s own assessment.178 As 
convincingly argued by Nekolaichuk et al, third party assessments for patients at the 
end of life should only be used as a partial substitute for ‘quality of life’ 
self-assessments by patients themselves.179 It is submitted however that for the purposes 
of law reform in this thesis, third party assessments will not be accepted. Quality of life 
assessments will be based on the subjective patient evaluation of a competent terminally 
ill patient who is capable of not only making an autonomous request for physician-
assisted suicide, but also of then carrying out the act to end their own life.  
4.6 Conclusion 
From an analysis of the extent to which ‘quality of life’ has been considered in 
end-of-life medical decisions, this chapter concludes that the law on assisted death is 
unsatisfactory. The chapter finds that ‘quality of life’ has been an influence on legally 
permitted end-of-life medical decisions in England and Wales. 
The chapter established that the English courts have made ‘quality of life’ assessments 
when determining the ‘best interests’ of critically ill and severely disabled newborn 
babies, and mentally disabled adults. In deciding whether to allow the withdrawal or 
withholding of life sustaining treatment — Re B (A Minor), Re J, Wyatt, and Re R all 
showed that courts have looked at issues like ‘intolerability’, a patient’s ‘assumed 
view’, and that they have applied an objective welfare appraisal in assessing a child’s 
best interests. From Re J, Wyatt, and Re R: the chapter found that applying a 
‘substituted judgement’ for a newborn baby or a mentally disabled adult, as a means of 
respecting their autonomy, is purely speculative. Similarly, the chapter found that in 
cases involving patients in a PVS (Bland’s case, Re G), or with similar severe 
                                                          
176 AM Epstein et al, ‘Using Proxies to Evaluate Quality of Life: Can They Provide Valid Information about Patients’ 
Health Status and Satisfaction with Medical Care?’ (1989)27(3) Medical Care S91. 
177 LZ Rubenstein et al, ‘Systematic biases in functional status assessment of elderly adults: effects of different data 
sources’ (1984)39 J Gerontology 686. 
178 C Salisbury et al, ‘The impact of different models of specialist palliative care on patients’ quality of life: a 
systematic literature review’ (1999)13 Palliative Medicine 3. 
179 CL Nekolaichuk et al, ‘A comparison of patient and proxy symptom assessment in advanced cancer patients’ 
(1999)13 Palliative Medicine 311. 
  
178 
conditions (Frenchay case, Re H, and Re D), the English courts have effectively made 
‘quality of life’ assessments to determine whether ANH should be withdrawn in the 
‘best interests’ of a patient. In this respect, the law on assisted death in England and 
Wales is inconsistent. It purports to respect the autonomy of an incompetent patient 
when removing life-sustaining treatment, whilst ignoring the autonomous wishes of a 
competent patient who requests an assisted death. The ethical presumption of the 
sanctity of life is rebuttable when removing life-sustaining treatment, but considered 
irrebuttable in those cases involving requests for assisted death. 
This chapter demonstrated that vulnerable incompetent patients are protected by the 
MCA 2005, whilst also being empowered to participate in decisions made in their ‘best 
interests’ through the consideration given to their previously expressed wishes and 
preferences. This is in contrast to the requests for assisted death by competent patients 
— where no legislation has yet been enacted to empower such patients, whilst 
protecting and empowering the vulnerable as happens under the MCA. To-date, the 
only protection offered the vulnerable with regard to assisted death has been to impose a 
blanket prohibition on the practice.     
This chapter supports a proposal for law reform that enables a competent terminally ill 
patient to make a request for physician-assisted suicide based on their own subjective 
assessment of their quality of life. The chapter established that physicians often make 
quality of life judgements when making treatment decisions concerning terminally ill 
patients. However, these quality of life judgements by physicians may be contrary to 
those of their patients (e.g. Re B180 and Burke181). The chapter established that ‘quality of 
life’ is a dynamic construct that alters over time. ‘Quality of life’ changes often occur 
during terminal illness, as patients adapt to their illness. The chapter concluded that it is 
essential to define ‘quality of life’ in terms of a subjective evaluation by the patient. 
Health-related quality of life measures need to capture a patient’s subjective assessment 
of the impact of their medical condition and of medical interventions on their physical 
and psychological well-being.  
The chapter established that ‘health-related quality of life’ is generally measured in two 
dimensions – objective assessment of health status and subjective perceptions of health. 
However, as quality of life should be based on a subjective evaluation, the chapter 
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concluded that any measurement instruments employed, should be ones which assess 
quality of life from a patient’s perspective. Nevertheless, the chapter acknowledged that 
there are methodological challenges using quality of life instruments to assess 
terminally ill patients, as patients may be too ill to complete the assessments.  
This chapter informs the proposal made in Chapter Seven for a law that enables a 
competent patient who is terminally ill to make a request for physician-assisted suicide 
based on a quality of life judgement that is subjectively assessed by the patient, 
according to the level of pain and suffering caused by their terminal illness. The ‘quality 
of life’ requirement proposed would be restricted to aspects of life affected by a 
person’s terminal illness and its treatment. 
The following chapter will review the laws which govern euthanasia and assisted 
suicide in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, the Northern Territory 
(Australia) and Oregon (US), to identify features of these laws which potentially resolve 
issues of debate, and which might be adopted in England and Wales. The chapter will 
also examine whether ‘quality of life’ has been an influence on any of these laws.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis of the Law of Assisted Death in 
Other Jurisdictions 
5.1 Introduction 
Having considered the extent to which English law has allowed ‘quality of life’ to 
influence decisions on end-of-life in Chapter Four, this chapter will examine the laws 
which govern euthanasia and assisted suicide in six other jurisdictions — the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, the Northern Territory (Australia), and 
Oregon (US). Although the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany have civil 
law systems, and the Northern Territory and Oregon have common law systems, the 
chapter will identify common themes in these legal regimes. The laws of these 
jurisdictions are a source of knowledge which can inform prospective law reform in 
England and Wales.  
Assisted suicide is currently expressly provided for by law in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Oregon, while there is legislation for euthanasia in Belgium and also 
in the Netherlands. In the Northern Territory, euthanasia and assisted suicide were 
temporarily legalised from July 1996 until March 1997. In all jurisdictions except 
Switzerland and Germany, assisted death1 has been carried out by physicians. In 
Germany, assisted suicide may be practised by anyone other than physicians because 
although it is not expressly permitted by law, there is no law that explicitly forbids it. 
The chapter will demonstrate that autonomy2 and self-determination3 have been the 
main ethical influences for encouraging a more permissive environment in respect of 
assisted death in these jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it will also be shown that there is an 
element of medical paternalism, where non-voluntary euthanasia4 is practised. 
The chapter will identify features of these foreign laws which potentially resolve issues 
of debate in England and Wales.5 The chapter will show that two essential safeguards 
for a law on assisted death are a mandatory mental health evaluation and the option for 
palliative care. It will be demonstrated that in jurisdictions where non-medically 
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qualified people assist in deaths, there is a lack of medical knowledge to address or 
manage complications during a patient’s dying process, and a risk of failure to detect 
clinical depression or other mental disorders in vulnerable patients6. The chapter will 
examine studies and surveys of these jurisdictions, first, to consider the impact of their 
laws on assisted death,7 and, secondly, to assess the efficacy of each jurisdiction’s 
approach to assisted death in the context of their particular cultural and legal 
background.8 The chapter will examine whether the laws in each of these jurisdictions 
have been effective in response to the jurisdiction’s initial call for reform, and whether 
these laws have been abused. Insights gained into the different legal approaches to 
assisted death in these jurisdictions will inform the law reform agenda for the 
legalisation of physician-assisted suicide in England and Wales, addressed in Chapter 
Seven. 
The following section examines the development of the law on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide in the first of the six jurisdictions to be considered — the Netherlands. 
5.2 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands was the first country in the world to legalise both euthanasia and 
assisted suicide.9  
5.2.1 Background 
The Dutch have followed a tradition of ‘legal prohibition and practical tolerance’ since 
the 17th century.10  They hold a view that any type of behaviour should be tolerated, 
provided that it does not harm others.11 This view is similar to Mill’s principle of liberty, 
‘[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’12 Painton notes that 
a basic premise of the Dutch culture is the belief that the government and the law should 
                                                          
6 See section 3.4.6. 
7 Orucu (ch1 n123) 442. 
8 P De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge and Cavendish 2007). 
9 G Bosshard et al, ‘A Role for Doctors in Assisted Dying? An Analysis of Legal Regulations and Medical 
Professional Positions in Six European Countries’ (2008)34 J Medical Ethics 28. 
10 Reeves, ‘The Permissive Dutch’ New York Times (New York,20 October 1985). 
11 P Zisser, ‘Euthanasia and the Right to Die: Holland and the United States Face The Dilemma’ (1988)9 
N.Y.Sch.J.Int’l.& Comp.L 361,363. 
12 Mill (ch3 n101) 9-10. 
    
182 
be used as ‘instruments of altruism’. Thus, regardless of the inherent complications, the 
Dutch address all problems openly to allow the incorporation of a solution into the 
law.13  
The Dutch legal system is based on a civil code, under which public prosecutors, judges, 
and lawyers work together to arrive at decisions that meet the needs of Dutch society.14 
Dutch public prosecutors may refrain from prosecution if it does not serve the public 
interest or if an offence can be more effectively dealt with through other measures.15 
This is similar to the powers of the DPP in England and Wales. Where there is sufficient 
evidence to justify a prosecution for a criminal offence, the DPP has a discretion to 
consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest.16  
Unlike the GMC and BMA in England and Wales, which both maintain that the 
underlying ethics of medicine is in conflict with the ethics of assisted death,17 the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association (‘KNMG’)18 has always supported physician-assisted death. 
For those who are not able to physically commit suicide without medical assistance, the 
KNMG did not think it was practical to endorse only physician-assisted suicide, and 
deny more active medical help in the form of euthanasia.19 As observed by Kimsma, 
suicide assistance provided in the form of oral preparations may not be sufficiently 
effective for some patients. There will always be patients who cannot drink, who are 
only semi-conscious, or who prefer that a physician perform euthanasia.20 
Voluntary euthanasia21 and assisted suicide were technically illegal in the Netherlands 
until the enactment of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act 2001 (‘Dutch Act’), which came into force on 1 April 2002. 
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code (‘DPC’) states that an individual found guilty of 
killing another at the latter’s request may be sentenced to up to 12 years of 
imprisonment, and Article 294 prohibits an individual from assisting or inciting another 
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person to commit suicide, with a possible sentence of three years imprisonment.22 
Despite this, for almost two decades, Dutch public prosecutors had declined to 
prosecute physicians who assisted deaths, provided they complied with the ‘due care’ 
criteria laid down by the Dutch Supreme Court in the 1984 case of Schoonheim.23 The 
‘due care’ criteria allowed the noodtoestand defence (defence of necessity) to provide 
the legal justification for assisted deaths. The defence is recognised under Article 40 of 
the DPC. It provides that an individual faced with two conflicting duties, may violate 
one to avoid violating another of greater moral significance.24 It is submitted that in this 
respect, Dutch law is in sharp contrast to English law. As was reaffirmed recently by the 
Court of Appeal in Nicklinson, English law does not recognise a defence of necessity in 
cases of assisted death.25 
As appropriately noted by DiCamillo, the underlying ethical influence which allowed 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide by Dutch physicians to take place in the 
Netherlands before the Dutch Act was one’s right to self-determination.26 This is 
illustrated in the cases that will be discussed below.  
Euthanasia was first considered by the District Court at Leeuwarden in the 1973 Postma 
case, in which a physician administered a fatal dose of morphine to her 78-year old 
terminally ill mother, who had repeatedly requested for death.27 As the physician had 
administered a single fatal injection, she was found guilty of euthanasia under Article 
293 of the DPC. However, she was only given a one week conditional prison sentence 
that was subject to a one year probationary period.28 The Court further stated that the 
physician would have escaped conviction had she pursued a course of alleviation of 
symptoms, by administering pain relieving medication in quantities that may also have 
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hastened death. Such medical decisions with a ‘double effect’ have also been legally 
endorsed by the English courts.29  
The 1981 Wertheim case established that only physicians are allowed to participate in 
assisted deaths in the Netherlands. In the Wertheim case, a person who was not 
medically trained assisted in the suicide of a 67-year-old woman suffering from various 
medical conditions.30 The District Court at Rotterdam recognised the patient’s right to 
self-determination and established a set of criteria for assisted suicide to be justified. 
The criteria included that i) the patient had a voluntary desire to die, ii) the patient had 
experienced unbearable physical or mental suffering, iii) the patient was aware of 
treatment alternatives, iv) there was no other reasonable solution, and v) a physician 
was involved in the assisted death.31 The Court found the person who had assisted the 
suicide guilty under Article 294 of the DPC, and imposed a six months conditional 
prison sentence which was subject to a one year probationary period, and two weeks of 
house arrest.  
In 1984, the Dutch Supreme Court in the case of Schoonheim, not only endorsed the 
defence of necessity in cases of physician-assisted death, but also approved of a set of 
‘due care’ criteria which had been issued by the KNMG.32 The case involved a 
95-year-old woman whose health was deteriorating due to an illness. Upon her repeated 
requests, her physician performed euthanasia. The Supreme Court overturned the 
physician’s conviction, holding that the lower courts had failed to consider whether 
there had been a conflict of duties.33 The question according to the Supreme Court was 
whether, according to responsible medical opinion measured by the prevailing standards 
of medical ethics, a situation of necessity had existed.34 The Supreme Court’s decision 
was influenced by the KNMG, which had not only published a set of ‘due care’ criteria 
that defined the circumstances in which Dutch physicians could perform euthanasia,35 
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but had also advised the Court that in a situation of necessity, euthanasia could be 
justified.36 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court, by referring to and relying on the KNMG, 
deferred on the legal and ethical issue of assisted death to the medical profession.37 This 
is similar to the practice by English courts of relying on medical assessments when 
determining whether life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn or withheld from 
incompetent patients in their best interests, as discussed in Chapters Two and Four. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s reliance on responsible medical opinion coincides with 
the application of the Bolam test38 in Bland’s case. As Lord Keith’s judgment in Bland 
states: ‘A medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat…a patient where a 
large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the effect that no benefit at 
all would be conferred by continuance.’39 As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, 
neither the English courts nor the medical profession in England and Wales are in 
favour of assisted death in any form. Similarly, the DPP’s prosecuting policy on assisted 
suicides deters physicians from providing any suicide assistance to patients.40  
In 1994, the Dutch Supreme Court addressed the issue of non-somatic (non-physical) 
suffering in the case of Chabot.41 The physician in Chabot’s case supplied lethal drugs 
to a patient who did not suffer from any diagnosable medical condition, but had recently 
lost both her sons and divorced her husband.42 She was described by the Supreme Court 
as suffering a ‘depression in a narrower sense without psychotic characteristics, in the 
context of a complicated grieving process’.43 The Court held that ‘the wish to die of a 
person whose suffering is psychic can be based on an autonomous judgement’, and that 
psychological suffering alone may satisfy the ‘due care’ criteria for assisted death as 
laid down in Schoonheim.44 The Court, however, reversed the earlier acquittal of the 
lower court. The physician was found guilty of assisted suicide as he had not consulted 
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an independent medical expert, which was held to be an essential requirement in cases 
of non-somatic suffering.45 Nevertheless, no punishment was imposed on the physician.  
Leenen argues that an independent medical expert would have been necessary for the 
patient in Chabot, as there may have been a realistic alternative treatment to alleviate 
the patient’s psychological suffering.46 Further, some Dutch commentators argued that 
the patient would not have been in a state of ‘unbearable suffering’ if a potentially 
effective treatment option had been refused by her.47 Smies observes that Chabot 
represents a significant extension in the law, and indicates the Dutch courts’ willingness 
to rely on ‘personal autonomy’48 and the ‘right to self-determination’ to justify assisted 
deaths in cases of psychological suffering.49 It is submitted that in cases such as Chabot, 
patients could be vulnerable50 due to depression and grief. Such depression51 may impair 
a person’s competence, and thus their decision-making capacity when requesting 
assisted suicide.  
According to Michael and Tannock’s definition of ‘health-related quality of life’ 
(discussed in Chapter Four), the patient’s psychological suffering in Chabot would have 
related to her general health.52 In this regard, the patient’s assisted death may have been 
justified. However, it may forcefully be observed that the patient’s quality of life would 
not have been health-related since the condition involved hopelessness, sorrow, or grief 
caused by death rather than an apparent or identifiable medical condition.  
Despite the Chabot ruling that psychological suffering alone could satisfy the ‘due care’ 
criteria for assisted death, in 2003, the Supreme Court in the case of Sutorius53 held that 
it was not lawful for a physician to assist death to simply relieve a patient of unbearable 
existential suffering.54 In Sutorius, a physician had assisted the suicide of an 86-year-old 
patient who was suffering from physical decline, and struggled with his ‘pointless and 
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empty existence’.55 The patient had also felt socially isolated, as all his friends and 
relatives had died.56 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for euthanasia. However, 
no punishment was imposed on the physician. The Court held that: 
a doctor who assists in suicide in a case in which the patient’s suffering is 
not predominantly due to a “medically classified disease or disorder”, but 
stems from the fact that life has become meaningless for him, acts outside 
the scope of his professional competence.57  
The case of Sutorius made it clear that a patient’s unbearable suffering had to be due to 
a medically classifiable cause, either physical (somatic) or psychiatric.58 As De Vries 
rightly argues, although a physician must consider all types of suffering, including 
existential suffering, they are not specialists in hopeless despair, loneliness, or 
existential suffering caused by the inability to adapt to a new situation.59 As was 
established in Chapter Four, existential suffering would affect one’s quality of life in a 
global wider sense beyond being a mere medical condition. 
It is concluded that the early history of Dutch jurisprudence on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide shows that, i) even when physicians have been found guilty of euthanasia or 
assisted suicide, the courts have been either reluctant or lenient in sentencing,60 ii) there 
has been a judicial deference to the prevailing standards of medical ethics, iii) there has 
been a willingness by the courts to extend the ‘due care’ criteria, e.g. the inclusion of 
non-somatic suffering, and iv) the influence of self-determination and personal 
autonomy has been strong.61  
5.2.2 The Dutch Act 
In 2001, the Dutch Act amended Articles 293 and 294 of the DPC. The amendments 
allow physicians to perform euthanasia or assist suicide provided they comply with a set 
of ‘due care’ criteria. These ‘due care’ criteria are that the physician must (i) be satisfied 
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that the patient’s request is voluntary and well considered; (ii) be satisfied that the 
patient’s suffering is unbearable and there is no prospect of improvement; (iii) inform 
the patient of their condition and further prognosis; (iv) discuss the situation with the 
patient and come to a joint conclusion that there is no other reasonable solution; 
(v) consult an independent physician who must examine the patient and confirm in 
writing that the attending physician has satisfied the ‘due care’ criteria and; (vi) exercise 
due medical care and attention in terminating the patient’s life or assisting in their 
suicide.62  
It is submitted that the ‘due care’ criteria in the Dutch Act focus on a patient’s 
autonomous request to die, and on their health-related quality of life.63 Nys cogently 
argues that the requirement of ‘unbearable suffering’ is based on the patient’s own 
experience, thus this is a subjective assessment of suffering.64 However, the related 
requirement that ‘there is no prospect of improvement’, is most likely an objective 
assessment by physicians. This requires a professional medical judgement to confirm 
that the patient’s condition is irreversible.65  
Hendin argues that, prior to the Dutch Act, consulting physicians were likely to be 
colleagues of the attending physician, and thus their supportive evaluations were likely 
to be a formality.66 He states that consulting physicians ‘seemed to be facilitators of the 
process rather than independent evaluators of the patient’s situation…easing the doubts 
of physicians who were uncertain whether to go forward with euthanasia’.67 To address 
this concern, today, a state-funded programme called ‘Support and Consultation on 
Euthanasia in the Netherlands’ (‘SCEN’) ensures that suitably qualified physicians are 
available in the Netherlands to give expert advice on assisted death, and to act as 
independent consulting physicians. To be accredited as a SCEN physician, a physician 
must complete training which includes legal frameworks, ethical issues, patient 
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communication and the process for completing a consultation report.68 This ensures that 
all consultation reports meet a consistent nationwide standard.  
As there are many cases of assisted suicide that fail,69 the ‘due care’ criterion which 
requires physicians to ‘exercise due medical care and attention’ addresses concerns on 
completion and complications when lethal medication is administered.70 In a study 
conducted in 2000, Groenewould et al found that almost one in five cases that started 
out as an assisted suicide ended with the physician administering a lethal injection 
because of complications:  
In most of these cases, the patient did not die as soon as expected or awoke 
from coma, and the physician felt compelled to administer a lethal injection 
because of the anticipated failure of the assisted suicide. In some cases, the 
physician administered a lethal injection because the patient had difficulty 
swallowing the oral medication, vomited after swallowing it, or became 
unconscious before swallowing all of it.71  
Additionally, Griffiths et al argue that the requirement for physicians to ‘exercise due 
medical care and attention’ requires a physician to either stay with the patient 
continuously or be immediately available until the patient dies.72 It is accepted that the 
existence of the Dutch huisartsen (family-care physicians) helps ensure that the 
physician attends to the patient and addresses all their needs until the time of death. In a 
2008 study by Lindemann and Verkerk, it was found that an estimated 70% of 
physicians who assist deaths in the Netherlands are huisartsen.73 Such physicians have a 
continuing and meaningful relationship with their patients. The requirement for 
physicians to ‘exercise due medical care and attention’ helps ensure that the lethal 
medication used remains under the control of the physician until the patient’s death and 
thus avoids any possible misuse or abuse.74  
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Physicians are required to report the cause of death to the municipal pathologist.75 After 
an examination of the patient’s body, the municipal pathologist sends a report to one of 
five Regional Review Committees (‘RRCs’).76 The RRCs assess whether physicians 
have acted in accordance with the ‘due care’ criteria. The RRCs may request physicians 
to supplement their medical reports with additional information to ensure a proper 
assessment.77 The systematic feedback from the RRCs to physicians controls the 
practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide, and engenders the appropriate level of care 
needed for a lawful assisted death.78 Only if a physician is found to have failed to 
comply with the ‘due care’ criteria, would an RRC report the case to the public 
prosecution authorities.79 The RRCs publish a summary of their findings in an annual 
report80 for the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, and the Minister of Justice who in 
turn report to Parliament. The Dutch Act relies on these annual reports by the RRCs to 
detect any abuse in the procedures.81 As argued by Smets et al, the annual reports 
improve public oversight of the Dutch Act, evaluate its implementation, and assist in 
making suitable amendments to the law on assisted death.82 
The 1990 Remmelink Report83 found that euthanasia as a last resort with ‘no other 
reasonable solution’ was often interpreted to include cases where palliative care84 
treatment could have alleviated the patient’s suffering, but where that treatment option 
had simply been declined by the patient.85 The Dutch law on assisted death thus gives 
emphasis to respect for personal autonomy86 and self-determination,87 as a patient is free 
to refuse palliative care and insist on assisted death. Keown, however, argued that 
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euthanasia in the Netherlands has often been used as an alternative to palliative care.88 In 
2002, Keown observed that approximately 40% of Dutch physicians indicated that 
‘[a]dequate alleviation of pain and/or symptoms and personal care of the dying patient 
make euthanasia unnecessary’.89 Although the Dutch Act does not require palliative care 
measures to be explored, the RRCs’ annual reports stress that physicians should always 
make the patient aware of palliative care options for relieving suffering.90 Nevertheless, 
the RRC members  who consist of a lawyer, a physician and an ethicist  may not have 
the relevant knowledge and expertise in palliative care, and thus may not be able to 
assess whether physicians have explored all reasonable options before resorting to 
euthanasia.91 
Since the early 1990s, procedures for reporting euthanasia and assisted suicide in the 
Netherlands have been evaluated and revised several times to increase the rate of 
reporting by physicians,92 and control the practice.93 Smets et al note that Dutch 
experience has been that physicians are more likely to report their cases to the medical 
profession rather than the public prosecution authorities. They are more open to review 
when they did not face the threat of immediate investigation.94 In this regard, the RRCs 
have been successful as a buffer between physicians and the authorities.95 Smets et al 
observe that physicians generally regard the RRCs as supportive, and that their 
existence provides a strong motivation for physicians to report their cases.96 This is 
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supported by an increase in the physician reporting rate in the Netherlands from 18% in 
1990 (prior to the RRCs) to 80.2% in 2005.97  
Smets et al observe that to ensure that euthanasia and assisted suicide are adequately 
regulated under the Dutch Act, controls were included in the form of reporting 
procedures for physicians, checks by the multi-disciplinary RRCs, and an assessment by 
Parliament.98 However, there may not be effective control of assisted death in the 
Netherlands as the Dutch Act relies exclusively on physician self-reporting.99 As Lewis 
cogently argues, physician reports may be fabricated so as to better fit the ‘due care’ 
criteria.100  
The 1995 Van der Maas study101 found depression to be the predominant symptom in 
3% of all patients who died by euthanasia or assisted suicide between 1990 and 1995.102 
As argued by Hendin, physicians are generally unable to assess when patients have 
psychiatric disorders that may be interfering with their judgement.103 In a 2005 study on 
euthanasia and depression among terminally ill cancer patients, it was found that cancer 
patients with a depressed mood were four times more likely to request euthanasia.104 It is 
submitted that as a mental health evaluation is not mandatory under the Dutch Act, 
vulnerable patients105 suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder may go 
undetected and untreated under the Dutch Act.  
The Dutch Act is available to patients who are experiencing the early onset of dementia. 
The first reported case of an assisted suicide which involved a patient suffering from 
dementia, was in 2004. The patient, who had been diagnosed with dementia three years 
earlier, stated that he did not want to endure the full course of his illness. He 
accordingly requested an assisted suicide.106 In its 2004 annual report, the RRCs noted 
that suffering in the early stages of dementia from the unacceptable prospect of further 
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loss of dignity amounted to ‘suffering hopelessly and unbearably’. Nevertheless, the 
RRCs acknowledged that: 
it is not always possible to perform euthanasia in accordance with the due 
care criteria when the patient in question is suffering from Alzheimer’s 
disease ... careful consideration will have to be given to all the facts and 
circumstances.107  
The extension of the Dutch law on assisted death to patients suffering from the early 
onset of dementia may support concerns of a ‘slippery slope’ in the Netherlands. This 
will be considered in Chapter Six. 
The Dutch Act also expanded the scope of lawful euthanasia and assisted suicide by 
providing that if a person becomes legally incompetent, but before reaching this state 
had written an advance declaration requesting that their life be terminated under 
particular circumstances, then their physician may comply with that request.108 This is in 
contrast to English law, where advance directives are restricted to the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment.109 Considering that the ‘due care’ criteria apply equally to advance 
declarations, it was originally uncertain whether these advance declarations would have 
effect in practice. As noted by Griffiths in 2001, ‘since the [‘due care’ criteria] continue 
to apply - in particular the requirement of unbearable suffering - it is doubtful the 
provision [on advance declarations] will have much practical effect’.110 Yet, in 2004, the 
Dutch Minister of Justice subsequently endorsed the legality of advance declarations of 
incompetent patients for medical conditions such as dementia, including Alzheimer’s 
disease. He accepted that a person suffering in the early stages of dementia may 
experience ‘unbearable and hopeless suffering’ due to the ‘fear of further deterioration 
and the risk of not being able to die with dignity’.111  
It is submitted that advance declarations under the Dutch Act effectively enable 
competent patients to extend their autonomy, to make decisions concerning their death 
into periods when they are no longer competent. Nevertheless, a request in an advance 
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declaration may still not always satisfy the ‘due care’ criterion for a ‘voluntary and 
well-considered request’ because the request is not contemporaneous with, and may not 
be evidence of, the patient’s wishes at the time that the advance declaration is carried 
out. As such, Dutch physicians may sometimes be reluctant to entertain advance 
declarations for euthanasia or assisted suicide from those suffering from dementia. This 
is demonstrated in Rurup et al’s 2004 study on physicians’ experiences with patients 
suffering from dementia. They found that approximately 2,200 patients with advance 
declarations requesting euthanasia after the onset of dementia die annually, having been 
treated by a physician who knows about the declaration. Although in 76% of cases, 
compliance with the advance declaration is discussed, euthanasia is seldom 
performed.112 This extension of the Dutch law on assisted death to incompetent patients 
through their advance declarations, for medical conditions such as dementia (including 
Alzheimer’s disease), may further support ‘slippery slope’ concerns. This will be 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
Some minors are regarded as having decision-making capacity in the Netherlands and 
are therefore not excluded under the Dutch Act. Section 2(3) provides that minors aged 
between 12 and 16 years who have a reasonable understanding of their interests, may 
request for assisted death and the physician may comply provided the minor’s parents or 
guardian agree. Minors between 16 and 18 who have a reasonable understanding of 
their interests may obtain euthanasia or assisted suicide without parental consent, 
although their parents must be involved in the decision-making process.113 Cohen-
Almagor cogently argues that this Dutch provision overestimates the capacity of minors 
to evaluate the meaning and consequences of a request to die. He says that by giving 
minors the opportunity to make such requests, it places a huge responsibility on young 
people and thus may disturb society’s confidence in the relationship between 
physicians, parents, and children.114 Jochemsen argues that unless Dutch society is 
prepared to give minors the right to do everything else in life that an adult can do, 
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giving them the right to end their life seems out of place.115 It is contended that minors 
are particularly vulnerable and often rely on others for their well-being.116 The capacity 
to make such grave decisions concerning death may be affected by their physical and 
emotional development and by changes in their health and treatment.117 It is submitted 
that the provisions relating to minors in the Dutch Act are further instances of 
reinforcing an individual’s right to autonomy.118 As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the 
extension of the Dutch law on euthanasia and assisted suicide to minors between the 
ages of 12 and 16 years may provide support for ‘slippery slope’ concerns.  
It is submitted that as Dutch physicians have been entrusted with carrying out the 
practice of ‘physician-assisted death’, Dutch society has accepted assisted death as part 
of overall medical practice involving end-of-life medical decisions. The adoption of the 
KNMG’s ‘due care’ criteria by the Dutch courts and their subsequent codification in the 
Dutch Act shows the level of influence which the medical profession has had on the law 
on euthanasia and assisted suicide in the Netherlands. As de Vries forcefully argues:  
[T]he [Dutch] law allows for a medical exception [to Articles 293 and 294 
of the Penal Code] because only doctors are allowed to entertain a request 
for euthanasia [and assisted suicide]…considerations about the request[,] 
specifically whether the patient’s suffering has been hopeless and 
unbearable[,] are medical or clinical considerations and considerations upon 
which the courts must rely.119  
Similarly, Gunning cogently argues that, ‘Many people think that legalising euthanasia 
will make [patients] autonomous. But, in fact, it is the doctor…who decides when life 
should be ended’.120 It is argued that the ‘due-care’ criteria in the Dutch Act may be as 
much a reflection of medical paternalism121 as of patient autonomy, due to their focus on 
a physician’s compliance with the law. Likewise, in England and Wales, English courts 
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rely on medically paternalistic assessments of an incompetent patient’s best interests 
when deciding whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from them.122  
The Netherlands extended lawful euthanasia to include non-voluntary euthanasia,123 
when it made neonatal termination a lawful medical practice. The following section will 
consider neonatal termination in the Netherlands. 
5.2.3 Neonatal termination 
Neonatal termination has been taking place in the Netherlands since the late 1980s, and 
has been recognised as a lawful practice, provided that physicians act in accordance 
with accepted medical practice. As observed by Borst-Eilers, a 1987 survey conducted 
by the Dutch Paediatric Association (‘DPA’) found that all eight neonatology centres 
surveyed permitted neonatal termination. Five of the centres had a general policy of 
administering a lethal drug in exceptional cases, while the other three limited such 
practice to the ‘dying phase’.124  
The 1995 cases of Prins and Kadijk, concerning two critically ill and severely disabled 
infants, demonstrate a strong influence of medical paternalism125 in neonatal 
termination.126 The Prins case involved a three-day-old baby with spina bifida,127 whilst 
the case of Kadijk involved a 24-day-old baby with trisomy 13.128 As the infants in both 
cases had a limited life expectancy with suffering that could not be alleviated, at the 
explicit request of their parents, the infants’ physicians ended their lives with lethal 
medication. In neither of these cases were the physicians found guilty of murder. 
Instead, in both cases, the courts accepted the defence of necessity and found the 
physicians to have acted according to sound medical opinion and within the norms of 
medical ethics.129 It is contended that the decision to end the lives of the infants in Prins 
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and Kadijk was based on a paternalistic judgement of quality of life by the physicians.130 
Further, two national surveys of Dutch neonatal deaths during the periods August to 
November 1995131 and August to November 2001,132 both found an estimated 10 to 15 
cases of neonatal termination annually. Of these, however, only three cases were being 
reported to the authorities per year on average.133  
To improve reporting rates, the Groningen Academic Hospital introduced a set of 
guidelines for the neonatal termination of severely ill infants in December 2004.134 The 
guidelines were called the Groningen Protocol. The Groningen Protocol was endorsed 
by the KNMG and adopted by the DPA as a national guideline in 2005.135 By excusing 
cases of neonatal termination on the basis that they have complied with the Groningen 
Protocol, the Dutch public prosecution authorities have indirectly approved of the 
Protocol,136 resulting in neonatal termination officially becoming a lawful practice in the 
Netherlands. In the same way, in England and Wales, the DPP’s reluctance to prosecute 
‘compassionate’ assisted suicide cases has led to the public perception that assisted 
suicides that meet the criteria stipulated by the DPP’s Policy have been 
decriminalised.137 The Groningen Protocol was given further validation in 2007, when a 
national review committee with multidisciplinary expertise138 (similar to the RRCs) was 
set up to review all cases of neonatal termination to ensure that its requirements had 
been met.139 There is a distinct difference between the law in the Netherlands and the 
law in England and Wales in respect of severely ill newborn infants. As LJ Taylor in the 
English case of Re J said:  
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the court never sanctions steps to 
terminate life. That would be unlawful. There is no question of approving, 
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even in a case of the most horrendous disability, a course aimed at 
terminating life or accelerating death. The court is only concerned with the 
circumstances in which steps should not be taken to prolong life.140 
The Groningen Protocol identifies three categories of newborns for whom physicians 
may perform neonatal termination — i) infants with no chance of survival, ii) infants 
who may survive after a period of intensive treatment, but would have a very poor 
quality of life, iii) infants with an extremely poor prognosis ‘who do not depend on 
technology for physiologic stability and whose suffering is severe, sustained, and cannot 
be alleviated’.141 The requirements of the protocol are that — i) the diagnosis and 
prognosis for the infant has to be certain, ii) the infant is experiencing hopeless and 
unbearable suffering, iii) the diagnosis, prognosis, and unbearable suffering has to be 
confirmed by an independent physician, iv) both parents have to give informed consent, 
and v) the procedure has to be performed in accordance with accepted medical 
standards.142  
It is submitted that the requirements of the Groningen Protocol, where possible, have 
tried to parallel the ‘due care’ criteria in the Dutch Act. Consistent with the Dutch Act, a 
measure of unbearable suffering is applied to newborns under the Groningen Protocol. 
However, unlike the Dutch Act, the element of ‘unbearable suffering’ in relation to 
newborns is more of an objective assessment of quality of life by physicians.  As argued 
by Kon, Dutch physicians are unable to accurately assess a newborn’s suffering, and 
determine whether the burdens of living outweigh the benefits.143 They would therefore 
be incapable of establishing whether death is in a newborn’s ‘best interests’. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Six, this extension of the Dutch law from voluntary euthanasia144 to 
non-voluntary euthanasia145 for newborns may also support ‘slippery slope’ concerns. 
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5.2.4 Summary for the Netherlands 
In conclusion, pursuant to the Dutch law on assisted death, a patient is required to be 
suffering unbearably, either physically or mentally, from a medical condition. To satisfy 
the requirement of ‘due medical care and attention’, a physician may be required to 
either stay with the patient continuously or be immediately available until the patient 
dies. This requirement not only addresses any complications during and immediately 
after an assisted death, but also avoids any possible misuse of the lethal medication 
supplied for assisted suicide, or abuse of the law. The existence of the huisartsen in the 
Netherlands also helps ensure that physicians address all the needs of their patients until 
the time of death. Further, to facilitate the Dutch Act, the SCEN network of physicians 
not only provides expert advice on assisted death, but also ensures the independence of 
consulting physicians. The RRCs also ensure that physicians comply with the ‘due care’ 
criteria. The Dutch Act includes safeguards in the form of reporting procedures for 
physicians, checks by the multi-disciplinary RRCs, and an assessment by Parliament. 
Nevertheless, there may not be effective control of assisted death in the Netherlands.  
The Dutch Act relies exclusively on physician self-reporting which means there is 
potential for the fabrication of reports. Further, as there is no requirement for palliative 
care, euthanasia has often been used as an alternative to palliative care. Clinical 
depression in patients may also go undetected under the Dutch law, as there is no 
mandatory mental health evaluation of patients requesting an assisted death. 
Additionally; the Dutch Act has extended the law on assisted death to patients suffering 
from the early onset of dementia, minors, and to incompetent patients who have made 
advance declarations for medical conditions that include dementia and Alzheimer’s 
disease. These extensions to the Dutch law on assisted death not only raise concerns of 
a ‘slippery slope’, but also raise issues pertaining to the ‘due care’ requirement for a 
voluntary and well-considered request. Further, since 2005, neonatal termination has 
become lawful in the Netherlands with the approval of the Groningen Protocol. Thus, 
what started off as lawful voluntary euthanasia has now been extended to non-voluntary 
euthanasia. This extension no longer reflects the influence of autonomy in the Dutch 
law on assisted death, but rather the influence of medical paternalism.   
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5.3 Belgium 
On 23 September 2002, the Belgian Act Concerning Euthanasia (‘Belgian Act’) came 
into force, making Belgium the second country in the world to legalise euthanasia.146 
The Belgian euthanasia law is based on the Dutch Act, but unlike the Netherlands, 
Belgium’s progression towards legalisation was not supported by its medical 
profession.147 As Belgium did not have the same permissive approach towards 
euthanasia as the Netherlands, there was no case law or regulated practice addressing 
euthanasia prior to the Belgian Act.148 
5.3.1 Background 
Prior to proposals for a law to legalise euthanasia, there were hardly any physicians 
prosecuted for euthanasia149 in Belgium.150 This is despite a finding by a 1998 study of 
end-of-life medical practices by Belgian physicians, that an estimated 640 cases of 
voluntary euthanasia151 (1.1% of all deaths) and no less than 1,796 cases of termination 
of life without the patient’s explicit request (3.2% of all deaths) occurred in the Belgian 
region of Flanders152 in 1998.153 The study indicated that Belgian physicians (or at least 
those from the Flanders region) had developed a practice of non-voluntary euthanasia.154 
Van der Wal et al observed that physicians often participated in such a practice, in cases 
where the medical decisions had been delayed or deferred. In these cases, patients had 
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become legally incompetent and were experiencing a condition that was unbearable, 
irreversible and painful.155  
Nys argues that while the Dutch Act aimed to codify the ‘due care’ criteria which had 
already been developed by the courts in the Netherlands, the Belgian Act aimed mainly 
to regulate the conduct of physicians in end-of-life medical practices which had 
previously been uncontrolled. The Belgian Act, according to Nys, was intended to 
encourage patients to express a voluntary and explicit request for euthanasia, and 
physicians to abandon their previous practice of termination of life without request.156 In 
2007, Bilsen et al compared two identical nationwide death certificate studies on end-
of-life medical decisions in Flanders — one conducted in early 1998 (when the 
legalisation process of euthanasia in Belgium started),157 and the other in late 2001 (just 
before the Belgian Act took effect).158 They noted that a shift in medical practices had 
indeed occurred between the two studies. ‘Termination of life with the intention of 
ending a patient’s life’ decreased from 4.4% of all deaths in 1998 to 1.8% in 2001. 
Voluntary euthanasia decreased from 1.1% to 0.3%, and ‘termination of life without 
request’ decreased from 3.2% to 1.5%. ‘The alleviation of suffering with an intention to 
shorten life’ also decreased from 5.3% to 2.8%. During the lead-up period to 
legalisation in Belgium, the judiciary initiated a number of criminal investigations into 
physicians who had helped to end their patients’ lives.159 Bilsen et al conclude that a fear 
of prosecution among physicians was a reason for the decline in end-of-life medical 
decisions between 1998 and 2001. They also observe that, besides a fear of prosecution, 
a growing awareness of the right to self-determination160 may have led to an increased 
expectation among patients of their participation in end-of-life decisions. 
5.3.2 The Belgian Act 
Euthanasia is defined in the Belgian Act as ‘intentionally terminating life by someone 
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other than the person concerned, at the latter’s request’.161 Compliance with the Belgian 
Act is monitored by the multi-disciplinary Belgian Federal Control and Evaluation 
Commission (‘CFCE’),162 to which all cases of euthanasia must be reported.163 The 
Belgian Act does not expressly include assisted suicide. Nevertheless, in its first 
biannual report, the CFCE accepted cases of assisted suicide as falling under the 
Belgian Act.164 It is submitted that this inclusion of assisted suicide has led to a 
discrepancy in Belgian law. Suicide and assisted suicide are not recognised as criminal 
offences in the Belgian Penal Code (‘BPC’). However, the BPC does provide that if 
anyone intentionally provides assistance in another’s death,165 then they may be 
prosecuted for either criminal negligence or failing to aid a person in grave danger.166 
In order for an assisted death to be legal, the Belgian Act requires the patient to be in a 
medically futile condition of persistent and unbearable physical or mental suffering that 
cannot be alleviated, as a result of a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or 
accident.167 In an English context, this provision in the Belgian Act would cover most of 
the recent cases that have been highlighted in the debate on assisted death in England 
and Wales, from terminal illnesses like motor neurone disease, to non-fatal conditions 
such as multiple sclerosis, spinal cord injuries, and locked-in syndrome.168 It is 
submitted that the provision concerning the patient’s medical condition in the Belgian 
Act, is a ‘quality of life’ judgement. The ‘persistent and unbearable physical or mental 
suffering’ is based on a subjective assessment by the patient. However, as physicians 
have the required knowledge and skill, they apply an objective assessment to the 
‘serious and incurable disorder’, which covers both somatic (physical) and psychiatric 
diseases. As noted by Nys, if a patient refuses treatment for a curable disease, they may 
remain in a state of unbearable suffering, but the disease will not amount to an incurable 
one.169 A patient’s refusal of potentially curative treatment will prevent them from 
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gaining access to the Belgian Act.170 Thus, the Belgian law on euthanasia is not based on 
an absolute right to have one’s personal autonomy respected.171 Rather, such a right is 
qualified by the requirement for ‘a serious and incurable disorder’, which is determined 
by physicians.172 
In its 2006/07 Report, the CFCE reported that the anticipation of a future coma, loss of 
independence, or progressive dementia could in themselves constitute ‘a medically 
futile condition of persistent and unbearable mental suffering’ ‘here and now’ that 
‘cannot be alleviated as a result of a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness’ for 
the purposes of the Belgian Act.173 This position was confirmed in its 2008/09 Report.174 
It is submitted that by extending the scope of ‘mental suffering’ to those who merely 
anticipate a future coma, loss of independence, or progressive dementia, such patients 
could be vulnerable175 under the Belgian Act. These patients may be unable to make a 
sound judgement due to depression, or may be coerced or pressured into requesting 
euthanasia. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, this extension in the law may provide 
support for ‘slippery slope’ concerns in Belgium.  
Cohen-Almagor observes that the CFCE’s position that ‘the anticipation of progressive 
dementia by a patient could in itself constitute mental suffering’ differs from its earlier 
view, that assisting patients with dementia to die was unlawful due to the uncertainty 
concerning a patient’s competence.176 It is submitted that the CFCE’s position may be an 
attempt to promote personal autonomy under the Belgian Act. Patients with dementia 
may make a request for euthanasia during a ‘lucid moment’. However, in cases of 
dementia it would be difficult to fulfil the requirements under the Belgian Act for 
‘competence’ and a ‘voluntary request’. The wishes of a patient at the time of assistance 
may differ from the wishes expressed by them during a ‘lucid moment’.177 To be certain 
of a patient’s wishes at the time of assistance, euthanasia itself would have to be 
performed during such a ‘lucid moment’. This is demonstrated by two high profile 
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Belgian cases. The first was in 2006, where a physician performed euthanasia on 
87-year-old Suzanne Roegiest, who had reportedly asked to be allowed to die during a 
‘lucid moment’.178 The second involved the prominent Belgian author, Hugo Claus, in 
2008. Claus, who was 78 years old, had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, and was 
reported to have been lucid, when euthanasia was performed in the presence of his 
wife.179  
Under the Belgian Act, a patient has to voluntarily make a repeated request for 
euthanasia, inclusive of a written request.180 The physician is also required to discuss the 
request, health and life expectancy, and possible therapeutic and palliative181 treatment 
available with the patient.182 These discussions must be spread out over a reasonable 
period of time, to allow the physician to be certain of the persistence of the patient’s 
suffering and the enduring character of the patient’s request. It is accepted that this 
requirement would ensure that the patient is making an autonomous, informed, and 
well-considered request to die. As observed by Lewy, the Belgian medical profession is 
governed by the Belgian Order of Physicians (‘BOP’) and its Code of Medical 
Deontology (‘CMD’). The BOP had initially opposed assisted death,183 and Article 95 of 
the CMD prohibited physicians from assisting patients to die. However, the CMD was 
amended in March 2006 to complement the Belgian Act.184 As noted by Bosshard et al, 
Articles 95-98 of the CMD now mention the duty of a physician, upon receiving a 
question from a patient on end-of-life decisions, to inform the patient of all possible 
options and provide any medical and moral assistance required.185 This initial opposition 
by the BOP to assisted death is similar to the current opposition by the GMC and BMA 
in England and Wales.186  
Under the Belgian Act, the physician is also required to consult an independent 
physician about the patient’s request for euthanasia. As the societal focus in Flanders is 
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on ‘personal autonomy’ and ‘quality of life’,187 requests for euthanasia in that region of 
Belgium are common.188 To support these requests, a network of volunteer physicians 
called End of Life Information Forum (‘LEIF’)189 was established in Flanders in 2003.190 
The LEIF network not only helps physicians find an independent physician who is 
specially trained and accessible for a formal consultation, but also offers a wide 
information and support forum for healthcare practitioners and patients who have 
questions about the end-of-life options.191 The LEIF network is similar to the Dutch 
state-funded SCEN programme (discussed above). As with SCEN, LEIF consulting 
physicians undergo a similar training programme to ensure nationwide consistency of 
consultations and reporting.192  
As with the Dutch Act, the Belgian Act does not require a mental health evaluation to 
assess whether a patient is suffering from depression or other psychiatric or 
psychological disorders. For this reason, patients whose judgement could be impaired 
by mental disorders may be vulnerable under the Belgian Act. In cases where death is 
not imminent (inclusive of terminal conditions), physicians are required to consult a 
second independent physician, who may either be a specialist in the patient’s disorder or 
a psychiatrist.193 It is accepted that a second independent physician provides some 
assurance that the patient’s request is well-considered. However, this safeguard may not 
be effective in protecting vulnerable patients. If the second independent physician is a 
specialist in the patient’s disorder, they will not necessarily be able to detect or assess 
whether any potential depression or other mental disorder has influenced a patient’s 
decision to die. Further, if death is not imminent, euthanasia is only performed after a 
month has lapsed from the time of the written request. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
the desire for death fluctuates.194 Thus, the one month ‘cooling off’ period allows a 
patient time to reconsider their decision, and provides vulnerable patients an 
opportunity to reassess their request.  
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The Belgian Act requires a patient to be conscious and competent when making a 
request for euthanasia.195 However, as with the Dutch Act, an advance directive is also 
recognised by the Belgian Act. An advance directive is valid if it is drafted within five 
years prior to the patient becoming legally incompetent.196 For a patient’s request for 
euthanasia in an advance directive to be acted upon, they have to also be in a medically 
irreversible state of unconsciousness, and suffer from a serious and incurable disease 
caused by illness or accident. It is argued that due to the qualification of ‘a medically 
irreversible state of unconsciousness’ only patients in a PVS would be able to satisfy the 
requirements for an advance directive under the Belgian Act.197 Unlike the Dutch Act, 
there is no requirement for ‘unbearable suffering’, as it is assumed that an incompetent 
patient in a ‘medically irreversible state of unconsciousness’ is incapable of 
experiencing suffering.198 As with the Dutch Act, advance directives are regarded as an 
extension of personal autonomy. Nevertheless, as there can be a lapse of almost five 
years from the time an advance directive is made to the time a request is carried out, in 
some cases it may be doubtful whether an advance directive is a valid representation of 
a patient’s request and wishes at the time of the euthanasia. 
The Belgian Act also requires patients to be over the age of 18, or an ‘emancipated’ 
minor.199 Nys notes that the emancipation of a minor may result either from marriage or 
from a declaration by a judge that the minor is competent to deal with their own 
personal affairs.200 It is argued that the Belgian Act places tighter controls over minors 
than the Dutch Act. As with the Dutch Act, the inclusion of emancipated minors in the 
Belgian Act clearly demonstrates that the Belgian law on euthanasia is influenced by the 
ethical principle of personal autonomy. As concluded earlier, decisions involving 
minors need to be treated with caution as minors may be particularly vulnerable due to 
their physical and emotional development.  
Physicians are required to report their cases of assisted death to the CFCE.201 However, 
the reporting rates for euthanasia have been low in Belgium. According to Smets et al’s 
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2010 study on the reporting rate in Flanders202 between June and November 2007, the 
rate of reporting was only 52.8% based on a random sample of euthanasia cases.203 In 
contrast, the Dutch reporting rate in 2005 was estimated at 80.2% (discussed above).204 
It is argued that the higher reporting rate in the Netherlands is due to the fact that there 
is greater acceptance of this procedural ‘reporting’ requirement within the medical 
profession. As discussed above, procedures for Dutch reporting have been amended 
several times, and the RRCs were specifically established to encourage physicians to 
report their cases. As there is more consensus between the medical profession and the 
RRCs, the Dutch reporting rates have gradually increased. As observed by Smets et al, 
the higher reporting rate in the Netherlands may be explained by the fact that the Dutch 
had two decades of relatively open euthanasia practice before the Dutch Act came into 
force, and a reporting procedure had been in place since the early 1990s. In contrast, 
bringing euthanasia into the open is a relatively new experience for Belgian physicians, 
as they have only been required to report cases since the Belgian Act came into force in 
2002.205 
Smets et al’s 2010 study found that in 76.7% of cases, the main reason for not reporting 
euthanasia was that Flemish physicians did not know that their medical practices in the 
circumstances of those cases had amounted to euthanasia.206 Smets et al argue that this is 
because Belgian law does not specify which drugs and which dosages should be used to 
perform euthanasia and does not have uniform guidelines, such as those that exist in the 
Netherlands.207 This lack of knowledge as to what amounts to euthanasia is not unique to 
Flemish physicians, as Smets et al noted in a separate 2010 study on euthanasia amongst 
patients dying at home in Belgium between 2005 and 2006.208 Smets et al deduced from 
their study that, although the Belgian Act has converted a once covert practice by 
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physicians into a more open and controlled one, the legalisation of euthanasia alone has 
not been sufficient to guarantee a regulated practice of euthanasia.209 
The CFCE refers cases to the public prosecutor, if physicians have not met the 
requirements of the Belgian Act.210 The CFCE is also required to present a summary 
report of euthanasia cases to Parliament biannually. Thus, as observed by Smets et al, 
the Belgian Act may be appraised and the law revised and developed further. Like the 
annual reports of the RRCs under the Dutch Act, the biannual reports of the CFCE 
amount to public disclosure of the practice of euthanasia in Belgium.211 However, Lewis 
argues that the Dutch practice of publishing details of cases of euthanasia in the annual 
reports of the RRCs allows for greater insight into individual cases than the essentially 
statistical reports of the CFCE.212 
In summary, control measures were included in the Belgian Act which were similar to 
provisions in the Dutch Act, in the form of physician self-reporting, a review by the 
multi-disciplinary CFCE and appraisals by Parliament.213 These can ensure that 
euthanasia is properly regulated as a medical practice in Belgium. As noted by 
Smets et al, Belgium and the Netherlands both established multi-disciplinary review 
committees, as physicians in both countries preferred not to be examined by public 
prosecutors.214 As discussed above in section 5.2.2, review committees function as a 
buffer between physicians and the public prosecution authorities, placing emphasis on 
information, accountability and transparency, rather than deterrence and punishment.215 
However, as persuasively argued by Smets et al, the existence of one central review 
committee in the form of the CFCE in Belgium, may provide better control and 
uniformity in the practice of euthanasia by physicians, than the five RRCs in the 
Netherlands.216 
As the official data on the practice of euthanasia in Belgium is largely based on 
self-reporting (similar to the Netherlands),217 this may not amount to an effective 
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safeguard against abuse of the law. Physicians may be inclined to only report cases 
where due care has been exercised, or to report that their cases complied with the law 
regardless of the actual circumstances.218 As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the 
disregard for the reporting requirements under the Belgian Act may support ‘slippery 
slope’ concerns.  
The Belgian Palliative Care Act (‘PCA 2002’), which was passed at the same time as 
the Belgian Act, requires every patient approaching the end-of-life to be able to benefit 
from palliative care.219 Article 7 of the PCA 2002 specifically provides that every patient 
has the right to obtain information about palliative care possibilities from their treating 
physician. Although the Belgian Act does not include a mandatory requirement for a 
patient to actually receive palliative care, it does require physicians to discuss palliative 
treatment options with their patients. Additionally, a few months after the Belgian Act 
was passed, the Belgian Medical Disciplinary Board (‘MDB’) issued a set of guidelines 
endorsing the Belgian Act, and emphasising that palliative care must be exhausted as an 
option before resorting to euthanasia.220 As a result, every Belgian hospital has a 
palliative care team, and palliative home care is available nationally.221 In addition, as 
LEIF physicians are also trained in palliative care, physicians may consult them on 
possible palliative treatment for their patients.222 The CFCE is also able to monitor the 
extent to which Belgian physicians have explored and exhausted palliative care 
treatment before resorting to euthanasia, since four of its 16 members are palliative care 
experts.223 Further, a unique feature of healthcare practice in Belgium is that 70% of 
Belgian hospitals are Catholic healthcare institutions run by the Caritas network.224 
Gastmans et al note that the guidelines of the Ethics Committee of the Caritas network 
restrict euthanasia to the terminally ill. As such, healthcare institutions run by Caritas do 
not recognise ‘absolute’ patient autonomy in cases of euthanasia.225 Caritas Flanders 
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oversees 65% of the general hospitals and 40% of nursing homes in Flanders.226 
Gastmans et al observe that:  
most ... Catholic healthcare institutions [in Flanders] consider ... [the 
requirement in the Belgian Act for physicians to discuss all possible 
palliative treatment with patients] to be insufficient, since in their view, not 
all [physicians] are familiar with the possibilities offered by various 
palliative care facilities ... they believe ... that euthanasia can only be 
justified when an obligatory consultation takes place with a palliative care 
expert.227  
Thus, many Catholic hospitals in Flanders impose a palliative filter requirement to 
ensure that all palliative options are explored by terminally ill patients.228  
It is concluded that the emphasis placed on palliative care treatment options for patients 
making end-of-life decisions in Belgium, and the extensive availability of palliative care 
resources, address the concerns of many whose needs can be met by adequate palliative 
care. The developments in palliative care at the time euthanasia was legalised in 
Belgium underscore the fact that euthanasia was intended to be an option of last resort. 
Smets et al’s 2009 study of reported euthanasia cases between September 2002 and 
December 2007 notes that ‘the proportion of euthanasia cases in which at least 1 
palliative team was consulted remained stable over the years’.229 It found that a palliative 
care specialist was consulted as the second independent physician in 12% of cases, and 
that palliative teams were consulted in 35% of cases.230 The amount of overlap, in order 
to determine how many cases involved either a palliative specialist or team, was not 
stated. It is submitted that such low rates may be due to the fact that a palliative care 
consultation is not a mandatory requirement under the Belgian Act.  
The CFCE noted in its 2006/07 biannual report, a view by some of its members that 
consultations beyond those that are legislatively required (such as the mandatory 
palliative consultation as required by Caritas Flanders discussed above) may constitute 
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an unwarranted constraint on ‘patient autonomy’.231 Such concerns may be unnecessary, 
however, as a study by Van den Block et al on end-of-life decisions from 2005 to 2006 
found that euthanasia and other end-of-life practices are considerably more prevalent in 
inpatient palliative care units than in hospitals or care homes.232 Contrary to the CFCE’s 
views in its 2006/07 report, Van den Block et al concluded from their study that the 
Belgian Act promotes patient autonomy and allows patients to request euthanasia even 
when palliative care options are proposed and considered.  
As noted in section 5.3.1, Bilsen et al’s follow-up nationwide death certificate study on 
end-of-life medical practices in Flanders in 2007 found that in 1.8% of all deaths, lethal 
drugs were used without the patient’s explicit request,233 a rate that was lower than that 
in 1998 (3.2%) but slightly higher to that in 2001 (1.5%)234. These rates indicate that the 
Belgian Act has not completely deterred physicians from carrying out the unlawful 
practice of ‘termination of life without request’ or non-voluntary euthanasia235. Bilsen et 
al’s study also found that 1.9% of all deaths were the result of euthanasia, a rate that 
was higher than that in 1998 (1.1%) and 2001 (0.3%). The rise shows that more patients 
are exercising their autonomy in expressing a voluntary request for euthanasia. The rate 
of ‘intensified alleviation of pain and other symptoms at the end of life’ had also 
increased from 18.4% of all deaths in 1998 and 22.0% in 2001 to 26.7% in 2007. On the 
one hand, this growth in palliative treatment in the form of symptom alleviation may 
show that more patients and physicians are exhausting palliative options before 
resorting to euthanasia. Alternatively, this growth may be due to an increased incidence 
of non-voluntary euthanasia under the guise of palliative treatment.   
It is accepted that the law on euthanasia in Belgium focuses on patient autonomy. The 
emphasis placed on palliative care treatment by the PCA 2002, the MDB, and Caritas 
ensures that patients are informed of palliative care options before euthanasia is resorted 
to. This addresses the needs of patients who are likely to change their minds about their 
request for euthanasia once administered with adequate palliative care. However, as 
observed above, Belgian physicians have not yet fully abandoned the practice of 
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‘termination of life without request’. Van den Block et al’s 2009 study found that such 
practice is also present in inpatient palliative care units.236 The study found that 25 of 
1,644 deaths had been the result of ‘termination of life without request’ (1.5%).  
Bilsen et al’s 2004 study on end-of-life decisions found that ‘termination of life without 
request’ often occurred where communication with patients became impossible because 
of a sudden deterioration of the illness, or where communication on end-of-life 
decisions had been deferred for too long.237 The findings in Bilsen et al’s study support 
an earlier observation made by van der Wal et al in 1993, prior to the Belgian Act.238 
Bilsen et al argue that such medical practice accords with the medical ethical principle 
of beneficence.239 It is argued, however, that beneficence may be an excuse for medical 
paternalism,240 as the incapacitated condition of the patients in such cases leaves them at 
the mercy of their physicians. As was noted by Faulder in 1985, ‘If beneficence is left 
entirely to the subjective judgment of [physicians] it…easily becomes an excuse for 
paternalism’.241  
In a 2007 population-based survey, Chambaere et al found that ‘termination of life 
without request’ occurred more often in Flanders than in five other jurisdictions.242 The 
results of the survey showed that in Flanders, out of 208 deaths by lethal medication 
(3.8% of all deaths), 66 (32%) were carried out in the absence of request or consent.
 
Such ‘termination of life without request’ or non-voluntary euthanasia occurred mainly 
among patients who were 80 years of age or older, who were either in a coma, or 
suffering from dementia. Chambaere et al stated that such patients ‘fit the description of 
vulnerable patient groups at risk of life-ending without request’ and that ‘attention 
should therefore be paid to protecting these patient groups from such practices.’243 In 
some cases, the physicians proceeded without consent because they felt that euthanasia 
was ‘clearly in the patient’s best interest’ and, in other cases, physicians felt that 
discussing euthanasia with the patient would have been harmful to them. The fact that 
                                                          
236 Van den Block (n232). 
237 J Bilsen et al, ‘The Incidence and Characteristics of End-of-Life Decisions by GPs in Belgium’ (2004)21 Family 
Practice 282,286. 
238 van der Wal (n155). See text to n155. 
239 See section 3.3.4.  
240 See section 3.3.8. 
241 Faulder (ch3 n160)158. 
242 K Chambaere et al, ‘Physician-Assisted Deaths under the Euthanasia Law in Belgium: A Population-Based 
Survey’ (2010) 182(9) Can Med Assoc J 895, 900. The five other jurisdictions were Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. 
243 Chambaere (ibid) 899. 
    
213 
physicians have been more open to such a practice in Flanders,244 suggests either a 
greater influence of the principle of beneficence, or a stronger culture of medical 
paternalism amongst Flemish physicians than elsewhere. Such paternalism may be due 
to physicians focusing on the quality of life of their patients.245 Further 
multi-jurisdictional studies which include Belgium are considered in Chapter Six on 
‘the slippery slope argument’.246 These also indicate a rate of non-voluntary euthanasia 
for Belgium which is higher than the Netherlands. 
5.3.3 Neonatal termination 
Despite neonatal termination being unlawful in Belgium, a survey on the 292 deaths of 
critically-ill infants between August 1999 and July 2000 found Belgian physicians to be 
carrying out neonatal termination in Flanders.247 In 7% of cases, physicians administered 
a lethal dose of drugs, and in 16% of cases, drugs were administered to alleviate pain in 
doses that might also have shortened lifespan. Lethal doses were mainly administered to 
premature babies, who were less than a week old, with severe brain damage or severe 
congenital malformations or disabilities, and a poor quality of life. Approximately 68% 
of physicians who participated in the survey said that they would be willing to use lethal 
drugs to shorten the terminal suffering of a neonate, and 88% agreed that quality of 
life248 should be taken into account in therapeutic decision-making made on behalf of 
neonates. The practice of non-voluntary euthanasia249 in the form of neonatal 
termination demonstrates a culture of medical paternalism250 in Belgium. Similar to the 
Netherlands, neonatal termination is practised based on a ‘quality of life’ judgement. 
However, there is no set criteria or guidelines to determine the quality of life of 
critically ill infants, in a manner like the Dutch Groningen Protocol.251 Further, unlike in 
the Netherlands, neonatal termination has neither been approved by the Belgian medical 
profession, nor been officially excused by the Belgian public prosecution authorities.  
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5.3.4 Summary for Belgium 
In conclusion, the law on euthanasia in Belgium is focused on patient autonomy. The 
Belgian Act had aimed to discourage the practice of ‘termination of life without request’ 
amongst Belgian physicians. Although the practice of non-voluntary euthanasia was 
found to have decreased from 3.2% in 1998 to 1.8% in 2007252, this remains a concern 
as it shows that the laws are not followed absolutely and hence are liable to slippage, as 
discussed in Chapter Six. This practice may be due to a strong influence of medical 
paternalism amongst physicians who focus on the quality of life. As non-voluntary 
euthanasia occurred mainly among patients 80 years of age or older, who were either in 
a coma or suffering from dementia, such patients may be regarded vulnerable under the 
Belgian Act. Further evidence to demonstrate a culture of medical paternalism in 
Belgium is the fact that neonatal termination has been practised in Belgium based on a 
‘quality of life’ judgement by physicians. As the Belgian Act covers the requests of 
emancipated minors and requests made in the advance directives of incompetent 
patients, such patients may also be vulnerable under the law. It is doubtful whether 
either of these requests are a reliable expression of a patient’s autonomous wishes. 
Additionally, as the Belgian Act does not require a mental health evaluation, patients 
whose judgement may be impaired by depression or other mental disorders are not well 
protected. The Belgian Act has also been extended to those who merely anticipate a 
future coma, loss of independence, or progressive dementia. As discussed above, the 
competence of such patients is questionable. 
A key strength of the Belgian law on euthanasia is its focus on palliative care. As the 
Belgian Act, the PCA 2002, the MDB, and Caritas emphasise the need for palliative 
care treatment, every Belgian hospital has a palliative care team and palliative home 
care is available nationally. The Belgian Act also includes control measures in the form 
of physician self-reporting, a review by the multi-disciplinary CFCE and appraisals by 
Parliament. However, the reporting rates for euthanasia have been low.   
5.4 Switzerland 
As noted in the earlier chapters, several British citizens have been accessing assisted 
suicide in more liberal jurisdictions like Switzerland. The Swiss right-to-die 
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organisation, Dignitas, has become the favoured destination for such ‘suicide tourists’ 
from England and Wales. For this reason, Switzerland will be examined in this section. 
5.4.1 Background 
Euthanasia is recognised as ‘homicide upon request’ or ‘voluntary euthanasia’253 in 
Switzerland, and is a crime under the Swiss Penal Code (‘SPC’).254 If an accused acted 
with honourable motives, however, an imprisonment sentence for euthanasia may be 
mitigated.255 Sayid states that in some cases, the motives of the accused may be so 
benevolent that there may be a total exculpation for the crime.256 Article 115 of the SPC 
only criminalises assistance in suicide that is motivated by selfish reasons.257 It is 
submitted that the effect of Article 115 is similar to that of the DPP’s Policy in England 
and Wales. Under the DPP’s Policy, if an assisted suicide is compassionately motivated, 
and the suspect does not stand to personally gain from the victim’s death, then the 
suspect will most likely not be prosecuted.258 As only the motivation of a person 
determines their culpability or innocence for the crime of assisted suicide, anyone may 
assist in suicides in Switzerland.259 Thus, the SPC does not restrict the practice to Swiss 
physicians.  
5.4.2 Current law 
In Switzerland, a death as the result of an assisted suicide is regarded an ‘unnatural 
death’.260 The police and coroner are informed of such deaths, and an inquiry is 
conducted.261 If the inquiry finds that there was no selfish motive on the part of the 
person assisting the suicide, the death is officially recorded as a suicide and the case is 
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closed. Otherwise, the matter is referred to the public prosecutor.262 A prosecution may 
be initiated if there is doubt regarding the patient’s competence or ability to make an 
autonomous263 decision to die.264 
Today, non-profit right-to-die organisations such as Dignitas, Exit Association pour le 
Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité (‘Exit ADMD’), and Exit Deutsche Schweiz (‘EDS’), 
play a significant role in facilitating assisted suicides in Switzerland. Assisted suicides 
that take place at these right-to-die organisations are carried out according to the 
procedures which each of them have independently established. They each have their 
own internal protocols to determine whether patients meet their own required criteria for 
assisted suicide.265 Exit ADMD assists only those who suffer from an incurable disease 
or who are terminally ill.266 EDS requires a patient to be suffering from an ‘incurable 
disease with unbearable pain’,267 and Dignitas requires the patient to be suffering from a 
‘disease that will inevitably lead to death or an unreasonable disability’268. Assistance 
with suicide by right-to-die organisations is usually given by non-medically trained 
volunteers.269 It is argued that each of these sets of qualifying criteria are in effect based 
on a ‘quality of life’ judgement. When considering a request for assisted suicide, 
right-to-die organisations make quality of life judgements by assessing how poor or 
intolerable a person’s physical condition is.270 
As legally permitted assisted suicides in Switzerland are not restricted to Swiss 
residents, Dignitas offers its services to non-residents and foreign nationals who travel 
to Switzerland to obtain assistance in dying.271 However, Exit ADMD and EDS limit 
their services to Swiss residents only. A well as providing suicide assistance to its 
members, Dignitas also operates as a counselling service to those who are 
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contemplating suicide, and as an advocacy service for the recognition of similar patient 
rights in other countries.272 Dignitas emphasises that their counselling service is aimed at 
preventing suicide, and that in so doing they are fulfilling the first half of their motto 
‘To live with dignity - To die with dignity’.273 In fact, Dignitas asserts a causal link 
between suicide legalisation and suicide prevention. In its evidence to the Commission 
on Assisted Dying, Dignitas stated that based on their 13 years of experience: 
paradoxically – the option of an assisted suicide without having to face the 
heavy risks inherent in commonly-known suicide attempts is one of the best 
methods of preventing suicide attempts and suicide ... Knowing about such 
an option will deter many from committing suicide through insufficient, 
undignified means.274 
However, it is unknown whether this anecdotal experience is matched by a statistically 
significant reduction in Switzerland’s national suicide rates. 
Almost all assisted suicides in Switzerland involve the self-administration of a lethal 
dose of barbiturates (taken by mouth) that has been prescribed by a patient’s family 
physician or by a physician affiliated with a right-to-die organisation.275 However, a 
death certificate study by van der Heide et al found that 92% of all physician-assisted 
suicides in Switzerland between June 2001 and February 2002, involved physicians 
affiliated with a right-to-die organisation.276 This is in contrast to the position in the 
Netherlands, where 70% of physicians who assist deaths are huisartsen or family-care 
physicians.277 As noted by Bosshard et al, the role and responsibilities of physicians in 
assisted suicides offered through right-to-die organisations have not yet been legally 
defined in Switzerland.278 It is argued that in situations involving physicians associated 
with right-to-die organisations, there is generally no opportunity for a physician to 
develop a meaningful relationship with a patient. This may result in a physician acting 
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hastily, without giving adequate consideration to a patient’s physical and mental health, 
their personal needs or medical history.279  
Swiss law only permits physicians to prescribe barbiturates if it is ‘accepted 
professional practice’.280 Physicians who depart from the requirement of ‘accepted 
professional practice’ may lose their right to prescribe controlled substances, and may 
be potentially convicted of negligent homicide.281 In 1999, a Swiss court held that 
physician-assisted suicide is accepted professional practice in cases where there are 
‘conditions indisputably leading to death’.282 Nevertheless, up until 2008, there were still 
no prosecutions brought against physicians for prescribing lethal medication to 
individuals with non-fatal physical conditions.283 As noted above, Dignitas will provide 
assistance to those with a disease that will inevitably lead to ‘an unreasonable 
disability’. British citizens who have ended their lives at Dignitas have included those 
with non-fatal conditions like multiple sclerosis284 and spinal cord injuries285. As noted in 
Chapter One, recent cases include an elderly arthritic British woman who ended her life 
to avoid ‘prolonged dwindling’, and a British man with progressive dementia.286 It is 
submitted that this exemplifies a culture in which, provided there have been no selfish 
motives, Swiss prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute cases of assisted suicide that have 
been based on a competent request. In this respect, the law on assisted suicide in 
Switzerland is influenced by personal autonomy and self-determination287. As Lewy 
argues, right-to-die organisations prioritise ‘patient autonomy’ over the nature of a 
patient’s underlying illness when facilitating the suicides of patients with various 
conditions.288 
There is no requirement for a mental health evaluation under Swiss law. It is also not 
known whether patients who are suspected of lacking capacity are systematically 
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referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist for a mental health evaluation.289 Thus, there is 
no safeguard to protect vulnerable patients290 whose decisions may be impaired by 
depression or some other psychiatric or psychological disorder.  
Since 1999, there have been Swiss cases where physicians have been prosecuted for the 
assisted suicides of individuals with mental disorders.291 Whilst there may not have been 
any selfish motive on the part of the physicians involved in these cases, the patient’s 
competence may nevertheless have been impaired. The patient would therefore not have 
been able to exercise patient autonomy when requesting assisted suicide. As noted by 
Bosshard, the main reason for such prosecutions is due to a perceived lack of due care 
by physicians to ensure the patient’s competence and autonomy.292  
Right-to-die organisations, in particular EDS, have volunteers trained in counselling to 
identify and refer depressed patients to a psychiatrist.293 In a study of 748 assisted 
suicides in the Zurich canton between 1990 and 2000, of 331 suicides assisted by EDS, 
2.7% were found to have depression or schizophrenia.294 In a 2008 study, Bosshard et al 
found that right-to-die organisations will not provide suicide assistance where it is 
ascertained that depression affects an individual’s capacity for decision-making.295 Their 
study found that in 90 suicides assisted by EDS between 1997 and 2000, EDS 
volunteers found that 27% of patients had depression. It is contended that mental 
disorders which impinge upon competence may be going undetected by Swiss 
right-to-die organisations, as trained volunteers with no medical background and 
expertise are making decisions regarding the impact of depression on decisional 
capacity.296 Thus, these right-to-die organisations may be facilitating the assisted 
suicides of vulnerable patients whose judgements are impaired by a mental disorder.  
Not only is there no requirement for a mental health evaluation under Swiss law, a 
mental disorder can actually be the basis for a request for assisted suicide. In 2006, the 
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Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that an incurable, permanent, serious mental 
disorder can be comparable to a serious physical condition.297 The Court stated that in 
such cases, patients would be required to demonstrate that they have the required 
capacity to make a reasoned and settled decision to die, and that their decision is not the 
result of a treatable mental disorder. In a study of assisted suicides facilitated by EDS 
and Dignitas in the Zurich canton between 2001 and 2004, mental disorders accounted 
for 2% of EDS cases and 3.3% of Dignitas cases respectively.298  
Just as voluntary euthanasia is recognised as a crime under Article 114 of the SPC, and 
is not practised by right-to-die organisations, the 2013 medical-ethical guidelines of the 
Swiss Academy for Medical Sciences (‘SAMS’), which govern the medical profession 
in Switzerland, state that physicians must refuse any request for euthanasia when 
providing patients with end-of-life care.299 The view of the SAMS in respect of 
euthanasia is similar to the views of the GMC and the BMA in England and Wales.300 
The SAMS guidelines further provide that, as Article 115 of the SPC applies to 
everyone, physicians are allowed to provide suicide assistance to patients approaching 
end-of-life. Under the SAMS guidelines, physician-assisted suicides are permitted if : 
i) the patient is at the terminal stage of a disease; ii) alternative treatment has been 
considered and perhaps even exhausted; iii) the patient is competent, and the persistent 
wish to end life has been well considered, without any external pressure. A third person, 
not necessarily a physician, has confirmed that the patient is competent and has made a 
voluntary autonomous request for death; and iv) the patient performs the act that leads 
to his or her death.301 Additionally, the SAMS guidelines refer to palliative care.302 They 
provide that patients in the final phase of life have a right to palliative care, which 
comprises medical treatment, nursing care, and psychological, social and spiritual 
support, with the aim of alleviating suffering and ensuring the best possible quality of 
life for the patient.303 The medical limitations of palliative care are also acknowledged in 
                                                          
297  _ v Gesundheitsdirektion des Kantons Zürich [Unnamed complainant v Health Directorate of the Canton of 
Zurich], Bundesgericht (Tribunal fedéral, Tribunale federale) [Federal Supreme Court] 5P.481/2006, 19 February 
2007.  
298 S Fischer et al, ‘Suicide assisted by two Swiss right-to-die organisations’ (2008)34 J Medical Ethics 810,812. 
299 Schweizerische Akademie der Medizinischen Wissenschaften, Medizin-Ethische Richtlinien: Betreuung von 
Patientinnen und Patienten am Lebensende [SAMS, Medical-ethical guidelines: end of life care] (‘SAMS 
guidelines’) (2013) para 4.2. 
300 See section 3.3.3. 
301 SAMS guidelines (n299) para4.  
302 See section 3.4.3. 
303 SAMS guidelines (n299) para3.1.  
    
221 
the guidelines. Thus, the SAMS guidelines accept the autonomous requests for 
physician-assisted suicide by terminally ill patients. The guidelines also focus on the 
need for palliative care to be exhausted first, before physician-assisted suicide is 
resorted to by patients and physicians. However, the SAMS guidelines do not mention 
the need for a mental health evaluation to ensure that patients have made competent 
autonomous decisions. In this regard, the guidelines have failed to include safeguards to 
protect vulnerable patients who may be depressed when requesting assisted suicide.  
It was found in a 2008 study, that right-to-die organisations may not proceed with an 
assisted suicide if an alternative treatment is possible.304 The study also found that 
right-to-die organisations exhaust palliative care as a medical option before resorting to 
assisted suicide. This suggests that Swiss right-to-die organisations may only assist in 
the suicides of those who have either already explored or exhausted palliative treatment 
options. It is, however, uncertain whether a patient’s refusal of palliative treatment 
would rule out the provision of an assisted suicide. 
Trained volunteers at right-to-die organisations not only mix the lethal medication, and 
remain with the patient whilst the latter ingests the drug, but they also manage any 
complications that arise during the procedure.305 As noted earlier, complications such as 
difficulties in swallowing and the inability to ingest lethal substances are not uncommon 
in patients.306 Additionally, non-medically trained volunteers may not be prepared or 
may not be trained to deal with situations where the patient remains in a coma for a 
lengthy period of time or vomits the medication. There have been instances, according 
to Ost, where the conduct of volunteers have gone beyond assistance and amounted to 
euthanasia.307 For example, if volunteers hold up lethal medication to a patient’s mouth 
for them to drink, it is difficult to determine whether this would qualify as ‘self-
ingestion’ or ‘self-administration’.308 Bosshard notes a case in which two patients were 
in a coma several hours after they had taken the lethal drug and volunteers from a 
right-to-die organisation suffocated them with a plastic bag.309 However, these claims 
were subsequently attributed to, and denied by, Dignitas. Dignitas assert that such 
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claims originate from their trial use of helium inhaled via a medical breathing mask, as 
an alternative to lethal medication: 
Media reports, politicians’ assertions, and even the statement from a 
judgement of the administrative court of the canton of Zurich (!) which 
claimed that the persons wishing to end their lives had died with a plastic 
bag over their head are completely fictitious.310 
Regardless of the truth, it is submitted that the present Swiss assisted suicide framework 
lacks proper guidelines and regulations. Assistance provided by volunteers may border 
on euthanasia, depending on the extent of the assistance.  
As Switzerland has no centralised notification system for assisted suicide, there are no 
official statistics for assisted suicides. Thus, there is strong reliance on figures published 
by the right-to-die organisations themselves.311 However, it is argued that although 
right-to-die organisations collect and maintain their own records of assisted suicide,312 
these records may not be complete. This is demonstrated in Imhof et al’s 2011 study, 
which found that 61 out of 147 records of suicides assisted by EDS in the Zurich canton 
between 1990 and 2000 did not contain a medical report, and that the available medical 
reports in the other records contained varying amounts of detail.313 However, without 
accurate medical reports there is no reliable way of knowing whether the medical 
conditions of patients would have indisputably led to death.314 It is submitted that the 
lack of a formal record keeping requirement makes the current system open to abuse.  
It is argued that, as physicians are required to ensure that the medical condition 
motivating a person’s request for assisted suicide315 is a ‘condition indisputably leading 
to death’, in cases where the request to die arises from existential suffering, physicians 
may be tempted to embellish other medical conditions of the patient in their medical 
reports to get them over this threshold.  
Dignitas has made representations and formal submissions in the UK to interest groups, 
political parties, parliamentary committees, and the Commission on Assisted Dying. 
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Dignitas has also submitted several amicus curare briefs in regard to end-of-life cases 
before the ECtHR. Dignitas asserts that as a non-profit organisation and advocacy 
group, its primary focus is on the right of a patient to a dignified life and death. Dignitas 
asserts that: 
people who inhabit a country should never be degraded by being considered 
the property of the state. They are the bearers of human dignity, and this is 
characterised most strongly when a person decides his or her own fate. It is 
therefore unacceptable for a state or its individual authorities or courts to 
choose the fate of its citizens.316  
Dignitas’ response to an enquiry from the Commission on Assisted Dying as to how 
they ‘ensure that people are making a voluntary and considered choice and are not 
pressured into an assisted death’ was to note that under Dignitas’ procedures, ‘the 
individual needs to take initiative again and again in order to proceed towards an 
[assisted suicide]’.317 Dignitas also listed five specific safeguards which they have in 
place: (a) patients are each in contact with several different staff members of Dignitas, 
(b) patients are visited at home for a preliminary in-depth discussion, (c) one or more 
physicians who are independent of Dignitas assess the request, including at least two 
personal consultations, (d) at least two volunteers from Dignitas are present at the 
assisted suicide itself, each of whom are trained to assess the patient’s decision and free 
will, and to look for possible influence by third parties, (e) relatives and friends of the 
patient are encouraged to participate, allowing a further opportunity to monitor the 
interaction between the patient and their loved ones.318 
Whilst the Dignitas safeguards noted above serve to protect individual patients from the 
undue influence of others, it is less certain whether they address the concern expressed 
by some advocacy groups, that a law which permits assisted death will make some 
members of society feel generally that their lives are less valued.319 In Switzerland, any 
such feeling would be one created by the SPC which only criminalises assisted suicides 
that are motivated by selfish reasons, rather than by the existence of right-to-die 
organisations such as Dignitas. Whilst Dignitas may have experienced some success 
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with suicide prevention, groups in the UK which feel most threatened, such as the 
physically disabled, remain amongst the groups which Dignitas will assist to die.   
5.4.3 Summary for Switzerland 
In conclusion, there are several inconsistencies in the Swiss assisted suicide framework. 
Swiss law only allows physicians to prescribe lethal amounts of barbiturates for 
physical or mental conditions indisputably leading to death. Yet, right-to-die 
organisations, like Dignitas, do not restrict their services to those that are terminally or 
incurably ill. There have been no known prosecutions of physicians who have 
participated in the assisted suicides of patients with non-fatal conditions. This is despite 
the fact that the SAMS guidelines state that physician-assisted suicide should only be 
performed when the patient is terminally ill. The SAMS and right-to-die organisations 
both require palliative care to be exhausted first as a medical option, before assisted 
suicide is resorted to. As there is no legal requirement for a mental health evaluation, 
vulnerable patients whose decision-making capacity may be impaired, and they may not 
be protected under Swiss law. Further, as there is no national body to which assisted 
suicides are reported, there is no public accountability of the practice in Switzerland. 
This lack of formal regulation and transparency has resulted in differing practices for 
assisted suicides within Switzerland.320 Under the Swiss framework, assistance provided 
by volunteers may also border on euthanasia, depending on the extent of the assistance. 
5.5 Germany 
This section will examine the law on assisted death in Germany. Whilst euthanasia is a 
crime in Germany, assisted suicide is not. German physicians are, however, not allowed 
to participate in assisted suicides. The following discussion will focus on the extent to 
which German physicians are allowed to make end-of-life medical decisions involving 
the terminally ill. 
5.5.1 Background 
For a long period of time, the term ‘euthanasia’ in Germany was predominantly used to 
describe Nazi atrocities committed during the Third Reich, when physically and 
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mentally impaired people were murdered by the national socialist regime.321 Today, 
euthanasia in Germany is recognised as ‘homicide upon request’ or ‘voluntary 
euthanasia’322 under § 216 of the German Criminal Code (‘GCC’). A person who is 
charged for this offence is prosecuted for manslaughter rather than murder.323  
5.5.2 Current law 
As suicide is not a crime in Germany, assisted suicide is also not a crime provided the 
person committing suicide is capable of exercising control over their actions 
(‘tatherrschaftsfdhig’), and that they act out of their own free will (‘freiverantwortliche 
Wille’).324 The person must not only be physically capable of ending their life, but must 
also have the required competence to exercise autonomy. Thus, the law on assisted 
suicide in Germany is based on self-determination325 and personal autonomy.326 Oduncu 
and Sahm observe that assisted suicide is only legally permitted in Germany in 
circumstances when the victim’s will to kill themselves is clearly documented and 
demonstrates sufficient independence from outside influences or pressures.327 This is 
similar to the public interest factors in the DPP’s Policy in England and Wales requiring 
proof that the victim had made a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to 
commit suicide and that such a decision was free from any pressure.328 
A physician’s participation in a patient’s death would violate the German code for 
professional medical conduct.329 Thus, it is illegal for German physicians to administer 
lethal substances which cause death, even if this is the expressed will of the patient,330 or 
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to cause a patient’s death by not treating a medical condition.331 Further, attempted 
suicide is regarded an ‘accident’ under § 323c of the GCC, and under § 221, a person is 
prohibited from abandoning another in a helpless situation if they have an obligation to 
provide assistance. Thus, German physicians not only have professional duty to save a 
patient’s life, but also have a legal obligation to prevent the death of a suicidal patient.332 
Despite this legal situation, in a 2004 nationwide survey of the attitudes of German 
physicians towards euthanasia, 13% of respondents were found to have performed 
euthanasia at least once, whilst 38% had performed assisted suicide.333 The study also 
found that the atrocities of the Third Reich played only a minor role in shaping the 
attitudes of German physicians towards euthanasia. This is consistent with an earlier 
study published in 1999, which also found that Nazi history only had a minor influence 
on the euthanasia debate in Germany.334 
The German Association for Palliative Medicine (‘DGP’)335 and the General Assembly 
of the Representatives of German Physicians336 have both rejected any practices that 
hasten death, and regard them as being unethical.337 The opposition by these professional 
medical bodies in Germany to practices that hasten death is a lot wider than the current 
opposition by the GMC and the BMA in England and Wales, to merely euthanasia and 
assisted suicide.338 Nevertheless, Schildmann et al’s 2009 survey on end-of-life medical 
practices by members of the DGP, found that 47 out of 692 cases involved non-
participation of competent patients in end-of-life medical decisions, including two cases 
of non-voluntary euthanasia.339 The reasons given by physicians for not consulting their 
patients were that decisions were made in the patients’ best interests, and that there 
would have been more harm than benefit had patients been involved.340 It is submitted 
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that such medical decisions suggest an influence of medical paternalism341 amongst 
German physicians, which runs contrary to patient autonomy. Schildmann et al 
conclude in their study that this paternalistic approach may be largely due to there being 
no legislation on euthanasia and assisted suicide in Germany.342 
As physicians in Germany are not legally permitted to provide suicide assistance, 
patients depend on the assistance of people who are not medically qualified, or on 
non-medical organisations to end their lives. One such organisation is the German 
Society for Humane Death (‘DGHS’),343 which promotes suicide and assisted suicide as 
ways of achieving a painless and self-determined death.344 The DGHS is an independent 
non-governmental organisation that provides information to those who are terminally 
ill, and wanting to end their lives. Its internal safeguards are, i) it only provides 
membership to those who have not received any medical or psychotherapeutic treatment 
for psychiatric illnesses or depression over the two years prior to membership, and 
ii) only members who have been with the DGHS for more than a year may request a 
copy of its booklet, Dignified and Responsible Death,345 which contains a list of drugs 
and dosages necessary for a painless death. It is submitted that these safeguards are not 
sufficient to protect vulnerable patients. There is nothing to ensure that the services of 
the DGHS are restricted to the terminally ill, as is its stated focus. There should be a 
physician to make the relevant diagnosis and prognosis for terminal illness before an 
individual becomes a member. Not only does the DGHS not place any stress on 
palliative care,346 but as there is no requirement for a mental health evaluation, 
vulnerable patients347 who are depressed or experiencing any other mental disorder 
which impairs their decision-making capacity, are at risk. There is also the further 
possibility of a failed or ‘botched’ suicide as medications are ingested based on 
information provided by the DGHS with no proper supervision by healthcare 
professionals. Another organisation in Germany which provides suicide assistance is 
Dignitate Deutschland (‘Dignitate’) in Hannover. Dignitate is the German branch of the 
Swiss right-to-die organisation, Dignitas. Dignitate does not provide a patient with a 
lethal substance for assisted suicide, rather it facilitates suicide tourism to Switzerland 
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amongst German nationals. Nevertheless, non-medically trained people in Dignitate 
may not be able to detect depression or other mental disorders which affect the 
decisions of patients seeking assisted suicide in Dignitas. As noted in section 5.4, 
neither does Dignitas in Switzerland require a mental health evaluation.  
German courts have placed some limits on the operation of non-medical organisations 
which provide suicide assistance. In 2008, an association called Dr. Roger Kusch 
Sterbehilfe e.V. helped Germans to commit suicide.348 The only requirements were that 
an intention to end life has been documented, and that the patients had undergone a 
psychiatric evaluation. The association even assisted patients who were not in the last 
stages of terminal illness, and some who were not ill at all. In February 2009, the 
Hamburg Administrative Court prohibited the association from assisting in further 
suicides. Whilst the DGHS and Dignitate are non-profit organisations which merely 
provide information and referrals, this association was a commercial enterprise 
providing active assistance. The Court held that the commercial aid of suicide is a 
socially reprehensible act.349 
There is on-going debate in Germany about the appropriate ethical and legal framework 
for end-of-life medical decisions.350 Although the German Medical Association 
(‘BÄK’)351 had initially rejected medical practices that hasten death,352 since its 2011 
guidelines were issued, it no longer considers assisted suicide to be against professional 
medical ethics. The BÄK’s Principles Concerning Terminal Medical Care (‘PCTMC’) 
provide that: 
The duty of the physician is to preserve life, protect and restore health, 
relieve suffering and to be there for the dying until death, while respecting 
the patient’s right of self-determination.353  
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The PCTMC not only focus on the sanctity of life,354 but also promote self-
determination. As observed by Oduncu and Sahm, the PCTMC give emphasis to 
palliative care and use the expression ‘Sterbebegleitung’ which means ‘accompanying 
the dying’.355 They argue that physicians are not only obliged to provide basic care 
(‘basisversorgung’) to the terminally ill, but to also help them die with dignity.356 This 
means that if a patient is terminally ill, the objective would be no longer to preserve life 
or to cure the illness, but instead to alleviate suffering.357  
According to Oduncu and Sahm, the PCTMC permit life-sustaining treatment to be 
withheld or withdrawn from a terminally ill patient pursuant to their request. Such 
decisions are based on the principle of self-determination and an individual’s right to 
personal autonomy. In 2007, Rittner observed that German physicians have been 
reluctant to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for fear that their conduct 
would be mistaken as the act that causes the patient’s death.358 In respect of terminally ill 
patients, Michalsen argues that the continuation of treatment is what would need to be 
justified, not its withdrawal. He observes that there has to be a clear indication that the 
life-sustaining treatment is likely to benefit the terminally ill patient,359 and that the 
patient consents to such treatment, or at least that they would most likely consent if they 
could still make a decision.360 Similarly, Fassier et al argue that a reluctance to withhold 
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the terminally ill who have requested its 
discontinuance can lead to a continuation of extraordinary measures, and the harmful 
overtreatment of patients.361 This is in contrast to the law in England and Wales, where a 
competent person, whether terminally ill or not, has the absolute right to exercise their 
autonomy to refuse life-sustaining treatment. If a competent patient has refused 
life-sustaining treatment, English law prohibits physicians from treating them.362 
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The PCTMC also recognise medical decisions with a ‘double effect’. Similar to the law 
in England and Wales,363 the administration of excessive amounts of palliative 
medication requires a physician to merely intend relieving a patient of their pain and 
suffering, and not the shortening of life as a result.364 However, Rittner notes that 
German physicians have been reluctant to prescribe or administer high dosages of 
palliative medication, once again, for fear that their conduct will be mistaken as the act 
that causes the patient’s death.365 The PCTMC also state that life-sustaining treatment 
(including ANH) is mandatory for patients with a life-threatening illness that is not 
terminal. This principle applies equally to patients in a PVS. In the context of English 
law, this principle is in contrast to the House of Lords decision in Bland.366 It is 
submitted that the BÄK is swayed by the ethical doctrine of ‘sanctity of life’ in cases 
involving non-fatal conditions, and that the patient’s ‘quality of life’ is not considered in 
such cases. The PCTMC also provide for cases of newborns with severe deformities 
with no prospect of improvement, extremely premature babies whose inevitable death is 
foreseeable, and newborns who have suffered extreme brain damage. The PCTMC 
allow life-sustaining treatment to be discontinued from such neonates with the consent 
of their parents. This is similar to the law in England and Wales,367 where in cases 
involving critically ill or severely disabled neonates, end-of-life decisions are based on 
what is in the ‘best interests’ of a child, which is in effect a ‘quality of life’ judgement 
by physicians.  
In cases concerning ‘advance decisions’, the BÄK has recognised advance directives 
(‘betreuungsverfügungen’) as an expression of a patient’s will since 1998.368 On 
17 March 2003, the German Federal Court of Justice (‘BGH’)369 legally endorsed 
advance directives by holding that they are legally binding insofar as they relate to a 
particular medical treatment and the patient has not changed his or her mind.370 Further 
legal endorsement was given to advance directives on 1 September 2009,371 when the 
German Federal Parliament made advance directives on life-sustaining treatment, by 
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patients who are dependent on such treatment due to an accident or a terminally illness, 
binding on physicians.372  
On 25 June 2010, the BGH held that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment and medical decisions with a double effect are lawful so long as such actions 
reflect a patient’s will or are carried out based on a patient’s prior request.373 The BGH 
overturned the conviction of a lawyer who had advised his client to remove her 
mother’s feeding tube. The 71-year-old mother had been in a non-responsive coma for 
five years.374 Shortly before her coma, she had insisted that she did not want to be kept 
alive artificially.375 According to the German Minister of Justice, the BGH’s decision 
was a major step toward respecting an individual’s autonomous decision from the 
previous focus on ‘sanctity of life’, ‘[t]here can’t be forced treatment against a person’s 
will [as] [t]his is about the right of self-determination and therefore a question of a life 
in human dignity376 until the end.’377 The decision in this case reflects the current law on 
advance decisions on the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment in 
England and Wales, though under English law, such advance directives would have to 
be in writing.378 As established in Chapter Two, where previous known wishes or 
preferences are considered, this would amount to an extension of autonomy from the 
time when a patient was competent, to a time when they have become incompetent. 
5.5.3 Summary for Germany 
In conclusion, although euthanasia is illegal in Germany, and assisted suicide is allowed 
except by physicians, studies have demonstrated that German physicians have 
participated in not only euthanasia and assisted suicide, but non-voluntary euthanasia as 
well. Under the current law on assisted death in Germany, assisted suicides may not 
only have the potential for failure as they are not supervised by medical experts, but 
patients may also be vulnerable due to a mental disorder impairing their decision-
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making capacity, coercion or pressure. In Germany, medical decisions with a double 
effect and those involving the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
are generally based on the principles of autonomy and self-determination for terminally 
ill patients. For conditions that are not terminal, Germany had been leaning in favour of 
the doctrine of sanctity of life. However, in the 2010 BGH case noted above,379 the 
Court respected a non-terminally ill patient’s previous autonomous decision and held 
that the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the patient was lawful.        
5.6 Northern Territory, Australia 
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (‘ROTI Act’) in the Northern Territory of Australia 
was the first statute in the world to legalise both assisted suicide and euthanasia by 
physicians.380 After being in force for only nine months, the ROTI Act was overridden 
by the Australian Federal Parliament exercising its constitutional powers as described 
later in this section. Despite the ROTI Act’s short lifespan, there are numerous lessons 
to be learnt from this legislation. The ROTI Act will be examined to identify parallel 
influences that affected its legalisation process, and to consider statutory provisions that 
could help inform law reform on assisted death in England and Wales.  
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are both currently illegal in all States and Territories of 
Australia. However, on 25 May 1995, the Northern Territory Parliament (‘NTP’) passed 
the ROTI Act,381 making euthanasia and assisted suicide by physicians legal in the 
Northern Territory.382 The ROTI Act allowed physicians to prescribe and administer 
lethal substances to terminally ill patients who requested assistance to end their lives.383 
The Act was, however, only in force for nine months — from 1 July 1996 to 25 March 
1997.384 
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5.6.1 Background 
According to commentators, the influences which led the ROTI Act to be introduced 
into the NTP included an ageing community385 that was becoming more interested in 
end-of-life options with increasingly secular values, and a strong belief in the right to 
choose; an increasing number of deaths from cancer and AIDS; limitations on the 
respite provided by palliative care;386 and advances in sustaining human life387 which 
were prolonging the dying process.388 These influences overlap substantially with those 
currently shaping the debate on the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales, 
as discussed in Chapter Three. When the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill was 
introduced in the NTP, it was acknowledged that the right of terminally ill patients to 
decide when to end their lives was based on a respect for personal autonomy,389 and that 
people who approach questions of life from different moral and religious perspectives 
should be allowed to live their lives in accordance with their values and beliefs so long 
as the practice of those values and beliefs does not adversely affect others.390 It is 
accepted that this position is based on Mill’s principle of liberty.391  
5.6.2 The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (ROTI Act) 
The ROTI Act provided that competent patients over 18 years, suffering from a terminal 
illness and experiencing pain, suffering or distress that is severe and to an unacceptable 
extent, could request that their physician assist them to terminate their life.392 Terminal 
illness was defined as an injury or degeneration of mental or physical faculties which, in 
reasonable medical judgement will, in the normal course, without the application of 
extraordinary measures or of treatment unacceptable to the patient, result in the patient’s 
death.393  
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The physician had to be satisfied that there was no medical treatment acceptable to the 
patient which could reasonably be undertaken to cure the patient, and that any medical 
treatment reasonably available was confined to palliative care.394 Under the ROTI Act, 
two independent second opinions had to be obtained, one from a physician qualified in 
the patient’s terminal illness, and the other from a psychiatrist. It is accepted that these 
were safeguards intended to confirm the medical diagnosis and prognosis, and the 
competence of the patient. Although an independent second opinion of the patient’s 
terminally illness was required, the ROTI Act did not state what would happen if the 
physicians had differing opinions of a patient’s prognosis. A 1998 study on seven 
cancer patients who applied for an assisted death under the ROTI Act found that it was 
difficult to make an accurate prognosis for cancer and that some patients had resorted to 
‘physician-shopping’ to obtain the prognosis they desired.395 In the case of one patient, 
an oncologist gave the patient’s prognosis as nine months, but a dermatologist and a 
second oncologist assessed that she was not terminally ill.396 The patient sought further 
second opinions until a physician diagnosed her as terminally ill with cancer.397 Upon 
satisfying the requirements of the ROTI Act, the patient was given a lethal overdose. 
However, at the post-mortem she was found to be disease free.398 This demonstrates that 
a prognosis of a terminal illness may be subject to differing second opinions, and that 
patients may resort to physician-shopping to get the diagnosis and prognosis they 
require to fulfil the legal requirements for an assisted death. 
In respect of the independent second opinion required of a psychiatrist, the ROTI Act 
stipulated that a qualified psychiatrist had to be satisfied that the patient was of sound 
mind and not suffering from treatable clinical depression.399 It is argued that the 
requirement for a qualified psychiatrist would adequately protect the vulnerable,400 
whose judgement or decision-making capacity may have been impaired due to a mental 
disorder. This would provide assurance that the patient is mentally competent and able 
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to make an autonomous request for assisted death. The 1998 study on the seven cancer 
patients noted above, found that the patients were not sure to what extent they could 
trust their psychiatrists with information that would allow the psychiatrists to 
understand their predicament.401 With one patient, details about the death of her child 
and estrangement from another child were withheld during the psychiatric assessment. 
The researchers in the study argued that such experiences may have placed the patient in 
a lonely, grieving, demoralised position, and that associated depression may have gone 
unrecognised. The study concluded that if psychiatric assessments are seen as 
adversarial by patients, and viewed as obstructing successful treatment (including 
euthanasia or assisted suicide), rather than being a part of proper multidisciplinary care, 
patients will not be open during psychiatric assessments. Thus, mental health 
evaluations may not always be successfully carried out by psychiatrists, and the 
vulnerable may still be at risk.402 
Although the social and ethical influences impacting on the drive for legislation in the 
Northern Territory were based on the right to autonomy and need for 
self-determination,403 social judgements about the moral value of life were relevant to 
restrict the exercise of this right to a narrow context where a patient was terminally ill, 
not suffering from a treatable depression, and was suffering pain or distress at an 
unacceptable level.404 
Under the ROTI Act, the attending physician had to be satisfied that the patient had 
reached their decision voluntarily, had considered the implications for their family, had 
been informed of the prognosis expected and understood the medical treatments 
reasonably available, including palliative care,405 counselling and psychiatric support 
and extraordinary measures for keeping them alive.406 This requirement would have 
helped ensure that a patient was competent and had made a voluntary, informed, 
well-considered and autonomous decision to end their life. It would have made certain 
that the patient had considered all the possible treatment options available, including 
palliative care. It also took into account the implications of an assisted death for the 
patient’s family. Although the ROTI Act required the patient to be informed of the 
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prognosis expected, as discussed in Chapter Two, an accurate prognosis in terms of 
‘life-expectancy’ is often not possible for a terminal illness.407 It is submitted that this 
may have been the reason why a prognosis in terms of life-expectancy was not included 
in the definition of ‘terminal illness’ in the ROTI Act.  
Information on palliative care had to be provided by a physician with specialist 
qualifications in palliative care.408 The attending physician was not to assist in a death if 
they believed there were palliative care options reasonably available to alleviate pain 
and suffering to levels acceptable to the patient.409 It is argued that by involving a 
palliative care expert in the consultation process, the patient’s specific needs in terms of 
pain, suffering and distress were more likely to be met. The attending physician was 
also prevented from providing any assistance to die if they believed there were 
palliative care options which could address the patient’s concerns. This requirement 
emphasised the need to not only explore, but to exhaust palliative care options before 
resorting to assisted death. As such, it protected patients who were not aware of other 
treatment options, and helped assure that assisted death was an option of last resort. 
A patient had to wait for at least seven days before signing a formal certificate of 
request to die, witnessed by their attending physician and a second physician.410 It is 
accepted that the requirement for witnesses would have acted as a safeguard protecting 
vulnerable patients from undue influence, duress or coercion from third parties. If a 
further 48 hours had then elapsed from the signing of the certificate of request, and the 
patient had not withdrawn their request, the attending physician could then provide 
assistance.411 It is argued that the ‘seven-day’ and ‘48-hour’ periods were two ‘cooling 
off’ periods to allow a patient time to reconsider their decision and to discuss it with 
their family, loved ones, and perhaps even with their physician. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the desire for death among vulnerable members in society who are terminally ill, 
is known to change.412 A patient may have been depressed, feeling helpless, or feeling 
like they were a financial or emotional burden on their family when making the initial 
request. The cooling off periods would have given such vulnerable patients an 
opportunity to reassess their request. Additionally, the cooling off periods would have 
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given a physician assurance of the certainty of the enduring character of their patient’s 
request. However, there was no requirement for a patient to confirm their request at the 
time of assistance, even if they had received psychiatric treatment for clinical 
depression.413 In this regard, the ROTI Act ignored the possibility that a patient may 
have changed their mind at the time of assistance. Thus, the ‘cooling off’ provisions in 
the ROTI Act may not have been effective as a safeguard. Nevertheless, it is accepted 
that there is a practical difficulty with requiring a patient to confirm their request at the 
time of assistance. If a patient’s health has deteriorated from the time of the initial 
request, it may be difficult for them to confirm their request. A confirmation of request 
may have been excluded from the ROTI Act due to this practical difficulty.  
The assistance which a physician was permitted to provide, included prescribing, or 
providing a lethal substance for self-administration, and administering the substance 
directly to the patient, provided the physician was not promised any reward or, 
subjected to any threats.414 By including a qualification that the assistance was not to be 
influenced by any reward or threats, this provided assurance that there was no selfish 
gain, or personal motive, for the physician to assist the patient.415 In the English context, 
this requirement is similar to the public interest factor in favour of prosecution in the 
DPP’s Policy which focuses upon whether or not the suspect was motivated by the 
prospect of gain from the victim’s death.416 The medical records of patients who were 
assisted to die under the ROTI Act had to contain documentation of their oral and 
formal request, their state of mind at the time of signing the formal certificate of 
request, and the physician’s belief that the request was made voluntarily and after due 
consideration.417 It is submitted that as the medical records were not required to contain 
details about a patient’s state of mind at any time after making their formal request, the 
patient’s mental capacity and competence were disregarded at the time of assistance. 
Thus, the ROTI Act did not consider the possibility of a change in circumstances that 
could have led to either the patient becoming vulnerable, or the patient’s desire for 
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death changing. As acknowledged above, this omission may have been deliberate due to 
potential practical difficulties. The medical records were also required to contain the 
attending physician’s qualifications, the independent physicians’ reports, information on 
the substance prescribed and any steps taken to perform euthanasia.418 Such additional 
information helps control and monitor the actual practice of physician-assisted death, 
and ensures that only qualified experts participate in a patient’s assisted death. 
The ROTI Act provided immunity to physicians against criminal, civil, or professional 
disciplinary action for anything done in good faith and without negligence.419 Such 
immunity was to address the reluctance which physicians might otherwise have had to 
assist their patients when a request for death was made. It is submitted that it is the fear 
of criminal prosecution, and of disciplinary action by professional bodies, that deters 
physicians from assisting their patients. This is clearly seen in the current law in 
England and Wales. As discussed in Chapter Two, the DPP’s Policy specifically 
provides that if the suspect who assists in a victim’s death is a medical doctor then this 
would be considered a public interest factor in favour of criminal prosecution.420 As 
discussed in section 5.5, there is a similar fear among German physicians who are 
reluctant to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from terminally ill patients 
upon their request, and who are also reluctant to prescribe or administer high dosages of 
palliative medication to alleviate pain and suffering. 
A copy of the death certificate and relevant sections of the medical record relating to the 
illness and death had to be forwarded to the Coroner.421 The Coroner was required to 
provide annual advice to the Attorney-General on the number of patients who had been 
assisted to die under the ROTI Act.422 The Attorney-General, in turn, was required to 
report to the Legislative Assembly of the NTP.423 It is submitted that the reporting 
procedures would have amounted to safeguards to ensure that euthanasia and assisted 
suicide were medical practices that were properly controlled and regulated. These 
procedures not only permitted public oversight of the ROTI Act, but also provided 
assurance that there was no abuse of the law. 
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The ROTI Act was opposed by the Australian Medical Association, the Australian 
Association for Hospice and Palliative Care, mainstream religions, the Right to Life 
Association, and other organisations representing the aged and those with disabilities.424 
The Coalition Against Euthanasia425 had also publicly challenged the ROTI Act, 
declaring that the assistance given by physicians was unethical.426 As was noted in 
Chapters One and Three, there are similar objections currently being expressed to any 
proposed law which permits assisted death in England and Wales.427 As a result of such 
fierce opposition and political lobbying, the Australian Federal Parliament overturned 
the ROTI Act by enacting the Euthanasia Laws Act, an overriding piece of federal 
legislation, which came into force on 25 March 1997.428   
When the Euthanasia Laws Bill was presented to the Australian Parliament, several 
arguments were asserted, in favour of the Bill’s objective of overriding the ROTI Act.429 
It was argued that patients had travelled to the Northern Territory from elsewhere in 
Australia to make use of the ROTI Act, thus making the ROTI Act a national issue. By 
contrast, (i) all other Australian States and Territories had consistently rejected the 
legalisation of euthanasia, thus indicating a clear national consensus against the ROTI 
Act, and hence (ii) the issue should not be driven by the Northern Territory legislature 
representing less than one percent of Australia’s national population. It was further 
argued that (iii) the ROTI Act ran contrary to (a) ‘the findings of every major committee 
of inquiry in the world’ (with particular reference to the 1990 Remmelink Report,430 and 
the 1994 House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics431), (b) ethical principles 
of the medical profession, (c) the ‘tenets’ of every major religious group, (d) the 
concerns expressed by the Northern Territory’s indigenous communities (which form 
approximately 23% of the Northern Territory’s population),432 and (e) ‘the evidence of 
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widespread abuse of euthanasia in the Netherlands’.433 Additionally, it was argued that 
(iv) the ROTI Act failed to provide ‘a caring response for all dying people’ due to its 
failure to address two outstanding issues in the Northern Territory — (a) relatively poor 
laws for the appointment of third parties to make medical decisions on behalf of a 
patient, and (b) inadequate standards of palliative care.434 
Many of the arguments above are addressed elsewhere in this thesis. Concerns for 
vulnerable members of society based on the Remmelink Report and other suggested 
evidence of abuse in the Netherlands are considered in Chapter Six,435 where no 
evidence is found to support them. The Report of the 1994 House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics, professional medical ethics, religious viewpoints and the 
importance of adequate palliative care are all discussed in Chapter Three. 
Contrary to the assertions of those who tabled the Euthanasia Laws Bill in the 
Australian Federal Parliament (as discussed above), when the Bill was debated and then 
assessed by a Senate Committee, some contention was expressed concerning (i) the true 
views of local indigenous communities on the ROTI Act,436 and (ii) the true levels of 
public support throughout Australia for the ROTI Act.437  
5.6.3 Summary for the Northern Territory 
In conclusion, the ROTI Act was restricted to terminally ill adult patients. Although it 
included safeguards in the form of independent second opinions from a medical expert 
on the patient’s terminal illness and a psychiatrist, patients had been able to resort to 
‘physician-shopping’ to get the required diagnosis. Some patients had also not been 
fully cooperative during psychiatric evaluations, as such evaluations were thought to 
frustrate their chances of getting an assisted death. By requiring a physician to be 
satisfied that their patient had considered the implications of their decision, and had 
been informed of all the treatment options available, the ROTI Act had ensured that the 
patient’s decision was a well-informed, well-considered autonomous decision. As 
physicians were prevented from providing any assistance if they believed there were 
palliative care options which could address a patient’s concerns, assisted death was 
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regarded an option of last resort under the ROTI Act. This provision also protected 
patients who were not aware of palliative treatment. The requirement for a patient to 
have signed the certificate of request in the presence of two witnesses would have 
protected vulnerable patients who may have been under pressure, duress or coercion at 
the time of request. The ‘seven-day’ and ‘48-hour’ cooling off periods also gave 
vulnerable patients an opportunity to reassess their request, and gave physicians 
assurance of the certainty of their patient’s request. However, as there was no 
requirement for a patient to confirm their request at the time of assistance, the ROTI Act 
had failed to protect patients who may have changed their mind, or felt pressured or 
compelled to proceed with, or follow through with their initial request. Additionally, as 
the ROTI Act provided immunity to physicians against legal action or professional 
disciplinary action, it addressed one of the main reasons for the reluctance of physicians 
to assist in assisted deaths. 
5.7 Oregon, US 
Traditionally, the law in the United States of America (‘US’) has regarded euthanasia 
and assisted suicide as crimes.438 Further, the US Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that there 
is no constitutional right to assisted suicide.439 However, this federal ruling does not 
prevent any US State from promulgating its own law regarding physician-assisted 
suicide.440 Thus, the Death with Dignity Act (‘DDA’) in Oregon was narrowly voted 
into law in November 1994 by a citizen-initiated referendum.441 It was the first 
successful attempt by a US State to legalise physician-assisted suicide.442  
5.7.1 Background 
The legalisation of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon was the result of a 
dissatisfaction with the medical profession and the development of a national ‘right to 
die’ movement.443 Patients had become concerned about the distance between physicians 
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and patients, the effect of modern medicine on patients, and the modern tendency for 
physicians to act simply as technicians and to lose sight of the patient as a person.444 The 
legislation reflected a desire to regain autonomy,445 and thus challenge the medical 
profession’s authority.446 Support for ‘the right to die’ was high in Oregon, according to 
Doyle, and nearly 60% of those Oregon citizens polled expressed support for legalising 
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill.447 In 1994, a group known as Oregon 
Right to Die, along with other advocates of assisted death, proposed a ballot initiative in 
Oregon, i.e. Measure 16 or the DDA.448 Hillyard and Dombrink observe that Oregon 
was a ‘unique state both in terms of the long history of citizens using the “initiative” 
power as a tool of legal and social change and in terms of citizens’ defiance toward both 
organised religion and outside political pressure’.449  
Purvis observes that the Oregon Right to Die group promoted the DDA by appealing to 
Oregon citizens’ individual self-determination,450 desire for choice, and patient 
autonomy at the time of death. Some proponents, he notes, argued that patients had a 
right to choose the timing and manner of their deaths when faced with a terminal illness, 
rather than having to suffer an undignified,451 possibly humiliating, and likely painful 
death.452 He states that the DDA supporters described the legalisation of physician-
assisted suicide as a right that upheld patients’ choice, control, and freedom at the end 
of life. The DDA passed with 51% of the vote.453 After a legal injunction and several 
court challenges,454 the DDA finally became law on 27 October 1997.455 Since the DDA 
provides that assistance under the DDA ‘shall not, for any purpose, constitute suicide, 
assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law’, the cause of any death 
assisted under the DDA is officially attributed to the underlying illness.456 
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5.7.2 The Death with Dignity Act (DDA) 
The DDA permits physicians to prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill adult (18 years 
and above) residents of Oregon.457 The DDA places the following requirements on the 
patient and the attending physician. The patient must i) be capable,458 ii) have a terminal 
disease, and iii) have made one written and two oral requests to die.459 The attending 
physician is required to i) confirm the above conditions together with a consulting 
physician,460 ii) refer the patient for counselling if the attending or consulting physician 
believes that the patient’s judgement is impaired by depression or some other 
psychiatric or psychological disorder,461 and iii) inform the patient of all feasible 
alternatives, such as comfort care, hospice care, and pain-control options.462 
As a means of policing physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, the DDA requires 
physicians to file reports each time they write a prescription for lethal medication.463 
Besides the written prescriptions, physicians have to report all deaths that result from 
the prescribed medication to the Oregon Public Health Division (‘OPHD’) of the 
Oregon Health Authority (‘OHA’).464 The reports include a copy of the patient’s written 
request, the physician’s compliance form, and a psychiatrist’s compliance form if a 
mental health evaluation was carried out.465 It is submitted that there is no mechanism to 
enforce the reporting requirements, and neither are there any penalties imposed on 
physicians who choose to disregard these requirements.466 As such, the self-reporting 
procedure has been criticised due to the possibility of physicians ‘under-reporting’. This 
was acknowledged by the OPHD in its first annual report in 1999, where it stated that 
‘[it is] difficult, if not impossible, to detect accurately and comment on 
underreporting’.467 It added that ‘the reporting requirements can only ensure that the 
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process for obtaining lethal medications complies with the law’.468 In its 2006 annual 
report, the OPHD stated that it merely monitors the DDA, and does not intend to ‘ferret 
out’ abuse.469 It only investigates cases in which physicians’ reports have deficiencies or 
do not correlate with the death certificates or other information, and it reports cases 
involving inadequate reporting or unexpected side effects to the Oregon Board of 
Medical Examiners or the Board of Pharmacy respectively.470 
An annual statistical report of the OPHD data is made available to the public.471 These 
annual OPHD reports include incidence data, and data on demographics, underlying 
illness, end-of-life care and concerns, complications and timing, and data about the 
process of dying after the lethal medication has been ingested.472 It is accepted that the 
information in the annual reports allows for transparency and public oversight of the 
DDA. Nevertheless, physicians are not required to report the numbers of requested 
prescriptions that are refused and reasons for such refusal.473 This affects the 
transparency of the physicians’ decision-making process.474 As Hendin and Foley 
observe, the OPHD ‘does not collect the information it would need to effectively 
monitor the law’.475  
Terminal illness is defined by the DDA as ‘an incurable and irreversible disease that has 
been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgement, produce 
death within six months’.476 However, as discussed in Chapter Two,477 studies show that 
reliably measuring life expectancy in this context is very difficult. Physicians in Oregon 
have similarly expressed doubts about their ability to determine whether an individual 
has less than six months to live.478 In 1996, Lee et al found that over 50% of Oregon 
physicians were not confident they could make such an accurate prediction on life 
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expectancy.479 The OPHD annual reports demonstrate this limitation. The reports 
indicate that patients who have opted not to use their prescription have lived longer than 
six months.480 For example, the 2000 OPHD annual report showed a patient having 
received a lethal prescription more than eight months before ingesting it.481 The 2004 
OPHD annual report had a patient die in 2003, after having obtained a lethal 
prescription in 2001.482 The fact that physicians have been inaccurate in their estimation 
of their patients’ prognoses is evidence that it is difficult to assess the terminal phase.483 
This concern was also considered by the House of Lords’ Select Committee in its report 
on the ADTI Bill 2004 (‘2004 HL Select Committee Report’).484 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the DDA has taken account of the limitations of physicians when 
estimating life expectancy. This is because it specifies that the disease should, ‘within 
reasonable medical judgement’ produce death within six months. As noted in the 
recommendations of the 2004 HL Select Committee Report, ‘[this] reflect[s] the 
realities of clinical practice as regards accurate prognosis’.485  
In Oregon, if a patient is refused a prescription by one physician, then they might yet be 
able to obtain a prescription from a more ‘accommodating’ physician (‘physician-
shopping’).486 An example of a case of ‘physician-shopping’ under the DDA is the 1999 
case of Kate Cheney, an 85-year-old terminally ill patient, who had been denied by 
three physicians before finally receiving a lethal prescription.487 This case is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six,488 in relation to possible ‘slippery slope’ concerns. According to 
the 2001 OPHD annual report, over the first three years of the DDA’s operation, only 
41% of patients received their prescription from the first physician asked, whilst the 
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remaining 59% requested a lethal prescription from more than one physician before 
finding a ‘willing’ participant to the DDA.489  
Additionally, suicide advocacy groups such as Compassion and Choices have a practice 
of referring patients to physicians who are known to be ‘willing’.490 This is demonstrated 
in the 1999 case of Helen.491 Helen was an 86-year-old terminally ill patient, whose 
physician refused to assist in her suicide. A second physician also refused, on the 
grounds that Helen was depressed. Helen’s husband then contacted Compassion and 
Choices, who referred her to a willing physician who gave her a favourable medical 
assessment.492 This case, too, is discussed in Chapter Six,493 in relation to ‘slippery slope’ 
concerns. In 2002, Hamilton noted that at least 86% of the reported assisted suicide 
cases in Oregon between 1998 and 2002 were handled by suicide advocacy groups.494 In 
2008, Hendin and Foley observed that a physician affiliated with a suicide advocacy 
group provided the consultation in 58 of 61 (95.1%) consecutive cases of patients 
receiving physician-assisted suicide in Oregon.495 It is submitted that the extent to which 
suicide advocacy groups in Oregon are involved in the practice of physician-assisted 
suicide raises concerns about the objectivity of the process and the safety of vulnerable 
patients.496 As suicide advocacy groups may be facilitators of the DDA, there would be a 
strong influence of bias on the part of physicians affiliated with such groups.497  
There is no requirement under the DDA for the consulting physician to act 
independently of the primary physician. As such, the consultation requirement could be 
satisfied by a friend or colleague of the primary physician, who would be more likely to 
share the same opinion as the latter than if they were wholly independent.498 It is argued 
that the element of ‘independence’ is essential to ensure that the consulting physician is 
able to freely and objectively assess the patient, and to challenge the attending 
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physician’s decision-making where necessary.499 There is also nothing in the DDA to 
prevent an attending physician from ‘shopping around’ until they find a consulting 
physician who is prepared to give a supportive confirmation of the patient’s request and 
condition.500 Thus, the requirement for a consulting physician to confirm the attending 
physician’s diagnosis and prognosis may not amount to an effective safeguard under the 
DDA. 
As evidence consistently links the desire to end one’s life to depression,501 physicians are 
required to refer a patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist if they suspect a mental 
disorder or depression causing impaired judgement.502 However, the OPHD annual 
reports indicate a downward trend in the percentage of patients being referred for formal 
psychiatric or psychological evaluation, from a high of 37% in 1999,503 to only 1.4% in 
2011504 and 2.6% in 2012.505 Of the 673 total reported deaths between 1998 and 2012, 
only 42 patients (6.2%) had been referred for a psychiatric or psychological 
evaluation.506 In 2010, only one of the 65 patients who died by lethal prescription had 
been referred.507 In 2011, there was only one referral out of the 71 deaths,508 and in 2012, 
only two referrals out of the 77 deaths.509 In an interview, Ganzini stated:  
I think it’s risky how low the rate of mental health evaluation is because 
people with depressive disorders are more likely to be able to get a (lethal) 
prescription if you’re not…careful. [Patients who want to end their lives 
often suffer from a treatable depression,] and a trial of depression treatment 
should be the first approach, not a lethal prescription.510  
It is submitted that physicians in Oregon are generally not competent to assess the 
mental state of a patient. Physicians providing a lethal prescription are less likely to 
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know the patient well due to the occurrence of ‘physician-shopping’. The OPHD annual 
reports show that the median length of the physician-patient relationship between the 
request and the death by lethal prescription between 1998 and 2012, was 12 weeks, 
though the median length for 2012 alone was somewhat higher, at 19 weeks.511 
Additionally, the attending and consulting physicians may not have the adequate 
knowledge, expertise or experience to reliably diagnose depression, let alone whether 
such depression is causing an impaired judgement.512 As Battin observes, in the absence 
of a standardised depression-screening tool, there is a risk that a physician will fail to 
recognise depression when it occurs. It is not sufficient to merely rely on the 
professional competencies of physicians when screening for depression.513 
It is argued that even with a mental health evaluation, the DDA may fail to protect some 
patients whose request for a lethal prescription is influenced by depression. Ganzini et 
al’s 2008 study of a sample of patients (18) who had been prescribed with lethal drugs 
showed that one in six of them (3) had been suffering from undiagnosed clinical 
depression, although all of them were evaluated by a mental health professional.514 As 
concluded by the researchers in their study, the DDA ‘may not adequately protect all 
mentally ill patients’.515 Chochinov et al contend that psychiatrists need to have an 
existing relationship with a patient before making successful assessments about their 
competency.516 This is demonstrated in an earlier 1996 study by Ganzini et al of 
attitudes of Oregon psychiatrists.517 They found in their study that only 6% of Oregon 
psychiatrists and psychologists were confident that in the absence of a long-term 
relationship with a patient, they could satisfactorily determine in a single visit whether 
that patient was legally competent to commit suicide. The majority were more 
confident, however, about assessing decision-making capacity over an extended period 
of time. 
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A psychiatric evaluation under the DDA is also likely to fail as a safeguard to protect 
vulnerable patients due to the possibility of ‘shopping around’ for an ‘accommodating’ 
psychiatrist who will provide the desired mental health evaluation. Besides the case of 
Helen, discussed earlier,518 this is illustrated by the case of Kate Cheney (also considered 
earlier).519 A psychiatrist found Kate to have had mild, potentially reversible mental 
depression.520 Kate consulted two other mental health professionals who found her 
decision-making capacity to be intact.521 She also obtained a competency evaluation 
from a clinical psychologist, who concluded that there was no severe impairment that 
would limit her ability to make a medical decision.522 Battin argues that the differences 
in mental health evaluations may have been because Kate’s impairment was temporary, 
and therefore different clinicians were seeing her in different conditions. Nevertheless, 
it is uncertain how differing mental health assessments are to be reconciled when they 
occur.523  
Studies from Oregon show that most patients receiving a prescription under the DDA 
were enrolled in hospice care, and that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide has 
resulted in more hospice referrals and more training by physicians in palliative care.524 
The 2012 OPHD annual report shows that between 1998 and 2012, 586 (90.4%) of the 
673 individuals who received assistance to die had been enrolled in hospice care.525 In 
2011, 59 (96.7%) of the 71 patients who ingested lethal medication were enrolled in 
hospice care,526 whilst in 2012, 64 (97%) out of 77 patients were enrolled.527 Most of 
these patients were enrolled in hospice care either at the time the prescription was 
written, or at the time of death. This demonstrates that the majority of patients in 
Oregon sought physician-assisted suicide as an adjunct to palliative care, rather than as 
an alternative to palliative care. Palliative care is also promoted by suicide advocacy 
groups, like Compassion and Choices. Campbell and Cox note in their 2010 research 
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paper on the collaboration between hospice and physician-assisted death, that 
Compassion and Choices ‘makes referrals to hospice a primary feature of its patient 
care counselling’ to ensure that physician-assisted death is practiced responsibly.528  
The DDA requires a patient to make their request for assistance twice orally and once in 
writing.529 As a safeguard protecting vulnerable patients, there are two ‘cooling off’ 
periods before a prescription is issued. There must be a 15-day lapse between the 
patient’s initial oral request and the writing of a prescription, and a 48-hour lapse 
between the patient’s written request and the writing of the prescription.530 The ‘cooling-
off’ periods ensure that the patient’s request is voluntary, informed and well-considered. 
To ensure that the patient’s desire for death remains unchanged, and is not the result of 
pressure, the DDA requires that immediately before a prescription is written, the 
attending physician verifies that the patient is making an informed decision.531 A further 
safeguard protecting vulnerable patients is that a patient’s written request must be 
witnessed by at least two people who can verify that the patient is competent, and that 
the decision is voluntary and informed. At least one witness must not be a relative, the 
patient’s beneficiary, or an owner or employee of the treating healthcare facility.532 The 
attending physician is also prohibited from acting as a witness.533 This increases the 
assurance that the patient’s request is voluntary and that they are not being coerced or 
influenced by third parties.534 
Under the DDA, patients are able to collect their drugs weeks or months before they 
actually ingest them. The 2012 OPHD annual report shows that between 1998 and 2012, 
the mean interval between first request and death by ingestion was 46 days.535 However, 
this mean figure lies within a range of 15 to 1,009 days, and some of those receiving 
lethal drugs do not even take them until longer periods of time have elapsed. Thus, the 
DDA does not have any safeguards to ensure that when the patient subsequently takes 
the lethal drugs, they are capable, acting voluntarily and not suffering from any mental 
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disorder, and are not taking the drugs under duress or undue influence.536 There is no 
way of knowing whether the conditions that existed at the time when the drugs were 
prescribed, continue to exist when the drugs are taken.537 Further, there are no safeguards 
in the DDA to ensure that the lethal medication is stored safely, or returned to the 
pharmacy if unused. There is also no account taken of the unused drug, should the 
patient then die naturally. As argued by Gianelli, physicians should witness patients’ 
deaths to guard against any misuse of the lethal medications.538 However, there is no 
requirement in the DDA for physicians to be present when the drugs are taken.  
The 2012 OPHD annual report indicates that between 2001 and 2012, the prescribing 
physician was present at the time the lethal medication was ingested in only 26% of 
cases (108 out of 416 deaths),539 and at the time of death (after the lethal medication was 
ingested) in only 16% of cases (96 out of 591 deaths). It is submitted that complications 
that arise when ingesting the lethal medication, or cases where patients regain 
consciousness after ingesting the lethal medication, are likely to go unaddressed under 
the DDA. Such cases have been highlighted in the 2012 OPHD report which shows that 
22 (4.4%) out of 496 individuals who died from the lethal prescriptions since 1998 
experienced complications in the form of regurgitation, and a total of six patients 
regained consciousness after ingesting the prescribed lethal medications.540 
It is submitted that the DDA does not effectively prevent assistance from being 
provided during the self-ingestion. Although the DDA refers to a ‘patient’s act of 
ingesting medication’,541 it does not specify the exact means of taking the medication. 
The DDA also does not require the physician to determine that the patient is capable of 
self-administering the lethal drugs. As observed by Jeffrey and Teahan, this raises 
questions about the degree of assistance which may lawfully be provided to the 
patient.542 This is illustrated in a 1999 case in Oregon, involving the assisted suicide of a 
43-year-old man whose relative held a drink mixed with the prescribed lethal 
medication so that the man was able to drink from a straw.543 In this case, the assistance 
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was regarded as a legal act.544 However, in the absence of clear guidelines, such conduct 
could have been held to constitute euthanasia. 
Tolle et al argue that most patients who initially consider obtaining lethal medication, 
do not persist with their request.545 This is demonstrated in their 2004 study on the 
characteristics of dying Oregonians, which found that while 17% of dying Oregonians 
consider the option of assisted death, approximately only one out of 1,000 actually 
obtain a lethal dose of medication.546 This argument is also supported by the 2012 
OPHD annual report which indicates that since the DDA was passed in 1997, 64% of 
patients (673 out of 1,050 lethal prescriptions) had died from ingesting those 
medications, whilst the remainder had either died from natural causes or had a status 
that was as yet unknown.547 Ganzini and Dahl note that the prescription is described as 
an ‘insurance policy’ by sufferers of progressive, incurable conditions who believe that 
the end of their lives will be more tolerable by knowing that they have the ability to end 
it, should it become intolerable.548 Similarly, Savage observes that for many who obtain 
a prescription, it is enough to have the comfort of knowing that they have the means to 
end their lives, even if they never choose to do so.549 
Of the 77 deaths under the DDA during 2012, most (67.5%) were aged 65 years or 
older, with the median age being 69 years.550 This was similar to the previous year. Of 
the 71 deaths during 2011, most (69.0%) were also aged 65 years or older, with the 
median age being 70 years.551 Of the 65 deaths during 2010, most (70.8%) were over age 
65 years, with the median age being 72 years.552 It is concluded that the law on 
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon is mainly utilised by its elderly population (defined 
as those aged 65 years or older). In the English context, one of the main social 
influences for law reform on assisted death is the growing aging population.553 As in 
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previous years, the 2012 OPHD report found that the most frequently mentioned end-of-
life concerns by those who utilised the DDA were loss of autonomy (93.5%),554 a 
decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable (92.2%), a loss of 
dignity (77.9%),555 and being a burden556 on family, friends or caregivers (57.1%).557 
35.1% of patients requested physician-assisted suicide because they feared losing 
control of their bodily functions. As discussed in Chapter Three, similar concerns have 
been raised by those in favour of legalising assisted death in England and Wales.  
In 2007, there were 49 deaths under the DDA. This corresponds to 15.6 deaths under 
the DDA per 10,000 total deaths in Oregon.558 In 2008, there were 60 deaths (19.4 per 
10,000 deaths),559 in 2009, there were 59 deaths (19.3 per 10,000 deaths),560 in 2010, 
there were 65 deaths (20.9 per 10,000 deaths),561 in 2011, there were 71 deaths (22.5 per 
10,000 deaths),562 and in 2012, there were 77 deaths (23.5 per 10,000 deaths).563 It is 
concluded that although there is a low rate of assisted deaths pursuant to the DDA, there 
has been a marginal increase in the number of such deaths. Nevertheless, despite the 
concerns over safeguards in the DDA noted above, there have been no ‘record highs’ of 
deaths under the DDA in Oregon.564 
5.7.3 Summary for Oregon 
In conclusion, safeguards  such as the ‘cooling off’ periods and the requirement for 
witnesses to be present when a patient makes their written request  provide assurance 
that patients are competent, and are making a voluntary request for assisted suicide. As 
discussed, the majority of patients in Oregon seek physician-assisted suicide as an 
adjunct to palliative care, rather than as an alternative. Nevertheless, the safeguards in 
the DDA may not be effective to protect vulnerable patients in Oregon. There is the 
possibility of ‘under-reporting’ to the OPHD, as there is no legal mechanism to enforce 
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the reporting requirement. The DDA requires the patient to be terminally ill and to have 
a life expectancy of less than six months. However, studies have demonstrated that it is 
difficult to make such an accurate terminal prognosis. There is also the potential for 
‘physician-shopping’ under the DDA. Patients are not only able to seek prescriptions 
from more ‘accommodating’ physicians, but attending physicians may also be able to 
look for more supportive consulting physicians and psychiatrists. The involvement of 
suicide advocacy groups also challenges the objectivity of the practice of physician-
assisted suicide in Oregon. A further issue with the law is that with the low referral rate 
for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation, physicians may fail to recognise 
depression or other mental disorders that cause impaired judgement in patients. Even 
with a mental health evaluation, studies in Oregon have shown that this still fails to 
protect some patients suffering from depression. As patients are able to collect their 
lethal medication weeks or months before they take them, and physicians are not 
required to be present when the medication is taken, there is no guarantee that the 
conditions which existed at the time the prescription was written continue to exist when 
the medication is eventually taken. Complications that arise when ingesting the lethal 
medication or after the ingestion are also unlikely to be addressed, as is the possibility 
of active assistance being provided by others during the self-ingestion. As observed 
above, physician-assisted suicide in Oregon is mainly resorted to by its elderly 
population, 65 years or older.  
5.8 Conclusion 
The legal developments concerning assisted death in the jurisdictions discussed in this 
chapter, can inform the reform agenda for the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide 
in England and Wales by providing the following valuable reference points and lessons. 
As the first valuable reference point, it was shown that in four of the jurisdictions 
discussed  the Netherlands, Belgium, the Northern Territory (Australia), and Oregon 
(US)  there has been specific legislation on physician-assisted death in some form. The 
exemption from legal or disciplinary action provided by these laws addressed the 
reluctance of physicians to assist in their patients’ deaths. By contrast, in the other two 
jurisdictions considered  Switzerland and Germany   existing practices stem from 
their respective Penal Codes and professional guidelines, and have been relatively 
unregulated. 
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Secondly, the chapter demonstrated a varying emphasis on personal autonomy between 
the jurisdictions. Although the Dutch Act is based upon a patient’s ‘unbearable 
suffering’ which cannot be improved, the patient may refuse palliative care. Thus, the 
Dutch Act focuses on absolute personal autonomy. However, the Belgian Act does not 
respect absolute patient autonomy, as it requires a physician to confirm a diagnosis of 
‘incurable disorder’. The ROTI Act and DDA, by contrast, both require the patient to be 
terminally ill. Under the ROTI Act, the patient must also be suffering to an 
unacceptable and severe extent.    
Thirdly, the chapter noted varying control measures between the jurisdictions to 
regulate the practice of assisted death. Control measures are included in the Dutch Act 
and the Belgian Act in the form of reporting procedures for physicians, checks by multi-
disciplinary review committees, and an assessment and appraisal by Parliament. 
Similarly, as a means of policing physician-assisted death in Oregon and the Northern 
Territory, physicians are required to file reports each time they write a prescription for 
lethal medication. By contrast, in Switzerland, no such reporting requirements exist for 
either right-to-die organisations or physicians. 
Fourthly, although Swiss courts only allow physician-assisted suicide for conditions 
indisputably leading to death, physicians associated with right-to-die organisations have 
been prescribing lethal medication for patients with non-fatal conditions as well.  
Fifthly, the chapter demonstrated that, as is the case in England and Wales, physicians 
in Germany are not permitted to provide suicide assistance. Thus, patients depend on 
the assistance of people who are not medically qualified to end their lives. This may 
expose vulnerable patients to the risk of mental disorders going undetected, 
complications arising during the dying process which go unaided, and failed suicides 
due to inappropriate medication.  
Sixthly, the chapter found that in the Northern Territory of Australia, the ROTI Act was 
intended to address the concerns of an aging population, who were aware of the 
limitations of palliative care, and were concerned with advances in medical technology 
which merely ‘prolonged death’. These influences overlap substantially with those 
currently shaping the debate on the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales. 
In Oregon, by comparison, the drive for more patient autonomy was a key influence.    
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In addition to these reference points, several lessons were noted. Firstly, the chapter 
found that vulnerable patients, whose judgement is impaired by depression or other 
mental disorders, are at risk under the Dutch Act, the Belgian Act, and the DDA, as 
none of these require a mandatory mental health evaluation. Similarly, mental disorders 
which impinge upon competence may also go undetected at right-to-die organisations in 
Switzerland. Even when such referrals occur, studies in Oregon have demonstrated that 
psychiatrists and psychologists are not confident, in the absence of a long-term 
relationship with a patient, that they could satisfactorily determine in a single visit 
whether the patient was competent to make a decision to end their life. The chapter 
further found through the limited experience with the ROTI Act that if psychiatric 
assessments are seen as adversarial by patients, and viewed as merely frustrating one’s 
request for death, then patients may not be fully open and honest during psychiatric 
assessments. Those psychiatrists and psychologists with long-term patient relationships, 
are perhaps more likely to earn patient trust, or detect the withholding of relevant 
information.   
As a second lesson, the effectiveness of legislation in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Oregon, and the Northern Territory relies heavily on physician self-reporting, whose 
reports may be biased so as to better fit the requirements of the law. However, by 
making an annual statistical report of data available to the public, this allows for 
transparency and public oversight. 
A third lesson has been the significance of palliative care. A key strength of the Belgian 
law on euthanasia, is its focus on palliative care. Not only does the Belgian Act require 
physicians to discuss palliative treatment options with their patients, but the PCA 2002 
also requires every patient approaching the end-of-life to experience palliative care. The 
Belgian Act, the PCA 2002, and Caritas all emphasise the need for palliative care 
treatment. The extensive availability of palliative care in Belgium, addresses the needs 
of the many patients making end-of-life decisions, whose needs can be met by adequate 
palliative care. This emphasises that euthanasia is to be an option of last resort. The 
chapter also found that most patients receiving a lethal prescription under the DDA in 
Oregon had received some form of palliative care, despite no legal requirement to do so. 
The legalisation of physician-assisted suicide has resulted in more hospice referrals and 
more training by physicians in palliative care. This provides a strong indication that by 
permitting assisted death, concerns that palliative care will be displaced as the option of 
first resort are unfounded. Under the ROTI Act, information on palliative care had to be 
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provided by a palliative care expert, and there could be no assisted death if the attending 
physician believed there were palliative care options reasonably available. 
Fourthly, the various safeguards intended to confirm the medical diagnosis and 
prognosis, and competence of the patient were noted. In the Northern Territory and 
Oregon, two independent second opinions from a physician qualified in the patient’s 
terminal illness, and a psychiatrist had to be obtained. The chapter also found that the 
ROTI Act and the DDA had similar safeguards in their requirements for witnesses and 
cooling off periods. Under both laws, patients are required to have signed a written 
request for death in the presence of two witnesses. This would protect vulnerable 
patients who have been subjected to pressure from family members. The two cooling 
off periods in both Acts give patients an opportunity to reassess their request, and 
assures physicians of the genuineness of the patient’s request for death. Under the DDA, 
the physician also has to verify that a patient is making an informed decision 
immediately before the prescription is issued. 
A concern with the DDA that is highlighted in the chapter is that as there is no emphasis 
on the ‘independence’ of consulting physicians. As a result, such physicians may end up 
being facilitators of the DDA rather than independent evaluators. This concern is 
addressed in the Netherlands and Belgium, where the SCEN and LEIF networks provide 
suitably trained physicians to act as independent consulting physicians under each of 
their laws. 
The chapter found that as the DDA allows patients to collect their medication weeks or 
months before they actually take them, there is no way of knowing whether a patient’s 
personal circumstances have remained the same or have changed at the time when the 
medication is taken. Other concerns with the DDA are that complications that arise 
when the lethal medication is taken, or cases where patients regain consciousness after 
taking the medication, are not expressly provided for. Neither does the DDA safeguard 
against assistance being provided during the ingestion, as it does not specify the exact 
means of taking the medication. These concerns are similar to those highlighted in 
Switzerland, in regard to the involvement of non-medically trained volunteers. These 
issues are however addressed in the Netherlands. Under the Dutch Act, a physician is 
required to either stay with the patient continuously or be immediately available until 
the patient dies. This not only addresses any complications during and immediately after 
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an assisted death, but also avoids misuse of the lethal medication supplied for assisted 
suicide, or other abuse of the law. 
Fifthly, the chapter also demonstrated that the phenomenon of ‘physician-shopping’ in 
Oregon has caused a negative impact on the DDA. Due to ‘physician-shopping’, 
physicians or psychiatrists in Oregon are less likely to be able to diagnose depression, or 
any other mental disorder in their patients. Such ‘shopping’ was also noted to have 
occurred under the ROTI Act. The chapter also noted that as suicide advocacy groups 
may be facilitators of the DDA, the involvement of physicians affiliated with suicide 
advocacy groups may further undermine the DDA safeguards. 
Sixthly, although the initial intent of legislation in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Oregon, was to limit assisted death as a medical option to a particular group of people, 
experiences from these jurisdictions indicate that the laws have been extended to a 
wider group of people than was originally intended. The extension of the Dutch law on 
assisted death to patients suffering from the early onset of dementia, to incompetent 
patients through their advance declarations, to medical conditions such as dementia 
(including Alzheimer’s disease), and to minors between the ages of 12 and 16 years 
may support concerns of a ‘slippery slope’ in the Netherlands. The extension of the 
Dutch law from voluntary euthanasia565 to non-voluntary euthanasia566 for newborns may 
also support ‘slippery slope’ concerns. In Belgium, extending the scope of ‘mental 
suffering’ to those who merely anticipate a future coma, loss of independence, or 
progressive dementia may also provide support for ‘slippery slope’ concerns. By 
extending the law to a wider group of patients, the laws on assisted death in both the 
Netherlands and Belgium may have failed to adequately protect such vulnerable 
members of society. The acceptance of these extensions to the law indicate a change in 
societal values after the legalisation of assisted death.567 The extent to which the assisted 
death laws in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon support such concerns of a 
‘slippery slope’ is discussed in the following chapter. 
                                                          
565 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ (ch1 n7). 
566 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
567 Pereira (n496) e39.  
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Chapter 6: The Slippery Slope Argument 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will critically examine the ‘slippery slope’ argument, which is a form of 
argument often raised by those opposed to the legalisation of assisted death in England 
and Wales. As slippery slope arguments are not unique to the UK, the chapter will 
evaluate the slippery slope argument against the experience of three of the six foreign 
jurisdictions considered in Chapter Five  the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon. These 
are the jurisdictions whose assisted death practices are governed by current legislation. 
As Switzerland and Germany do not have legislation governing assisted death,1 the 
slippery slope argument will not be investigated in these jurisdictions. The Northern 
Territory of Australia will also not be investigated, as assisted death was only briefly 
made legal by legislation in this jurisdiction.  
Before considering the extent to which experiences in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Oregon support the slippery slope argument, the chapter will review the definition of a 
slippery slope argument, and the forms of this argument most commonly asserted in 
relation to assisted death. Common slippery slope ‘mechanisms’ will also be described. 
The chapter will consider whether evidence from the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon 
bears out the presence of a slippery slope, or whether, on the contrary, it demonstrates 
that euthanasia and assisted suicide can be controlled and regulated effectively without 
adverse effects on the vulnerable.2  
The chapter will demonstrate that the expansion of circumstances for lawful euthanasia 
in the Netherlands provides some support for concerns of a slippery slope. In Belgium, 
slippery slope concerns are also supported by both an expansion of circumstances held 
to be lawful and a disregard for the current regulations by both the physicians and 
enforcement authorities. In Oregon, whilst no evidence of actual slippage is found, 
several risk factors are identified which constitute potential slippery slope 
‘mechanisms’.  
                                                          
1 ‘Assisted death’, defined in section 1.1.  
2 See section 3.4.6. 
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The chapter will also examine whether there is evidence to support a slippery slope 
argument that a law on voluntary euthanasia3 will lead to a stronger likelihood of 
non-voluntary euthanasia4 taking place. This argument will primarily be evaluated in 
relation to the Netherlands, as this is the only jurisdiction that has substantial data both 
before and after the Dutch Act came into force. A similar evaluation of Belgium is not 
possible, as there is no data on the rates of voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia for 
the period prior to the Belgian Act. Multi-jurisdictional studies are also reviewed to 
determine whether they also indicate a slippage from voluntary to non-voluntary 
euthanasia. 
As noted in the section which follows, slippery slope concerns can potentially arise in 
any area of the law. On this basis, the chapter will also consider whether the current 
English law concerning the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment 
provides support for slippery slope concerns.   
6.2 Definition of ‘slippery slope’ 
As Lode observes, slippery slope arguments generally take the following form: ‘We 
should resist some practice or policy [at the top of the slope] on the grounds that 
allowing it could lead us to allow some other practice or policy that is clearly 
objectionable [at the bottom of the slope]’.5 Between top and bottom may be many little 
steps, or ‘slippages’, and the slope is described as being ‘slippery’ because no matter 
where one decides to draw the line between the top and the bottom, it is impossible to 
hold it.6 A step on to the top of the slope will on this view lead inexorably toward the 
bottom.7  
Slippery slope arguments are not limited to assisted death. They have been asserted 
across varied subjects including the regulation of abortion, freedom of speech, tobacco, 
torture, and government surveillance.8 In relation to assisted death, slippery slope 
                                                          
3 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ (ch1 n7). 
4 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
5 E Lode, ‘Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning’ (1999)87(6) Calif.L.Rev 1469,1471. 
6 F Schauer, ‘Slippery Slopes’ (1985) 99(2) Harv.L.Rev. 361,378. 
7 DA Jones, ‘Is There a Logical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non-voluntary Euthanasia?’ (2011)21(4) Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 379,380. 
8 E Volokh, ‘The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope’ (2003) 116 Harv L Rev 1026.  
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arguments have been key to the campaigns of anti-euthanasia activist groups. For 
example, Care Not Killing argue on their website as follows:  
If assisted suicide or euthanasia is legalised any ‘safeguards’ against abuse, 
such as limiting it to certain categories of people, will not work. Instead, 
once any so-called ‘right-to-die’ is established we will see incremental 
extension with activists applying pressure to expand the categories of people 
who qualify for it.9  
Similarly, Not Dead Yet assert on their website that: 
Proponents claim they seek a small change in the law. But this is a crack 
that can be steadily opened wider and wider until any person may assist 
another disabled person to die without consequence.10  
Slippery slope concerns also featured prominently in the submissions received by the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on the ADTI Bill 2004, as noted in its report.11  
Not all those who raise concerns of a slippery slope in relation to assisted death pose the 
same arguments; neither do they all articulate their arguments in detail. Some merely 
express a general concern. Whilst not all anti-euthanasia activist groups have expressed 
their arguments in detail, the variations of the slippery slope argument most commonly 
discussed by academic commentators have been the ‘logical’ argument and the 
‘empirical’ argument. These are outlined in the following two sections. 
6.2.1 The logical slippery slope argument 
The logical form of the slippery slope argument (the ‘logical’ argument) is described by 
Rachels as follows:  
Once a certain practice is accepted, from a logical point of view we are 
committed to accepting certain other practices as well, since there are no 
good reasons for not going on to accept the additional practices once we 
have taken the all important first step. But, the argument continues, the 
                                                          
9 See Care Not Killing (ch1 n76).  
10 See Not Dead Yet UK (ch1 n93). 
11 2004 HL Select Committee Report Vol I (ch1 n49) paras91-103. 
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additional practices are plainly unacceptable; therefore, the first step had 
better not be taken.12  
Keown assesses the ‘logical’ argument by considering a hypothetical law which permits 
physician-assisted suicide in response to a competent patient who (i) makes a request 
and (ii) is terminally ill and experiencing unbearable suffering. Keown asserts that such 
a law would be the first step onto a slippery slope, by raising logical dilemmas. Under 
such a hypothetical law, he notes that if a competent patient’s request merely triggers a 
physician’s assessment of their suffering, then a logical extension would be to also 
relieve the unbearable suffering of incompetent patients, rather than exclude them 
simply because they cannot make a request to have their suffering assessed. If, on the 
other hand, a competent patient’s request is the primary requirement for assisted death 
then a logical extension would be to accede to all competent requests rather than 
requiring the patient to be suffering unbearably (or even at all).13 Not all commentators, 
however, agree with Keown that this ‘logical’ dilemma is valid. Smith, for example, 
asserts that Keown’s arguments are flawed. Smith argues that the logical dilemma and 
risk of slippage raised by Keown only arise when unbearable suffering and competency 
are considered separately. If a law requires both elements together, then no slippage is 
likely, and it is possible to hold the line.14   
6.2.2 The empirical slippery slope argument15 
According to Rachels, the empirical form of the slippery slope argument (the 
‘empirical’ argument) provides that:  
once certain practices are accepted, people shall in fact go on to accept other 
more questionable practices. [The ‘empirical’ argument] is simply a claim 
about what people will do and not a claim about what they are logically 
committed to. [T]his form of the argument [holds] that if we start off by 
killing people to put them out of extreme agony, we shall in fact end up 
killing them for other reasons, regardless of logic and nice distinctions.16 
                                                          
12 Rachels (ch3 n102)172-3. 
13 Keown (ch5 n24) 77. 
14 SW Smith, ‘Fallacies of the logical slippery slope in the debate on physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia’ 
(2005)13(2) Med.L.Rev 224,232. 
15 Also referred to as the ‘practical’ or ‘psychological’ slippery slope argument. 
16 Rachels (ch3 n102). 
 263 
Enoch similarly describes the ‘empirical’ argument as follows:  
Once we allow voluntary euthanasia…we may (or will) fail to make the 
crucial distinction, and then we will reach the morally unacceptable 
outcome of allowing involuntary euthanasia; or perhaps even though we 
will make the relevant distinction, we will not act accordingly for some 
reason.17  
Thus, the ‘empirical’ argument recognises the moral and legal distinctions between 
voluntary, non-voluntary,18 and involuntary euthanasia, but as Lewis maintains, 
‘[people] are bad at abiding by [those] distinction[s]’.19 
Keown argues that the ‘empirical’ argument’s concerns are real. He asserts that even if 
a defensible line permitting voluntary euthanasia can be drawn in principle, a slide from 
voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia will occur in practice, because the safeguards will 
inevitably be ineffective.20 Keown asserts two mechanisms which would drive such 
slippage, and hence support the ‘empirical’ argument. Firstly, the legalisation of 
voluntary euthanasia would tend to change physician attitudes towards non-voluntary 
and involuntary euthanasia. Secondly, that if voluntary euthanasia is permitted under 
certain circumstances, then occurrences of non-voluntary euthanasia are more difficult 
to police than if voluntary euthanasia were not permitted at all. More specifically, 
Keown asserts that allowing voluntary euthanasia as a last resort would make it difficult 
to prevent from becoming an earlier resort.21  
Several commentators have noted a slippage in relation to the Abortion Act 1967, of a 
nature which parallels the ‘empirical’ argument. In 1988, Keown observed that the 
Abortion Act had resulted in abortion being carried out in over 180,000 cases every year 
on request, and in most cases not on health grounds as required by the Act but rather on 
                                                          
17 D Enoch, ‘Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re on a Very Slippery Slope’ (2001)21 Oxford 
J.Leg.Stud 629,631. For ‘voluntary euthanasia’, see ch1 n7, and for ‘involuntary euthanasia’, see text to ch1 n98. 
18 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
19 Lewis (ch1 n177) 198. 
20 J Keown, ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?’ (1995)9 Notre Dame 
J.L.Ethics&Pub.Pol’y 407,408. 
21 Keown (ch5 n24) 72. 
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social grounds.22 Earlier, in 1974, Lord Habgood explicitly drew a parallel between 
abortion and euthanasia by noting that: 
The safeguards and assurances given when the [Abortion] Bill was passed 
have to a considerable extent been ignored…[one could expect] similarly 
far-reaching and potentially more dangerous consequences from legalised 
euthanasia.23  
The same parallel was later supported in 1995 by Goff, when he stated that: 
An indication that there may well be no such defensible line may be drawn 
from experience of the legalisation of abortion in England which, though 
introduced for the main purpose of attacking the perceived evil of back 
street abortions, now extends to permit abortion in practically all 
circumstances.24 
As with the ‘logical’ argument, not all commentators agree that the ‘empirical’ 
argument is valid. Jackson, for example, expresses scepticism for such an argument. 
She notes that:  
The argument suggests that although we might be able to distinguish 
paradigm cases at the top of the moral slope from those at the bottom, it 
would be very difficult to locate or police the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable practices towards the middle of the slope. Yet this ‘grey area’ 
problem exists whenever we attempt to regulate anything.25 
6.2.3 Slippery slope ‘mechanisms’ 
The potential mechanisms for a slippery slope are numerous, and potentially unlimited.  
Commentators have provided several examples of such ‘mechanisms’, where the 
enactment of one law may make the enactment of a second law or the occurrence of 
some conduct more likely than if that first law weren’t enacted. One mechanism is that 
                                                          
22 J Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of Abortion in England from 1803 
to 1982 (CUP 1988). 
23 Rt Rev JS Habgood, ‘Euthanasia – A Christian View’ (1974)3 J Royal Society Health 124, 126. 
24 R Goff, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’ (1995)3(1) Med.L.Rev 1,14. 
25 E Jackson, ‘Memorandum by Professor Emily Jackson, Chair of Medical Law, Queen Mary, University of London’ 
in Select Committee on the ADTI Bill 2004, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL], Volume III - Evidence 
(Individual Submissions) (2004-05, HL86-3) 52. 
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the first law may change public attitudes towards another law or behaviour, making it 
more likely. 26 A second mechanism is that several incremental changes in a law may 
each be small enough to be ignored by those who would otherwise be opposed, whilst 
collectively they have a significant detrimental impact.27 A third mechanism exists when 
a law sets a pre-condition, where it is impossible to set a dividing line between the 
presence and absence of that condition.28 In relation to assisted death, another set of 
mechanisms which may cause laws or practices to be broadened if assisted death were 
to be legalised are external factors, such as an aging population. Such mechanisms as 
those listed above are identified in the chapter, against each of the jurisdictions 
reviewed. 
As noted above, those who argue against the legalisation of assisted death based on 
slippery slope concerns, may each have different reasons for believing that such a 
slippage will occur. They may point to different causal ‘mechanisms’ as being the 
drivers or the risk factors which encourage slippage, and which make it difficult to 
police a particular line. 
The following section will examine the evidence for the ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ 
arguments in the experience of the Dutch law on physician-assisted death. It will also 
examine whether there has been an increase in non-voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands since it legalised voluntary euthanasia. 
6.3 The Dutch experience 
In the Netherlands, the categories of people and the types of suffering that may lawfully 
receive assisted death have gradually widened.29 This section analyses whether this 
widening of the law provides evidence in support of any slippery slope concerns.30 
Before Dutch legislation on assisted death came into force in 2002, Wachter noted that 
in cases decided between 1973 and 1983, Dutch courts had already applied two 
conditions for lawful euthanasia in the Netherlands — ‘voluntary request’ and 
                                                          
26 Volokh (n8) 1117; Smith (ch3 n271) 21.  
27 Volokh (n8) 1125.  
28 M Rino & D Whitman, ‘The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories and Slippery Slopes’ (2003)51(2) UCLA 
Law Review 539,542 fn8 citing D Walton, Slippery Slope Arguments (Clarendon Press 1992) 3-7. 
29 Gorsuch (ch2 n54) 105-106. 
30 MA Somerville, ‘Euthanasia’s Slippery Slope: Once assisted suicide is legalized, it becomes impossible to limit the 
justifications for its use’ (The Mark,17 March 2010). 
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‘unbearable suffering’. Wachter observed that from 1984, some courts had imposed 
additional conditions, such as that the patient had to have been suffering from an 
incurable disease, or that the patient’s death must not have imposed undue suffering on 
others.31 In 1984, the Dutch Supreme Court in Schoonheim endorsed the KNMG32 
guidelines on the ‘due care’ criteria for assisted death, as was discussed in Chapter 
Five.33 In doing so, Schoonheim effectively legalised euthanasia and assisted suicide in 
the Netherlands.  
As will be demonstrated below, the sanctioning of assisted death by Dutch physicians 
gradually led to the legalisation of assisted death for increasingly broad categories of 
patients who did not meet the ‘due care’ criteria of the KNMG guidelines.34 In a series 
of cases between 1985 and 2001, although the Dutch courts referred to the KNMG 
guidelines, they assessed each case according to its own circumstances. This approach 
gradually expanded the circumstances for lawful physician-assisted death.35 This 
expansion of circumstances supports both the ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ arguments noted 
above.  
The ‘logical’ argument is supported by the Dutch courts having extended the ambit of 
‘unbearable suffering’ to include mental anguish (i.e. suffering which is not associated 
with somatic or physical disease) by the early 1990s.36 This extension is illustrated by 
two unrelated cases in 1992, in which the patients’ suffering was primarily not of a 
physical nature. In the first case, the patient suffered from depression.37 In the second, 
the patient suffered from anorexia nervosa.38 Dutch courts decided that in both cases, the 
suffering had been unbearable. In both cases, charges for assisted suicide against the 
physicians were dismissed and a defence of ‘necessity’ was accepted. The ‘logical’ 
argument is further exemplified in a third case  the 1994 Dutch Supreme Court case of 
Chabot. As was noted in Chapter Five, in Chabot, a psychiatrist had assisted the suicide 
                                                          
31 MAM de Wachter, ‘Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands’ (1989)262 JAMA 3316,3317. 
32 KNMG (ch5 n18). 
33 Schoonheim Case (ch5 n23). The Dutch cases cited in this section have been reported in Dutch, and their citation 
relies on a translation. 
34 BA Bostrom, ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?’ (1985)4 Issues L.&Med. 467,473. 
35 ibid 473. 
36 Hendin (ch5 n66) 48,135-36. 
37 Rechtbank Rotterdam [District Court of Rotterdam] 23 June 1992 reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992 nr 
664; affirmed on appeal by Gerechtshof Den Haag [Hague Court of Appeal] 18 December 1992 reported in TGR 
1993/52 [both noted by Griffiths (ch5 n30) 80 fn123]. 
38 Rechtbank Almelo [District Court of Almelo] 20 December 1991 reported in TGR 1992/19 [noted by Griffiths 
(ch5 n30) 80 fn123]. 
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of a 50-year old woman who had intractable depression but without any concomitant 
physical illness.39 The Court in Chabot affirmed that ‘unbearable suffering’ may consist 
of mental suffering alone, without involving a medical condition.40  
The 1985 Admiraal case also supports the ‘empirical’ argument.41 A physician (an 
anaesthetist) performed euthanasia on a 34-year-old woman named Karin who was 
suffering from multiple sclerosis.42 Karin had lost all movement except for one hand, 
was barely able to swallow or speak, was losing her sight, and was in constant pain. 
Despite her condition, Karin was not classified as being terminally ill. The physician 
was prosecuted for euthanasia. A question raised at the trial was whether the physician’s 
conduct had failed to meet the KNMG guidelines on the ‘due care’ criteria for an 
assisted death, as he had failed to consult an expert on multiple sclerosis (a neurologist). 
The District Court ruled that the doctor had been confronted by a situation of 
‘necessity’, that he had carefully weighed the conflicting duties and interests against 
each other, and that in doing so he had made a justifiable choice. Although the 
physician had not consulted a neurologist, he had consulted the terminal care team at the 
hospital where he practised, and so was found to have complied with the requirements 
of careful practice.43 On this basis, the physician was acquitted. The Admiraal case 
exemplifies the inherent potential for guidelines to be broadened through a 
consideration of individual circumstances, rather than an insistence on strict 
compliance. 
Support for the ‘empirical’ argument is also illustrated by a 1986 Dutch case which 
accepted that a physician who succumbs to the pressures of a patient’s distress may be 
excused from criminal liability. The case involved the euthanasia of Mrs M, a 
73-year-old patient with advanced multiple sclerosis, by a physician who was also a 
friend of the patient. The Supreme Court rejected a defence of ‘necessity’, as the 
physician had not consulted a colleague in accordance with the KNMG guidelines.44 
Nevertheless, the Court held that both the dire physical and psychological distress of the 
                                                          
39 Chabot case (ch 5 n41). 
40 Griffiths (ch5 n30) 329-40. 
41 Admiraal Case, Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 21 June 1985 reported in Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie 1985 nr 709 [tr: as noted by Griffiths (ch5 n30) 66-67]; ‘Abstract: HRG Feber, De 
Wederwaardigheden van Artikel 293 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht vanaf 1981 tot Heden (The Vicissitudes of 
Article 293 of the Penal Code from 1981 to the Present), in Euthanasie Knelpunten in Een Discussie (Euthanasia: 
Bottlenecks in a Discussion), 54-81 (G.A. Van Der Wal, ed., 1987)’ (1988)3 Issues L.&Med. 455,465. 
42 Griffiths (ch5 n30) 66-67.  
43 R Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The Policy and Practice of Mercy Killing (Springer 2004), 42.  
44 ibid 44.  
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patient, and the resultant mental duress on the physician were mitigating factors against 
a conviction for euthanasia.45 Once again, this illustrates a broadening of general 
principles when applied to specific circumstances. 
A 1991 study of 26 euthanasia cases in the Netherlands by Gomez also found support 
for the ‘empirical’ argument. The study found that the ‘due care’ criteria in the KNMG 
guidelines were not being strictly followed. Gomez noted that (1) requirements such as 
‘unbearable suffering’ were loosely interpreted, (2) alternatives were often not provided 
to patients so that euthanasia was not a ‘last resort’, (3) consulting physicians were not 
always used in euthanasia cases, and when they were, there was no way of assuring 
their independence from the attending physician, and (4) euthanasia cases were not 
routinely reported to the public prosecutor as required.46 The 2005 case of van Oijen, in 
which the Dutch courts sentenced a physician leniently for involuntary euthanasia,47 
further corroborates the ‘empirical’ argument.48 The case involved an 84-year-old 
patient whose physical condition had deteriorated terribly, before she then lapsed into a 
coma. The patient’s condition was described as ‘very exceptionally degrading’ and she 
was expected to die within 48 hours. Although the patient had earlier expressed that she 
did not want euthanasia, her daughter had requested that she be assisted to die.49 The 
physician gave the patient a lethal injection, soon after which she died. The Supreme 
Court found the physician guilty of murder. The Court held that not only was there no 
request for euthanasia, but that because the patient was in a coma, she was not suffering 
unbearably.50 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also accepted that the physician had 
made an ‘error of judgement’, and that he acted ‘honourably and according to his 
conscience’, showing compassion in what he considered to be in the interests of his 
patient.51 For these reasons, the physician was merely given a one-week conditional 
prison sentence which was subject to a two-year probationary period.   
                                                          
45 Hoge Raad [Supreme Court] 21 October 1986 reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987 nr 607 [reviewed in 
‘Nota Bene, The High Court of The Hague, Case No. 79065, October 21, 1986’ (1988) 3 Issues L.&Med. 445].  
46 Gomez (ch5 n36). 
47 ‘Involuntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
48 van Oijen case, Hoge Raad [Supreme Court] 9 November 2004 reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2005 nr 
217. 
49 T Sheldon, ‘Dutch GP Found Guilty of Murder Faces No Penalty’ (2001)322 BMJ 509. 
50 T Sheldon, ‘Two test cases in Holland clarify law on murder and palliative care’ (2004)329(7476) BMJ 1206. 
51 Smies (ch5 n49). 
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Further corroboration of the ‘logical’ argument is found in the expansion of the ambit 
for lawful physician-assisted death under the Dutch Act. As discussed in Chapter Five,52 
the Dutch Act allows physicians to perform euthanasia or assist with the suicides of a 
much wider group of people than that initially envisaged by the KNMG and the Dutch 
courts. Also as discussed in Chapter Five, the Dutch Act explicitly extended assisted 
death to minors aged between 12 and 16 years. Prior to the Dutch Act, such minors 
were not expressly given such rights. Since 2004, the RRCs have allowed those with the 
early onset of dementia, but who are otherwise competent, to request an assisted death 
on the basis that the prospect of a further loss of dignity constitutes ‘unbearable and 
hopeless suffering’. The Dutch Act also loosened the requirement for a ‘voluntary and 
well-considered request’, to include the advance declarations of incompetent patients. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Five, a request in an advance declaration is not an 
expression of a patient’s current wishes. Since it is not an expression of a person’s 
autonomous request at the time of assisted death, it is difficult to argue that this satisfies 
the ‘due care’ criteria in the Dutch Act. As an additional loosening of requirements 
since the Dutch Act — as of 2004, the RRCs have given legal effect to those advance 
declarations which specify dementia (including Alzheimer’s disease) as the medical 
condition covered.53 In support of this, the requirement for ‘unbearable and hopeless 
suffering’ in the Dutch Act has been loosened to include ‘the unacceptable prospect of a 
further loss of dignity’ such as that which a patient feels during the early onset of 
dementia.  
The Groningen Protocol, which has provided for lawful neonatal termination54 since 
2005, may also provide support for the ‘logical’ argument. Through recognition of the 
Groningen Protocol by the Dutch prosecution authorities, this extension to Dutch law 
demonstrates that what started off as voluntary euthanasia55 for competent adult patients 
suffering unbearably due to a condition that cannot be improved, has been extended to 
non-voluntary euthanasia56 for critically ill and severely disabled neonates suffering 
unbearably and experiencing a poor quality of life. The Groningen Protocol does not, 
however, provide support for the ‘empirical’ argument. Despite concerns that the 
Protocol would lead to a large increase in neonatal terminations, such cases have 
                                                          
52 See section 5.2.2. 
53 2004 RRC Annual Report (ch5 n106). 
54 Discussed in section 5.2.3. 
55 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ (ch1 n7). 
56 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
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decreased from 10-15 per year in 199557 and 200158, to two per year in 2010.59 Verhagen 
attributes this to a change in antenatal ultrasound screening practices in 2007, resulting 
in a greater number of critical health conditions being detected in vitro. 60 As 
summarised by Verhagen, ‘This resulted in increased terminations of pregnancy and 
fewer instances of euthanasia’.61  
In response to the 2003 Sutorius case,62 discussed in Chapter Five, the KNMG 
established a committee (‘Dijkhuis committee’) to analyse the issues concerning 
patients who request assisted death because they are ‘tired of living’. The Dijkhuis 
committee recommended that from a medical perspective some ‘tired of living’ cases 
would qualify for assisted death under existing standards of unbearable suffering despite 
the judgment in Sutorius stating that no such cases would qualify.63 This illustrates the 
practical difficulties in setting a boundary for assisted death which prevents slippage. 
The Dijkhuis committee also differed from the Supreme Court in Sutorius in their 
opinion of whether doctors have the expertise to address suffering due to a 
non-medically classified disease or disorder.64 The committee felt that doctors would 
have the necessary expertise in some cases. 
In May 2010, a Dutch ‘citizen’s initiative’ called Uit Vrije Wil [From Free Will] 
submitted a petition with over 116,000 signatures to the government, which called for 
anybody over the age of 70 to be able to request euthanasia, with no requirement to 
prove unbearable suffering.65 The proposal was never acted upon, however, the ability 
of the proposal to raise so many endorsements itself supports concerns of a slippery 
slope. Under the ‘logical’ argument, the tabling of such a proposal is consistent with a 
shift in Dutch public opinion following the Dutch Act and earlier case law.  
                                                          
57 van der Heide (ch5 n131). 
58 Vrakking (ch5 n132). 
59 E Verhagen, ‘The Groningen Protocol for newborn euthanasia: which way did the slippery slope tilt?’ (2013)39(5) 
J Medical Ethics 293,294. 
60 ibid 294. 
61 ibid 295. 
62 Sutorius case (ch5 n53). 
63 Op zoek naar normen voor het handelen van artsen bij vragen om hulp bij levensbeëindiging in geval van lijden 
aan het leven: rapport Commissie Dijkhuis [The role of the physician in requests for assisted death from patients who 
are ‘suffering from life’: Report of the Dijkhuis Commission](KNMG 2004). 
64 See section 5.2.1. 
65 Uit Vrije Wil [From Free Will] <www.uitvrijewil.nu> accessed 16 December 2013. 
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Based on the discussion above, the Dutch experience indicates that multiple potential 
slippery slope mechanisms may exist in the Netherlands. Firstly, there is the imprecise 
requirement of ‘unbearable suffering’, whose boundary with being ‘tired of living’ is 
intrinsically difficult to define. Secondly, there is the shift in public attitudes which has 
apparently occurred once laws have been introduced.66 The expansions and extensions in 
the Dutch law clearly support the slippery slope argument, be it the ‘logical’ or 
‘empirical’ argument.  
In addition to these mechanisms, there is also the argument to be considered that the 
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands has resulted in an increase of 
non-voluntary euthanasia. In 1989, Fenigsen argued ‘that regulations promulgated by 
Dutch courts to control the practice [of lawful euthanasia] were widely ignored, and that 
euthanasia without informed consent of patients was common’.67 Fenigsen’s argument 
was not supported by the subsequent findings of the Remmelink Commission in its 
1990 Remmelink Survey.68 The Remmelink Survey showed that termination of life by 
the administration of lethal drugs without explicit request from patients accounted for 
1,000 out of 130,000 deaths (0.8%). A similar rate for the termination of life without 
request (0.7%) was noted in two subsequent government studies  the 1995 Van der 
Maas Survey,69 and the 2001 Onwuteaka-Philipsen Survey.70 
A follow-up study by van der Heide et al in 2005 (‘van der Heide study’), found that the 
rate of non-voluntary euthanasia had fallen to 0.4%.71 However, the van der Heide study 
included only a death certificate review, whereas the previous three studies also 
included physician interviews and questionnaires. Despite this fourth study being more 
limited in scope, it is still worth noting that no evidence of an increase in non-voluntary 
euthanasia was found. It is submitted that across the four studies, there is no evidence 
that Dutch physicians are engaging more frequently in non-voluntary euthanasia since 
the Dutch Act came into force than beforehand, and hence no support for this aspect of 
the ‘empirical’ argument was found.  
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In conclusion, prior to the Dutch Act coming into force, the slippery slope argument is 
evidenced in the Netherlands by the courts’ willingness to overlook strict compliance 
with the law when considering the individual circumstances of each case, and to 
logically expand the circumstances which permit lawful euthanasia. Subsequent 
extension of the law, following the Dutch Act — to include minors, those with the early 
onset of dementia, and advance declarations of incompetent patients (including for 
reasons of dementia) — further supports the slippery slope argument. The 2005 
Groningen Protocol also supports the argument. Within this slippage by the 
Netherlands, however, there is no evidence that there has been a post-legalisation 
increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. Thus, an argument that the legalisation 
of voluntary euthanasia in England and Wales would bring about a slide down a 
slippery slope to non-voluntary euthanasia is not supported by the Dutch experience.72 
The following section will examine the extent to which experiences with the Belgian 
law on euthanasia support either the ‘logical’ or ‘empirical’ argument.  
6.4 The Belgian experience 
In considering medical practices under the Belgian Act, any evidence of the legal 
requirements for euthanasia being ignored by physicians, or of the Belgian authorities 
not enforcing the law, would support the ‘empirical’ argument. 
The first official euthanasia case in Belgium involved a 39-year-old with multiple 
sclerosis who died by lethal injection within seven days of the Belgian Act coming into 
force.73 This was despite the Act’s requirement for a cooling off period of one month, 
for deaths that are not imminent. In this case, also, it is unclear whether the patient’s 
attending physician had consulted a second independent physician, who is required 
under the Belgian Act to be either a specialist in the patient’s disorder or a psychiatrist.74 
The CFCE 75 overlooked these failures, and instead placed emphasis on the fact that the 
patient had made repeated requests for euthanasia prior to the Belgian Act coming into 
force.76  
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Such disregard for the requirements of the Belgian Act was also found by a number of 
Belgian studies between 2006 and 2010, which in turn support the ‘empirical’ 
argument.  
In the first study, Inghelbrecht et al surveyed Flemish nurses who cared for patients that 
had been assisted to die in 2006.77 Despite a requirement under the Belgian Act that 
lethal medication be administered by a physician, this study found widespread instances 
where physicians had delegated this task to nurses, sometimes with the physician not 
even being present when the medication was administered. The study found that lethal 
medication was not only administered by nurses in 12% of voluntary euthanasia78 cases, 
but also in 45% of non-voluntary euthanasia79 cases.  
In the second study, Smets et al surveyed Flemish physicians whose patients had died 
between June and November 2007. The study considered the reporting requirements 
under the Belgian Act. It found that nearly half of all euthanasia cases in Flanders 
between June and November 2007, were not reported to the CFCE.80 The researchers 
further found that in 41.3% of euthanasia cases which were unreported, opioids or 
sedatives had been administered by a nurse rather than the physician, thus corroborating 
Inghelbrecht et al’s study above. 
In a third study, Chambaere et al reviewed Flemish death certificates between June and 
November 2007 (the same coverage as Smets et al’s survey above). As noted in Chapter 
Five, this study found that 32% of euthanasia cases were carried out in the absence of a 
request or consent; mainly among patients aged 80 years or older who were incompetent 
due to either being in a coma, or suffering from dementia.81  
In a fourth study by Van Wesemael et al, 132 LEIF82 physicians were surveyed between 
May and September 2008 on their consultations over the previous 12 months.83 The 
study found instances where the conduct of LEIF physicians had gone beyond the scope 
of their role as ‘consultants’. Among 311 LEIF consultations between May and 
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September 2008, in 26.7% of euthanasia cases, LEIF physicians had helped with the 
preparation of lethal medication, and in 23.5% of cases they (rather than the attending 
physician) had administered the lethal medication. This had occurred in the presence of 
the attending physician, but on occasions when the attending physician was unwilling to 
administer the medication, inexperienced, or unfamiliar with the drugs being used. As 
discussed in Chapter Five,84 the LEIF network is supposed to merely provide physicians 
for the purposes of consultation. Although the Belgian Act does not specify that the 
attending physician should be the one to actually perform euthanasia (it can be done by 
any physician),85 the roles between the attending physicians and the ‘consultant’ 
physicians from LEIF should not be reversed as this compromises the LEIF role. 
Further support for the ‘logical’ argument is provided by the fact that since 2007, the 
Belgian Act has extended the law to those suffering from the mere ‘anticipation of a 
future coma, loss of independence, or progressive dementia’. As discussed in Chapter 
Five, the CFCE has accepted that such anticipation can in itself constitute a medically 
futile condition of persistent and unbearable mental suffering ‘here and now’ that cannot 
be alleviated.86  
In conclusion, the ‘empirical’ argument is supported by evidence in Belgium of a failure 
by physicians to strictly comply with the requirements of the Belgian Act, and the lack 
of enforcement by the Belgian authorities. Evidence of widespread non-voluntary 
euthanasia was found, but with no evidence that this had increased since the Belgian 
Act legalised voluntary euthanasia.87 The ‘logical’ argument is supported by the CFCE 
having extended the legal boundaries of lawful euthanasia as noted in the previous 
paragraph. 
Experience with the Death with Dignity Act (‘DDA’) in Oregon will be examined in the 
following section to determine whether there is support for either the ‘logical’ or 
‘empirical’ argument. 
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6.5 The Oregon experience 
In Oregon, the phenomenon of ‘physician-shopping’ which was noted in Chapter Five 
provides support for the ‘empirical’ argument. The case of 85-year-old Kate Cheney in 
1999 demonstrates that patients may be able to shop around until they obtain a positive 
mental health evaluation that will satisfy the DDA, and may possibly do so under 
pressure from others. The first psychiatrist in Kate Cheney’s case found her to be 
cognitively impaired, and possibly under pressure from her daughter to request a lethal 
prescription.88 The second psychiatrist similarly found Kate to have had mild, 
potentially reversible mental depression.89 However, Kate then consulted two other 
psychiatrists, who found her decision-making capacity to be intact.90 She also obtained a 
further competency evaluation from a clinical psychologist, who noted that her choices 
‘may be influenced by her family’s wishes and her daughter…may be somewhat 
coercive’.91 The psychologist concluded, however, that there was ‘no severe impairment 
that would limit her ability to make a medical decision’.92  
A second phenomenon in Oregon which may also support the ‘empirical’ argument is 
that many patients are shepherded to doctors affiliated with suicide advocacy groups93 
(also noted in Chapter Five). This is demonstrated by the 1999 case of 86-year-old 
Helen, who had been refused assistance by two physicians as they had each found her to 
be depressed. Her husband then contacted a suicide advocacy group Compassion and 
Choices, which referred Helen to the physician who then prescribed the lethal 
medication which enabled her death. The then director of Compassion and Choices, 
Barbara Coombs Lee, was quoted in a 1998 media interview as saying of the DDA and 
the patient’s ability to physician shop, that ‘[i]t really is a shift of power from the 
physician to the patient. If I get rebuffed by one doctor, I can go to another, because 
there are more physicians willing to do it now that it is legal and out in the open.’94 
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Compassion and Choices was a key member of the Oregon Right to Die group which 
drafted the citizens initiative which became the DDA, as discussed in Chapter Five.95  
It is argued that when physician-shopping occurs, there are no safeguards to ensure that 
each physician consulted is made aware of earlier findings. As the case of Helen 
highlights, even when a physician is aware of earlier consultations, there is no 
obligation on the physician to confer with those physicians who attended the patient 
previously. Helen’s prescribing physician subsequently stated that, ‘Before my patient 
died I didn’t personally discuss the case with her regular physician and had only a very 
cursory contact with her second. I regret this.’96 In relation to Helen’s potential 
depression, the prescribing physician further conceded that, ‘[h]ad I felt there was a 
disagreement among the physicians about my patient’s eligibility ... I would not have 
written the prescription’.97 
In another case in 2000, the children of 65-year-old Joan Lucas contacted a suicide 
advocacy group to get the required help to end their mother’s pain and suffering. Joan 
suffered from motor neurone disease. She had also been depressed, and had made 
numerous suicide attempts.98 As the DDA does not specify how mental health 
evaluations should be carried out, a psychologist sent her a questionnaire by mail.99 
Joan’s children read her the questionnaire and completed the form on her behalf, as she 
was physically unable to do so. Joan Lucas’ case was well documented in the media and 
there is no suggestion of abuse in this instance. However, it does highlight the risk of 
abuse generally, due to a lack of safeguards. As noted by Physicians for Compassionate 
Care:  
With such unreliable information, the psychologist declared Joan Lucas was 
not depressed ... The psychologist made this determination despite the fact 
that studies published in the American Journal of Psychiatry100 show 94% of 
Oregon psychiatrists don’t feel confident they can determine when 
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depression is affecting decisions about assisted suicide in a single visit, no 
less, no visit at all.101  
The cases of Helen and Joan Lucas both highlight another potential risk that relates to 
physician-shopping. In both cases, the need to physician-shop was partly driven by a 
reluctance by many physicians to provide an assisted suicide. For the physician who 
ultimately agrees to help the increasingly desperate patient, their knowledge of such 
difficulties may compel them to follow through despite uncertainties as to whether a 
patient meets all of the DDA requirements. In an article for The Lancet, Helen’s 
prescribing physician reflected on the case’s personal impact for him due to the 
fondness he had come to have for Helen as a person. The physician notes that:  
The thought of Helen dying so soon was almost too much to bear, and only 
slightly less difficult was the knowledge that many very reasonable people 
would consider aiding in her death a crime. I found even worse the thought 
of disappointing this family. If I backed out, they’d feel about me the way 
they had [felt] about their previous doctor, that I had strung them along, and 
in a way, insulted them.102  
Despite safeguards, this indicates the pressures which a physician may feel when 
assessing a patient against the requirements of the DDA.  
Whilst the cases discussed above note the risks associated with physician-shopping, a 
2007 study by Battin et al (‘Battin study’) found no statistical evidence that vulnerable 
groups had been abused under the DDA.103 Battin et al chose to focus on vulnerable 
groups, based on a premise that whilst all patients are equally exposed to slippery slope 
pressures, any such pressures ‘would selectively disfavour patients whose capacities for 
decision making are impaired, who are subject to social prejudice or who may have 
been socially conditioned to think of themselves as less deserving of care’. 104 
The Battin study analysed the annual reports of the Oregon Department of Human 
Services (‘ODHS’)105 from 1997 to 2006, to see whether particular vulnerable groups 
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were over-represented in the data.106 The vulnerable groups considered were the elderly 
(defined as 85 years and older), women, the uninsured, people with low educational 
status, the poor, the physically disabled or chronically ill, patients with AIDS, minors, 
people with psychiatric illnesses (including depression), and people from racial or 
ethnic minorities. The only group for which any evidence of a heightened risk was 
found was those patients with AIDS. However, as the study notes, this finding was 
based on only six persons with AIDs having died under the DDA during the nine years 
which were analysed.107  
In considering the elderly, the Battin study compared 18 to 64-year-olds with those aged 
85 years and above. It found that patients aged between 18 and 64 years were over three 
times more likely than those over the age of 85 to receive physician-assisted suicide 
under the DDA. However, as noted by Finlay and George,108 the study completely 
omitted 65 to 84-year-olds from its consideration. Had it compared 18 to 64-year-olds 
with those aged 65 years and above, then the results would have been quite different. 
The 2012 annual report of the Oregon Public Health Division (‘OPHD’) demonstrated 
that of 673 patients who died under the DDA between 1998 and 2012, 461 (68.5%) 
were aged 65 years or over, whereas the remaining 212 (31.5%) were aged between 18 
and 64 years.109 Further, the average age for DDA deaths recorded over this period was 
71 years. It is argued that this statistical ‘over-representation’ of over-65s is not 
conclusive evidence of abuse. Some age related factors relate directly to vulnerability, 
such as not wanting to be a burden on family, friends or caregivers.110 However, there 
are reasons why one would rationally expect the elderly to be more strongly represented 
than their younger peers, amongst those utilising the DDA. This is due to other 
age-related factors, such as a decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life 
enjoyable.111 
In considering those who are not mentally competent, the Battin study states that none 
of the patients were determined to have had a mental illness which influenced their 
decision. In support of this statement, Battin et al referred to Ganzini et al’s 2000 study 
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which found that approximately 20% of requests for lethal prescription under the DDA 
came from depressed patients and that none progressed to physician-assisted suicide.112 
However, as the Battin study itself notes: 
Because not all patients who requested assistance were specifically 
evaluated by mental health professionals and because many cases of 
depression are missed in primary care, it is possible that some depressed 
patients received lethal prescriptions.113  
Further, even when patients are referred for a mental health evaluation, a 2008 study by 
Ganzini et al found that some patients with depression were still not being detected. The 
study found that of 58 patients who had requested a lethal prescription, 18 patients were 
given clearance for physician-assisted suicide, of which three had treatable depression 
which went undiagnosed.114 It is thus submitted that patients with any mental disorder, 
including depression, may be vulnerable under the DDA.  
In considering those who are chronically ill, the Battin study observed that according to 
the annual reports of the OPHD, many patients who did not ingest their lethal 
prescriptions have subsequently lived longer than six months.115 The 2012 annual report 
of the OPHD shows that the length of time between first request for physician-assisted 
suicide and death has ranged up to 1,009 days.116 Whilst this range is due to the 
difficulties of giving an accurate prognosis (discussed in Chapter Five),117 such 
difficulties place the chronically ill in a vulnerable position of being misdiagnosed as 
‘terminal’ and constitutes a risk factor for the ‘empirical’ argument.   
In conclusion, the phenomena of ‘physician-shopping’, and referrals by suicide 
advocacy groups to willing physicians, the fact that mental health evaluations are not 
compulsory, and the difficulties with estimating a six-month life expectancy are all 
mechanisms which may lead to the ‘empirical’ argument being realised. However, there 
is no evidence that such a slippage has yet occurred. 
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The following section will examine whether experiences with the current law on end-of-
life medical decisions in England and Wales support either a ‘logical’ or ‘empirical’ 
argument, of a nature similar to those asserted for euthanasia. 
6.6 Have England and Wales already experienced a slide down a slippery 
slope? 
As discussed in Chapter Four,118 since Bland’s case in 1994,119 English courts have 
tended to presume in favour of the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment in cases involving patients in a PVS, or with a similarly severe condition. The 
English courts’ willingness to decide in favour of the withdrawal of such treatment may 
support both the ‘empirical’ and ‘logical’ argument. 
In the Frenchay case, almost a year after Bland’s case, a court declaration had been 
granted at first instance without a full investigation into the facts, due to time 
constraints.120 The patient had suffered severe brain damage due to a drug overdose, and 
had been diagnosed as being in a PVS. When his feeding tube became dislodged, the 
hospital obtained an urgent court declaration on short notice to lawfully refrain from 
replacing the life-sustaining feeding tube. However, the Official Solicitor then appealed 
to the Court of Appeal, on the grounds that there was insufficient time to consider the 
medical evidence provided, that two independent medical reports had not been obtained, 
and that there was some uncertainty about the patient being in a PVS.121 The appeal was 
unsuccessful. Whilst the Court of Appeal in the Frenchay case acknowledged that 
Bland’s case had laid down a principle that the Official Solicitor should have adequate 
time to consider all medical evidence on behalf of the incompetent patient, Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR held that ‘I do not consider that it would be right to allow the appeal 
simply on the basis that there has not been an opportunity on behalf of S for there to be 
a full exploration of the facts which in other circumstances would be desirable.’122 In 
then exploring the facts, the Court of Appeal also acknowledged that the medical 
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evidence concerning the extent and degree of a PVS was not as clear for S as it had been 
for Bland.123 
Following Bland’s case and in response to a recommendation of the 1994 House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on Medical Ethics,124 the RCP issued guidelines for the 
diagnosis of a PVS.125 The RCP guidelines include a list of clinical criteria for the 
diagnosis of a PVS. Two English decisions in 1997 – Re D126 and Re H127 - made 
reference to the RCP guidelines when considering the withdrawal of ANH from two 
incompetent patients. 
In Re D, the patient was found to be in a PVS despite not meeting one of the ‘clinical 
features’ of a PVS from the RCP guidelines  one which concerns the patient’s 
responses to ice water, moving objects and other stimuli.128 Based on the unanimous 
testimony of three key medical experts and the supporting testimony of the patient’s 
attending nurses and family, Sir Stephen Brown P held that ‘[I]t must be recalled that 
every single witness…have all made it clear that this patient has no awareness 
whatsoever. She is, in the words of Lord Goff in Bland, suffering what he described as 
“a living death”.’129 
In Re H, which also came before Sir Stephen Brown P, the patient was similarly found 
to be in a PVS, despite not meeting the same ‘clinical feature’ concerning a patient’s 
responses to stimuli that was considered in Re D.130 As well as considering the 
unanimous testimony of the medical experts as to H’s lack of awareness, Sir Stephen 
Brown also noted an alternative definition of a PVS which had been cited in the 
testimony of the medical experts, and which was satisfied by H. The alternative 
definition was sourced from the report of an international working party for the Royal 
Hospital for Neuro-Disability at Putney.131 After noting this alternative definition, 
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Sir Stephen Brown commented of the PVS condition that ‘This is, of course, a 
developing field for medical analysis’.132 
It is concluded that the post-Bland case law reflects a relaxation of the criteria for the 
diagnosis of a PVS, and a move towards ‘quality of life’ standards133 under which a 
patient may have some degree of awareness.134 The cases above highlight that whilst 
Bland established a precedent for patients in a PVS, subsequent cases have favoured 
expert testimony on the awareness of individual patients, over compliance with a 
pre-defined set of clinical criteria. As had been noted above by Sir Stephen Brown P in 
Re H, the professional body of knowledge concerning PVS was still developing. This 
highlights the difficulties of establishing precise boundaries, and raises concerns of a 
potential empirical slippery slope. There is, however, no compelling evidence that such 
a slippage has yet occurred.   
Concerns of a potential slippery slope in relation to incompetent patients have been 
heightened by guidance of the BMA from 1999. This guidance appears to extrapolate 
from the cases noted above in two respects, both of which are consistent with the 
‘logical’ argument. Firstly, the BMA guidance builds upon the emphasis which the 
courts placed on awareness. The guidance not only endorses the withdrawal and 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment from patients in a PVS, but also extends this to 
patients with ‘other serious conditions’, such as those with severe dementia or those 
who have suffered a serious stroke.135 The guidance is, however, imprecise as to what 
the ‘other serious conditions’ are, and the degree of ‘seriousness’ that would merit the 
withdrawal or withholding of ANH.136 Secondly, the BMA guidance appears to draw 
conclusions from the emphasis which the courts have placed on expert medical opinion 
in preference to pre-defined guidelines. The guidance asserts that, in the absence of any 
serious conflict of medical opinion or uncertainty about a patient’s diagnosis, such 
decisions do not require legal review or a court declaration.137  
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The following section will consider studies which have examined the rates of 
non-voluntary euthanasia138 in several jurisdictions where euthanasia is illegal, and 
compared those rates with the Netherlands. It considers whether these studies provide 
support for the ‘empirical’ argument that the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia139 in 
the Netherlands has resulted in a higher rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. 
6.7 Multi-jurisdictional studies 
In considering multiple studies which have analysed the rates of euthanasia across 
jurisdictions, it is noted that one must be careful when comparing the results from 
different studies because of potential differences in study designs and definitions used.140 
Nevertheless, the studies analysed in this section (conducted between 1996 and 2002) 
all purposively adopted a methodology similar to the Dutch nationwide studies.141 They 
are all based on similar studies of death certificates, and the use of a similar interview 
questionnaire. This gives the findings from a comparison between the studies, a higher 
likelihood of validity.142 
A further consideration when evaluating any single multi-jurisdictional study, as argued 
by Gorsuch, is that ‘different countries have different baseline (pre-legalisation) 
rates…because of unrelated cultural phenomena’.143 Thus, even if the rate of 
non-voluntary euthanasia is higher in some jurisdictions where voluntary euthanasia is 
illegal than in jurisdictions where it is not, this difference may not be due to the 
legalisation alone. 
A 1996 Australian survey by Kuhse, Singer et al144 (‘Kuhse-Singer Survey’) does not 
support the ‘empirical’ argument that the rate of termination of life without request will 
tend to be higher in a country which allows euthanasia to be practised, than in a country 
which does not. Kuhse, Singer et al carried out an anonymous postal survey of 3,000 
Australian doctors, who were randomly selected from a list of 27,000 on the Australian 
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medical database. With the return of 1,918 completed questionnaires, the survey had a 
64% response rate. The doctors were only asked about the most recent death they had 
attended. The researchers then adjusted the responses by the number of deaths each 
doctor had attended in that year.145 The Kuhse-Singer Survey estimated that 1.7% of all 
deaths were the result of voluntary euthanasia,146 and that 0.1% were the result of 
physician-assisted suicide. The survey also estimated that the rate of termination of life 
without request in Australia for that year was 3.5% of all deaths. This is a significantly 
higher rate than the Dutch rate of 0.7%.147 Such a finding is contrary to Keown’s 
argument that it is more likely for non-voluntary euthanasia148 to occur where voluntary 
euthanasia is legal, as it is harder to regulate a practice that is permitted under 
prescribed conditions than one which is not permitted at all.149 Kuhse, Singer et al 
suggested: 
It may be that, because existing laws prohibit the intentional termination of 
life, doctors are reluctant to discuss medical end-of-life decisions with their 
patients lest these decisions be construed as collaboration in euthanasia or in 
the intentional termination of life.150  
Similarly, Otlowski attributed the higher rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in Australia 
found by the survey to the illegality in Australia of euthanasia. She argued that a lack of 
openness on the issues of euthanasia often results in physicians taking such decisions 
upon themselves.151  
An alternative suggestion by Amarasekara and Bagaric is that, ‘The prevalence of 
non-voluntary euthanasia [in Australia] is attributable not to the ban on [euthanasia] but 
to the faulty exercise of a discretion not to prosecute violations of the ban’.152 They cite 
the cases of seven doctors in the Australian State of Victoria from the mid-1990s, who 
were not prosecuted for performing voluntary euthanasia illegally despite making 
                                                          
145 Seale (ch2 n148). 
146 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ (ch1 n7). 
147 The Van der Maas Survey (ch5 n92-2). 2.4% of all deaths were the result of voluntary euthanasia, and 0.2% were 
the result of physician-assisted suicide: ibid. 
148 ‘Non-voluntary euthanasia’ (text to ch1 n98). 
149 Keown (ch5 n24) 146. 
150 The Kuhse-Singer Survey (n144) 196. 
151 M Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (OUP 2000). 
152 The Kuhse-Singer Survey (n144) 196 cited by K Amarasekara and M Bagaric, ‘The Legalisation of Euthanasia in 
the Netherlands: Lessons to be Learnt’ (2001)27 Mon LR 179,191. 
 285 
written admissions and receiving significant media publicity. 153 Thus, the legal 
prohibition on euthanasia did not influence the rate of 3.5% found.154 Based on the 
Kuhse-Singer Survey and the subsequent commentary noted above, there is stronger 
support for a reverse ‘empirical’ slippery slope argument in which non-voluntary 
euthanasia becomes more common in jurisdictions (like Australia) where a ban on 
euthanasia exists but is not enforced, compared with jurisdictions (like the Netherlands) 
where euthanasia is permitted under prescribed regulations.  
In 1998, prior to the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia in Belgium, Deliens, Mortier 
et al conducted a study on end-of-life medical decisions in Flanders (‘Deliens-Mortier 
Study’).155 The study had a response rate of 52% (1,355 questionnaires).156 It found a rate 
of 1.1% of all deaths for voluntary euthanasia and of 3.2% for the termination of life 
without request.157 Mortier, Deliens et al noted ‘that the figure [for non-voluntary 
euthanasia] is four to five times higher in Flanders than in the neighbouring 
Netherlands’.158 They suggested as an explanation that ‘in Belgium, the patient’s 
autonomy is legally less clearly recognised and paternalistic medical practice appears to 
be more widely accepted’.159 They also observed a lower likelihood of Belgian 
physicians than their Dutch counterparts to discuss with their patients, either decisions 
involving the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, or palliative measures intended to 
shorten the patient’s life. They noted that this observation was consistent with their 
explanation noted above.160 It is submitted that due to a culture of medical paternalism161 
in Belgium, it is difficult to compare Belgium with the Netherlands, a jurisdiction that is 
                                                          
153 Amarasekara and Bagaric (ibid) 191. cf. In England and Wales, the DPP’s consent to prosecute is required for a 
crime of ‘assisted suicide’. As discussed in ch2, there is often no prosecution due to public interest reasons. 
154 M Bagaric, ‘The Kuhse-Singer Euthanasia Survey: Why it fails to Undermine the Slippery Slope Argument – 
Comparing Apples and Apples’, (2002)9 Eur J Health L 229,236-8. 
155 The Deliens-Mortier Study (ch5 n153). 
156 ibid 1806. 
157 In the Netherlands, the Van der Maas Survey (ch5 n92-2) found that 2.4% of all deaths were the result of 
voluntary euthanasia, and 0.7% were the result of termination of life without request. 
158 Mortier, Deliens (ch5 n148) 179–95, 184 fn 17. Even in 2007, Chambaere’s survey (ch5 n242) found that 
termination of life without request occurred more often in Flanders than in other jurisdictions, including the 
Netherlands. 
159 Mortier, Deliens (ch5 n148) 186–7. 
160 ibid 186-7. 
161 See section 3.3.8. 
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strongly influenced in end-of-life decisions by the ethical principles of autonomy162 and 
self-determination.163 
It has been argued that due to the methodology used in the Kuhse-Singer Survey and the 
Deliens-Mortier Study, the rates of non-voluntary euthanasia found may not be entirely 
accurate. The actual rates of termination of life without request in Australia and 
Belgium may have been lower.164 Had either study included the ‘physician interview’ 
element of the Dutch nationwide studies, it would have been possible to verify the 
questionnaire data to ensure that the medical practices recorded as ‘termination of life 
without request’ were indeed of this nature. Further, Amarasekara notes that the 
Kuhse-Singer Survey did not differentiate between the doctrine of double effect165 and a 
practice of relieving pain with an intention to cause death.166 This same flaw is also true 
of the Deliens-Mortier Study which came after Amarasekara’s criticism. Due to this 
flaw, neither the Kuhse-Singer Survey nor the Deliens-Mortier Study are a reliable 
measure against which to assess the slippery slope argument concerning non-voluntary 
euthanasia. 
A subsequent pan-European study of six countries by van der Heide et al (‘van der 
Heide Study’) obtained conflicting results.167 The study considered data from Belgium 
(immediately prior to the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia), Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland between June 2001 and February 2002. The 
Netherlands was the only jurisdiction where both voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide were legal at the time of the study. However, rather than finding that the 
Netherlands had a rate of termination of life without request which was either higher or 
lower than all of the other jurisdictions where euthanasia was prohibited, its rate was in 
the middle. The rates in Belgium (1.5%) and Denmark (0.67%) were higher than the 
Netherlands (0.6%), whilst Italy (0.06%) and Sweden (0.23%) had significantly lower 
rates. Thus, the van der Heide Study neither supports nor refutes the slippery slope 
argument concerning non-voluntary euthanasia. 
                                                          
162 See section 3.3.4. 
163 See section 3.3.2. 
164 A Fisher, JI Fleming et al, ‘Letter to the Editor’ (1997)166 Med J Aust 506. 
165 See section 3.3.6. 
166 K Amarasekara, ‘Euthanasia and the Quality of Legislative Safeguards’ (1997)23 Mon LR 1,15-16. 
167 The van der Heide Study (ch5 n92-4). 
 287 
Seale’s 2004-05 UK survey of end-of-life medical decisions (‘Seale’s UK Survey’), 
based on a similar methodology to the Kuhse-Singer Survey and the van der Heide 
Study, found a much lower rate for the termination of life without request for the UK 
(0.33% of all deaths) than either Kuhse, Singer et al had found in Australia (3.5%)168 or 
van der Heide et al had found in the Netherlands (0.9%)169. Based on this one statistic 
alone, Seale’s UK Survey provides support for the slippery slope argument concerning 
non-voluntary euthanasia by finding a rate for the UK which was lower than the 
Netherlands. However, the high rates which Seale found for ‘symptom alleviation with 
possible life-shortening effect’ (32.8%), and ‘withholding or withdrawal of treatment’ 
decisions (30.3%) may offer an alternative explanation, which calls that support for the 
‘empirical’ argument into question. These two rates are both high when compared with 
Australia and the Netherlands.170 As Kuhse asserted some years prior to Seale’s UK 
Survey in 1988: 
laws prohibiting the intentional termination of life, but permitting the 
withholding or withdrawing of treatment and the administration of 
life-shortening palliative care, do not prevent doctors from intentionally 
ending the lives of some of their patients.171  
Similarly, Griffiths asserts that ‘To a considerable extent, a doctor can choose how to 
bring about a shortening of his patient’s life and how to describe what it is that he has 
done.’172 This explanation potentially weakens the support provided by Seale’s UK 
Survey for the slippery slope argument concerning non-voluntary euthanasia, and 
indicates the general challenges of using comparative studies to assess such arguments. 
6.8 Conclusion 
From an analysis of specific jurisdictions, the chapter revealed that there is evidence to 
support the ‘logical’ argument in relation to euthanasia from both the Netherlands and 
                                                          
168 Seale (ch2 n227) 6(Table 2).  
169 ibid 7(Table 3).  
170 ibid 7(Table 3). cf. The Kuhse-Singer Survey (n144) showed a rate of 6.5% of all deaths for symptom alleviation 
with possible life-shortening effect, and a rate of 24.7% of all deaths for the withdrawal and withholding of treatment. 
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171 H Kuhse, ‘From Intention to Consent: Learning from Experience with Euthanasia’ in MP Battin et al (eds), 
Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate (Routledge 1998), 263. 
172 J Griffiths, ‘Comparative Reflections: Is the Dutch Case Unique?’ in A Klijn et al (eds), Regulating Physician-
Negotiated Death (Elsevier 2001), 203.  
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Belgium. There is also evidence from England and Wales to support a similar ‘logical’ 
slippery slope argument in relation to the withdrawal of treatment from incompetent 
patients. Evidence to support the ‘empirical’ argument in relation to euthanasia or 
assisted suicide was also found in the Netherlands, and Belgium. A review of 
multi-jurisdictional studies found evidence which refutes concerns of an ‘empirical’ 
slippery slope in relation to euthanasia, in which the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia 
causes an increase in non-voluntary euthanasia. 
The chapter established that prior to the Dutch Act, there is evidence to support both the 
‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ argument. In support of the ‘logical’ argument, the scope of 
unbearable suffering was extended over time. In support of the ‘empirical’ argument, 
the Dutch courts overlooked breaches of the KNMG guidelines, which purportedly set 
the ‘due care criteria’ for lawful physician-assisted death at that time. The expansion of 
lawful assisted death practices since the enactment of the Dutch Act further supports the 
‘logical’ argument. The Dutch Act has extended the law on assisted death to minors and 
to patients experiencing the early onset of dementia, and includes the advance 
declarations of incompetent patients, even for reasons of dementia (including 
Alzheimer’s disease). Further support for the ‘logical’ argument is provided by the 2005 
Groningen Protocol, which made neonatal termination lawful. However, no evidence 
was found from the Netherlands to support a slippery slope argument that the 
legalisation of euthanasia will lead to a rise in non-voluntary euthanasia.  
In Belgium, the chapter found support for both the ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ arguments. 
In support of the ‘logical’ argument, the CFCE has extended the legal boundaries of 
lawful euthanasia to those suffering from a mere anticipation of a future coma, loss of 
independence, or progressive dementia. In support of the ‘empirical’ argument, there 
was evidence of a regular contravention of the Belgian Act by physicians, and a lack of 
enforcement by Belgian authorities. Such contraventions include euthanasia being 
carried out by nurses and LEIF physicians.  
In Oregon, no evidence of an actual slippage was found in relation to physician-assisted 
suicide. However, several slippery slope mechanisms were found which each increase 
the risk of an ‘empirical’ slippage. These are physician-shopping, referrals by suicide 
advocacy groups, the fact that mental health evaluations are not compulsory under the 
DDA, and the difficulties with estimating a six-month life-expectancy.  
 289 
In England and Wales, no evidence of an actual slippage was found in relation to the 
law concerning the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients in a PVS. However, several slippery slope mechanisms were found 
which increase the risk of both a ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ slippage. In relation to a 
‘logical’ slippage, two mechanisms stem from the 1999 BMA guidance. The first is the 
extension of the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from patients 
in a PVS to patients with ‘other serious conditions’, and the second is an assertion that 
not all end-of-life medical decisions require review by a court. In relation to an 
‘empirical’ slippage, these mechanisms are the reliance by courts on expert testimony 
on the awareness of each individual patient rather than a pre-defined set of clinical 
criteria, and the fact that medical opinion as to what constitutes a PVS is an area of 
medical knowledge which has been developing. 
A key lesson from the Netherlands and Belgium is that assisted death laws which are 
not effectively regulated and enforced can easily lead to vulnerable people being 
abused.173 Such a seemingly entrenched circumvention of laws with little if any 
prosecution can occur through a shift in attitudes, and has been exemplified in the UK’s 
experience with the Abortion Act. Although the Netherlands prior to the Dutch Act, and 
Belgium were both found to have allowed lapses in their requirements for lawful 
assisted death by physicians, no systematic abuse of the vulnerable has been found to 
have occurred in either jurisdiction. These experiences provide an argument for 
proceeding with caution to legalise assisted death in England and Wales, by developing 
law reforms which ensure effective safeguards and enforcement, and that contain 
mechanisms by which any slippages are detected and rectified.174 Being mindful of the 
need for effective safeguards, the following chapter will conclude the thesis by making 
specific proposals for law reform on assisted death in England and Wales. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The thesis has explored the debate on the legalisation of assisted death1 in England and 
Wales. It was noted that the increasing media coverage on the assisted suicides of 
British subjects at Dignitas and high-profile cases like Tony Nicklinson2 have fuelled 
the debate. The thesis has considered the three principal sources of controversy which 
were highlighted in Chapter One. These sources of controversy are, first, the suicide 
tourism of British citizens, secondly, the lack of clarification on the circumstances in 
which a person will be prosecuted for assisted suicide and, thirdly, inconsistencies 
between the law on assisted death and the law which governs legally permitted 
end-of-life medical decisions.  
To address these controversies with law reform, the thesis has analysed the present law 
on assisted death and the social and ethical influences affecting its development. It has 
demonstrated how considerations of ‘quality of life’ are relevant to assisted death, and 
evaluated the laws of six foreign jurisdictions. The thesis has also examined the 
‘slippery slope’ argument in three selected jurisdictions, and in England and Wales 
based on its current laws. The research has been conducted by employing three types of 
research methods. The social aspects of the law has been analysed by using a socio-
legal approach. The doctrinal research method has been used to examine the current law 
and the legal developments in England and Wales, and comparative law has been used 
to examine and compare evidence from across the legal systems of selected 
jurisdictions. 
Based on the research carried out in this thesis, it has been concluded that the current 
English law on assisted death is unsatisfactory, and in need of Parliamentary reform. 
The law does not address the needs of society, particularly of the terminally ill seeking 
an assisted death in England and Wales. To better meet the needs of society, it is 
proposed that there should be a law which permits physician-assisted suicide for 
terminally ill patients in England and Wales under strictly defined circumstances, with 
strict safeguards to protect potentially vulnerable people from abuse of the law. This 
                                                          
1 ‘Assisted death’, defined in section 1.1.  
2 See section 1.1.1, and section 2.2.2 under Tony Nicklinson. 
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proposed law reform, which responds to Research Question v) in Chapter One, will be 
discussed in section 7.3 below. 
This chapter will recapitulate the key findings from the analysis within this thesis. This 
will be done by examining how far the research aims and objectives set out in Chapter 
One3 have been met and the extent to which the research questions set out in that 
chapter 4 have been answered.  
7.2 Research aims and objectives  
The current prohibition on assisted suicide in England and Wales shows the influence of 
state paternalism. This was reflected in Pretty when the ECtHR held that any arguments 
premised on respect for patient autonomy were outweighed by the state’s interest in 
‘preserving life and protecting the vulnerable’.5 However, the trend towards 
individualism in England and Wales, as discussed in Chapter Three, has encouraged 
strong support for the ethical influences of autonomy and self-determination in end-of-
life decisions. As observed in Chapter Two, the law’s recognition of autonomy and self-
determination is currently reflected in its position on suicide, the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, and the ‘best interests’ assessment of incompetent patients in cases 
concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment6. 
The ethical doctrine of sanctity of life alone cannot coherently be the rationale for the 
current prohibition on assisted death in England and Wales. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Two, neither legally permitted end-of-life medical decisions, nor the statute which 
decriminalised suicide, are based on the doctrine of sanctity of life. In Chapter Three, it 
was argued that the growing secularisation of England and Wales has resulted in 
increasingly liberal attitudes towards assisted death. As such, the orthodox religious 
values in English society on sanctity of life can no longer be relied upon to justify the 
current prohibition on assisted death. 
It was established in Chapter Three that for assisted death to be permissible, it requires 
the approval of society. As the 1994 House of Lords’ Select Committee on Medical 
Ethics stated, ‘the issue of [assisted death] is one in which the interest of the individual 
                                                          
3 See section 1.3. 
4 See section 1.4. 
5 Pretty (ECtHR) (ch2 n22) 36-37,48, see section 2.2.2 under Diane Pretty.  
6 Aintree NHS Trust case (ch2 n306),see also section 4.3.4.  
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cannot be separated from the interest of society as a whole.’7 Society’s approval was 
also given emphasis in Baroness Hale’s judgment in Purdy: 
It is not for society to tell people what to value about their own lives, 
[however at times, it] may be justifiable for society to insist that we value 
their lives even if they do not.8  
Baroness Hale stressed the need for society, in certain situations, to value the lives of 
others and thus deny assisted suicide (e.g. those tired of living, those with physical 
disabilities) even if those others do not value their own lives. It is argued that the legal 
option of physician-assisted suicide should be restricted to those suffering from a 
terminal illness. If physician-assisted suicide is extended to others with non-terminal 
conditions, many people in society might be vulnerable under such a law. Their lives 
might be less valued in the eyes of society, by the very fact that such a medical option is 
made available to them.   
As was demonstrated in Chapter Two, the public attitude in England and Wales is 
generally sympathetic towards assisted death for those with an unbearable terminal 
illness, but is not so for those wanting to die for less obvious reasons. As was noted in 
Chapter One, opinion polls show that less than 50% support assisted death being made 
available to those with ‘severe physical disability’.9 This was acknowledged by 
Baroness Hale in Purdy: 
[T]he British public have consistently supported assisted dying for people 
with a painful or unbearable incurable disease from which they will die, if 
they request it, while rejecting it for people with other reasons for wanting 
to die.10 
Lord Hope in Purdy also made particular reference to the terminally ill. His Lordship 
distinguished assisted suicide cases that would ordinarily invite prosecution, from 
‘uncertain’ cases involving the compassionate assistance of the terminally ill.11 Thus, the 
line between what is legal and what is not with respect to physician-assisted suicide 
                                                          
7 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (ch3 n113) 48.  
8 Purdy (HL)(ch1 n31)[66]. 
9 See section 1.3. 
10 Purdy (HL)(ch1 n31)[66].  
11 ibid [27],[54]. These assertions in the House of Lords reflect, consistently with the accepted judicial function, a 
judicial view of public morality. 
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should be drawn at terminal illness, with this marking the compromise between sanctity 
of life and public acceptability.  
As noted in Chapter Two, the House of Lords judgment in Purdy addressed the right to 
private life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Purdy argued that Article 8(2) of the ECHR 
required the law to be accessible, foreseeable and precise in order for individuals to 
know in advance whether their conduct will be unlawful.12 The House of Lords found 
that the consequences of assisting a suicide were not sufficiently foreseeable under 
section 2(4) of the SA 1961 with regard to the DPP’s consent to prosecute, and that 
more guidance was required. In July 2009, the House of Lords held that in order to 
satisfy Article 8(2), the DPP needed to promulgate an offence-specific prosecution 
policy identifying the facts and circumstances which he will take into account in 
deciding whether or not to consent to a prosecution for assisted suicide under section 
2(1) of the SA 1961.13 The right to private life under Article 8(1) protects an individual’s 
right to make autonomous choices regarding their quality of life, including the choice to 
end their life. This was plain in Baroness Hale’s judgment: ‘[I]f the court is serious 
about protecting autonomy [then it must] accept that autonomous individuals have 
different views about what makes their lives worth living’.14 Nevertheless, the DPP’s 
prosecuting policy should not solely be based on one’s right to autonomy. It should also 
protect the vulnerable, to ensure that a decision to end one’s own life is not the result of 
pressure, coercion or duress. As Baroness Hale held: ‘Clearly, the prime object must be 
to protect people who are vulnerable to all sorts of pressures…[and]…at the same time, 
the object must be to protect the right to exercise a genuinely autonomous choice.’15 In 
this manner, some degree of state paternalism is warranted to prevent any potential for 
abuse and to protect the vulnerable in society. 
Also as noted in Chapter Two, individual autonomy has been recognised in the DPP’s 
Policy16. Prosecution for assisted suicide is unlikely if a person had made a rational, 
autonomous, and independent decision to end their own life. The DPP’s Policy was 
intended to clarify how prosecutorial discretion is exercised, by providing specified 
circumstances where a prosecution for assisted suicide would tend to be either in, or not 
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14 ibid [66]. 
15 ibid [65]. 
16 DPP’s Policy (ch1 n34). 
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in, the public interest. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Tony Nicklinson’s case 
requested that the DPP amend his prosecuting policy to provide more clarity for 
healthcare professionals.17 Under the DPP’s Policy, physicians are currently deterred 
from getting involved in assisted suicides. The Court of Appeal in Nicklinson 
recognised that it is impossible to predict with any certainty whether a healthcare 
professional who assists a victim to commit suicide will be prosecuted or not. As a 
consequence, assisted suicide is an activity carried out by amateurs or inexperienced 
individuals in England and Wales. Not only is there a risk of a ‘botched suicide’ or of 
complications arising during the suicide which are poorly managed, but also family 
members and friends may be reluctantly compelled to assist in a loved one’s suicide.18 It 
was argued in Chapter Two that the involvement of healthcare professionals would give 
greater certainty of outcome, as they have the required medical knowledge and expertise 
to assist in suicides and to manage any complications during the suicide. 
As argued in Chapter Three, it is unethical for the medical profession to bring patients 
to a state of extended suffering, and then abandon them in that state. If physicians are 
responsible for the prolonged unbearable pain and suffering caused by medical 
advances, then they should also be able to assist a patient to end such prolonged pain 
and suffering. Public opinion surveys in the UK show majority support for physician-
assisted suicide. A 2010 survey found 74% of its respondents supporting physician-
assisted suicide for the terminally ill.19 Nevertheless, studies on assisted death discussed 
in Chapter Two, found that only between one-third and two-fifths of doctors favour 
such a permissive approach to assisted suicide for patients suffering from a terminal 
illness.20 Also as noted, a recent survey of doctors in the UK showed that only 24.9% of 
physicians are willing to perform physician-assisted suicide.21 Physicians are generally 
concerned about the impact of physician-assisted suicide on the relationship with their 
patients, and on the relationship between the medical profession and society in general. 
Chapter Three also determined that the medical profession in England and Wales, as 
represented by the GMC and the BMA, is against the legalisation of physician-assisted 
suicide as it goes against the underlying ethics of medicine.  
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It has, however, been concluded in this thesis that the legalisation of physician-assisted 
suicide will not undermine the integrity of the medical profession. A physician’s 
involvement in their patient’s death should be judged in the context of all the medical 
interventions made during the patient’s terminal illness. As demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, despite end-of-life medical decisions which involve an ‘acts and 
omissions’ distinction or a ‘double effect’, such decisions have not undermined the 
public’s trust in physicians. Further, the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction and the 
‘doctrine of double effect’ do not prevent a physician from intentionally ending the life 
of a patient. In the case of the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction, a physician is allowed to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent patient (in the 
absence of the patient’s prior request or consent), effectively causing the patient to die 
slowly from starvation rather than from their underlying medical condition. Seale’s 
2007-2008 survey on end-of-life medical decisions in the UK showed that 21.8% of 
such deaths involved the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, and a 
further 17.1% of such deaths involved a medical decision with a ‘double effect’.22 
Medical decisions with a ‘double effect’ involve those where a physician administers 
palliative medication which has a possible life-shortening effect. In such instances, the 
physician may not solely have an intention to relieve suffering but may also have an 
intention to hasten death. This was evidenced by Seale’s survey, which found that 
physicians had both an intention to alleviate suffering and an intention to hasten death in 
2% of the 17.1% of deaths noted above that involved a ‘double effect’. End-of-life 
medical decisions involving the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction or a ‘double effect’ 
promote medical paternalism, rather than the autonomous wishes of a patient. As noted 
in Chapter Six, these might also be used to conceal non-voluntary euthanasia.23 
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the KNMG24 has always supported physician-assisted 
death in the Netherlands. In respect of Belgium, the Belgian Act25 did not at first 
command the support and approval of the Belgian medical profession. The Belgian 
medical profession’s CMD initially continued to prohibit physicians from assisting 
patients to die. In time, however, it was amended to complement the Belgian Act. 
Physicians are now required to inform patients of all possible treatment options and to 
provide the relevant assistance for euthanasia. As with Belgium, it is expected that the 
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GMC and the BMA in England and Wales would make similar amendments to their 
respective codes of practice and medical guidelines, to support and complement any law 
reform that permits the participation of physicians in assisting suicide. As in Oregon, 
however, it should be anticipated that patients might still have difficulties finding a 
willing physician. 
In Chapter Three, it was accepted that a request for physician-assisted suicide should 
trigger a medical investigation into other treatment options, such as palliative care. It 
was demonstrated that a number of remedies available through palliative care, such as 
symptom control, treating depression and improving social support, may reduce the 
desire for a hastened death in people with a progressive incurable illness. Studies in the 
UK have shown that suicidal patients who have expressed a strong desire for death, 
have been known to change their views once given high-quality palliative care. The 
practice of investigating other treatment options forms part of Oregon’s legal 
framework on physician-assisted suicide under the DDA, discussed in Chapter Five. 
The annual reports of the OPHD consistently show that over 90% of patients receiving a 
lethal prescription had previously been referred to and enrolled in hospice care. In 
contrast, in the Netherlands, ‘euthanasia as a last resort’ often included cases where 
palliative care treatment could have alleviated a patient’s suffering, but where such 
treatment was simply declined by them. As noted in Chapter Five, the practice of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands was often used as an alternative to palliative care.26  
It was recognised in Chapter Three that not all terminally ill patients in England and 
Wales currently have access to effective palliative care or hospices.27 It was also 
acknowledged that there have been serious shortfalls in palliative care training and 
practice. This raised concerns not only of the lack of expertise in palliative care, but also 
of its adequacy. It has been concluded in this thesis that a law which permits physician-
assisted suicide will not meet the needs of society, if it operates against a backdrop of 
inadequate palliative care. There would need to be further development and 
improvement in palliative care treatment in England and Wales to adequately support 
such a law. As observed in Chapter Five, Belgium and Oregon both made advancements 
in palliative care treatment as an adjunct to legalising assisted death. In Oregon, the 
legalisation of physician-assisted suicide led to more training and interest by physicians 
in palliative care. In Belgium, the measures taken to promote palliative care were more 
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deliberate and extensive. The Belgian PCA was not only enacted around the same time 
as the Belgian Act, but the Belgian MDB, which endorsed the Belgian Act, stressed that 
palliative care had to be exhausted before euthanasia was resorted to.28 As a 
consequence, every Belgian hospital has a palliative care team, and palliative home care 
is available throughout the country. In respect of the Netherlands, although the Dutch 
Act29 does not mention the need for palliative care treatment, the Dutch RRCs have 
stressed in their annual reports that physicians should inform patients of the palliative 
care options that are available to relieve pain and suffering. 
Chapter Three further established that despite physicians doing everything medically 
possible to minimise the distress and discomfort of a terminally ill patient through 
palliative care, their terminal illness may still involve intolerable pain and suffering 
beyond the scope of optimal palliative care. Such care may not be able to provide total 
relief for all patients.30 In addition, some terminal degenerative conditions involve a 
decline in physical integrity and functional ability, beyond what patients perceive to be 
dignified bounds. It was also noted that the inability to maintain control or 
independence while dying is a fundamental loss of dignity for the terminally ill which 
palliative care may not be able to address. As an option of last resort, physician-assisted 
suicide would provide an assurance to the terminally ill that they are able to depend on 
their physicians to help them achieve a peaceful and dignified death. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, depression is strongly associated with a terminally 
ill patient’s request for assisted death. Clinical depression is likely to impair a patient’s 
competence and decision-making capacity. According to a recent Dutch study, cancer 
patients with a depressed mood were four times more likely to request euthanasia.31 In 
spite of this, physicians in England and Wales often fail to detect depression amongst 
terminally ill patients. A 2000 study in the UK showed that even physicians who were 
trained in depression recognised it in only 39% of patients who were known to have 
depression.32 As observed in Chapter Five, Dutch commentators also acknowledge that 
physicians are generally unable to assess when patients have psychiatric disorders that 
may be interfering with their judgement.33 Thus, to meet the needs of these vulnerable 
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patients, it has been concluded that any law which permits physician-assisted suicide 
should also include a mandatory mental health evaluation. Terminally ill patients may 
also be indirectly pressured by family members to request an assisted death, in order to 
spare them financial or emotional strain. It has been accepted in this thesis that to meet 
the needs of the vulnerable members of society, palliative care treatment should have to 
be explored and exhausted as an option before resorting to physician-assisted suicide. 
The scope of palliative care includes measures to relieve others of burden, and 
strengthen relationships with loved ones.34 
It was demonstrated in Chapter Four that under common law, English courts have been 
allowing the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent 
patients based on a ‘best interests’ assessment that reflects a paternalistic quality of life 
judgement by physicians and the courts. However, a ‘best interests’ assessment under 
the MCA 2005 promotes patient autonomy. It includes, where possible, a consideration 
of an incompetent patient’s previously expressed wishes and feelings about 
life-sustaining treatment. The Supreme Court decision in the Aintree NHS Trust case35 
affirmed that a ‘best interests’ assessment under the MCA 2005 requires a patient’s 
subjective interests to be considered, an assessment which is in line with a ‘substituted 
judgement’ standard.36 It has also been accepted in this thesis that a ‘best interests’ 
assessment which is based on a patient’s subjective view is in effect a subjective 
evaluation of ‘quality of life’.37 Thus, a law permitting physician-assisted suicide for 
competent patients who are terminally ill should also be based on a subjective 
evaluation of quality of life. 
As established in Chapter Four, individuals seeking to end their lives do so based on a 
personal assessment of their quality of life. This is evident from the range of medical 
conditions suffered by Britons who have sought an assisted suicide at the Swiss 
right-to-die organisation, Dignitas. Although physicians are often the ones to make 
quality of life judgements in treatment decisions concerning the terminally ill, it has 
been concluded in this thesis that such quality of life assessments should be based on a 
patient’s subjective experiences. As observed in Chapter Three, due to a patient’s ability 
to adapt to illness (the ‘response shift’ phenomenon), their quality of life may change 
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during the course of terminal illness.38 It was also noted that this ability to adapt to 
illness may be influenced by effective palliative care treatment. As a person’s quality of 
life often changes during the course of terminal illness, a patient’s subjective evaluation 
would best describe and define their quality of life. The Aintree NHS Trust case,39 as 
mentioned above, also emphasised the subjective interests and views of a patient when 
deciding on the potential withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients. There are, however, acknowledged difficulties measuring quality 
of life at the end of life using subjective measurement instruments. Patients may be too 
ill to complete such an assessment. Under such circumstances, doctors and family 
members may make an assessment of the patient’s quality of life on their behalf. 
However, it was identified that such assessments are less accurate for the more 
subjective aspects of a patient’s life.40 It has accordingly been concluded in this thesis 
that such third party or proxy assessments would be inappropriate for a law permitting 
physician-assisted suicide, which should be entirely based on a terminally ill patient’s 
subjective assessment of their quality of life.  
Chapter Three established that the population of the UK is rapidly ageing. ‘The elderly’ 
(people aged 65 and over) are projected to increase to 12.7 million in 2018, and reach 
16.9 million by 2035.41 Studies demonstrate that the elderly often associate dignity in 
old age with autonomy and independence. They fear a poor quality of life and an 
undignified prolongation of death due to advances in medicine. As a consequence, a 
recent opinion poll found that 90% of the elderly feel that assisted suicide should be 
legalised for people with terminal illness.42 These concerns of the elderly in the UK can 
be matched with those of the elderly in Oregon. As noted in Chapter Five, the annual 
reports of the OPHD consistently show that physician-assisted suicide under the DDA is 
predominantly utilised by the elderly43 who have concerns with a loss of autonomy, a 
decreasing ability to enjoy life, the loss of dignity, and being a burden to others.44  
It was demonstrated in Chapter Three that the elderly in the UK may already be under 
indirect pressure to desire an assisted death. According to studies, many elderly people 
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in the UK experience abuse; especially psychological abuse and neglect.45 Further, as 
the opportunity to go into a hospice appears statistically to decline with age, the elderly 
do not have equal access to palliative care, thus adding further pressure on some elderly 
individuals.46 Inadequate care and support for older people (over-75s) at the end of their 
lives has also been documented by various government reports. One report in particular 
criticised the NHS for treating elderly people without compassion, and for condemning 
many to die in unnecessary pain, indignity and distress.47 It has been concluded in this 
thesis that these existing circumstances could make elderly people vulnerable, and 
desire an assisted death in circumstances where palliative care might otherwise provide 
relief. Any legalisation of physician-assisted suicide in England and Wales will need to 
address such prejudices towards the elderly, if it is to protect them from abuse.  
Based on the experience of the Dutch law on euthanasia that has spanned over more 
than 30 years, Chapter Six found no evidence that the legalisation of voluntary 
euthanasia led to an increase in the rates of non-voluntary euthanasia48 in the 
Netherlands.49 Thus, this argument, which is often tendered by those opposed to the 
legalisation of assisted death, is entirely speculative. It was, however, noted in Chapter 
Five that even after euthanasia was legalised in Belgium, Belgian physicians did not 
completely abandon their pre-existing practice of non-voluntary euthanasia.50 In these 
cases, communication with patients had been impossible due to a sudden deterioration 
in the patient’s illness, or communication had been deferred for too long.51 In Flanders, 
non-voluntary euthanasia occurred mainly among patients 80 years of age or older, who 
were in a coma or suffering from dementia.52 This approach by Belgian physicians 
demonstrates a highly paternalistic attitude in which physicians apply their own quality 
of life judgement to a patient. Nevertheless, the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia in 
Belgium has dropped since 1998.53  
Based on the findings in this research, it is accepted that there is indeed a case for 
change in the law on assisted death in England and Wales. The present status quo is 
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unsatisfactory, as the DPP’s Policy does nothing more than reinforce the current law 
that assisted suicide is a crime. Despite the prospect of the DPP’s Policy being 
developed further to clarify the law in respect of those healthcare professionals who 
assist in suicides,54 it is proposed that there should be a law which permits physician-
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients. As noted in Chapter Three, such a law could 
be justified by the ethical measures of deontology and consequentialism.55 The law 
permitting physician-assisted suicide should be restricted to competent patients who are 
terminally ill, who find themselves suffering unbearably and experiencing a poor and 
unacceptable quality of life due to their terminal illness. Such patients should be 
allowed to make an autonomous request for assisted suicide, based on their own 
subjective evaluation of their quality of life. There should also be adequate and stringent 
safeguards to protect the vulnerable in society and to prevent abuse of the law.  
7.3 Research questions 
Based on the analysis of the preceding chapters, the research questions posed in Chapter 
One will now be answered in turn. 
Research Question i) 
Is the current law on assisted death in England and Wales satisfactory? 
i.e. whether the law meets the needs of society in general and of individuals who 
competently decide that they do not wish to continue living, whether the law is 
consistent and coherent, and whether the law is legally and morally defensible. 
It is concluded in this thesis that the present law is unsatisfactory for the following 
reasons. 
With regard to the terminally ill, the current law is out of step with public opinion. This 
is demonstrated by recent public opinion polls in the UK which have shown a high level 
of support for legalising assisted death for the terminally ill. The BSA surveys, discussed 
in Chapter Two, have consistently found that 80% of respondents believe that assisted 
death should be allowed for terminally ill patients.56 With regard to those who are not 
terminally ill, the current law is not so out of step. The BSA surveys found that of the 
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same respondents, only 45% thought it should be available to people with incurable but 
non-terminal illness.57 
The large numbers of British citizens seeking an assisted suicide at Dignitas indicates 
that the law prohibiting assisted death in England and Wales is unsatisfactory. As noted 
in Chapter One, recent figures show that approximately 215 Britons have been helped to 
end their lives at Dignitas, whilst 821 other Britons were registered with Dignitas at the 
end of 2012.58 The public reaction to increasing media coverage of these assisted 
suicides is also evidence that the law is unsatisfactory.  
It has been noted in this thesis that, in one sense, due to a patient’s right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, a competent patient can already achieve an assisted suicide with a 
physician’s assistance. As observed in Chapter Two, physicians are required by law to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment from a competent patient who has made an 
autonomous refusal for such treatment.59 It is morally indefensible that any competent 
patient is permitted to die of starvation and dehydration by refusing life-sustaining 
treatment, yet is prevented from ending their life more directly and humanely through 
the ingestion of a lethal medication prescribed by a physician.  
The cases of Pretty60 and Re B61 also demonstrate the inconsistency in the current 
English law on assisted death. Ms B who was not terminally ill, was allowed by the 
court to refuse a life-sustaining ventilator which was keeping her alive, whilst Mrs 
Pretty who was terminally ill, was denied a court order permitting her husband to assist 
her to travel abroad to Dignitas for an assisted suicide.  
Further evidence of inconsistency in the current law is demonstrated by the English 
courts adopting the ‘doctrine of double effect’ and the ‘acts and omissions’ distinction, 
to differentiate permissible end-of-life medical decisions from acts of assisted death. 
Both the ‘doctrine of double effect’ and ‘acts and omissions’ distinction merely 
re-describe ‘indirect euthanasia’ and ‘non-voluntary euthanasia’62 in medical terms. 
Physicians in England and Wales may be using these permitted practices as a guise for 
practising euthanasia with no proper supervision or safeguards. As suggested in Chapter 
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Six, the prohibition on euthanasia in the UK may have encouraged doctors to terminate 
life in ways which are more difficult to detect.63 Laws permitting the administration of 
life-shortening palliative care and the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment do not prevent physicians from intentionally ending the lives of some of their 
patients.64 Seale’s 2004-2005 survey on end-of-life medical decisions showed that the 
administration of life-shortening palliative care and the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment were widespread practices in the UK, with an estimated 33% 
and 30%, respectively, having had their lives ended this way every year.65  It is argued 
that these widespread practices are the result of a culture of medical paternalism that is 
encouraged by the absence of a law permitting physician-assisted death. 
Seale’s 2007-2008 survey also found that 0.5% of all annual deaths in the UK are the 
result of euthanasia by physicians  0.2% being cases of voluntary euthanasia,66 and 
0.3% being cases of non-voluntary euthanasia.67 Seale’s survey shows that in the 
absence of a legislative scheme to regulate assisted death, unlawful deaths are currently 
being facilitated by doctors without any appropriate safeguards, thus placing the 
vulnerable at risk. This is further evidence that the current law on assisted death in 
England and Wales does not meet the needs of society. As noted in Chapters Five and 
Six, studies in Germany68, Australia,69 and Belgium70 have similarly found that a law 
against euthanasia does not deter all physicians from performing not only voluntary 
euthanasia but non-voluntary euthanasia as well.71  
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the law on assisted suicide in England and Wales 
lacks coherence. The DPP’s Policy neither decriminalises assisted suicide, nor provides 
an assurance of immunity from prosecution.72 Nonetheless, there have been no 
prosecutions for assisted suicide since the policy came into effect. The DPP’s decision 
to not prosecute cases that satisfy the factors against prosecution has, in addition, 
                                                          
63 See text to ch6 nn168-172.  
64 Kuhse (ch6 n171).  
65 Seale (ch2 n227). See ch6 nn168-170. 
66 ‘Voluntary euthanasia’ (ch1 n7). 
67 Seale (ch2 n148). 
68 Schildmann (ch5 n332). 
69 The Kuhse-Singer Survey (ch6 n144).  
70 The Deliens-Mortier Study (ch5 n153). 
71 See section 6.7. 
72 DPP’s Policy (ch1 n34) para6.  
304 
undermined society’s respect for the law on assisted suicide,73 and led to a public 
perception that assisted suicides that meet the policy criteria stipulated in the DPP’s 
Policy are decriminalised.74 
Research Question ii) 
Have the recent legal developments on assisted death addressed the needs of 
society and the concerns of those seeking an assisted death in England and Wales? 
It is concluded in this thesis that the recent legal developments have not addressed the 
needs of society, and the concerns of those seeking an assisted death in England and 
Wales. All of the following reasons support this conclusion. 
As observed in Chapter Two, the DPP’s Policy makes a prosecution unlikely to be in 
the public interest where a person compassionately assists a loved-one, who has made a 
voluntary, clear, settled and informed choice to die.75 However, investigations pursuant 
to the DPP’s Policy to consider the victim’s settled decision to die and the suspect’s 
motivation, are carried out only after the victim’s death.76 This inherent limitation is 
because the decision to prosecute cannot be made in advance. Thus, there are no 
prospective safeguards in place to protect those who might be vulnerable, particularly 
those who might be under pressure from others to end their lives.  
The DPP’s Policy makes it is difficult to obtain practical assistance in suicide within 
England and Wales. The policy specifically deters healthcare professionals from 
assisting patients.77 However, their involvement would give greater certainty of 
outcome, lower the risk of botched suicides,78 and reduce potential suffering during the 
suicide itself. The public-interest factors also prevent any individuals or organisations 
from providing any expert information or advice, and prohibit anyone from providing 
specific information via a website or publication.79 As a result, there is no possibility for 
organisations such as the German Society for Humane Death or Dignitate Deutschland 
to support people in need of suicide assistance, by either providing information on drugs 
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and dosages necessary for a painless death, or by facilitating suicide tourism to 
Dignitas.80 
The DPP’s Policy has ensured that suicide assistance provided in England and Wales 
remains an activity carried out only by inexperienced individuals. As with the current 
position in Germany, patients in England and Wales depend on the assistance of people 
who are not medically trained to assist in their suicides. Amateur suicide assistance 
from family members or friends, subjects patients to numerous risks. Complications 
may take place during the assisted suicide. For example, a patient may have difficulties 
taking a medication or may experience a sudden unexpected reaction to the medication 
taken. Further, depression will also go undetected and unaddressed, as the ban on 
healthcare professionals in the DPP’s Policy includes psychiatrists and psychologists.   
Those who are unable to obtain the assistance of family members or friends in England 
and Wales are left only with the option (provided they are financially able) of seeking 
help from right-to-die organisations abroad. Some may seek an assisted suicide sooner 
than otherwise, because of the need to travel abroad whilst they are physically able to do 
so. However, those going to Dignitas to end their lives may be at risk under the Swiss 
legal framework for assisted suicide. As was noted in Chapter Five, Swiss law is 
similarly vague. To-date, Swiss courts have only affirmed that physicians are permitted 
to assist in suicides for conditions indisputably leading to death.81 Yet, Britons who have 
been assisted to die at Dignitas have suffered from various conditions, inclusive of non-
terminal and curable medical conditions.82 There is also no requirement for a mental 
health evaluation under Swiss law.83 Thus, right-to-die organisations may fail to detect 
depression or any other mental disorder that impairs the decision-making capacity of 
patients. Further, as the volunteers at such organisations are not medically trained, they 
will not be able to address the complications that can arise after the lethal medication is 
ingested.84 Such complications occurred in the 2010 case of Andrew Colgan, who due to 
his high tolerance to medication, remained alive for more than 90 minutes after 
ingesting lethal medication.85    
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Research Question iii) 
Can a person’s ‘quality of life’ determine whether they should have an assisted 
death? 
As observed in Chapter Four, individuals seeking to end their lives at right-to-die 
organisations abroad are already doing so based on a personal assessment of their poor 
quality of life due to illness, disease or disability. It was appreciated that terminally ill 
patients who have a higher quality of life  in terms of physical, cognitive and social 
functioning  are less likely to desire a hastened death.86 The ‘best interests’ assessment 
under common law (prior to the MCA 2005) for cases involving the withdrawal or 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients, had in effect been a 
paternalistic ‘quality of life’ judgement by the courts and physicians. As of 2007, the 
law under the MCA provides that in cases where life-sustaining treatment is futile or 
overly burdensome to an incompetent patient, or where there is no prospect of recovery 
with such treatment, it may be withdrawn or withheld in the ‘best interests’ of the 
patient. As noted above, the ‘best interests’ assessment under the MCA 2005 takes into 
account the previous statements by a patient about their wishes and feelings about life-
sustaining treatment. By referring to a patient’s subjective views, the ‘best interests’ 
assessment effectively focuses on a subjective evaluation of quality of life. Thus, where 
possible, there is now respect for patient autonomy, and the English courts and 
physicians are deterred from exercising a paternalistic quality of life judgement. As 
mentioned above, the Aintree NHS Trust case87 confirmed that the ‘best interests’ 
assessment under the MCA 2005 requires a patient’s subjective interests to be 
considered. It has been accepted in this thesis that for consistency with the law on the 
withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients, a 
subjective assessment of ‘quality of life’ should also be the basis for any right conferred 
upon a competent terminally ill patient to request a physician-assisted suicide.  
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Research Question iv) 
Would a law permitting assisted death for a restricted group of people lead to 
assisted death being practised beyond that group? 
As demonstrated in Chapter Six, there is evidence to support the ‘slippery slope’ 
argument in relation to assisted death from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Oregon. The 
evidence demonstrates that the laws have been extended to a wider group of people 
beyond that originally intended.  
In respect of the Netherlands,88 prior to the Dutch Act, there is evidence to support both 
the ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ slippery slope arguments. In support of the ‘logical’ 
argument, the scope of ‘unbearable suffering’ was extended over time, whilst in support 
of the ‘empirical’ argument, the Dutch courts disregarded breaches of the KNMG 
guidelines when considering each case based on its own circumstances. The expansion 
of lawful assisted death since the Dutch Act came into force also supports the ‘logical’ 
slippery slope argument. The Dutch Act has extended the law to a wider group of 
people including minors aged between 12 and 16 years. Since 2004, the RRCs have 
allowed those with the early onset of dementia to make a lawful request for assisted 
death, on the basis that the prospect of a further loss of dignity constitutes ‘unbearable 
and hopeless suffering’. The Dutch Act also recognises the advance declarations for 
assisted death of incompetent patients, including for reasons of dementia and 
Alzheimer’s disease. Further support for the ‘logical’ argument is provided by the 2005 
Groningen Protocol, which made neonatal termination lawful. By endorsing the 
Groningen Protocol, the Dutch authorities have accepted the practice of non-voluntary 
euthanasia for infants.  
In respect of Belgium,89 it has been found in this thesis that there is support for both the 
‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ slippery slope argument. In support of the ‘logical’ argument, 
the Belgian CFCE90 has extended the legal boundaries of lawful euthanasia to those 
suffering from a mere anticipation of future coma, loss of independence, or progressive 
dementia. In support of the ‘empirical’ argument, there was evidence of regular 
contraventions of the Belgian Act by physicians, and a lack of enforcement by Belgian 
authorities. Such contraventions include euthanasia being carried out by nurses and 
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LEIF physicians.91 Evidence of widespread non-voluntary euthanasia has been found in 
Belgium. However, there is no evidence that this has increased since the Belgian Act 
legalised voluntary euthanasia. 
In Oregon,92 no evidence of an actual slippage was found in relation to physician-
assisted suicide. However, several slippery slope mechanisms were found which each 
increase the risk of an ‘empirical’ slippage. These are physician-shopping, referrals by 
suicide advocacy groups, the fact that mental health evaluations are not compulsory 
under the DDA, and the difficulties of obtaining an accurate prognosis when attempting 
to estimate a six-month life-expectancy. 
In England and Wales, no evidence of an actual slippage was found in relation to the 
law concerning withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
incompetent patients in a PVS.93 However, several slippery slope mechanisms were 
found which increase the risk of both a ‘logical’ and ‘empirical’ slippage. In relation to 
a ‘logical’ slippage, two mechanisms stem from the 1999 BMA guidance. The first is 
the extension of the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment from 
patients in a PVS to patients with ‘other serious conditions’, such as those with severe 
dementia or those who have suffered a serious stroke, and the second is an assertion that 
not all end-of-life medical decisions require review by a court.94 In relation to an 
‘empirical’ slippage, these mechanisms are the reliance by courts on expert testimony 
on the awareness of each individual patient rather than reliance on a pre-defined set of 
clinical criteria, and the fact that medical opinion as to what constitutes a PVS is still 
developing. 
It has been accepted in this thesis that the experience from the Netherlands and Belgium 
shows that assisted death laws which are not effectively regulated and enforced can lead 
to a risk of vulnerable people being abused. These experiences provide a basis for 
proceeding with caution in developing law reform for England and Wales. They 
highlight the need for safeguards. Barriers on the slope and mechanisms by which 
slippages down the slope can be detected and, thereafter, rectified are essential.95 With 
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this in mind, such a proposal for law reform will be addressed under the following and 
final research question. 
Research Question v) 
If the law on assisted death is to be reformed in England and Wales, what would 
the scope of the change be and how should the proposal for law reform be drafted? 
The law reforms proposed in this thesis only apply to competent adult patients. Thus, 
the following proposal for England and Wales does not address patients such as 
incurably ill and severely disabled neonates, minors, and patients with dementia. It also 
does not include the recognition of advance directives of competent patients.  
The law reforms proposed include some features from past law reform proposals. 
Incremental changes have been made to these features to develop them into effective 
safeguards to prevent abuse of the law and protect the vulnerable in society. It is 
proposed that physician-assisted suicide should be made available as a medical option 
of last resort to competent patients who are terminally ill and suffering unbearably and 
experiencing a poor and unacceptable quality of life due to their illness. Listed below 
are 14 key provisions that will need to be included in the proposed law, to reduce the 
risk of a slide down a slippery slope, and to also detect and address any such slippages 
should they occur.  
(i) Physician-assisted suicide will be made available as a medical option of last resort 
to terminally ill patients. 
Chapter Two demonstrated that society’s needs would be better served if physicians 
were involved in assisted suicides.96 Physicians have the required competence to achieve 
a safe and humane death, thus reducing the risk of failed assisted suicides and giving 
patients the comfort of professional medical assistance in the event that any 
complications arise when the patient takes the lethal medication. As with the Dutch law 
on assisted death, physicians should stay with the patient continuously from the time the 
patient takes the lethal medication until the patient’s death.97  
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As has been established in this thesis, by restricting lawful physician-assisted suicide to 
terminally ill patients, the proposed law reform would be in line with current public 
opinion in England and Wales. The notion of lawful euthanasia by physicians is rejected 
in this thesis. Such a law would be open to medical paternalism, as the patient would not 
have control over the final act that causes their death. As asserted by the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on the ADTI Bill 2004 (‘2004 Select Committee’), the key 
issue with assisted death is that the responsibility for the ultimate act should rest with 
the patient. This has the effect of making patients think more carefully before carrying 
out the act to end their lives.98 As noted in Chapter Two, the 2004 Select Committee also 
found that the experiences of the Netherlands and Oregon suggest a strong connection 
between the inclusion of euthanasia in a law on assisted death, and a significantly higher 
rate of deaths.99 This is supported by the 2012 OPHD annual report which indicates that 
approximately one third of patients do not use the lethal medication once prescribed.100 
They rather treat it as an ‘insurance policy’.101  
The proposal is for a law which permits physician-assisted suicide that focuses on a 
patient’s terminal illness and its treatment. As physician-assisted suicide would be 
available as a medical option, the proposed law will not address any suffering that is 
unrelated to a terminal illness e.g. ‘tired of life’, ‘prolonged dwindling’, and existential 
suffering. As concluded in Chapter Four, these examples of other types of suffering are 
not within a physician’s professional competence.102   
(ii) There must be a voluntary verbal request for physician-assisted suicide by a 
competent patient to their attending physician, with whom they have an established 
continuing relationship. The attending physician and independent consulting 
physician will have to be certain that the patient is competent and has made a 
voluntary, informed and settled decision free of undue influence. A mental health 
evaluation will also have to be carried out to ensure that the patient is not suffering 
from any mental disorders that could impair his or her decision-making capacity. 
The patient may revoke the request for physician-assisted suicide at any time and in 
any manner.  
                                                          
98 See section 2.4.2.  
99 See text to ch2 nn371-372. 
100 See text to ch5 n547. 
101 Ganzini and Dahl (ch5 n548).  
102 See text to ch4 nn151-152. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the requirement for an established physician-patient 
relationship could help ensure that the patient’s decision is autonomous, voluntary and 
well-considered.103 The physician who has a treatment history with the patient would not 
only be better able to determine that their patient is not under pressure or coerced to end 
their life, but would also have better knowledge of their patient’s medical history. The 
requirement for a physician-patient relationship is based on the benefits realised through 
the ‘huisartsen’ (family-care physicians) which often administer the Dutch law on 
assisted death.104 This proposed requirement would be able to address the phenomenon 
of ‘physician-shopping’ which is a criticism of Lord Falconer’s AD Bill 2013.105 As 
demonstrated by the experiences with Oregon’s DDA106 and the ROTI Act107 in the 
Northern Territory of Australia, patients have been able to approach more 
accommodating physicians via ‘physician-shopping’. 
Based on the ROTI Act, to ensure that the patient’s decision is a well-considered 
autonomous decision, the attending physician and consulting physician will have to be 
satisfied that the patient has considered the implications of their decision, has been 
informed of the prognosis expected, and has understood the treatment options that are 
reasonably available, including palliative care.108 Similar requirements have been 
included in Lord’s Joffe’s ADTI Bill 2004109 and the AD Bill 2013110. 
(iii) The patient will have to follow up with a written request for physician-assisted 
suicide at least 12 days after the verbal request. If the patient has a prognosis of less 
than a month to live, then the written request may be made at least six days after the 
initial verbal request. The written request must be made in the presence of the 
attending physician, the consulting physician, and two witnesses. At least one 
witness must not be a relative, the patient’s beneficiary, or a person directly 
involved in the patient’s care or treatment. 
                                                          
103 See text to ch3 nn200-203.  
104 See Lindemann and Verkerk (ch5 n73), and text to ch5 n73. See also section 5.2.2.  
105 See section 2.4.6.  
106 See section 5.7.2.  
107 See section 5.6.2.  
108 ROTI Amendment Act (ch5 n383) sub-s7(1)(e).  
109 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48) cl 2.  
110 AD Bill 2013 (ch1 n57) cl 3.  
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This proposed requirement helps ensure that the patient is not feeling pressure from 
others to follow through with the earlier verbal request. Based on the DDA, to protect 
vulnerable patients and ensure that they are making an autonomous request, at least one 
witness will have to be completely independent.111 Additionally, the joint presence of the 
attending physician and consulting physician, which is based on the ROTI Act,112 
increases the assurance that the patient’s request is voluntary and that they are not 
coerced or influenced by third parties. Both the ADTI Bill 2004 and the AD Bill 2013 
included a requirement for witnesses. The former required two witnesses, one a solicitor 
and the other a person known to the patient,113 while the latter required only one witness 
who was not related or involved in the patient’s treatment or care.114 
(iv) The patient must be suffering from a terminal illness. Terminal illness must be 
defined as an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed 
and will within reasonable medical judgement produce death within six months. The 
attending physician and the consulting physician will have to independently assess 
the patient to confirm that the patient has a terminal illness with a prognosis of six 
months or less to live. 
The definition of terminal illness is based on the DDA.115 However, as demonstrated in 
Chapters Two116 and Five117, an accurate prognosis in terms of life-expectancy is not 
possible for a terminal illness. This was evidenced by the OPHD annual reports in 
Oregon, where patients who opted to defer the use of their prescription had frequently 
lived longer than six months.118 The limitations on prognosis were also demonstrated by 
the limited cases under the ROTI Act,119 and noted by the 2004 Select Committee120. 
Although it has been accepted in this thesis that there are practical limitations on the 
accuracy of prognoses, this proposed requirement is included to avoid any potential 
abuse of the law. As with the DDA, the difficulties in accurate prognosis are taken into 
                                                          
111 Or Rev Stat §127.810. 
112 ROTI Amendment Act (ch5 n383) sub-ss7(1)(i)-(k).  
113 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48) cl 4.  
114 AD Bill 2013 (ch1 n57) cl 3.  
115 Or Rev Stat §127.800 (1998).  
116 See text to ch2 nn382-386.  
117 See text to ch5 nn476-483.  
118 Battin (ch5 n480). See text to ch5 nn481-482.  
119 See text to ch5 nn395-398.  
120 See text to ch2 nn382-386.  
313 
account by the inclusion of the words ‘within reasonable medical judgement’. If the 
consulting physician’s prognosis differs from that of the attending physician, the patient 
will be referred to a body of informed medical professionals 121 (within the NHS) for a 
confirmation on prognosis that is ‘within reasonable medical judgement’. This proposed 
requirement takes into account the recommendations of the 2004 Select Committee that 
the definition for terminal illness must reflect the realities of clinical practice as regards 
accurate prognosis.122 The prognosis of six months is similar to the provision in the 
AD Bill 2013.123 
(v) The patient must be suffering unbearably and experiencing a poor and unacceptable 
quality of life due to the terminal illness. The attending physician will have to make 
sure that a quality of life assessment is carried out within 12 days of the patient’s 
verbal request. 
It is proposed that physician-assisted suicide should be made available to terminally ill 
patients experiencing a poor and unacceptable quality of life. The quality of life 
assessment will be based on a subjective patient evaluation. As the proposed law will be 
available as a medical option of last resort, the assessment of quality of life will be 
restricted to the pain and suffering (physical or psychological) medically caused by the 
patient’s terminal illness and its related treatment. Although it may be difficult for 
terminally ill patients to complete subjective measurement instruments due to ill health 
or a fragile state,124 for the purposes of this law reform, third party assessments will not 
be accepted.125 As the proposed law is based on patient autonomy, and suffering is a 
subjective experience which cannot be assessed objectively by clinical methods or 
reliably be attributed to the underlying condition,126 quality of life must be determined 
by a subjective patient evaluation. 
In drafting this provision, the option of requiring that the suffering be ‘unrelievable’, 
rather than ‘unbearable’ was considered. As noted in Chapter Two, ‘unrelievable’ was 
the term favoured by the 2004 Select Committee when it considered the ADTI Bill 
                                                          
121 Bolam test (ch4 n18). 
122 2004 HL Select Committee Report Vol I (ch1 n49) para 269(c)(iii).  
123 AD Bill 2013 (ch1 n57) cl 3, and sch for form of declaration pursuant to cl 3.    
124 Cohen (ch4 n169), Thompson (ch4 n170).  
125 See section 4.5.  
126 2004 HL Select Committee Report Vol I (ch1 n49) paras 127-130.  
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2004.127 The term was favoured for its greater objectivity, and as a means of compelling 
patients to experience palliative care first. In the proposed law reform in this thesis 
(Provision (ix) below), however, the physician is required to ensure that palliative care 
is exhausted first.    
(vi) The attending physician must (a) inform the patient of the medical diagnosis, 
prognosis, alternative treatment options available, including palliative care, and of 
the patient’s right to revoke his request at any time; (b) be satisfied that the patient’s 
request is made voluntarily, and that the patient has made an informed decision; 
(c) refer the patient to an independent consulting physician for a second opinion; 
(d) refer the patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist for a mental health evaluation; 
and (e) be satisfied that a patient is suffering unbearably from a terminal illness, and 
that the suffering is affecting their quality of life.  
 
(vii) The attending physician will have to refer the patient to an independent consulting 
physician, who must be a specialist in the patient’s terminal illness. For this 
purpose, a network of specialists in various terminal illnesses must be provided by 
the NHS. These specialists must be prepared to act as independent consulting 
physicians under the proposed law. The consulting physician will have to 
(a) confirm the diagnosis and prognosis by the attending physician; and (b) be 
satisfied that the patient has a clear and settled intention to end their own life which 
has been reached voluntarily, on an informed basis and without coercion or duress. 
When the consulting physician’s opinion differs from the attending physician’s 
prognosis, the patient’s medical condition will have to be confirmed by applying a 
professional medical judgement in accordance with a responsible body of informed 
medical opinion128 from the NHS. 
By requiring consulting physicians to act independently of attending physicians, this 
would prevent friends or colleagues of the attending physician from providing the 
required medical confirmation to facilitate the proposed law. This was the experience 
with the Dutch law prior to the Dutch Act.129 However, pursuant to the Dutch Act, the 
                                                          
127 See text to ch2 n389.  
128 Bolam test (ch4 n18). 
129 See text to ch5 nn66-67. 
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SCEN130 programme provides suitably trained physicians to act as independent 
consulting physicians in the Netherlands, as does the LEIF131 network in Belgium132. 
Based on the ROTI Act,133 an independent second opinion from an expert on the 
patient’s terminal illness provides greater assurance of the diagnosis and prognosis of 
the patient’s terminal illness. A network of specialists provided by the NHS to act as 
independent consulting physicians discourages ‘physician-shopping’. As with the ROTI 
Act, the DDA did not specify how differing opinions on a patient’s prognosis were to be 
addressed. This failure encourages physicians and patients to obtain the desired 
confirmation on prognosis by ‘physician-shopping’.134 The ADTI Bill 2004135 and AD 
Bill 2013136 both included similar provisions, requiring a consulting physician to have 
either qualifications, experience, or a specialisation in the patient’s terminal illness.   
(viii) Soon after the medical examination by the consulting physician, the attending 
physician will have to refer the patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist for a mental 
health evaluation. For this purpose, a network of psychiatrists and psychologists 
must be provided by the NHS. Members of this network must be prepared to carry 
out the required mental health evaluations under the proposed law. They will have to 
determine that (a) the patient’s decision is not distorted by treatable clinical 
depression; and (b) the patient is not suffering from any other psychiatric or 
psychological disorder causing impaired judgement. The mental health evaluation 
will have to be performed twice. The first evaluation must be within 12 days of the 
patient’s verbal request, and the second evaluation must be a day before the lethal 
medication is given to the patient. In cases where the patient has a prognosis of less 
than a month to live, then the first evaluation must be within six days of the patient’s 
verbal request, and the second evaluation must be on the day the written request is 
made. 
This mandatory requirement for a mental health evaluation addresses the concern in the 
ADTI Bill 2004 which proposed that only if a physician believed that the patient was 
                                                          
130 SCEN (ch5 n68).  
131 LEIF (ch5 n189). 
132 See text to ch5 n191. 
133 See section 5.6.2. 
134 See Kissane (ch5 n395), and text to ch5 n500. 
135 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48) cl 2. 
136 AD Bill 2013 (ch1 n57) cl 3. 
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not competent, were they to refer the patient to a psychiatrist.137 Similarly, the DDA only 
requires the attending physician or consulting physician to refer the patient for a mental 
health evaluation if they believe that the patient’s judgement is impaired by depression 
or some other psychiatric or psychological disorder.138 However, as established in 
Chapter Three, depression amongst terminally ill patients is significantly overlooked 
and under-treated in England and Wales.139 Experiences with the DDA also confirm that 
physicians often fail to recognise depression. This is evidenced by the downward trend 
in the percentage of patients being referred for formal psychiatric or psychological 
evaluation.140 Thus, it is not sufficient to merely rely on the professional competencies of 
physicians when screening for depression.141 A network of psychiatrists and 
psychologists provided by the NHS would discourage ‘physician-shopping’ for a 
favourable evaluation. As observed in Chapter Five, this often takes place in Oregon to 
obtain the desired mental health evaluation.142 Nevertheless, it is also accepted that a 
mental health evaluation is not foolproof. Despite having depression at the time of a 
mental health evaluation, some terminally ill patients in Oregon were still cleared for an 
assisted suicide under the DDA.143 Based on the ROTI Act, it was noted that patients 
may not be cooperative or volunteer information during a mental health evaluation for 
fear of frustrating their chances of getting an assisted death under the law.144 
As observed in Chapter Five, in the absence of a long-term relationship with a patient, 
only a small number of psychiatrists are confident that they can satisfactorily determine 
in a single visit whether a patient is legally competent to commit suicide.145 Thus, under 
the proposed law reform, a mental health evaluation will have to be performed by the 
same psychiatrist (or psychologist) at two different times, once before the written 
request for physician-assisted suicide is made, and once after the written request. The 
second mental health evaluation performed a day before the lethal prescription is taken 
would ensure that a patient’s capacity is assessed at an appropriate point before their 
suicide. This would substantially address the concern with the AD Bill 2013, that 
                                                          
137 ADTI Bill 2004 (ch1 n48) cl 8. 
138 Or Rev Stat §127.800 (1998). 
139 See text to ch3 nn292-297. 
140 See text to ch5 nn501-509. 
141 Battin (ch5 n513). 
142 See text to ch5 nn519-522. 
143 See text to ch5 n514. 
144 See text to ch5 nn401-402. 
145 See text to ch5 nn516-517. 
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mental capacity may be lost in the period between the request being approved and the 
drugs being supplied and swallowed.146 A mental health evaluation performed a day 
before the assistance may not satisfy the requirement under the MCA 2005 for an 
assessment of a person’s capacity to be based on their ability to make a specific decision 
at the time it needs to be made.147 However, it may not be practical to have a mental 
health evaluation on the same day of the assisted suicide. A patient may be too fragile or 
weak for a psychiatric consultation immediately before taking the lethal medication. It 
would be reasonable to regard a mental health evaluation performed a day before the 
assisted suicide to be a decision that is most current. Instances of a second mental health 
evaluation carried out on the same day of the assisted suicide should be restricted to 
situations where a patient has a prognosis of less than a month to live. 
(ix) The attending physician must ensure that palliative care treatment is explored and 
exhausted by a palliative care specialist before physician-assisted suicide is resorted 
to by the attending physician as a medical option of last resort. The attending 
physician must refer the patient to a palliative care specialist immediately after the 
consulting physician has confirmed the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis. A 
network of palliative care specialists for purposes of the proposed law must be 
provided by the NHS. Physician-assisted suicide will not be proceeded with if a 
palliative care specialist believes that there are palliative care options reasonably 
available to alleviate a patient’s pain and suffering to levels acceptable to the 
patient. Until the patient experiences palliative treatment as recommended by the 
palliative care specialist, they will not be eligible for physician-assisted suicide. 
The proposed law reform has expanded on a similar provision in the ADTI Bill 2004 
and the AD Bill 2013. The former merely required a palliative care specialist to have 
discussed the option of palliative care with the patient,148 and the latter merely required 
the patient to be informed of the available palliative, hospice and other care options.149 
The proposed requirement implements the recommendations of the 2004 Select 
Committee that patients should actually experience palliative care rather than merely be 
informed of it as an option.150 As noted in Chapter Five, Caritas Flanders believed that a 
                                                          
146 Camden-Smith (ch2 n444) para26. 
147 MCA, Code of Practice paras 4.36 and 4.4. 
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similar requirement in the Belgian Act  for physicians to merely discuss palliative 
treatment with patients  was insufficient.151 Caritas appreciated that not all physicians 
were familiar with palliative care options, and so imposed a mandatory consultation 
with a palliative care expert on all terminally ill patients.152 
Based on the ROTI Act,153 the proposed law will only be available to those whose pain 
and suffering cannot be alleviated to levels acceptable to them. It restricts the 
availability of physician-assisted suicide to those who are unable to find any relief for 
their pain and suffering. This proposed requirement addresses a concern with the Dutch 
law where assisted death is often resorted to as an alternative to palliative care.154 As 
discussed in Chapter Five, Dutch doctors have performed euthanasia on patients who 
refused palliative care treatment that may have alleviated their pain and suffering.155 In 
doing so, it cannot be said that assisted death is being regarded as a medical option of 
last resort under the Dutch legal framework.156 
(x) Physician-assisted suicide will have to take place within 30 days of the initial verbal 
request. There must at least be a 12-day lapse between the patient’s initial verbal 
request and the follow-up written request, and at least a further two-day lapse from 
the time of the patient’s written request to the time the lethal medication is given to 
the patient to be ingested. In cases where the patient has a prognosis of less than a 
month to live, there must at least be a six-day lapse between the patient’s initial 
verbal request and the follow-up written request, and the lethal medication must be 
given to the patient to be ingested on the same day the written request is made. 
The rationale for a 30-day period is to ensure timely relief for those patients who are 
truly suffering unbearably. However, as noted in Chapter Three, the desire for death 
often changes as personal circumstances change.157 Thus, the proposal for the assisted 
suicide to take place anytime within 30 days of the initial verbal request takes into 
account the possibility for change in the patient’s circumstances within this time period. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, a patient may adapt to their pain and suffering and find 
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their quality of life bearable.158 Based on the DDA159 and the ROTI Act160, the 
requirement for the ‘cooling off’ periods protects vulnerable patients. The ‘cooling off’ 
periods provide an opportunity for patients to reconsider their request for assisted 
suicide, and deters them from making hasty decisions. They provide an assurance of the 
persistence and certainty of the patient’s request. The ‘cooling off’ periods in the 
proposed law are regarded as a reasonable compromise to look after the needs of those 
determined to put an end to their suffering as soon as possible and those who need a 
period of reflection and contemplation.  
As noted in Chapter Two, there is a better chance at an accurate prognosis when a 
patient is within the last two or three weeks of their life.161 On this basis, if a patient has 
a prognosis of less than a month to live, the proposal is for a much shorter ‘cooling off’ 
period between the verbal and written requests, and for the lethal medication to be given 
to the patient to be ingested on the same day of the written request, soon after a second 
mental health evaluation is performed. This requirement takes into consideration the 
recommendation of the 2004 Select Committee that any future Bill should balance the 
need to avoid increased suffering for determined applicants against the desirability of 
providing time for reflection for the less resolute.162 The provision in the AD Bill 2013 
has a two week waiting period before patients get to request for the drugs, which is 
shortened to six days if death is to be expected within one month.163 
(xi) A patient will have to confirm their request for assisted suicide immediately before 
taking the lethal medication. If a confirmation of request cannot be obtained for 
whatever reason, the attending physician must not proceed with the assisted suicide. 
If a confirmation has been obtained, the attending physician will have to give the 
patient the lethal medication to be ingested. The patient must take the lethal 
medication in the presence of the attending physician and the consulting physician, 
both of whom must remain with the patient until the patient dies. If a patient is 
physically unable to take the lethal medication, or if they change their mind and do 
not wish to take it, the lethal medication will have to be returned to the attending 
physician. Under such circumstances, the assisted suicide will not take place. 
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A confirmation of request immediately before taking the lethal medication would 
provide further assurance of a patient’s autonomous decision to die, and that their desire 
for death has not changed. As there was no similar requirement under the ROTI Act, 
there remained potential uncertainty as to whether euthanasia had been performed based 
on a patient’s voluntary autonomous request to die.164 Under the proposed law reform, 
the lethal medication is only given to a patient when they are to take it. This avoids the 
potential for abuse and misuse of medication which currently exists in Oregon.165 Under 
the DDA, although there is a confirmation of request immediately before the 
prescription for lethal medication is written,166 patients are allowed to collect their 
medication weeks or months before they actually ingest them. 
The presence of the attending physician and consulting physician when the patient takes 
the medication will ensure that there is professional medical assistance available in the 
event of any complications during or after the ingestion. After the medication is 
ingested, if the physicians determine that the suicide is likely to be unsuccessful due to 
complications, then under their general duty of care, the objective would become one of 
restoring the patient to their previous state of health. 
The presence of the physicians also protects vulnerable patients from any undue 
influence, pressure, or duress from others immediately before the ingestion, and ensures 
that the lethal medication is not misused in any way. The AD Bill 2013 also proposes 
for an assisting healthcare professional to be with the patient when the medication is 
ingested, and to remain with them until they die.167 The Bill further states that a 
physician need not be in the same room, but may instead be within close proximity to 
the patient. However, as the proposed law regards physician-assisted suicide as a 
medical procedure, the proposed provision requires that ingestion occur in the presence 
of a physician.  
The ADTI Bill 2004 proposed that the attending physician be permitted to end a 
patient’s life by administering euthanasia, when the patient is physically unable to 
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ingest lethal medication.168 No such option of euthanasia is proposed in this thesis for 
the reasons noted under Provision (i), above.  
(xii) Following the patient’s death, the attending physician and consulting physician 
overseeing the death will have to certify the patient’s death as ‘assisted suicide’. The 
attending physician will have to report the death to a Monitoring Commission 
responsible for regulating the practice of the law. The medical reports of the 
attending physician, consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, and 
palliative care specialist will have to be filed in the patient’s medical records and 
sent to the Monitoring Commission within seven days of the assisted suicide. The 
Monitoring Commission, which will be under the charge of the Chief Medical 
Officer for England and Wales, will collect and publish national data on reported 
cases of physician-assisted suicide, and publish an annual report for Parliament each 
year. Findings from these reports could assist Parliament to conduct a full review of 
the law’s implementation. The attending physician will also keep a record of 
requests for physician-assisted suicide that fail to meet the requirements under the 
law. This record will be sent to the Monitoring Commission bi-annually. 
The reporting requirements under the proposed law must be strictly enforced to ensure 
there is no abuse of the law. This will not only address the issue of fabrication of reports 
or under-reporting in the Netherlands,169 Belgium,170 and Oregon,171 but would also avoid 
the potential for a ‘slippery slope’ caused by a disregard for the law and lack of 
enforcement such as that experienced in Belgium.172 To ensure a high quality of reports 
nationwide, it is recommended that a similar accreditation and training programme be 
implemented for consulting physicians, as was established in the Netherlands and 
Belgium for the SCEN and LEIF consulting physicians.173 
As in the Netherlands174 and Belgium175, the Monitoring Commission must investigate 
cases of suspected non-compliance retrospectively, and refer instances of malpractice to 
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the professional bodies or prosecutorial authorities where appropriate. As with the 
Dutch RRCs and the Belgian CFCE, the Monitoring Commission would encourage 
reporting, by providing a buffer between physicians and the prosecuting authorities.176 
Society’s needs for transparency will be met by the statistics reported by the Monitoring 
Commission in its annual reports. There will also be adequate oversight of procedures 
under the proposed law, as unlike the law in Oregon,177 physicians’ reports will not be 
merely compiled but will also be reviewed. As data will also be collected on requests 
that are declined under the proposed law, the Monitoring Commission would be able to 
include such data in their reports and better guard against physician-shopping. 
The Commission would have protocols which encourage physician interviews, 
including the reasons why patients are refused physician-assisted suicide. Not only 
would this requirement ensure public accountability of the practice of physician-assisted 
suicide but also provide greater transparency in the law.178 As noted in Chapter Five, a 
shortcoming of the OPHD was that it performed a minimalist monitoring function, with 
no focus on identifying abuse.179 The requirement for a Monitoring Commission and for 
the Chief Medical Officer to be responsible for monitoring the operation of the 
proposed law are combined features taken from the ADTI Bill 2004180 and the AD Bill 
2013181. As a further safeguard to detect abuse, it is recommended that the government 
commission periodic nationwide surveys similar to those of the Netherlands.182 
(xiii) No physician shall be under a duty to participate under this law if they have a 
conscientious objection. 
This legal requirement has taken into account the 2004 Select Committee’s 
recommendation that any new Bill should not place on a physician with conscientious 
objection the duty to refer a patient requesting physician-assisted suicide to another 
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physician without such objection.183 This provision is similar to the provision in the 
AD Bill 2013.184  
(xiv) A person who acts according to the law on physician-assisted suicide will not be 
guilty of any offence. 
This requirement also appeared in the ADTI Bill 2004185 and the AD Bill 2013186. As 
explained in Chapter Five, with reference to a similar requirement in the ROTI Act,187 
this provision addresses the fear by physicians of criminal prosecution. 
Finally, it is intended that the proposed law reform will address the controversies in the 
debate on the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales. In line with the 
recommendations of the 2004 Select Committee,188 and the House of Lords’ decision in 
Purdy,189 the proposed law on physician-assisted suicide is aimed at addressing the 
needs of society, particularly the terminally ill. The law is based on autonomy and self-
determination. The proposal takes into account the failings of the DPP’s Policy in 
respect of making suicide assistance an activity carried out by non-medically trained 
people, thereby subjecting patients to the risk of further harm as a result of failed 
suicides and medical complications. Rather than abandon their terminally ill patients 
(with whom they already have an established physician-patient relationship), it would 
be more ethical for physicians to provide a medical option of last resort in the form of 
assisted suicide to those suffering unbearably and experiencing an unacceptable quality 
of life. Quality of life, based on a subjective assessment, would be consistent with the 
current focus on a subjective evaluation of quality of life in medical decisions involving 
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. 
To protect the vulnerable in society, the proposed law reform includes referrals to an 
independent consulting physician, a psychiatrist or psychologist, and a palliative care 
specialist. Cooling off periods have also been included to enable the attending physician 
to be certain of the patient’s autonomous and voluntary request for assisted suicide. In 
line with patient autonomy, a patient is responsible for the final act that leads to the 
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death under the proposed law. The safeguards will have to be rigorously enforced to 
prevent potential abuse, and to protect the vulnerable. 
The 14 proposed legal provisions aim to provide barriers on a ‘slippery slope’ and 
mechanisms by which slippages down the slope can be detected and addressed. While it 
is never possible to completely guarantee that abuse and unjustified practices will not 
take place, strong and effective safeguards, may reasonably meet the concerns of those 
presently opposed to the legalisation of assisted death in England and Wales. With such 
safeguards and under the prescribed circumstances, these provisions enable the 
autonomous decision of a competent adult who wishes to end their life with the comfort 
of assistance from a physician.  
—=oOo=— 
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